SAMPSON COURTNEY v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW (2023)

The Court denies the petition for writ of certiorari on the merits.

This is another appeal from a denial (or, more properly, a dismissal) of a mandamus complaint directed to the commission's decision about a prisoner's presumptive parole release date (“PPRD”). Unfortunately, this court has incorrectly recharacterized the appeal as a certiorari petition; so while I concur in the ultimate denial of relief, I dissent as to the handling of the appeal. Yes, the effect for the appellant—a loss—is all the same, regardless of the characterization. Indeed, in the past, I have simply concurred in the result (rather than dissent in part) in at least one similar scenario. See, e.g., Oliver v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Rev., Case No. 1D22-279, 2023 WL 3859339, *1 (Fla. 1st DCA June 7, 2023) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring in result). I write a partial dissent in this case, however, just to highlight one point: This court's characterization (or recharacterization) of an appeal like this necessarily dictates the type of constitutional authority we end up exercising in our review. The authority we exercise in turn affects the scope of our review, which can affect the outcome.

Not every final order of a trial court on a prisoner's mandamus complaint is one rendered by the court in its “review capacity.” See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(B); cf. Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Gould, 344 So. 3d 496, 504–05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), rev. granted, SC22-1207, 2022 WL 17347630 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2022). A trial court operates in a “review capacity” regarding an agency only when it examines a quasi-judicial proceeding (i.e., a proceeding in which there is an adjudication of a factual dispute on which the parties’ rights or obligations turn). There was no such proceeding here.¹

Sampson Courtney sought mandamus in the trial court because the commission suspended his PPRD under section 947.18, Florida Statutes, and extended out his interview date to five years hence, rather than two. That action was not adjudicatory, though. As the trial court acknowledged, it was wholly within the commission's discretion. Cf. § 947.18, Fla. Stat. (“No person shall be placed on parole until and unless the commission finds that there is reasonable probability that, if the person is placed on parole, he or she will live and conduct himself or herself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that the person's release will be compatible with his or her own welfare and the welfare of society.”). In making its determination, the commission did not take witness testimony or adjudicate any factual dispute. The commission, in fact, stated that it made its decision based solely on information “contained in the Department of Corrections and Commission record.”

Even though the trial court in this case characterized what it was doing as “review,” there was no quasi-judicial proceeding to consider. The commission exercised its administrative discretion, so the trial court correctly concluded it could not compel the exercise of that discretion to produce a different outcome. No further consideration was necessary to deny relief. The trial court nevertheless looked at the records considered by the commission, but because those records were not before the commission as part of a quasi-judicial proceeding, that consideration could not fairly be characterized as “review” in an appellate sense.

Because the trial court did not render its final order in a review capacity, Courtney is entitled to a direct appeal as a matter of right. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; cf. Amends. to the Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 696 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 1996) (construing Article V, section 4(b)(1)—albeit from a non-adjudicatory, administrative perspective—“as a constitutional protection of the right to appeal”); State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 2000) (relying on Amendments to read section 4(b) as granting “criminal defendants a constitutional right to an appeal”); Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 2000) (same). I would treat Courtney's request for review as it came in the door: as a direct appeal of a final order. Even so, Courtney fails to identify any prejudicial error in the record on appeal that produced the final order on review. In the exercise of our proper constitutional authority, we should affirm.² See Oliver, 2023 WL 3859339, at *1 (Tanenbaum, J., concurring in result); Estremera, 360 So. 3d at 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring in result).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Notably, the commission typically has the authority to conduct but one quasi-judicial proceeding regarding the PPRD, and it will occur, if at all, under sections 947.16(1) and 947.173(1), Florida Statutes, when the PPRD is first set. See Estremera v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Rev., 360 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring in result). No such proceeding is at stake here.

2.   As I mentioned at the start, my dissent goes only to the limited scope of certiorari review applied here. I still concur in the effect of the disposition here: the denial of relief.

PER CURIAM.

LEWIS and NORDBY, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.