The People of the State of New York, v. J.A. (A Juvenile Offender), Juvenile Offender. (2026)

The Juvenile Offender (hereinafter referred to as the "JO"), born XX/XX/2010, was fifteen (15) years of age at the time of his arrest. The JO was charged with one count of Robbery in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 160.15 (4); and one count of Robbery in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 160.10 (1). The JO was arraigned before the Hon. Ricja Rice on March 18, 2026. On June 15, 2026, counsel for the JO filed a motion seeking removal of the matter to Family Court, pursuant to CPL § 722.22 (1). The People filed papers in opposition on June 29, 2026.

Counsel for the JO argues, among other things, that the interests of justice favor removal to Family Court because (1) the JO was neither the individual with the firearm nor the individual who made threatening statements to the victim, (2) the victim did not suffer any physical injuries, (3) the JO has been working hard to do better in school and overcome past behavioral issues, (4) Family Court would be better equipped to put the Youth on a more positive path, and (5) that the goals underlying the Raise the Age Legislation would not be served by retaining this matter in Youth Part.

Conversely, the People argue that removal to Family Court is inappropriate. The People point to the seriousness of the charged offense and the evidence of guilt. The People further argue that, although no physical harm was caused, the emotional toll on the victim is significant. The People further ask the Court to consider the JO's lengthy history in both Albany County Court, Youth Part and Albany County Family Court, alleging that this history demonstrates that the rehabilitative services of Family Court are ineffective and that the JO poses a danger to the safety and welfare of the community.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

It is alleged in the Felony Complaints that on January 13, 2026, at approximately 7:15 p.m., in the City of Albany, County of Albany, that the JO, along with several other participants forcibly stole a pair of shoes, a jacket, and an iPhone from the victim while another participant in the crime brandished a firearm (see People's Exhibit 2).

The People submitted a written deposition given by the victim describing the incident. The victim alleged that he was leaving night school at approximately 7:00 p.m. when a group of seven males approached him from behind. One of the individuals described as a "tall kid" said: "Give me all of your shit". The victim refused, at which point, another "kid" known to the victim, lifted up their shirt revealing a black handgun.¹ The first individual then took the victim's shoes off of his feet before unzipping the victim's jacket and taking that too. A different "kid" then went through the victim's pockets and took his phone (see People's Exhibit 1). While going through the victim's possessions and demanding that he delete everything off his phone, one of the individuals spoke to the victim in Spanish and stated that they were going to "put a bullet through [the victim]". The victim stated that he feared he would have been shot if he did not comply with the group's demands.

The People submitted various surveillance footage in which an individual identified as the JO can be seen with a group of people in the area where the crime is alleged to have occurred (see People's Exhibit 3). The JO was identified by an Albany Police Department detective and a patrol officer who recognized the JO from prior personal interactions (see People's Exhibit 5 and 6). The JO was further confirmed to be in the area via GPS electronic monitoring (see People's Exhibit 7 and 8).²

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CPL § 722.22 provides that the court may order removal of the JO's case to Family Court if, after considering the enumerated factors, the Court determines that removal would be in the interest of justice (see CPL § 722.22 [1] [a]). When making the determination the Court shall, to the extent applicable, examine individually and collectively the following factors:

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;

(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;

(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;

(e) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense;

(f) the impact of a removal of the case to the family court on the safety or welfare of the community;

(g) the impact of a removal of the case to the family court upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system;

(h) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and

(i) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction in the criminal court would serve no useful purpose.

(see CPL § 722.22 [2]).

Here, the seriousness of the offense weighs in favor of this case remaining in Youth Part (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [a]). Robbery is a very serious offense, all the more so where a firearm is involved. However, the evidence presented does not suggest that the JO was the ringleader of this offense. Further, it does not appear that the JO was the individual who displayed or possessed a firearm, nor one of the individuals who issued verbal threats to the victim. Rather, it appears that the JO's role in this offense was relatively passive, and the People have not submitted any evidence to suggest otherwise (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [c]). Furthermore, the extent of harm is limited (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [b]). While the incident was undoubtedly fear-provoking, there was no physical injury. Thus, the Court finds that the limited extent of harm provides some weight in favor of removal of this matter to Family Court.

If this matter remains in Youth Part, and the JO is convicted, he would face a maximum sentence of three and one third (3 ½) to ten (10) years on the top charge of Robbery in the First Degree (see Penal Law § 70.05 [2] [d], [3] [c]). Conversely, if this matter is removed to Family Court, the JO would face a maximum placement period of three (3) years (see Family Court Act § 301.2 [8]; Family Court Act § 353.5 [5]). Imposition of the maximum authorized sentence would result in the JO spending his formative years incarcerated (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [e]). While incarceration could potentially increase safety of the community during this time, it could also result in a situation where a youth spends their formative years incarcerated, only to be released back into the community as a young adult with a high risk of recidivism (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [f]). Further, given that Family Court retains the authority to impose as significant period of placement, the Court does not find that removal to Family Court would negatively impact the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [g]).

This Court does not discern any facts relevant to the factors promulgated in CPL § 722.22 (2) (h-i).

The aforementioned factors, in aggregate, weigh in favor of removal to Family Court, particularly in light of the comparatively passive role that the JO played in the crime, the lack of physical harm, and the lack of evidence of any specific acts committed by the JO. However, the People also argue that the JO is a "frequent flyer in Albany County Youth Part as well as Albany County Family Court" and that this should weigh against removal (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [d]). The People further note that the JO was arrested on the current charges, only one day after a prior matter was removed to Family Court, while the JO was under the supervision of probation, on electronic monitoring.

There is no question that the People's request to consider the JO's prior Juvenile Delinquency history is plainly improper (see People v Aaron VV., 246 AD3d 131, 136 [3d Dept 2025]). However, the question of whether a court may consider "evidence of a defendant's re-offense and services" is a question not fully settled in the State of New York, as noted by Judge Halligan of the Court of Appeals (cf. People v Guerrero, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00826, *21 n 7 [2026, Halligan, J., dissenting]). In People v Guerrero, both Judge Halligan and the majority found that this contention was unpreserved for appellate review, but Judge Halligan noted in her dissent that the case-law "reveals a puzzling inconsistency that the Legislature may wish to address, or that this Court may wish to clarify in a proper case" (Id.). When the matter at issue in People v Guerrero was before the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, that Court emphasized that "defendant's prior adjudications as a juvenile delinquent or any evidence obtained as a result of those proceedings cannot be used in determining whether to grant the People's motion" (People v Guerrero, 235 AD3d 1276, 1278 [4th Dept 2025). However, the Court further held that, "although it is impermissible to raise any issue related to the adjudication or evidence obtained therefrom, it is still permissible to raise the illegal or immoral acts underlying such adjudications" (Id. [internal quotations marks and citations omitted]). The fine line treaded by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department highlights the tension that exists between Family Court Act § 381.2 and the legislative intent underlying Youth Part proceedings. Indeed, many Courts have grappled with this question. In People v D.J., Judge Freedman of the Erie County Family Court noted that the People "may not, in any way, use the [youth's] juvenile delinquency history, including any past admissions or adjudications, in any application for removal under the statute", but nevertheless held that removal was inappropriate because the youth had five (5) prior matters transferred from Youth Part to Family Court, demonstrating a "disregard for this Court's leniency after multiple cases are removed to Family Court" and further demonstrating that the rehabilitative services of Family Court were "unlikely to be of further benefit" (cf. People v D.J., 78 Misc 3d 1232[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50405[U] [Fam Ct Erie County 2023]). Conversely, other courts have found that Family Court Act § 381.2 prohibits consideration of prior Youth Part proceedings, or prior arrests, where the matters were ultimately removed to Family Court (cf. People v C.J., 73 Misc 3d 1233[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51227[U], *4 [Nassau County Ct 2021]). In People v C.J., Judge Singer of the Nassau County Court rejected the People's argument that "they [were] not asking this Court to consider the [Adolescent Offender]'s prior juvenile delinquency adjudication, and that they [were] instead asking the Court to consider the AO's previous arrest, which was first handled in the Youth Part" (Id.). The court reasoned that where the case involving the youth's prior arrest was ultimately removed to Family Court, the People were in fact asking the Court to consider the youth's Family Court history and records against the youth, in contravention of Family Court Act § 381.2. Though this Court agrees with the factual analysis and rationale of the Erie County Family Court, this Court reluctantly agrees with the finding of the Nassau County Family Court that it was "constrained . . . to disregard those portions of the People's argument which rely on the [youth's] Family Court case" (Id.).

Family Court Act § 381.2 provides that "[n]either the fact that a person was before the family court under this article for a hearing nor any confession, admission or statement made by him [or her] to the court or to any officer thereof in any stage of the proceeding is admissible as evidence against [them or their] interests in any other court." The term "at any stage of the proceeding" clearly demonstrates that the protections of Family Court Act § 381.2 were intended to be expansive. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has held that "[a]s a rule, a juvenile delinquency adjudication cannot be used against the juvenile in any other court for any other purpose" (Green v Montgomery, 95 NY2d 693, 697 [2001]). The Court of Appeals has further compared the protections of Family Court Act §§ 381.2 and 381.3 with the sealing provisions of CPL § 160.50 under which an arrest would be deemed a nullity (see Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662, 672 [1988]). Therefore, this Court concludes that the prohibitions of Family Court Act § 381.2 extend to proceedings which are before the Albany County Court, Youth Part, where said matters are subsequently removed to Family Court, and that said prohibitions extend to consideration of the underlying arrests in those proceedings.

This Court accepts this interpretation with reluctance in light of the practical inconsistencies and limitations which this rule creates when applied to Youth Part matters. A youth's failure to meaningfully engage with the rehabilitative services offered by Family Court is some evidence that the youth will continue to be unamendable to these services, particularly where, as here, the crimes were allegedly committed in such close succession. The Appellate Division, Second Department has noted that recidivism or escalating conduct could constitute significant aggravating factors which would weigh against removal to Family Court (cf. People v Lloyd F., 245 AD3d 69, 80 [2d Dept 2025]); however, due to the limitations of Family Court Act § 381.2, any evidence of criminal history which could be used to establish recidivism or an escalating pattern of conduct is barred from consideration.³

This is not the first time that applications of Family Court Act § 381.2 have drawn the ire of jurists when applied to certain juvenile proceedings. Former Chief Judge Wachtler of the Court of Appeals noted in a dissenting opinion that "[i]n juvenile cases especially, the court should not be required to turn a blind eye to what its own records would reveal concerning the juvenile's prior involvements with the law" (Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662, 672 [1988, Wachtler, J., dissenting]). This mandate to turn a blind eye to clearly relevant factual circumstances is particularly concerning given that the mandate appears to be incompatible with the Legislative intent underling the current statutory scheme governing proceedings in Youth Part matters.

"Although the Raise the Age legislation drastically changed the landscape of juvenile justice in New York State, it did not alter the definition of a juvenile offender or modify the process of removal of those cases to Family Court" (People v K.S., 84 Misc 3d 319, 329-330 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2024]; see CPL § 722.22 [2]; former CPL § 210.43 [repealed by L 2017, ch 59, § 30).⁴ Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Legislative intent underlying the broader Raise the Age Legislation is relevant when considering the scope of evidence in any Youth Part case. When applying the Raise the Age Legislation to Adolescent Offenders, the legislative history makes clear that "a series of serious crimes committed . . . over the course of many days" may constitute extraordinary circumstances that would preclude removal to Family Court (cf. People v Guerrero, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00826, 24 [2026]). This intention to consider whether a youth engaged in a series of crimes over the course of many days often conflicts with the mandate that this Court not consider prior arrests, where those arrests gave rise to a matter ultimately removed to Family Court.

There is no question that Family Court Act § 381.2 serves an important public policy goal. The Court of Appeals has emphasized that "[d]elinquency proceedings are designed not just to punish the malefactor but also to extinguish the causes of juvenile delinquency through rehabilitation and treatment" (Green v Montgomery, 95 NY3d at 687-698). However, as acknowledged by both the People and counsel for the JO, among the most important considerations underlying any proceeding in Youth Part is the question of whether the youth would benefit from the rehabilitative services offered by Family Court (see generally CPL § 722.22 [2] [d]-[i]). Where, a youth has repeatedly been offered rehabilitative services, fails to avail themselves of these services, and is subsequently rearrested multiple times, this may suggest that the youth will not benefit from the services offered through Family Court (cf. People v D.J., 78 Misc 3d 1232 [A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50405[U] [Fam Ct Erie County 2023]; compare People v Lloyd F., 245 AD3d 69, 81 [2d Dept 2025]).

Returning to the specific facts of this case, counsel for the JO references a prior report from Albany County Probation Department, dated June 1, 2026 suggesting that the JO was engaging with services offered by probation and was "not doing poorly". However, the Court takes judicial notice of the report received on July 8, 2026, which paints a much different picture, noting that the JO admitted to using marijuana regularly and, since June 3, 2026, had missed three appointments with the Addiction Care Center of Albany, in addition to missing a mental health appointment with Northern Rivers. The youth's decision to yet again shun the services offered by the Department of Probation is relevant, particularly where, as here, the JO has a lengthy history of arrests, Juvenile Delinquency proceedings, and Youth Part proceedings. The Court further finds it especially relevant that the JO was on electronic monitoring at the time of the alleged offense (People's Exhibit 7).

Although this Court finds that it may not consider the JO's prior Youth Part matters, prior Juvenile Delinquency proceedings, or prior arrests, the Court does find that it is proper to consider that the JO was on electronic monitoring at the time of this alleged offense. The fact that the JO violated the terms of his Release Under Supervision is a new violation which is part and parcel to the instant offense. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the JO was initially placed under the supervision of probation in connection with a matter removed to Family Court, the Court nevertheless finds that the violation of an existing Order is within the scope of proper consideration, where the alleged violation was the underlying crime at issue in this proceeding.

However, the Appellate Division, Second Department has held that "[t]he mere fact that an adolescent engaged in rehabilitative services and was later arrested, without more" is insufficient to prevent removal to Family Court (cf. People v Lloyd F., 245 AD3d at 81).⁵ And in the absence of contrary controlling authority from the Appellate Division, Third Department or the Court of Appeals on this specific question, this Court is constrained to follow the precedent set by the Appellate Division, Second Department (see generally Shoback v Broome Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 184 AD3d 1000, 1001 [3d Dept 2020]). When reviewing all of the relevant factors, this Court has no choice but to remove this matter to Family Court. While the Court recognizes the struggles that the youth has faced for many years now, the JO's past history has demonstrated that the rehabilitative services offered through Family Court are ineffectual. However, as this Court cannot consider the JO's prior criminal history, what the Court is left with is a crime which resulted in no physical harm, in which the JO's involvement was relatively passive. Upon consideration of these facts alone, removal is proper. However, had this Court been permitted to consider the JO's lengthy criminal history and past failures to meaningfully engage in rehabilitative services, this Court may well have reached a different conclusion when weighing the statutory factors.

Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED, that JO's motion for removal is GRANTED.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Date: July 17, 2026

Hon. Ricja Rice

Papers considered:

1. Notice of Motion Pursuant to CPL § 722.22 to Remove Action Against Juvenile Offender to Family Court, dated June 15, 2026.

2. Affirmation of Timothy J. Berry, Esq., in support of Motion to Remove, with Exhibits "A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, C, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5".

3. Affirmation of Nicholas S. Pittari, Esq., in Opposition to Motion to Remove, with Exhibits 1-8.

4. Albany County Probation Department "UPDATE MEMO" dated July 8, 2026

FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim identified the individual with the gun by name. The name given by the victim is not the JO's name.

2.   At the time of the alleged offense, the JO was wearing an ankle monitor inasmuch as the youth was under the supervision of the Albany County Department of Probation, pursuant to a Release Under Supervision Order issued by this Court as a part of a prior matter that was removed to Family Court, upon consent of the People, by Order dated January 12, 2026.

3.   The interaction between the Family Court Act § 381.2 and the statutory provisions governing Youth Part proceedings also results in certain clearly illogical, unintended, and inconsistent applications. For example, if a youth was brought before this Court having been arrested and charged with committing two separate crimes two weeks apart, this Court would be able to consider both offenses and may well find that the repeated criminal acts were relevant to the youth's history, character and condition (see CPL § 722.22 [2] [d]). Conversely, if the youth was charged with a crime after the first incident, arraigned, and had their matter removed before the second crime was committed, or before the youth was charged with the second crime, this Court would be prohibited from considering the first incident pursuant to Family Court Act § 381.2. This inconsistency which the law mandates for two identically situated youths is troublesome, all the more so because it appears inconsistent with the Legislative intent underlying the broader statutory scheme of the Raise the Age Legislation.

4.   In 2017, the New York State Legislature passed sweeping reforms known as the Riase the Age Legislation which transformed the way that sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) year-old youths, referred to as Adolescent Offenders (hereinafter "AO's"), were treated under this State's criminal statutes. Conversely, the Juvenile Offender Law, enacted in 1978, governs the procedure applicable where a JO is charged with a qualifying offense. "A review of the New York State Assembly Record of Proceedings prior to the vote on the Raise the Age legislation in 2017 reveals there was very little mention of juvenile offenders, other than to say those laws would remain unchanged, and no discussion as to the different statutory scheme devised for removal of the older adolescents' cases to Family Court" (People v K.S., 84 Misc 3d at 328-329).These differences result in a number of peculiarities, such as the fact that JO's are required to file a motion seeking removal to Family Court, whereas older Adolescent Offenders are entitled to automatic removal to Family Court unless the People meet their burden to demonstrate that removal is improper at either a six-day hearing or by filing a motion demonstrating the existence of extraordinary circumstances. Some of these differences have even subjected CPL 722.22 to Constitutional challenges, where the statutory scheme would subject younger JO's to more stringent standards than older AO's, inasmuch as there can be no rational basis for treating younger youths more harshly than older youths (see Id.), nor is there any basis to believe that the Legislature intended to create such a disparity.

5.   Although People v Lloyd F. involves an AO rather than a JO, inasmuch as it would be improper to subject a JO to a higher standard than an AO (see People v K.S., 84 Misc 3d at 328-329), the Court finds that this case is controlling in the instant matter.

Ricja Rice, J.