IN RE: a Custody/Visitation Proceeding Pursuant to Article 6 of the Family Court Act A.L. (2026)

In accordance with CPLR 2219 (a), the following papers were read and considered in addition to a review of the contents of the file in this matter:

PAPERS NUMBERED

Petitioner A.L.'s Order to Show Cause seeking Relocation Relocation, including Petitioner's Affirmation in Support Exhibit 1-5

Respondent B.M.'s Opposition to Motion, Including Attorney's Affirmation in Opposition, Affirmation of Respondent 6-14

Petitioner's Reply Affirmation and Exhibits 15-78

On April 28, 2025, A.L. (hereafter the "mother"), filed a petition against B.M. (hereafter the "father") seeking to modify a final order of custody and visitation dated [redacted] with regard to the parties' child [redacted] (hereafter "the "child") (Humphrey, J). On August 8, 2025, the mother filed an order to show cause seeking an order permitting her to relocate to Indiana with the child. The father filed opposition to the motion on September 18, 2025. The mother filed a reply affidavit on September 26, 2025. The attorney for the child did not file responsive papers on the motion but stated the child's position both via email to the Court and counsel and on the record during the proceedings.

A fact-finding hearing on the mother's application to relocate to Indiana was held on April 7, 2026. The mother testified and called her mother, the maternal grandmother, as a witness on her behalf. The father testified on his own behalf. After oral summations, this Court reserved decision.

RELEVANT FACTS

The parties are the parents of one child, [redacted] who is now 7 years old. From the time of the child's birth until in or about 2022, when she was 4 years old, the parties resided together in an apartment in Dobbs Ferry. Following the parties' separation, by all accounts, the father continues to share a close relationship with the child and has been an active participant in the her life. It is also acknowledged by both parties that the child has serious academic and behavioral issues and receives extensive support and services within the Yonkers School system pursuant to an individual education plan ("IEP"). The mother seeks to relocate with the child from Yonkers to Plainfield, Indiana.

The mother testified at trial that she is seeking to relocate primarily because she is unable to continue to afford to reside in Yonkers. The mother testified credibly to her inability to earn additional income, stating that she already works full-time (40 hours) while caring for the child and has tried but has been unable to find a higher paying job. She further testified that she has had trouble meeting her rent and faced possible eviction until the Department of Social Services stepped in and made a one-time payment toward her back rent. She also stated that she is currently behind on her rent and has no savings. The mother testified that she has searched for more affordable housing in both the Bronx and Westchester County and has not been able to find a suitable apartment for less than her current rent. Both the mother and the maternal grandmother testified that upon relocation to Indiana, the mother would be able to reside with the maternal grandmother in a five-bedroom home, rent-free, for as long as necessary. The mother further testified that she has a job lined up in Indiana that will pay her an additional $2 an hour over what she is now earning, and that she observed that the cost-of-living is lower and housing is more affordable in Indiana. The mother asserts that the relocation would allow her to save money and improve her financial circumstances. She further testified to the support system that would be available to her with her mother and close relatives, including young cousins, living in close proximity. The grandmother testified to her availability to care for the child and her willingness to utilize a "firm hand" in addressing the child's behavioral issues. With respect to a plan for the father's access to the child should the move take place, the mother proposed considerable extended periods of access, including all school break and almost the entire summer. However, the mother's proposal, offered for the first time at trial, did not specify how such extensive access could practically be implemented. Finally, the mother testified that she researched the Plainfield school system and spoke to the special education department at the elementary school regarding the child's IEP and need for services. However, she did not provide any specifics as to how equipped the Plainfield schools would be to address the child's academic and behavioral issues and whether there would be any improvement over the services currently being provided in Yonkers.

The father testified at trial that he is currently employed part time by the Dobbs Ferry School District as a maintenance supervisor. He stated that he works only part time so he is able to exercise visitation with the child. The father testified that he resides in a large, five-bedroom apartment in the Dobbs Ferry School District with several family members, including his parents, siblings, an 8-year-old nephew, and his partner. He testified that there is space for The child to have her own room if she were to reside with him full time. The father does not pay rent.

The father further testified that his residence is currently ten minutes away from the mother's residence, that he and The child share a close bond, and he participates in many activities and social gatherings with her, including field trips and school events. The father currently has alternate weekends with the child, mid-week visits and shared holidays in addition to face-time access. The father further testified that he has an extensive network of family members throughout Westchester, the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens, including siblings, aunts and cousins and nephews, with whom he gathers regularly and with whom The child shares a close relationship. The father stated that he would like to spend more time with The child but that he feels the mother and the current court order limit his time unnecessarily. The father testified that he has face-time access with the child, but that the mother often interferes with it or the device used by the child is not charged and he is unable to contact her. The father testified that there have been times when he has attempted to reach the child for days, either through the child's device or by texting the mother and has had no response. He testified to his fear that the limitations on his electronic access would be even worse if the child relocates, weaking his connection to The child and preventing him from checking in on her when she is hundreds of miles away. The father testified that the mother told the child that they would be moving to Indiana prior to a decision being made on her motion to relocate. He testified that as a result, the child has begun to behave differently with him, being rude and disrepsctful and making statements to the effect of "it doesn't matter, I'm moving to Indiana anyway."

The child's Academic and Behavioral Issues

Both parties testified similarly with regard to the existence and seriousness of the child's academic and behavioral issues. The mother testified that the child is attending a special school within the Yonkers School District for children with behavioral issues. The school is staffed with a school psychologist, psychiatrist and a nurse practitioner. The parties testified that the child has an IEP that directs that she is to receive at least 6 hours of instruction each day. However, according to the parties' testimony, due to a marked escalation in the child's conduct, i.e., wandering away from school, making threats, hitting and injuring teachers and other students, the school has indicated that they are not equipped to handle her for a full day, and she is currently only receiving 3 hours of school instruction each day. Pursuant to the testimony and evidence, both parties are actively involved in efforts to obtain proper treatment and educational instruction for the child. The father testified to attending conferences with the school and meeting with the pediatrician in an effort to obtain a neurological evaluation for the child. The mother testified to her efforts undertaken with the school district, student advocacy and others. Despite the parties' acknowledgment of the child's needs, and each party's commitment to the child, the evidence at trial demonstrates they have not always managed to cooperate and communicate effectively in order to see that her needs are met. According to the testimony of both parties, they do not speak directly with each other and only communicate through Our Family Wizard texts. Both parties testified to a recent incident where the father was endeavoring to get neurological testing for the child. The father sought and obtained a referral to a neurologist. However, due to the parties' inability to communicate effectively, as of the date of trial an appointment had not even been scheduled. The parties testified to another recent incident where the school's nurse practitioner recommended the child start a psychiatric medication due to her aggressive behavior. Back and forth text messages entered into evidence as show the parties disagreed as to whether to start the medication on the recommendation of the nurse practitioner alone, without completed evaluations. The mother started the medication over the father's objection, and now, three months later, the parties recognize that the medication made the child's behavior worse and are working to wean the child off of it.

The father testified to another possible option for the child's education should she remain in New York. He resides in the Dobbs Ferry School District which is highly regarded. The father testified that his nephew attends and has an IEP. The father testified to his observations that the Dobbs Ferry school district operates efficiently and without the delays the parties have encountered in Yonkers in implementing services identified in the child's IEP. The father further testified that he has the means to accommodate the child in an arrangement that would enable her to attend school Dobbs Ferry, including having the child reside with him.

DISCUSSION

A parent seeking to relocate with a child bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed move would be in the child's best interests (see Matter of Hirtz v. Hirtz, 108 AD3d 712, 713 [2d Dept 2013]; Rubio v. Rubio, 71 AD3d 862, 863 [2d Dept 2011]; Matter of Martino v. Ramos, 64 AD3d 657, 884 [2d Dept 2009]. In determining whether relocation is appropriate, the court must consider a number of factors, which include "each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements" (Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727, 740—741 [1996]). In assessing these factors, "no single factor should be treated as dispositive or given such disproportionate weight as to predetermine the outcome" (id at 738). However, "the impact of the move on the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent will remain a central concern" (id at 739; see Matter of Hirtz v. Hirtz, 108 AD3d at 713). "In the end, it is for the court to determine, based on all of the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed relocation would serve the child's best interests" (Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d at 741).

In this case, the Court finds that the mother has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation would serve the child's best interests. While the mother has articulated a number of coherent reasons for her desire to move, any potential benefits are not so dramatic so as to override the numerous countervailing factors weighing against relocating and separating the child from regular and consistent contact with both of her parents at this time. Application of the Tropea factors to the established facts of this case supports this conclusion.

Evidence presented at trial reveals the potential negative impact the proposed relocation would have on the child's relationship with her dad. The record establishes that the father consistently exercises his visitation rights, and that both he and the child desire to spend more time together. There is no dispute that the father is actively involved, present, and engaged in all aspects of the child's life. The child also benefits from a meaningful and ongoing relationship with extended family in New York. Relocation would significantly impair these relationships (see Argila v Edelman, 174 AD3d 521 [2d Dept 2019]). Although a proposed visitation schedule was presented, it was introduced for the first time during the court proceedings and lacks sufficient detail and feasibility analysis. The Court finds that relocation would reduce the frequency and quality of the father's contact with the child, diminishing the meaningful relationship that exists between them. While long-distance visitation may be structured, it cannot replicate the consistency of the current relationship. Moreover, issues regarding the consistency of electronic communications between the father and child raise concerns as to whether this form of communication would serve to maintain a regular and significant connection during the long stretches between in person visits (see Doreen F v Fabrico M, 176 AD3d 563 [2d Dept 2019]). Testimony regarding child's change in attitude upon learning she would be moving away, also serves to highlight the potential negative impact such a move could have on her bond with the father. The Court further finds that the potential disruptive impact of uprooting this child from the only home she has known, in light of the serious challenges she is currently facing, runs the real risk of further destabilizing this child (see Martino v Ramos, 64 AD3d 657 [2d Dept 2009]).

In addition, this Court cannot overstate the evident need for this child to have both parents actively involved in addressing her considerable emotional needs. It is hard to envision how such active involvement of both parents could meaningfully take place when one parent is residing hundreds of miles away. Moreover, this child has significant mental health and educational needs that are currently being addressed through established services in New York. The mother did not present sufficient evidence that similar or adequate services are available in Indiana. Disrupting these services without assurance of continuity presents a substantial risk to the child's well-being

The Court acknowledges the mother's testimony that she would have stable, rent-free housing in Indiana in a five-bedroom home with the maternal grandmother, which would allow her to save money. The Court further acknowledges the mother's belief that the maternal grandmother's "firm hand" could be beneficial to the child. However, the record reflects that the child's needs are not merely behavioral in nature, but involve serious and ongoing mental health and educational challenges requiring consistent, specialized, and therapeutic intervention. The Court does not find that a stricter or more rigid home environment, without evidence of corresponding professional supports, would address those needs. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the child benefits from structured services currently in place in New York. While the proposed living arrangement may provide financial stability to the mother, financial improvement alone is not determinative (see, e.g., McBryde v Bodden, 91 AD3d 781 [2d Dept 2012]). The mother has not demonstrated that the relocation would enhance the child's life educationally, emotionally, or developmentally. Instead, the proposed move risks disrupting essential services and supports. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of relocation.

The child's expressed desire to move has been considered. However, at seven years old, the Court finds that the child lacks the maturity to fully appreciate the long-term implications of relocation. (See Morgan v Eckles, 214 AD3d 983 [2d Dept 2023]; Clark v Dunn, 195 AD2d 811 [2d Dept 1993]). Moreover, during the course of the proceedings on the mother's application to relocate, the child's expressed preference completely flip-flopped, further demonstrating the unreliability of her stated preference. The Court credits the Attorney for the Child's report that the child enjoys time with her father and that they are "extraordinarily close." Accordingly, the Court finds that her preference is not determinative under these circumstances.

The Court is mindful of the mother's financial concerns. However, the record reflects that the father is young, healthy, and has limited financial obligations, including the absence of rent expenses. The Court finds that financial issues may be more appropriately addressed through a child support proceeding. The parties are therefore directed to seek relief before a Support Magistrate, where income may be imputed as appropriate to ensure that the child's needs are adequately met while remaining in New York.

After considering the totality of the circumstances and applying the Tropea factors, the Court finds that the mother has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that relocation to Indiana is in the best interests of the child. The child's need for stability, continuity of care, access to established mental health and educational services, and the preservation of a strong and meaningful relationship with the father and extended family outweigh the asserted benefits of relocation.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that the mother's petition for relocation is DENIED in its entirety.

This Court has searched the required databases and has notified the parties and counsel of said results, to wit: results denied; and has considered the results of that search in making its determination in this matter.

Dated: June 3, 2026

E N T E R:

HON. MARITZA FUGARO

FAMILY COURT JUDGE

Maritza Fugaro, J.