IN RE: a Proceeding for Custody/Visitation Under Article 6 of the Family Court Act S.G. (2026)

On June 2, 2026, the attorney for the petitioner, Michelle L. Haskin, Esq., moved by order to show cause requesting to be relieved as counsel for the petitioner on the grounds that her client can no longer afford Ms. Haskin's firm representing her  ¹ . The court signed the order to show cause, and the matter was made returnable on June 8, 2026. At the June 8, 2026 appearance, petitioner stated that she applied twice for public defender but was declined due to finances. Now it is asserted that she can no longer afford Attorney Haskin. Neither the attorney for the respondent nor the attorney for the child opposed the motion. After hearing petitioner and counsel, the court denied the motion with relief to renew.

On June 25, 2026, Attorney Haskin renewed her motion by another order to show cause, which was sign with a return date of July 14, 2026 (stating that there would be no appearances on the motion on arguments on submission only). Also on June 24, 2026, the court received an email from the attorney for the child, Louise Roback, Esq., stating that she had no objection to the relief being requested by Attorney Haskin. The attorney for the respondent to not submit any response to the order to show cause.

The decision to grant or deny an attorney's motion to withdraw rests within the sound discretion of the trial court  ² . An attorney may not withdraw from representation in the absence of good and sufficient cause  ³ . While a client's inability to continue to pay legal fees may, under certain circumstances, establish good cause for withdrawal, it does not provide an absolute right to do so, particularly after many days of hearings.

In the middle of a protracted hearing, the court must balance the attorney's financial interest against the potential prejudice to the parties and the efficient administration of justice  ⁴ . Discharges or withdrawals that disrupt the continuous flow of a trial are heavily disfavored  ⁵ .

NY CLS Rules Prof Conduct R 1.16(c) provides:

(c) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client when:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;

(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

(4) the client insists upon taking action with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

(5) the client deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees;

(6) the client insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;

(7) the client fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively;

(8) the lawyer's inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interest of the client likely will be served by withdrawal;

(9) the lawyer's mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively;

(10) the client knowingly and freely assents to termination of the employment;

(11) withdrawal is permitted under Rule 1.13(c) or other law;

(12) the lawyer believes in good faith, in a matter pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal; or

(13) the client insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct which is illegal or prohibited under these Rules.

NY CLS Rules Prof Conduct R 1.16(d) further provides:

(d) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a matter before that tribunal without its permission. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

Such required permission of the court (i.e., "tribunal") is set forth in CPLR § 321(b)(2)⁶ . provides:

(b) Change or withdrawal of attorney.

1. Unless the party is a person specified in section 1201, an attorney of record may be changed by filing with the clerk a consent to the change signed by the retiring attorney and signed and acknowledged by the party. Notice of such change of attorney shall be given to the attorneys for all parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the party.

2. An attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending, upon motion on such notice to the client of the withdrawing attorney, to the attorneys of all other parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the party, and to any other person, as the court may direct.

While Disciplinary Rule 2-110(C)(1)(f) provides that a lawyer in a litigated matter may apply to the court for permission to withdraw from representation of a client who, "(d)eliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees," there has been no showing that such is the case here. To the contrary, the allegations here are that the client has run out of money to continue paying her attorney, and now the attorney wants out, asking the public defender to step in. The court does not consider this as a deliberate disregard by the petitioner of an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.

It is the opinion of this court that to allow counsel to withdraw at this late juncture would severely prejudice both parties and cause an unacceptable delay in a proceeding involving the best interests of a child  ⁷ . If this application were granted, the court would be required to halt the hearing schedule to allow the petitioner to apply for assigned counsel under Family Court Act § 262. If eligible, newly assigned counsel would then need months to obtain, review, and hundreds of pages of hearing transcripts and exhibits just to pick up in the middle of a hearing. This would result in an unconscionable delay.

An attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates that they will see it to its conclusion. They cannot abort the representation mid-stream solely because the client's funds have run dry, especially when a hearing is actively underway  ⁸ . Having committed to the representation of the petitioner, counsel must see it through to completion. The court would expect that an attorney, prior to accepting a retainer for a litigated matter, would have discussed the overall litigation strategy with the client upfront, taking into consideration the client's financial ability to fund the litigation tactics that the attorney's strategy would require. A lay person cannot be expected to foresee the costs of the agreed upon litigation strategy. That is the responsibility of the lawyer to know and explain to the prospective client. If an attorney has any doubt as to the client's ability to adequately fund such litigation, the attorney is in the position at that time to decline representation.

The decision to grant or deny an attorney's motion to withdraw rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The Court finds that the financial hardship to counsel does not outweigh the severe prejudice that a mid-hearing withdrawal would inflict upon the child, the litigants, and the court's calendar.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that attorney Haskin's motion to be relieved from representation of the petitioner is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that all parties and counsel shall appear as previously scheduled for the continuation of the hearing on October 2, 2026, at 9:30 AM.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: August 18, 2026

Hudson, New York

Hon. Brian J. Herman, ASCJ

Family Court Judge

FOOTNOTES

1.   Haskin affirmation dated and filed on June 2, 2026, para 2., that the petitioner, "is now in a position of qualifying (for the public defender) due to the enormous amount of debt she has incurred. That debt has been a result of significant legal fees . . .".

2.   See, J. M. Heinike Assoc., Inc. v Liberty Natl. Bank, 142 AD2d 929 [4th Dept 1988].

3.   See, Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v State Univ. Constr. Fund, 79 AD2d 782 [3d Dept 1980], wherein the Third Department stated, "An attorney-client relationship is a unique one, the foundation of which, on the part of the attorney, is the undivided loyalty and devotion to the interests of the client. It is well established that a client may at any time and for any reason under reasonable conditions discharge an attorney (Rogers & Haggerty v Island Dock Lbr ., 29 AD2d 706). On the other hand, an attorney may not terminate the relationship except for good and sufficient cause (Matter of Dunn, 205 NY 398, 403)."

4.   See, George v George, 217 AD2d 913 [4th Dept 1995].

5.   See, Isser v Berg, 38 Misc 2d 957 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1963].

6.   2. An attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending, upon motion on such notice to the client of the withdrawing attorney, to the attorneys of all other parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the party, and to any other person, as the court may direct.

7.   The state's interest in protecting a child's welfare is paramount (see Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89 [1982])). A mid-trial attorney withdrawal in a custody dispute causes an unconscionable delay that directly conflicts with the court's mandate to resolve placement swiftly (see Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 [1969]). See also, (Domestic Relations Law § 70.

8.   See, George v George, supra., "To be entitled to terminate the relationship with a client, an attorney must make a showing of good or sufficient cause and reasonable notice (see, Catrone v Catrone, 92 AD2d 559; Isser v Berg, 38 Misc 2d 957; see also, Heinike Assocs. v Liberty Natl. Bank, 142 AD2d 929, 931; 6 NY Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 54-55). The attorneys for defendant failed to make that showing. The fact that a client fails to pay an attorney for services rendered does not, without more, entitle the attorney to withdraw (see, Isser v Berg, supra; see, e.g., Haskell v Haskell, 185 AD2d 333; see generally, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110 [C] [22 NYCRR 1200.15 (c)]). Additionally, discovery has been completed and a note of issue has been filed. To permit the withdrawal of the attorneys for defendant at this late date would further delay the resolution of this action (see, Haskell v Haskell, supra, at 333; Torres v Torres, 169 AD2d 829) and would not promote judicial economy."

Brian J. Herman, J.