IN RE: a Proceeding Under Article 6 & 8 Of the Family Court Act (2026)

At issue in in this consolidated custody and family offense proceeding is whether to disqualify the Attorney for the Children (AFC) based on the prior representation of Respondent C.G. over twelve years ago when C.G was a child, and Petitioner M.P. was the subject of a neglect proceeding. Based on this record, the court finds disqualification is not required.

The court heard oral arguments on the motion seeking to disqualify the Legal Aid Society from continuing to represent the subject children in this consolidated custody and family offense proceedings. The motion is predicated on an alleged former-client conflict of interest arising from the Legal Aid Society's historical representation of the children's mother, C.G., the Respondent in the consolidated custody and family offense proceedings.

The factual timeline concerning the prior representation is not in dispute. Between 2005 and 2014, the Legal Aid Society represented Respondent C.G. as a subject child across three separate matters—comprising two neglect proceedings and one voluntary placement proceeding—spanning two boroughs. Over that nine-year duration, at least seven different Legal Aid attorneys appeared on Respondent C.G.'s behalf. During those historical proceedings, the Legal Aid Society advocated against placing Respondent C.G. in the care of her mother, M.P. In the current proceeding, M.P. is the petitioner seeking custody, and the Legal Aid Society now advocates that C.G.'s children be placed with Petitioner, M.P.

Respondent C.G. has indicated that she refuses to consent to or waive the alleged conflict. In support of disqualification, moving counsel argues that the matters are substantially related because they involve the same family members and the same court system, that an impermissible appearance of impropriety exists by forcing Respondent C.G. to face her former counsel in this consolidated custody and family offense proceedings, and during oral argument counsel alleged that a Legal Aid Society supervisor admitted that an internal "ethical wall" had been permeated, however proffered no evidence in that regard. Moving counsel also indicated an intent to introduce prior neglect findings against Petitioner M.P. during the upcoming custody trial, and counsel debated the propriety of using the Universal Case Management System (UCMS) to research the Petitioner's historical legal records.

The Legal Aid Society opposes disqualification. As a threshold matter, the Legal Aid Society contends that the moving party lacks standing because the Respondent father did not have a prior attorney-client relationship with the organization. The Legal Aid Society further contends that the matters are not substantially related because the prior representation ended ten years ago in 2014, and the subject children were not yet born at the time prior representation concluded. To the merits, the Legal Aid Society asserts that no confidential information has been shared, that archived files from the prior representation have not been accessed, and that its institutional size allows for effective departmental screening. The Legal Aid Society also argues that the moving parties failed to identify any specific confidential information obtained during the prior representation that would disadvantage the Respondent mother, that the motion is an untimely litigation tactic filed almost two years into the proceeding following The Legal Aid Society's opposition to the father's position (thereby constituting an implied waiver), and that disqualification would severely prejudice the subject children by severing the rapport and trust established with their counsel.

The court declined to issue preliminary rulings on the admissibility of prior-case evidence, factual attenuation, or UCMS inquiries, and only addresses the disqualification motion, deeming it fully submitted.

Motions to disqualify counsel are governed by the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and established precedent balancing the protection of client confidences against a party's right to chosen representation and the continuity of proceedings.

Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) provides that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Complementing this standard, Rule 1.9(c) prohibits counsel from using confidential information relating to the prior representation to the disadvantage of the former client, except as permitted or required by the rules, or when the information has become generally known.

In Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 NY2d 123 (1996), the Court of Appeals established a three-prong standard for disqualification based on a former-client conflict. The movant must demonstrate:

1. The existence of a prior attorney-client relationship between the moving party and opposing counsel;

2. That the interests of the present client and former client are materially adverse; and

3. That the matters involved in both representations are substantially related.

Tekni-Plex also emphasizes that continuity of counsel is favored to ensure the swift administration of proceedings and avoid unnecessary disruption. Furthermore, the moving party bears the burden of satisfying all three prongs of the disqualification test and generalized or speculative assertions of conflict are insufficient. Matter of the Adoption of Gustavo G., an Infant. Patricia C., 9 AD3d 102 (1st Dept. 2004); Matter of Carl B., Jr., 181 AD3d 1161 (4th Dept. 2020); Matter of Hannah T.R., 156 AD3d 887 (2ndDept. 2017). Similarly, in Pellegrino v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 49 AD3d 94 (1st Dept. 2008), the court affirmed that disqualification is improper where there is no substantial relationship between the issues or where the moving party fails to identify specific confidential information acquired in the prior representation that could be used to the former client's disadvantage.

Applying the three-prong standard of Tekni-Plex and its progeny to the record presented, this court concludes that disqualification of the Legal Aid Society is not warranted at this time.

It is undisputed that the Legal Aid Society represented Respondent C.G. as a subject child from 2005 through 2014 across three separate matters. Although the Legal Aid Society raises a threshold challenge whether the moving party possesses standing where that party was not in a direct attorney-client relationship with the Legal Aid Society, Respondent C.G.'s current attorney joined in the motion and has affirmatively refused to waive the alleged conflict.

The record reflects that the Legal Aid Society currently represents the subject children and advocates for their placement with Petitioner M.P. —a position directly contrary to the stance the Legal Aid Society took on Respondent C.G.'s behalf years ago, and adverse to Respondent C.G.'s current position in this custody and family offense proceedings.

Movants have failed to satisfy the essential third prong of the Tekni-Plex inquiry: establishing that the present proceeding is substantially related to the prior matters.

Under current jurisprudence, disqualification requires more than a generalized assertion that the proceedings involve members of the same family or the same court system. (See, Matter of the Adoption of Gustavo G., an Infant. Patricia C., supra.) The prior representation concluded in 2014—approximately twelve years ago. Crucially, the subject children were not yet born when Legal Aid's representation of Respondent C.G. terminated. The legal and factual issues concerning the present care and custody of these subject children are distinct from the historical circumstances surrounding Respondent C.G.'s own placement proceedings as a child a decade or more ago.

Moreover, the moving parties have failed to identify any specific confidential information acquired by the Legal Aid Society during the 2005—2014 representation that could be deployed to Respondent C.G.'s disadvantage or materially advance the children's position in the current proceeding (see Rule 1.9[c]; Pellegrino, 49 AD3d at 94). The Legal Aid Society has affirmed that no confidential information has been shared from the files archived from the historical representation and have not been accessed. As an institutional organization of substantial scale, The Legal Aid Society possesses the capacity for effective departmental screening. While moving counsel alleged that an internal ethical wall was permeated, this assertion remains an unsupported allegation on the present record and is insufficient to mandate disqualification or further action by this Court.

The timing of the motion further weighs against disqualification. The current matter has been pending for over two years, during which Respondent C.G. remained silent regarding the alleged conflict. The Legal Aid Society contends that the motion was raised only after it opposed the father's position, characterizing the application as a strategic litigation maneuver.

Disqualifying the Legal Aid Society at this advanced stage would severely prejudice the subject children by severing the established rapport and trust developed with their attorney. As recognized in Tekni-Plex, the policy favoring continuity of counsel must be given significant weight to ensure the swift and stable administration of justice for the children.

This determination does not resolve the separate evidentiary questions raised during oral arguments. The court does not rule at this time on the admissibility of prior neglect findings against Petitioner M.P., the extent to which historical facts from twelve years ago may be attenuated by time, or the parameters of research conducted through the Universal Case Management System (UCMS). Those evidentiary determinations are properly addressed during the forthcoming trial or upon targeted evidentiary motions, if at all.

Because the moving parties have failed to establish a substantial relationship between the current and prior representations and have failed to identify specific confidential information that could be use to Respondent C.G.'s detriment under Rules 1.9(a) and 1.9(c), the motion to disqualify must be denied. This ruling is without prejudice to appropriate evidentiary rulings or other relief if materially different facts are established.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the motion to disqualify the Legal Aid Society from representing the subject children in this proceeding is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that this denial is without prejudice to the parties raising appropriate evidentiary objections or motions regarding the admissibility or attenuation of prior-case evidence; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall contact the court attorney to schedule a conference on the consolidated custody and family offense proceedings.

Dated: October 7, 2026

Bronx, NY

HON. ANGEL CRUZ, A.J.F.C.

Angel Cruz, J.