LORETTA BELARDO ANGELA TUITT SMITH BERNARD SMITH YVETTE ROSS EDWARDS AVON CANNONIER ANASTASIA DOWARD DARYL RICHARDS EVERTON BRADSHAW RODELIQUE WILLIAMS BRADSHAW PAMELA GREENIDGE WINSTON GREENIDGE v. THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA ORIENTAL BANK SCOTIABANK DE PUERTO RICO (2026)

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Loretta S. Belardo, Angela Tuitt-Smith, Bernard A. Smith, Yvette Ross-Edwards, Avon Cannonier, Anastasia M. Doward, Daryl Richards, Everton Bradshaw, Rodellique Williams Bradshaw, Pamela Greenidge, and Winston Greenidge's (collectively “Plaintiffs”) motion [ECF 129] to compel responses to their first sets of discovery requests.¹ Defendants the Bank of Nova Scotia (“Scotiabank”) and Oriental Bank (“Oriental”), successor by merger to Scotiabank de Puerto Rico (“SBPR”), (collectively “Defendants”) have filed an opposition [ECF 139], with Plaintiffs having filed a reply [ECF 141]. At their request, the Court provided the parties with additional time to attempt to resolve their discovery disputes amicably.² While these efforts were partially fruitful, several disputes remain. See generally [ECF 229] and [ECF 231]. To address these remaining disputes, the parties were directed to file simultaneous supplemental briefs by October 27, 2025.³ Each complied. See [ECF 229] and [ECF 231]. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part as set forth herein.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a proposed class action lawsuit. See generally [ECF 45]. It revolves around residential mortgages and forced-placed insurance (“FPI”) coverage, or the lack thereof. Id. The events that brought the issue to light were Hurricanes Irma and Maria, which struck the Virgin Islands on September 6, 2017 and September 20, 2017, respectively. Id. ¶ 43; [ECF 72] ¶ 43. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) defines the class as:

All persons with residential home mortgage loans owned by [Scotiabank] or serviced by [SBPR] on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged for lender-placed insurance coverage for the period including August 1, 2017 and thereafter.

[ECF 45] ¶ 132. It further defines the subclass as:

All persons with residential home mortgage loans owned by [Scotiabank] or serviced by [SBPR] on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged for lender-placed insurance coverage for the period including August 1, [2017] and thereafter, and who made claims for property damage caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria under [Scotiabank's] lender-placed insurance policy.

Id. ¶ 133.

Plaintiffs are homeowners on St. Croix, each of whom allege having entered into residential mortgage agreements with Scotiabank ⁴ for their respective properties. Id. at 10–16. They contend that Scotiabank holds thousands of mortgages throughout the Virgin Islands and issues residential home mortgages on St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. Id. ¶ 27. Although Scotiabank denies this assertion as stated, it nonetheless admits that until December 31, 2019, it owned a portfolio of residential mortgage accounts in the Virgin Islands. [ECF 72] ¶ 27. According to Plaintiffs, Scotiabank and its borrowers in the Virgin Islands entered into standard mortgage agreements that contain “substantially the same terms and conditions.” [ECF 45] ¶ 28.

Defendants counter that not all Scotiabank residential mortgages are identical and that each mortgage—all are of public record—speak for themselves. [ECF 72] ¶ 28. Notwithstanding this position, Scotiabank acknowledges that each of the Plaintiffs’ mortgages

contain various terms that require the mortgagor to obtain and maintain adequate hazard insurance coverage for the mortgaged property and to provide evidence of the renewal of such coverage, and that each mortgage has terms that permit, but do not require, the lender to obtain coverage to protect its interest as mortgagee if the mortgagor fails to do so.

Id. ¶ 30.

Scotiabank further states that all of its residential mortgages with Plaintiffs include the following provisions:

6.3 Should Mortgagor fail at any time to maintain such insurance coverage, Mortgagee may, but shall not be required, to obtain such of the coverages as Mortgagee may then elect with insurance companies of its choosing and make the required premium payment with any interest and penalties then owing.

6.6 If all or any part of the Property and any other property which is mortgaged or which secures the Mortgagee under the terms of a security document is destroyed or damaged at any time by any cause whatsoever while any loan or obligation secured hereby is outstanding, the Mortgagee, in its absolute discretion, may apply the proceeds of any insurance policy or any part thereof, either to the reduction or satisfaction of the amounts secured by this mortgage, or the construction, restoration or repair of the Property, in such manner as the Mortgagee may elect in its complete discretion.

6.8 Unless otherwise agreed in writing, any damage to the Property covered by insurance or any application of insurance proceeds to any amount secured by this Mortgage shall not extend or postpone the payment of amounts due under the Note.

Id. ¶ 32. In addition to the above, six of the eight mortgages ⁵ associated with Plaintiffs contain the following provision as well:

6.2 ․ In the event that the Mortgagee elects to force place property insurance over the Property to protect its security due to the Mortgagor's failure to obtain and maintain property insurance as provided in Section 6.1 above, the Mortgagor acknowledges and agrees that such force placed insurance coverage shall be in such amount as the Mortgagee shall in its sole and absolute discretion determine is necessary to protect its security and repayment of the obligations of the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee. Such coverage may or may not be sufficient to pay the Mortgagor's obligations to the Mortgagee. Further, the proceeds of any claim on force placed property insurance shall be solely for the benefit of the Mortgagee, and the Mortgagee shall have the sole and absolute right to settle any claims involving force placed insurance and the Mortgagor shall have no claim or any right to such proceeds unless the net proceeds therefrom exceed the total of the Mortgagor's obligations to the Bank.

Id.

Plaintiffs allege that each have paid premiums to Scotiabank for FPI for their respective properties, with all such payments having begun at “some point prior to August 1, 2017.”⁶ They further allege that their mortgages provide that Scotiabank may only collect such premiums if, and only if, Scotiabank uses same to obtain FPI coverage for their properties. [ECF 45] ¶ 31. According to Plaintiffs, Scotiabank ceased to obtain such coverage as of August 1, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 37–42. Before this date, Scotiabank purportedly had a master policy with American Security Insurance Company (“ASIC”), through which it obtained FPI coverage for its Virgin Islands mortgages. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs contend that on August 1, 2017, however, Scotiabank changed its loan servicer for its Virgin Islands mortgages, switching from Cenlar Corporation (“Cenlar”) to SBPR.⁷ Id. ¶ 38. In doing so, Plaintiffs allege that the ASIC policy terminated without there being any FPI coverage in place. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Despite this purported lack of coverage, however, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants continued to charge them premiums for FPI coverage. Id. ¶ 42. They further allege that following the 2017 hurricanes, Scotiabank misled its Virgin Islands borrowers who had paid premiums for FPI coverage to believe that their properties were covered under an FPI insurance policy, when Scotiabank knew otherwise. Id. ¶¶ 44–52.

Scotiabank, in turn, vehemently denies the allegations that it did not have FPI insurance coverage in place for the period in question. [ECF 139] at 4–6; [ECF 229] at 4–6. It points to a policy (the “Integrand Policy”) it had with Integrand Assurance Company ⁸ (“Integrand”), with said policy having an FPI Endorsement that authorized Defendants to add or reduce coverage for Scotiabank's interest as mortgagee of its residential mortgages in the Virgin Islands.⁹ [ECF 139] at 4–5; see also [ECF 229] at 5. Such coverage fluctuated on a monthly basis dependent upon the values report for a particular month. [ECF 139] at 5. SBPR, as loan servicer, would submit monthly values reports to Defendants’ licensed insurance broker—Marsh Saldana Inc. (“Marsh”)—for the FPI coverage that was to be added, or subtracted, for the following month. Id. at 4–5. Marsh would then submit same to Integrand, who would issue the endorsements and an invoice amount for the premium. Id. at 5. Upon receipt of the endorsements, payment would then be issued.¹⁰ Id.

On February 16, 2018, Integrand disputed coverage of Scotiabank's claims under the FPI endorsements for the months of August and September 2017 (i.e., the months in question). Id. at 6. On March 19, 2018, Integrand filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico against Scotiabank and SBPR (the “Integrand Lawsuit”) captioned Integrand Assurance Co. v. Scotiabank of Puerto Rico, Inc., and Bank of Nova Scotia, Civ. No. SJ2018CV01442. [ECF 45] ¶¶ 53–54; see also [ECF 72] ¶¶ 54–58. In their answer to the SAC, Defendants contend that

[t]he existence of the Integrand lawsuit confirms that Scotiabank procured insurance coverage, received endorsements for that coverage, and asserted claims under that coverage for losses from the 2017 hurricanes, after which the carrier wrongfully attempted to rescind the endorsements it had issued and deny coverage.

[ECF 72] ¶¶ 54–58 (italics in original). According to Defendants, however, the Integrand Lawsuit was never resolved on its merits as the lawsuit was dismissed after Integrand was adjudged to be insolvent and placed in liquidation. [ECF 139] at 15. Moreover, the entire Integrand litigation and its various filings (including that of discovery) were conducted in Spanish. Id. at 16–18.

Defendants maintain they have produced documents that conclusively disprove that they failed to obtain FPI coverage. [ECF 229] at 5. In doing so, they contend that their supplemental productions have included:

(i) documents relating to the adjustment and payment of the claims for loss submitted by the named plaintiffs;

(ii) a copy of the Integrand Assurance Policy;

(iii) copies of the Integrand endorsements for U.S. Virgin Islands mortgaged properties; [ ]

(iv) payments of premiums to Integrand for the endorsements;

(v) copies of the agreements with Marsh and Pilot Catastrophe Services for the adjustment of claims following Integrand's breach of its obligations under the Integrand Policy and Endorsements to adjust and pay Scotiabank's claims for damages to the mortgaged properties; and

(vi) communications between [SBPR] and Marsh regarding the adjustment of the named plaintiffs’ claims.

Id. Defendants also intend to produce redacted copies of the schedules of forced placed insurance that SBPR submitted to Marsh in compliance with the Integrand Policy, with said schedules purportedly to show the amount of FPI coverage for each mortgaged property, as well as the amount of the monthly premium. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“In December 2015, a series of amendments to the Federal Rules were enacted to improve a system of civil litigation that ‘in many cases ․ has become too expensive, time-consuming, and contentious, inhibiting effective access to the courts.’ ” United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d. 242, 258 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Chief Justice John Roberts, “2015 Year–End Report on the Federal Judiciary,” Dec. 31, 2015 (Roberts Report), at 4, available http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf). To counter these problems, the amendments placed a greater emphasis on judicial involvement in discovery and case management, as well as cooperation among litigants’ counsel. Among the rules amended was Rule 26, which governs discovery. Id. at 259.

Rule 26(b)(1) provides the general scope for discovery. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 2019 WL 117555, *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2019). That scope, however, is prefaced by language giving district courts discretion to limit discovery. Id. Under the rule, parties may:

․ obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rule's relevancy standard is described as “undemanding,” with courts employing a liberal and broad discovery-type standard which requires only the probability that the desired information is relevant. Petro Indus. Sol., LLC v. Island Project & Operating Serv., LLC, 2023 WL 3864587, *2 (D.V.I. Jun. 7, 2023) (citing Crozer Chester Med. Ctr. V. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd., 2023 WL 3018280, *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 20, 2023). While the scope of relevance in the discovery process is far broader than that allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not without its limits and should not serve as a fishing expedition. Id.; see Ainger v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 2022 WL 3139079, *8 (D.V.I. Aug. 4, 2022). The party seeking to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information. Prime Energy and Chem., LLC v. Tucker Arensberg, P.C., 2022 WL 1642394, *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2022). Upon satisfaction of the initial burden, “the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Id. (citing In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009)).

Notwithstanding the relevancy standard, the court may limit discovery to ensure its scope is proportional to the needs of the case, with the court considering, among other factors, “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Democratic Nat'l, 2019 WL 117555 at *2. Whether the court reasonably limited the scope of discovery is a fact-based inquiry. “Because district courts have their eyes and ears on a case from start to finish, they are in the best position to ‘reach[ ] a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.’ ” Matters of discovery are ultimately committed to the broad discretion of the district court, with a court having abused its discretion only if its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable. Id.; see Petro, 2023 WL 3864587 at *2 (citing United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

According to Plaintiffs, their original motion to compel sought information about putative class members including names, addresses, loan files, payment records, insurance documents, and specified communications between the putative class members and Defendants. [ECF 231] at 3. Following negotiations with Defendants, however, the parties have agreed to narrow the categories of documents to be produced as follows:

• the mortgage agreement and promissory note, including all riders, addenda, and modifications;

• servicing records, including payment history, escrow account analyses, records of any disbursements, and communications about premium costs added to mortgage escrow accounts;

• insurance-related documents, including notices of cancellation or lapse of borrower-provided insurance, notices regarding the placement and cost of lender-placed insurance, and all insurance certificates, policies, and declarations;

• insurance claim-related documents, including property damage claims, adjuster reports, estimates, and internal evaluations as a result of the Hurricanes; and

• correspondence and communications with the borrower, including all complaints, letters, emails, or call logs related to insurance coverage, claims, loan servicing, and disaster-related relief.

[ECF 231] at 3–4; see also [ECF 229] at 2–3. Plaintiffs have also agreed to limit the scope of all responsive documents to the time period of January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018. [ECF 231] at 4. Based on these efforts, Plaintiffs contend that there are only three issues that remain with respect to their motion regarding the production of putative class member documents. Id. at 2.

First, the parties dispute how many putative class members should be included in the production.

Second, Defendants are improperly seeking to limit any production to the narrower “subclass” of borrowers who made property damage claims.

Third, Defendants have consistently conditioned any production on Plaintiffs’ preemptive agreement not to contact putative class members whose files are produced.

Id. With respect to the motion's demand that Defendants produce documents related to the Integrand Policy, no resolution has been reached by the parties on this issue. Id. at 3. Defendants, in turn, contend that they have produced supplemental documents confirming that Integrand provided Scotiabank with FPI coverage for Plaintiffs’ mortgaged properties effective as of August 1, 2017. [ECF 229] at 4. They further claim that they have provided documents that disprove Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants misrepresented the existence or scope of FPI coverage under the Integrand Policy, thus obviating the need for any additional discovery related to this issue. Id. Given this extensive discovery and what it confirms, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs are not entitled to further Integrand-related documents sought in their discovery. Id. at 6.

Each of the above are addressed in the following subsections.

A. Class Limitation

With respect to the production of documents associated with the putative class, the Court takes the second issue first and addresses whether Defendants are improperly seeking to narrow production to that of the subclass of borrowers as identified in the SAC. Plaintiffs seek production of documents to include all Virgin Islands mortgage holders who paid for FPI coverage during the period in question. [ECF 231] at 6. Defendants, in turn, argue that Plaintiffs do not have a representative who meets the class definition in the SAC. [ECF 229] at 12. Under the definition provided, the class consists of all residential mortgage holders who were charged FPI premiums regardless of whether they submitted property damage claims associated with the 2017 hurricanes. Id.; see also [ECF 45] ¶ 132. Defendants point out that each of the Plaintiffs made such claims. [ECF 229] at 13. As such, there is no plaintiff who is a member of the class but not a member of the subclass. Id. Thus, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ subclass is, in actuality, their entire potential class. Id. Plaintiffs counter that Defendants are improperly seeking to unilaterally narrow the class definition. [ECF 231] at 6. The Court agrees.

No order has been entered by the Court that limits the putative class set forth in the SAC. As for Defendants’ contention that those borrowers who did not file property damage claims cannot claim to have been harmed by any purported failure to timely receive reimbursement for the property damage they sustained, see [ECF 229] at 13, such a contention is shortsighted. The relief sought by the putative class in the SAC is much broader than that of just property damages.¹¹ See generally [ECF 45] ¶¶ 144–196. An opinion from the district court of the Western District of Pennsylvania—Joyce v. Colter Energy Serv.—addresses a somewhat analogous situation. In that class action matter, the defendant sought to limit its discovery responses to a group of employees that shared the same position as held by the plaintiff, contending that any discovery beyond this scope would be premature until such time as a class has been certified. Joyce v. Colter Energy Serv., 2024 WL 326664, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2024). The court, in granting the plaintiff's motion to compel, held that the definition of class was not limited to or otherwise cabined by plaintiff's particular job title and/or role, but instead the class allegations encompassed all current and former hourly-paid employees, regardless of their job titles or duties. Id. In arriving at its decision, the court found that defendant did not have the unilateral prerogative to determine the scope of discovery and that its attempt to limit production to just those individuals who held similar positions as that of the plaintiff was deficient. Id. By attempting to limit its discovery responses as it did, the court further found that defendant was proceeding as if it possessed the authority to determine class certification, which it did not. Id. at *2. This Court finds that the Defendants in the present matter are attempting to do the same.

Issues regarding class definition are best decided at the class certification stage. See Corbett v. Pharmacare U.S., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (denying a defendant's motion to strike class allegations based on the argument that the class was overbroad because “[p]laintiffs should be given an opportunity through discovery to demonstrate that a ․ class is viable at the class certification stage”). In this instance, Defendants are attempting to unilaterally limit the scope of discovery to that of the subclass defined in the SAC. This they cannot do. Thus, for purposes of pre-certification discovery, Defendants’ responses are to include all persons with residential home mortgage loans owned by Scotiabank and/or serviced by SBPR on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged for FPI coverage for the period including August 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, regardless of whether they submitted property damage claims associated with the 2017 hurricanes. Additionally, the scope of responsive documents shall be limited to the period January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018.

B. Sampling Approach

During the status conference held on October 16, 2025, the possibility of a sampling approach was raised. While the parties agreed to explore the possibility, they have been unable to agree as to what will constitute an acceptable sampling. Defendants initially estimated that there were 202 borrowers who submitted claims, including the named plaintiffs. [ECF 229] at 17, n. 5. After further review and investigation, however, Defendants have confirmed that the number is actually 166 separate borrowers who submitted claims.¹² Id. The Court adds emphasis to the word “submitted,” as again, Defendants are attempting to unilaterally determine class certification, which, as the Court holds above, they are not permitted to do.¹³ At least at this juncture, it appears the total number of borrowers who fall within the class as defined by the SAC is not currently known by the Plaintiffs. It certainly is not known by the Court.

In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs assume—for argument's sake—that the putative class size is approximately 200 members ¹⁴ as represented by Defendants. [ECF 231] at 4–5. Under such an assumption, Plaintiffs maintain they are entitled to discover all class member files due to the relatively small size of the putative class. Id. at 4. Notwithstanding this position, should the Court determine that a sampling approach is appropriate, Plaintiffs request the production of at least sixty percent of the putative class. Id. at 4–6. In doing so, Plaintiffs seek to preserve their right to seek additional discovery should Defendants later argue that the Rule 23 factors are not met based on limitations inherent in the sample size. Id. at 6. In contrast, Defendants argue that the sampling size should be limited to roughly ten percent. [ECF 229] at 11–12, 17. Because they contend the class contains 166 members, Defendant's proposal would equate to a sampling size of sixteen loan files. Id. at 17. Moreover, as Defendants have already produced the eight files associated with Plaintiffs,¹⁵ they would need to produce only eight additional loan files, which would be randomly selected. Id.

The purported putative class size of 166 members is likely inaccurate. Defendants fail to affirmatively state whether there exists a group of FPI premium-paying borrowers who did not assert damage claims stemming from the 2017 hurricanes. It may be safe to assume that there are such borrowers given Defendants’ stance on the putative class composition. Be that as it may, Defendants have given no indication as to how large the class might possibly grow if this group of borrowers is added to the equation. Thus, it is not possible for the Court to determine from the facts presented whether the actual count is closer to that of the putative classes considered “relatively small,” or otherwise. See Trujillo v. Chef's Warehouse West Coast LLC, 2020 WL 7315346, at * 27 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020). To loosely paraphrase the title of a well-known Herman Wouk novel, the Court won't allow this to stop the carnival, with the Court finding that a sample size of fifty percent to be a good starting point. See id. Specifically, a fifty percent sample size of the class as a whole as defined in the SAC, as opposed to just the loan files of the subclass. Should this sample size prove to be inadequate, Plaintiffs may apply for additional relief.

C. Disclosure of Non-Party Putative Class Financial Records

Defendants argue that both federal and territorial privacy laws prevent disclosing the financial documents of putative class members that Plaintiffs currently seek. [ECF 229] at 16. Specifically, Defendants maintain that such disclosure is prohibited under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq., as well as under Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code. Id.; [ECF 139] at 10–14. Plaintiffs counter that the “judicial process exception” of the GLBA found in § 6802(e) allows for such disclosures. [ECF 130] at 6. Likewise, Plaintiffs contend that 9 V.I.C. § 6 only bars disclosure to “a person not authorized by law,” which would be inapplicable to Defendants, as they will be authorized to provide said information as part of discovery in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 10.

(1) The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act

Under the GLBA, a financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless

(A) such financial institution clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in electronic form or other form permitted by the regulations prescribed under section 6804 of this title, that such information may be disclosed to such third party;

(B) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party; and

(C) the consumer is given an explanation of how the consumer can exercise that nondisclosure option.

15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1).

The above opt-out requirement, however, is subject to express exceptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e). Relevant in the case at hand, the GLBA's restrictions against disclosure do not apply when a financial institution releases information regarding its customers in order “to respond to judicial process.” Id. at § 6802(e)(8). Courts have construed the judicial process exception to mean that the Act does not prevent disclosure to a third party in response to a discovery request in civil litigation. Lieber v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 3923128, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2017). See e.g., MAS Inc. v, Nocheck, LLC, 2011 WL 1135367, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2011) (citing Marks v. Global Mort. Grp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492, 495 (S.D. W.Va. 2003)); Her v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2007 WL 2806558, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Sep. 25, 2007) (finding that both the judicial process exception and the exception for disclosure “to persons acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the consumer” applied because plaintiff's counsel was acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the putative class members). The Court agrees and finds that the judicial process exception is applicable to Plaintiffs’ present discovery requests, with the disclosure of non-party financial records being subject to the parties’ protective order at [ECF 197].¹⁶

(2) Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code

As for Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code, it provides as follows:

Whoever, being an officer, director or employee of any bank authorized to do business in the United States Virgin Islands, discloses any information concerning a depositor or borrower or such person's account with such bank, or who discloses any confidential information concerning such bank, to a person not authorized by law to obtain such information shall be fined $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; provided, however, that the provisions of this section do not prohibit the confidential exchange of necessary and pertinent information between banks, domestic and foreign, and between such banks and credit bureaus with respect to the credit of any person who has applied to any such bank for a loan.

V.I. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 6 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs contend that because the above bolded language only prevents disclosure “to a person not authorized by law;” Defendants are authorized under the statute to produce the financial records sought herein as part of discovery in a judicial proceeding. [ECF 130] at 10. In support of this statutory interpretation, Plaintiffs cite to Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, a case previously before this Court. Id. at 10–11. They note that Charleswell similarly involved a putative class of mortgagors with hurricane damaged properties who brought a class action against their mortgagee. [ECF 130] at 10–11; citing Charleswell, 223 F.R.D. 371, 373 (D.V.I. 2004). Plaintiffs point out that while this Court initially denied class certification in Charleswell based on “the present state of the record,” it did so without prejudice, allowing for additional discovery to be conducted. Id. at 11. Plaintiffs then note that after this ruling, the parties in Charleswell engaged in “extensive and contentious discovery,” with a renewed motion to certify having been filed. A settlement was reached, however, before that motion was ruled upon. Without any specific citation to the Charleswell docket, Plaintiffs surmise that such extensive discovery could not have occurred if Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code precluded such disclosures. Id.

Defendants, in turn, contend that the plain language of Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code precludes the disclosure of financial information to anyone other than government agencies or others expressly authorized by a specific law or regulation to obtain such information. [ECF 139] at 14. They further note that unlike the GLBA, the Virgin Islands statute criminalizes any unauthorized disclosures, putting the bank and its employees at risk. Id. To support their interpretation of the statute, Defendants rely on a local Virgin Islands opinion—Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac. The Isaac opinion involves a criminal proceeding wherein the defendants were convicted of possession of an unlawful firearm. Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 2004 WL 626278, at *1 (Terr. V.I. Feb. 2, 2004). At issue in that matter was 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), with the following language of the statute under scrutiny by the court:

Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports or carries, either actually or constructively, openly or concealed, any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section 451(d) of this code, loaded or unloaded, may be arrested without a warrant ․ [.] Isaac, 2004 WL 626278, at *2.

The Issac court held that the clause “otherwise authorized” to mean possession without a license. Id. at *2–4. According to Defendants, such a holding suggests that “authorized by law” means the authorization must expressly derive from a specific provision in another statute. [ECF 139] at 14. They also stress that unlike the GLBA, the Virgin Islands statutes does not contain a “judicial process” exception. Id. As a result, Defendants maintain that even were the Court to conclude the GLBA judicial process exception permits some pre-class certification disclosures, the more restrictive Virgin Islands law does not. Id.

Although the phrase “authorized by law” is found in seven statutes within Title 9, it is not defined in the title.^{17  18} See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 1. The Court has likewise been unable to locate any caselaw that interprets the phrase as found in Title 9. Thus, it appears this is an issue of first impression in the territory and will require statutory interpretation. As with all such questions of statutory interpretation, the Court's inquiry begins with an analysis of the plain text of the statute. DaCosta v. DaCosta, 2021 WL 2433619, at *3 (V.I. 2021). Should the statutory text be unambiguous, the inquiry ends there. Id. Each word is to be given its ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning. Thomas v. People, 2018 WL 6047702 at *5 (V.I. 2018) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 414 (2017)). In doing so, “we must give effect to every provision making sure to avoid interpreting any provision in a manner that would render it—or another provision—wholly superfluous and without an independent meaning or function of its own.” Id. (citing Defoe v. Phillip, 2012 WL 37404, *8 (V.I. 2012)).

At first blush, the phrase “authorized by law” would seem unambiguous. The parties, however, have offered differing views as to the applicable breadth of this phrase under the statute at issue. The Court notes that Black's law dictionary does not define the phrase “authorized by law.” It does, however, define the words “authorize” and “law.” The definition for “authorize” is “[t]o give legal authority; to empower,” and “[t]o formally approve; to sanction.” Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). As one might imagine, the definition for “law” is much more vast. In part, the word is defined as follows:

2. The aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action; esp., the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction apply in deciding controversies brought before them.

3. The set of rules or principles dealing with a specific area of a legal system.

4. The judicial and administrative process; legal action and proceedings.

5. A statute. Id.

This offers little assistance, as arguments can be made as to both parties’ respective interpretations using the above definitions.

It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to its place in the overall statutory scheme.” Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). In considering the specific context in which language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole, “interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.” Vooys v. Bentley, 901 F.3d 172, 192 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Cont., Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)). “An absurd interpretation is one that ‘defies rationality or renders the statute nonsensical and superfluous.’ ” Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).

Plaintiffs argue that adopting Defendants’ interpretation would lead to “untenable and absurd consequences.” [ECF 130] at 11. Specifically, they maintain that “[t]he statute was designed to protect confidential banking information from unauthorized disclosure, not to obstruct legitimate judicial proceedings or to shield financial institutions from accountability.” Id. The Court agrees. It is certainly true that financial institutions in the Virgin Islands have a statutory duty to maintain customer confidentiality. The statute, however, does not clearly prohibit the disclosure of information for discovery purposes. See Marks, 218 F.R.D. at 497. To the contrary, Title 9, Section 6 expressly permits financial institutions to disclose such information to a person “authorized by law.” In other words, when the institution must disclose the otherwise confidential information to a party in a lawsuit pursuant to a discovery request, it does so to a person who is “authorized by law.” See Marks, 218 F.R.D. at 496–497; see Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889; see Freeman, 405 F.2d at 1349. Conversely, the statutory interpretation advocated by Defendants would frustrate and/or inhibit litigation against financial institutions like those in Charleswell.

Accordingly, the Court finds that neither the GLBA nor Title 9, Section 6 of the Virgin Islands Code precludes Defendants from disclosing to Plaintiffs in discovery the financial documents of putative class members. The Court recognizes, however, that both Congress and the territory have expressed a strong interest in protecting the privacy of consumers’ financial information. Such information is thus to be protected, with Defendants directed to produce same in accordance with the protective order. See [ECF 197].

D. Contacting Putative Class Members

In addition to the purported statutory prohibitions on disclosure of non-party financial information, Defendants further contend Plaintiffs should be precluded from contacting any non-plaintiff class members at the pre-certification stage, with Defendants seeking an order to this effect. [ECF 229] at 17–18. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that such a broad restriction is inappropriate at this stage, as communication with putative class members may be necessary for Plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. [ECF 231] at 7.

Defendants maintain that:

the United States Supreme Court has rejected pre-class certification discovery of identifying information of potential class members when such information is sought merely for the purpose of identifying such individuals for notice of a class action.

[ECF 229] at 14 (citing McMahon v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2022 WL 15511013, *2 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2022)). The Supreme Court case cited to in the McMahon opinion is Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). In Oppenheimer, the Supreme Court—in dictum—drew a distinction in principle between requests for identification of class members made to enable a party to send notice and those that are made for true discovery purposes. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 354, n. 20. Specifically, the Oppenheimer court stated:

We do not hold that class members’ names and addresses never can be obtained under the discovery rules. There may be instances where this information could be relevant to issues that arise under Rule 23, ․ or where a party has reason to believe that communication with some members of the class could yield information bearing on these or other issues.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Regarding issues under Rule 23, the Supreme Court in Oppenheimer explained that “discovery often has been used to illuminate issues upon which a district court must pass in deciding whether a suit should proceed as a class action under Rule 23, such as numerosity, common questions, and adequacy of representation.” Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351 n.13. The court further stated

In deciding whether a request comes within the discovery rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for which a party seeks information. Thus, when the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied. See Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 565–568 (S.D.Miss.1976); Econo-Car International, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8, 10 (V.I. 1973), reversed on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (C.A.3 1974). Likewise, discovery should be denied when a party's aim is to delay bringing a case to trial, or embarrass or harass the person from whom he seeks discovery. See United States v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373, 381 (C.A.3 1966); Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 52 F.R.D. 23, 24–25 (E.D.Wis.1971).

Id. at 352, n. 17. But see SanMedica Int'l, LLC, 2021 WL 6198062, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2021) (citing Dziennik v. Sealift, Inc., 2006 WL 1455464, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) for the proposition that “[c]ourts have ordinarily refused to allow discovery of class members’ identities at the pre-certification stage out of concern that plaintiffs’ attorneys may be seeking such information to identify potential new clients, rather than to establish the appropriateness of certification.”). In this instance, Plaintiffs have consistently maintained that the information they seek is for the purpose of establishing the appropriateness of certification, i.e., to demonstrate numerosity, commonality, and predominance under Rule 23. [ECF 130] at 8; [ECF 141] at 5; [ECF 231] at 7. For such purpose, discovery of class members’ identities is proper at the pre-certification stage.

As for orders limiting contact, the Supreme Court has found that such orders can make it more difficult for plaintiffs, as the class representatives, to obtain information about the merits of the case from the persons they seek to represent. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100–102 (1981). In arriving at its finding, the Supreme Court stated that

[b]ecause of these potential problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties. Only such a determination can ensure that the court is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23. In addition, such a weighing—identifying the potential abuses being addressed—should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances.

Id. at 101–102. Similarly, the Third Circuit previously held that

to the extent that the district court is empowered ․ to restrict certain communications in order to prevent frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration to the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties.

Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).

The Court finds that there is no specific record showing that Plaintiffs’ activities represent abuses of the class action device. Rather, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ activities to be directed toward effectuating the purposes of Rule 23. Thus, the Court shall not enter an order at this stage prohibiting communication. The Court will, however, direct that the first contact between Plaintiffs and any non-plaintiff class members and/or non-party borrowers be by a mailed document. The Court will further direct Plaintiffs not to pursue any additional contact for seven days after such correspondence would likely to have been received. See Choate v. State Farm Lloyds, 2005 WL 1109432, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2005). The Court likewise reserves the right to revisit this issue should Defendants subsequently present evidence of actual abuse or improper conduct by or on behalf of Plaintiffs.

E. Integrand Communications, Policy, and Lawsuit

Lastly, Plaintiffs seek to compel the production of communications between Defendants, Integrand, and/or Marsh about the nature and scope of coverage, as well as documents related to the Integrand Policy and the Integrand Lawsuit. [ECF 130] at 12–15. According to Plaintiffs, this discovery goes to the heart of their claims; namely whether Defendants failed to procure coverage and then misrepresented the nature and scope of that coverage to Plaintiffs. Id.; [ECF 231] at 8. Defendants counter that their supplemental production “conclusively” disproves Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants failed to purchase FPI insurance for the period at issue.¹⁹ [ECF 229] at 5–6. Defendants have also agreed to produce (subject to the protective order) redacted copies of schedules of FPI coverage that were submitted to Marsh by SBPR in compliance with the Integrand Policy. Id. According to Defendants, these schedules show the amount of coverage for each mortgaged property and the amount of the monthly premium, as well as confirm that the premium costs charged to the escrow accounts of USVI mortgagors were based upon the schedules that Marsh submitted to Integrand.²⁰ Id. at 5–6.

Defendants further argue that any discovery associated with the Integrand Lawsuit is nothing more than an overbroad, wide-ranging fishing expedition. Id. In support of its argument, Defendants emphasize that the Integrand Lawsuit was a separate lawsuit with claims unrelated to the present matter. Id. Further complicating matters, the discovery in that litigation was entirely in Spanish, thus requiring translation. Id. Finally, Defendants cite to the fact depositions of several of the named Plaintiffs in the present lawsuit, none of whom testified as to having any knowledge of the Integrand Lawsuit or how it may relate to their case/claims. Id. at 7–8. Ultimately, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ discovery requests related to the Integrand Lawsuit are nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the lawsuit between Integrand and Scotiabank, which would result in turning that unrelated matter into a mini-trial within the present lawsuit. Id. at 6. They claim such a motive is improper, disproportionate to the needs of this case, and entirely irrelevant. Id.

Plaintiffs, in turn, argue that discovery associated with communications between Defendants, Integrand, and/or Marsh will help establish that Defendants failed to procure coverage and then misrepresented the nature and scope of such coverage (or lack thereof) to Plaintiffs. [ECF 130] at 13. They also contend these materials may reveal inconsistencies in Defendants’ defenses and provide insight into their knowledge of the lack of coverage. Id. As for the relevance of the Integrand Policy and Integrand Lawsuit, Plaintiffs not only point to the allegations asserted in their SAC, but also to Defendants’ own assertions in their answer to the SAC. Id. At paragraphs 54–58 of their answer, Defendants state:

The allegations in paragraphs 54-58 are denied. The so-called Integrand Lawsuit contains unsubstantiated and false allegations which were disputed and inaccurate, and which are irrelevant and inadmissible in this action as they are unsworn and unproven factual allegations by a nonparty about which the Plaintiffs have no personal knowledge. Scotiabank admits that on March 19, 2018, a lawsuit was filed arising out of an insurance coverage dispute between Defendants and their insurance carrier. The existence of the Integrand lawsuit confirms that Scotiabank procured insurance coverage, received endorsements for that coverage, and asserted claims under that coverage for losses from the 2017 hurricanes, after which the carrier wrongfully attempted to rescind the endorsements it had issued and deny coverage. All other allegations in paragraphs 54-58 based upon Integrand's unsubstantiated and false claims are denied.

Id. citing [ECF 72] at 7–8 (italics in original). Additionally, at paragraph 60 of their answer, Defendants state as follows:

The allegations in paragraph 60 are denied. Scotiabank and its insurance agent moved forward to coordinate with licensed adjusters to inspect the reported losses to all mortgaged properties in the United States Virgin Islands in a timely manner, so that Scotiabank's claims for coverage for the losses to the mortgaged properties could be timely adjusted. Scotiabank's actions and the actions of the adjusters had no relationship to the Integrand lawsuit. Scotiabank took responsible action to ensure that Integrand's delay in complying with its obligations under the policy purchased by Scotiabank and the endorsement issued to Scotiabank to cover its interest in the Virgin Islands mortgaged properties did not delay the adjustment process.

Id. citing [ECF 72] at 8 (italics in original).

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ refusal to produce the Integrand related materials obstructs Plaintiffs’ ability to prove that Defendants purportedly failed to secure valid insurance coverage, as well as their ability to prove that Defendants purportedly concealed and knowingly misled Plaintiffs regarding the true status of said coverage (or lack thereof). Id. at 14. Plaintiffs further contend that the only two documents that have been produced from the Integrand Lawsuit establish that Defendants were aware Integrand was contesting the existence of FPI coverage at a time when Defendants were advising Plaintiffs that their homes had been added to Defendants’ master policy prior to the 2017 hurricanes. Id.

“Relevance is ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cornett, 2021 WL 1582771, at *2 (D.V.I. Apr. 22, 2021). General objections such as “overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, and irrelevant,” without an accompanying factual basis to support said objections, are not just insufficient, they are improper. Great Lakes Ins. S.E. v. Sunshine Shopping Ctr., Inc., 2020 WL 9809840, at *7 (D.V.I. June 22, 2020). In this instance, the issue of whether FPI coverage was or was not secured is at center stage. The Court finds that communications between Defendants, Integrand, and/or Marsh about the nature and scope of coverage to be potentially relevant and certainly discoverable. The parties have already agreed to limit the period in which the requests seek responsive information / materials to that of January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018. The Court finds this to be reasonable and proportionate. The Integrand Policy is likewise at issue in this lawsuit and thus, relevant, with the Court finding that discovery is permissible as to this policy within the same temporal constraints.

As for the Integrand Lawsuit, that suit sought a declaratory judgment that Integrand did not owe FPI coverage for the properties in the Virgin Islands post the 2017 hurricanes. See [ECF 130] at 3. According to Plaintiffs, their claims align with that of Integrand's position in said lawsuit. Id. It definitely appears to the Court that the Integrand Lawsuit addresses the very FPI coverage issue that is at issue in the present matter. Thus, the Court likewise finds this issue to be discoverable, again, within the same temporal constraints.

The Court makes no determination as to any potential privilege assertions, however, as none have been specifically presented for consideration. The parties are reminded that should any particular production be withheld on the basis of privilege, a privilege log is to be provided. As for concerns related to matters in the Integrand Lawsuit being in Spanish, it is up to Defendants to determine whether they wish to translate same. Regarding the discovery responses exchanged in that matter, the Court would expect issues of privilege and attorney work product to have been addressed by the parties prior to said discovery having been exchanged. Moreover, to the extent any of those responses were made pursuant to a protective order, the parties have a protective order of their own that can be utilized should they so wish.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion [ECF 129] to compel responses to their first sets of discovery requests is GRANTED IN PART as set forth herein, with the parties to abide by their previously agreed upon narrowing of the categories of documents and information that is sought; it is further

ORDERED that for purposes of pre-certification discovery, Defendants’ responses SHALL INCLUDE all persons with residential home mortgage loans owned by Scotiabank and/or serviced by SBPR on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged for FPI coverage for the period including August 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, regardless of whether they submitted property damage claims associated with the 2017 hurricanes; it is further

ORDERED that Defendants SHALL SUBMIT a fifty percent (50%) sample size of all persons with residential home mortgage loans owned by Scotiabank and/or serviced by SBPR on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged for FPI coverage for the period including August 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, regardless of whether they submitted property damage claims associated with the 2017 hurricanes; it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs ARE NOT PROHIBITED from contacting non-plaintiff class members and/or non-party borrowers. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED that their first contact with non-plaintiff class members and/or non-party borrowers must be by a mailed document, with Plaintiffs NOT TO PURSUE any further contact for seven (7) days after such correspondence would likely to have been received; it is further

ORDERED that Defendants ARE TO PROVIDE RESPONSES to discovery requests that seek information and/or materials involving communications between Defendants, Integrand, and/or Marsh about the nature and scope of coverage, the Integrand Policy, and/or the Integrand Lawsuit; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants are to SUPPLEMENT and/or otherwise RESPOND to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests as directed herein by no later than thirty (30) days after the date of this Order.

Enter:

FOOTNOTES

1.   In addition to their motion, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in support thereof. Both the motion and the memorandum [ECF 129 and 130, respectively] are referred to collectively by the Court as the “motion.”

2.   Reference is made to [ECF 184], [ECF 207], [ECF 215], [ECF 216], and [ECF 219].

3.   Reference is made to [ECF 223].

4.   In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to the Bank of Nova Scotia by the acronym “BNS.” See [ECF 45] ¶ 1. For purposes of the present order, however, the Court refers to this same entity as “Scotiabank” and any reference to BNS in the parties’ briefings should be treated as synonymous with that of Scotiabank.

5.   Although there are currently eleven plaintiffs named in the lawsuit, there are only a total of eight mortgages related to these plaintiffs. See [ECF 45] ¶¶ 70–130.

6.   See [ECF 45] ¶¶ 30, 34, 72, 80, 87, 94, 101, 109, 117, and 125.

7.   Plaintiffs refer to Scotiabank de Puerto Rico, Inc. by the acronym “BNS-PR,” as well as by “Scotiabank-PR.” See [ECF 45] ¶ 1; see [ECF 130] at 1. For purposes of the present order, however, the Court refers to this entity as “SBPR” and any reference to BNS-PR and/or Scotiabank-PR in the parties’ briefings should be treated as synonymous with that of SBPR.

8.   Integrand's corporate name is set forth in ¶ 53 of the SAC. See [ECF 45].

9.   Defendants contend that under the Integrand Policy, Scotiabank is the insured. [ECF 139] at 6. They further contend that the Virgin Islands mortgagors are not named insureds and thus, have no right to submit claims directly to Integrand or to receive insurance proceeds from Integrand. Id.

10.   Regarding the Integrand Policy, Defendants maintain that it:․ sets forth a process for the addition or removal of FPI coverage for mortgaged properties by way of submission of a monthly schedule of values to Integrand identifying the subject properties to be covered under the extant Integrand Policy (which has been produced). Defendants have produced Endorsements showing that Defendants obtained FPI coverage for the USVI mortgaged properties effective August 1, 2017 (the date of cancelation of the coverage previously placed by Cenlar).[ECF 229] at 5, n. 1.

11.   By way of example, the SAC alleges damages for premiums paid for FPI coverage that was purportedly not obtained. See generally [ECF 45] ¶¶ 144–196. Other alleged damages include statutory damages, punitive damages, and treble damages. Id. at 28.

12.   Defendants argue that under any theory, Plaintiffs can only potentially claim to represent a class consisting of the approximately 166 borrowers who made claims for property damage as a result of the 2017 hurricanes. [ECF 229] at 12.

13.   Defendants are silent as to how many borrowers paid FPI premiums for the period including August 1, 2017 and thereafter, regardless of whether or not they submitted property damage claims associated with the 2017 hurricanes. For purposes of the present order, the Court is utilizing the period August 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018 as the applicable timeframe, as opposed to the “period including August 1, 2017 and thereafter,” as asserted in the SAC. See [ECF 45] ¶¶ 132–133. Should Plaintiffs believe that their class goes beyond the September 30, 2018 end date, the Court will reopen the matter for consideration on that limited basis.

14.   As noted above, Defendants have since revised the number of what it believes to be the putative class to 166 members. See [ECF 229] at 17, n. 5.

15.   Again, while there are currently eleven plaintiffs named in the lawsuit, there are only a total of eight mortgages (or loan files) related to these plaintiffs. See [ECF 45] ¶¶ 70–130.

16.   “[E]ven if the GLBA included no exception for civil discovery, the mere fact that a statute prohibits the disclosure of certain information does not give parties to a civil dispute the right to circumvent the discovery process.” Marks, 218 F.R.D. at 496. In arriving at this conclusion, the court in Marks cites to two Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cases, which had previously compelled discovery of information protected by non-disclosure statutes similar to that of the GLBA. Id. (citing Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889 (D.C.Cir.1987); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1349 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion). The Marks court held that[t]he GLBA, like the Privacy Act and the Commodity Exchange Act, does not clearly prohibit the disclosure of information for discovery purposes; in fact, the Act permits disclosures made to respond to judicial process. Therefore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the disclosure of information protected by the Act. The court recognizes, however, that Congress has expressed a strong interest in protecting the privacy of consumers’ financial information. For that reason, it is appropriate for a court to exercise its broad discretion to fashion protective orders. See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889; Freeman, 405 F.2d at 1348. Thus, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that a protective order is appropriate.Id. at 497. This Court finds the Marks opinion persuasive.

17.   In addition to 9 V.I.C. § 6, the phrase “authorized by law” is found in §§ 1 E, 121(13)(A); 182(a); 196; 667(b)(2); and 750(l).

18.   It further appears that the legislative records for 1968—including the legislative history of Title 9, Section 6—were among those destroyed during the 2017 hurricanes prior to their being digitized.

19.   As noted earlier in this order, Defendants’ supplemental productions have included: “(i) documents relating to the adjustment and payment of the claims for loss submitted by the named plaintiffs; (ii) a copy of the Integrand Assurance Policy; (iii) copies of the Integrand endorsements for U.S. Virgin Islands mortgaged properties; [ ] (iv) payments of premiums to Integrand for the endorsements; (v) copies of the agreements with Marsh and Pilot Catastrophe Services for the adjustment of claims following Integrand's breach of its obligations under the Integrand Policy and Endorsements to adjust and pay Scotiabank's claims for damages to the mortgaged properties; and (vi) communications between [SBPR] and Marsh regarding the adjustment of the named plaintiffs’ claims.” See [ECF 229] at 5.

20.   Defendants advise that the schedules are redacted to remove loan numbers, borrower names, and property addresses of the non-parties, but include the information necessary to understand how the premiums were calculated and charged to Plaintiffs (and to the non-parties). [ECF 229] at 6.

G. Alan Teague U.S. Magistrate Judge