Kristen Cox, Petitioner, v. LLC (2026)

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of a contempt order imposing monetary and other sanctions for violation of an order prohibiting pro se filings. To be sure, the trial court had both authority and good reason to bar pro se filings by Petitioner. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999). The court's Spencer order, however, only prohibits Petitioner's pro se filing of “further pleadings and motions,” and “pleadings and motions” have precise meanings under the so-named Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100. The filings for which Petitioner was held in contempt of the Spencer order did not include any complaint, petition, answer, or reply, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) (“No other pleadings will be allowed.”), or any “application to the court for an order [which] must be by motion,” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b).¹ While the trial court may have intended its Spencer order to bar all pro se filings, the court “cannot base contempt upon noncompliance with something an order does not say.” Prieto v. Rossi, 385 So. 3d 144, 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (quoting Kovic v. Kovic, 336 So. 3d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)). Nevertheless, even if we were to conclude that the contempt order departed from the essential requirements of the law, we do not have certiorari jurisdiction to review it because any such error is correctable on post-judgment appeal. See State v. Lobato, 394 So. 3d 1219, 1221–22 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). But the trial court “retains inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to entry of the final judgment or order terminating an action.” Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998).

PETITION DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner did file a copy of a discovery motion of Respondents in which they applied for an order from the trial court, but she filed no motion of her own.

GANNAM, J.

STARGEL and KAMOUTSAS, JJ., concur.