HARRIS v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC (2026)

Appellant Robert Dwayne Harris appeals a final judgment of foreclosure, the denial of rehearing from that judgment, and the denial of his motion to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Appellee Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, concedes the judgment was entered without adequate notice to Appellant and that remand for a new foreclosure trial is required.

“A judgment procured without notice or opportunity to be heard is void.” Daley v. Elevate Roofing & Exteriors, Inc., 432 So. 3d 653, 656 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026) (citing Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So. 2d 443, 445 (Fla. 1990)). “Notice to legally interested parties so that they can assert their claims is the essence of the procedural due process protections provided by the Florida Constitution.” Wyrick v. Wyrick, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1849, D1850, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2589317, *1 (Fla. 6th DCA Sept. 2, 2026) (quoting In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 593 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 1991)). Here, Nationstar concedes that, although Appellant was served with the foreclosure complaint and filed pleadings in response, he did not receive notice of the foreclosure trial until after the trial occurred. This deprived Appellant of an opportunity to be heard on his defenses to the foreclosure. Appellant brought this to the attention of the trial court on two occasions, including in a motion for rehearing, but the court denied that motion, on the merits, in an unelaborated order.

We now accept Nationstar's concession of error, reverse to vacate the foreclosure judgment, and remand for further proceedings. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to address Appellant's arguments concerning the court's entry of judgment without ruling on his motion to dismiss, his arguments on the merits of his defenses, or his arguments surrounding the denial of rehearing. See, e.g., Waterfront in Naples Condo. Ass'n v. Reynolds Ventures, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1728, D1729, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2450889, *2 (Fla. 6th DCA Aug. 21, 2026) (“We therefore address only the dispositive issue and remand for a trial on the merits.”); see also O'Hair v. O'Hair, 396 So. 3d 630, 634 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Akers v. City of Miami Beach, 745 So. 2d 532, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), for the proposition that “appellate courts ‘should not ordinarily decide issues not ruled on by the trial court in the first instance’ ”).

As to the denial of Appellant's motion to enjoin the foreclosure sale, we affirm because the motion became moot before it was heard, by virtue of the sale taking place. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 2 So. 3d 325, 327–28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“Generally, injunctive relief is available to prevent a threatened harm but is not available to redress harm which has already occurred.” (quoting Speer v. Evangelisto, 662 So. 2d 1340, 1341–42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995))). Even so, our reversal of the foreclosure judgment provides grounds for the parties to seek an order in the lower court vacating the foreclosure sale. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(5).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of injunctive relief but reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

BROWNLEE, J.

TRAVER, C.J., and NARDELLA, J., concur.