MUIR v. BOYD (2026)

Michael S. Muir, pro se, appeals an order enforcing a settlement agreement. To the extent Muir is using this appeal as a vehicle to challenge an earlier dismissal order, we dismiss because Muir did not timely appeal that final order. See Rhiner v. Lawnwood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 414 So. 3d 173, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (“Appellant is actually attempting to use this appeal as a vehicle for challenging the earlier order granting Lawnwood's motion to enforce settlement․ [B]ecause Appellant failed to timely appeal the earlier order granting Lawnwood's motion to enforce settlement, we do not have jurisdiction to review that earlier order in the instant appeal.”). Additionally, to the extent Muir is challenging the trial court's ruling that attorney fees may be sought from Muir should he not comply with the enforcement order, we dismiss that portion of the appeal as premature. See Lopez-Cortes v. Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, 398 So. 3d 597, 598 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (“To the extent Appellants seek to appeal the portion of the trial court's order finding Aflac and Weber were entitled to their attorneys' fees and costs ․ we dismiss that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because orders determining entitlement, without setting the amount, are not appealable orders.” (first citing Williams v. Williams, 386 So. 3d 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024); and then citing Valente v. Raissi, 343 So. 3d 640, 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022))). As to the order enforcing the settlement agreement, we affirm.

DISMISSED in part; AFFIRMED in part.

WOZNIAK, J.

MIZE and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.