SMITH v. STATE (2026)

Danny Lavan Smith appeals his conviction for possession of an electric weapon or device by a convicted felon. Smith argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the taser found in his possession was operable. We review the denial of Smith's motion for judgment of acquittal de novo and affirm. See McCloud v. State, 224 So. 3d 842, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“We review de novo both the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal and an issue of statutory interpretation.”).

Section 790.23(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), makes it unlawful for a convicted felon “to own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any ․ electric weapon or device ․” An “ ‘[e]lectric weapon or device’ means any device which, through the application or use of electrical current, is designed, redesigned, used, or intended to be used for offensive or defensive purposes, the destruction of life, or the infliction of injury.” § 790.001(7), Fla. Stat. (2023). Contrary to Smith's contention, the statute contains no requirement that the device be “operable.” Rather, according to the statutory definition, Smith's taser qualifies as an electric weapon or device if it is simply designed to be used for defensive purposes through the application or use of electrical current. It does not have to work.

The officer here testified that tasers use an electric current to incapacitate a person and that they are used for self-defense, which satisfies the statutory requirements. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Smith's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Because the State was not required to prove the taser was operable in order to convict Smith of possession of an electric weapon or device by a convicted felon, we affirm.¹

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case does not concern the constitutionality of Florida's ban on the possession of electric weapons or devices by convicted felons.

BROWNLEE, J.

SMITH and GANNAM, JJ., concur.