Ronald Hughes v. Reynolds Garage & Marine (2016)

ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

RULING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE

This case is an action by the plaintiff, Ronald Hughes, alleging common-law wrongful termination for violation of public policy in a one-count complaint.  Defendant moves to strike the operative amended complaint because a necessary element of the plaintiff's cause of action is that the plaintiff be “otherwise without remedy.”  The defendant argues that there is a statutory remedy in this case and, therefore, the complaint must be stricken as legally insufficient.  The court agrees with the defendant.  Therefore, the complaint is ordered stricken.

I

A motion to strike is used “[w]henever any party wishes to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defenses contained therein ․” Practice Book § 10–39(a)(5).  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “In

“[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 252.  Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.

II

This is the second complaint filed by the plaintiff in this matter.  In the first complaint, filed on October 21, 2015, the plaintiff alleged a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge for violation of public policy.  The pertinent facts, taken from the complaint, are that he was injured on the job while performing his duties for the defendant on October 22, 2013.  The defendant did not call for an ambulance, allegedly in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31–294d.  The following day, the plaintiff received a letter terminating him from employment stating, “Your termination is unrelated to your medical issue yesterday.”  The plaintiff alleges that his termination was a pre-emptive effort to deny his ability to file for workers' compensation benefits in violation of General Statutes § 31–[290a].  In fact, he alleges that, subsequent to the termination, the defendant contested his application for workers' compensation benefits contending that the injury did not arise in and out of the course of employment.  Plaintiff alleged that “the post injury firing of Mr. Hughes was contrary to law, in violation of important public policy, and specifically contrary to C.G.S. § 31–[290a] and C.G.S. § 31–[294d], mean-spirited and unjust.”  He sought “(1) reinstatement of his previous job;  (2) payment of back wages;  (3) re-establishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged;  (4) any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge;  (5) attorneys fees and court costs;  (6) punitive damages;  (7) any other such and further relief as seems appropriate to the court.

On December 28, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to strike, arguing that a plaintiff asserting wrongful discharge must plead that he is “otherwise without remedy.”  Since a statutory cause of action exists regarding workers' compensation discrimination, specifically General Statutes § 31–290a, the plaintiff's claim must be stricken, it argued.  Before the motion was heard, the plaintiff filed the subject Amended Complaint.  The Amended Complaint is identical to the original complaint, except that it adds language to the end stating, “The plaintiff brings this action in Superior Court because the Workers' Compensation Act does not enable the hearing Commissioner to award punitive damages, pursuant to C.G.S. Sec. 31–[290a], which punitive damages should be assessed against the mean-spirited and law breaking employer.  C.G.S. [31–290a] ․ The commissioner may award the employee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or discharged ․ Mr. Hughes is otherwise without remedy to obtain punitive damages, as such are not meted out by the Workers' Compensation Commission ․” Amended Complaint, para. 13.

In response, the defendant filed an identical motion to strike arguing, again, that the complaint must be stricken, as the added language did not cure the defect.  Plaintiff does not contest the characterization of his complaint as one stating a cause of action for common-law wrongful termination for violation of public policy.  Nor did plaintiff file any written opposition to the motion to strike.  At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel argued that the complaint is legally sufficient because plaintiff is otherwise without remedy because the workers' compensation commissioner cannot award punitive damages.  That makes the remedy inadequate, he argues.  For the following reasons, the court is not persuaded by plaintiff's argument and agrees with the defendant that, because the plaintiff has a statutory remedy, he cannot bring a claim for common-law wrongful termination.

To the extent that plaintiff alleges that “the post injury firing of Mr. Hughes was contrary to law, in violation of important public policy, and specifically contrary to C.G.S. § 31–290(a) and C.G.S. § 31–294(d), mean-spirited and unjust,” he has purported to allege a cause of action for common-law wrongful termination for violation of public policy.  See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Food, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).

In order to state a cause of action for common-law wrongful termination for violation of public policy, a plaintiff must allege facts showing, inter alia, (1) that the alleged conduct contravenes an important public policy;  and (2) that the plaintiff is “otherwise without remedy and that permitting the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go unvindicated.”  (Emphasis in original;  citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.  Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, 252 Conn. 153, 159–60, 745 A.2d 178 (2000).  In the instant case, the defendant correctly points out that one of the statutory grounds alleged in the complaint specifically authorizes suit for discharge or discrimination against persons claiming or exercising workers' compensation rights:

(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

(b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either:  (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discrimination or discharge.  The court may also award punitive damages.  Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be taxed by the court;  or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission alleging violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.  Upon receipt of any such complaint, the chairman shall select a commissioner to hear the complaint, provided any commissioner who has previously rendered any decision concerning the claim shall be excluded.  The hearing shall be held in the workers' compensation district where the employer has its principal office.  After the hearing, the commissioner shall send each party a written copy of his decision.  The commissioner may award the employee the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he otherwise would have been eligible if he had not been discriminated against or discharged.  Any employee who prevails in such a complaint shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees.  Any party aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the Appellate Court.

General Statutes § 31–290a (emphasis added.)

This statute clearly provides the plaintiff with a statutory remedy.  Carty v. High Precision, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Doc. No. CV 14–5034775 (June 3, 2015, Wilson, J.);  Coccagna v. Henderson Global Investors (North America), Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. CV 11–6018447 (November 22, 2011, Peck, J.).  And, in particular, as the emphasized portion above demonstrates, it allows for punitive damages.  Plaintiff's argument—that he does not have an adequate remedy because the workers' compensation commissioner is not authorized to grant punitive damages—is factitious because the statute specifically allows a remedy which includes the potential for punitive damages in a civil suit.

III

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge, Superior Court

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.