State of Connecticut v. Jean Jacques (2016)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OF JUNE 25, 2015

On February 8, 2016, the defendant, Jean Jacques, filed a motion to suppress statements he made during a videotaped interview with the Norwich Police Department on June 25, 2015.  The defendant claims that the statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to assistance of counsel as guaranteed in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article first, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.¹

The court held an evidentiary hearing on this matter on February 17, 2016.  Three witnesses testified at that hearing, Detective Anthony Gomes and Officer Nathaniel Tondreau, members of the Norwich Police Department, and the defendant.  The court also received and reviewed a video recording of the defendant's interview on June 25, 2015.  (Exhibit 1.) Based on the facts set forth below, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion to suppress is denied.²

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court credits the testimony of the two Norwich Police officers and finds the following facts based on that testimony and the videotape of the interview.  (Exhibit 1.)

1. On June 15, 2015, the defendant was arrested following a hand to hand sale of crack cocaine with a confidential informant and charged with the sale of narcotics.  The defendant was arraigned on June 16, 2015.  A public defender was appointed to represent him at that time and a $100,000 cash bond was set, which the defendant did not post.  He was therefore incarcerated on the pending charge when he wrote a letter to Detective Anthony Gomes requesting to speak with him.

2. On June 25, 2015, the defendant was interviewed by Gomes and Norwich Police Detective Joel Grispino regarding the murder investigation into the stabbing death of Casey Chadwick.  At the beginning of the interview, and prior to any questioning, Gomes confirmed with the defendant that he had requested to meet with the detectives about the murder investigation.  The defendant was asked to read aloud his Miranda rights ³ and initial next to each right on the form.  He did so and then also placed his initials on a different form agreeing to waive his rights.  Prior to questioning, Gomes also informed the defendant that he had a warrant for his arrest for the murder of Casey Chadwick, but that he was there to speak with the defendant at his request pursuant to the letter the defendant sent to Gomes.

3. Throughout the interview, the defendant was questioned with regard to the murder investigation.  When the defendant mentioned his narcotics charge, Detective Gomes returned the conversation to questions about the murder investigation.  Several times throughout the interview, Detective Gomes redirected the interview away from the narcotics transaction, for which the defendant had been arrested, and told the defendant that he was “not interested in any more drug stuff,” that he was “not trying to get [the defendant] on any drug charges” and that he was not interested in the drug case.  The interview lasted for approximately three hours and ended when the officers essentially concluded that the defendant had nothing more to say.

4. Despite having received and acknowledged his rights, at no time during the interview did the defendant seek to stop the interview or ask to have an attorney present during questioning.  The defendant testified at the hearing on February 17, 2016 that he had no problem understanding English or writing English and that he had no mental incapacities which would affect his ability to understand and communicate in English, other than an incident which occurred after these events in July 2015 when the defendant hit his head while incarcerated.

DISCUSSION

The defendant claims that at the time of the recorded interview with the Norwich Police on June 25, 2015, he was represented by counsel, specifically, the public defender appointed to represent him on his drug case, and that in the absence of that counsel, the defendant could not knowingly waive his Miranda rights.  Because the police questioned the defendant at the defendant's request about the murder investigation, and not about his pending drug charge, and because the defendant properly waived his right to have an attorney present during the interview, the motion to suppress is denied in all respects.

The United States Supreme Court has held “that the Sixth Amendment right is offense specific.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001).  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” ⁴  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 167–68.  “A defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he [has] not been charged [are] admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses.”  Id., 168.  The Court also stated that “when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.”  Id., 173.  Under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.2d 306 (1932), “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”

The crime of the sale of narcotics, for which the defendant had representation of counsel, is readily distinguishable under the Blockburger test from the crime of murder.  General Statutes § 21a–278(a), sale of narcotics, is violated by “[a]ny person who ․ sells ․ to another person ․ one-half ounce or more of cocaine in a free-base form ․” General Statutes § 53a–54a provides that “[a] person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person ․” Because each of these offenses requires proof of facts that the other does not, they are distinguishable under Blockburger.  Even if there is some factual connection between the charges, e.g., the state argued that the drug dealing activities of the defendant provided a motive for the murder, the two crimes themselves are nevertheless distinct.  See Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. 168.  Because the defendant was informed of his rights, properly waived his rights, and was being questioned about an offense that was distinguishable from the offense with which he was charged, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar the detectives from speaking with him at his request.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that the presence of counsel is not required, under article first, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution, when a defendant initiates contact with the police and has been properly advised of his Miranda rights.  State v. Piorkowski, 243 Conn. 205, 221, 700 A.2d 1146 (1997).  In that case the defendant, who had been charged with murder and who was represented by counsel on that charge, contacted the police to speak with them about the murder investigation.  Id., 210.  The defendant's counsel was neither contacted nor informed of the meeting.  Id. The court found that “article first, § 8, does not require the presence of counsel for a valid waiver of the right to counsel when the defendant himself initiates contact with the police and has been properly advised of his Miranda rights.”  Id., 221.  Moreover, in Piorkowski, the court stated that it had “․ rejected the ‘derivative’ right to counsel in holding that no state constitutional violation occurred when, at the time of interrogation, the police knew that the defendant was represented by counsel on an unrelated matter.”  243 Conn. 218 (citing State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 167–68, 434 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S.Ct. 789, 66 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980) [footnote omitted] ).

In this case, after being arrested and charged with the sale of narcotics, the defendant was interviewed by the police at his own request about the murder investigation.  The officers conducting the interview clearly informed the defendant that they were there to talk about the murder and not to talk about his drug case.  On a number of occasions, Detective Gomes rephrased questions or changed the direction of the conversation to avoid any discussion of the defendant's drug arrest.  As depicted in the video recording, at the outset of the interview, the defendant read aloud and initialed a form containing his rights.  He also initialed a second form waiving his rights.  The defendant does not claim that he was unable to read or understand the English language or that he was not able to understand the forms he signed and initialed.⁵  Rather, the defendant's sole claim is that he should have been specifically advised that the public defender appointed to represent him on his narcotics case could be present during any questioning of the defendant.⁶

Under article first, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution, the defendant initiated the contact with the police and validly waived his Miranda rights by signing the form.  The fact that the defendant was represented by counsel in the narcotics case was not an appearance by counsel in connection with the murder investigation, and “[t]he police were entitled to proceed with the interrogation upon receiving the defendant's valid waiver of his Miranda rights.”  State v. Derrico, supra, 181 Conn. 168.  Therefore, there was no requirement that the defendant be specifically advised that counsel representing him on another case could be present and the motion to suppress is denied.

For all the reasons set forth above, the motion to suppress is DENIED.

It is so ordered, this 4th day of May 2016.

Jongbloed, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. No memorandum of law in support of the motion was filed and the State did not file a memorandum in opposition to the motion..  FN1. No memorandum of law in support of the motion was filed and the State did not file a memorandum in opposition to the motion.

FN2. Prior to the start of trial on March 29, 2016, the court denied the motion and indicated that this written memorandum of decision would follow.  The evidence began on March 29, 2016 and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of murder on April 11, 2016..  FN2. Prior to the start of trial on March 29, 2016, the court denied the motion and indicated that this written memorandum of decision would follow.  The evidence began on March 29, 2016 and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of murder on April 11, 2016.

FN3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)..  FN3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

FN4. In this case, the actions of the police in informing the defendant that they had a warrant for his arrest for the murder of Casey Chadwick did not constitute the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 89–99 (2006) (right to counsel failed to attach upon the signing of an information);  State v. Falcon, 196 Conn. 557, 562 (1985) (“neither the request of a state's attorney, nor the action of a court in granting that request, converts an arrest warrant into an official accusation signaling the state's commitment to prosecute”)..  FN4. In this case, the actions of the police in informing the defendant that they had a warrant for his arrest for the murder of Casey Chadwick did not constitute the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 89–99 (2006) (right to counsel failed to attach upon the signing of an information);  State v. Falcon, 196 Conn. 557, 562 (1985) (“neither the request of a state's attorney, nor the action of a court in granting that request, converts an arrest warrant into an official accusation signaling the state's commitment to prosecute”).

FN5. The defendant specifically stated that he was not claiming to have any difficulty in communicating in English or that he failed to understand his rights..  FN5. The defendant specifically stated that he was not claiming to have any difficulty in communicating in English or that he failed to understand his rights.

FN6. In fact, the defendant was advised, when given his Miranda rights, that he had the right, among other things, to have an attorney present with him during questioning..  FN6. In fact, the defendant was advised, when given his Miranda rights, that he had the right, among other things, to have an attorney present with him during questioning.

Jongbloed, Barbara Bailey, J.