Kaitlin M. Syzmanski v. David Eveillard et al. (2016)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

The plaintiff, Kaitlin M.V. Syzmanski has brought this action against the defendants, David Eveillard, driver of a car she alleges injured her, and Emmanuel Alexander, owner of that car.  In the first two counts of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks damages from Eveillard based on allegations of negligence in the first count and recklessness, both common law and statutory, in the second count.  Eveillard has brought a motion to strike the second count on the grounds that it merely repeats the allegations of negligence and does not establish adequate grounds to make legal findings of recklessness.

The first count alleges that the defendant caused the accident at the intersection of Route 32 and Trading Cove Drive in Montville, Ct. on November 1, 2013, by, among other allegations, failing to obey a red traffic signal, not yielding the right of way to the plaintiff, operating at an unreasonable rate of speed, not keeping an adequate lookout, failing to keep a safe distance between vehicles and operating a vehicle without a driver's license or learner's permit.

The second count, which the plaintiff seeks to strike, includes allegations of common law and statutory recklessness based on charges that:

(a) That the plaintiff intentionally disregarded the red traffic light “because he was unfamiliar the area in which he was traveling”;

(b) That he operated his motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed given the condition of the road, exposing the plaintiff to extreme risk of danger;

(c) That he intentionally operated a motor vehicle when he knew or should have known that he did not have the required skills to do so and knew or should have known he was exposing the plaintiff to great risks.

The court has reviewed the allegations in the second count, and with the exceptions noted below, denies the motion.  In assessing a motion to strike, the court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint “․ in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․” Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193, 212–13 (2000).  “If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  Peter–Michael Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 271 (1998).

The fact that some of the elements supporting the recklessness counts are also a basis for the negligence counts does not require that the recklessness counts be struck, provided that, if proven, they would independently support a finding of recklessness.  See Webster v. Bell, 2006 WL 2865724 (Sup.Ct.JDNL).  In the case at hand, paragraphs 6(c) and (d) allege that the plaintiff was reckless in that he operated his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed, given the conditions of the road, when he knew or should have known that said conduct would expose the plaintiff to extreme risk of danger and injury, constituting recklessness under both common law and C.G.S. 14–218a.  In paragraph 6(e), the complaint alleges that the defendant operated a motor vehicle when he knew or should have known that he lacked the skills do so safely and that such conduct exposed the plaintiff to extreme risk and injury.

The court finds that these assertions achieve a level of specificity required to substantiate a violation of C.G.S. 14–295, and as to the above paragraphs, the motion to strike is denied.

However, the wording of paragraphs 6(a) and (b)—the first claiming common-law recklessness and the second statutory recklessness—is troublesome.  They allege that the defendant “․ intentionally disregarded the red traffic light because he was unfamiliar with the area in which he was traveling and entered the intersection when he knew or should have known that the conduct would expose the plaintiff ․” to extreme risk and danger.  These allegations mix intentionality—disregarding the traffic light—with negligence—”because he was unfamiliar with the area”—in a confusing manner, and it is not clear that if proven, they would constitute reckless behavior meriting double or treble damages.  The allegations in paragraphs 6(c) and (d) appear to cover this alleged behavior in a clearer manner that would not confuse a jury regarding the level of knowledge or disregard of risk necessary to establish recklessness.  Accordingly the motion to strike those two paragraphs is granted.

Bates, J.

Bates, Timothy D., J.