II v. CT (2016)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (Motion to Reargue/Reconsider # 147, Short Calendar, January 25, 2016)

In a Memorandum of Decision dated December 24, 2015, the court denied the defendant, William St. Onge's, motion for summary judgment as to Count IV.C, alleging civil conspiracy.¹  Pending before the court is a motion to reargue/reconsider filed by the defendant on January 12, 2016.  The motion seeks reconsideration of the court's decision to deny summary judgment as to Count IV.C. Argument was heard on January 25, 2016.

The motion to reconsider, as to Count IV.C, is granted.  As a preliminary matter, “[t]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferri v. Powell–Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 236, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).  In the present action, the defendant has failed to establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading.  Therefore, Count IV.C will be treated as a motion to strike.

“The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

On reconsideration this court finds that the contradictory factual allegations in the operative complaint render Count IV.C legally insufficient.  Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the operative complaint comprise Count IV.C. Paragraph 58 incorporates the prior paragraphs of the operative complaint into Count IV.C. Specifically, the incorporated paragraph 43 states, “Plaintiff contends that Chimento, Benway, St. Onge, and other servants and or agents of the Town, in whole or in part, conspired amongst themselves and with or not with Willimantic Waste Inc.;  and formed an agreement to ensure that Plaintiff would not be reappointed as Transfer Station Operator so that Willimantic would become the new awardee.”  Paragraph 59 states, “Plaintiff will evince at trial that St. Onge's tortious conduct was made in concert with Benway and/or Chimento, and/or with other unnamed agents of the Town.” The allegations in paragraph 59 directly contradict the allegations of paragraph 43, which were incorporated into Count IV.C. The discrepancy between the allegations is significant as one paragraph alleges a conspiracy with a third party, while the other paragraph limits the conspiracy between agents and/or employees of the Town. This contradiction renders Count IV.C legally insufficient.  “A motion to strike admits, like a common-law demurrer, only well pleaded allegations ․ and contradictory allegations are not facts well pleaded ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Evans v. Tiger Claw, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07–5013346–S (July 15, 2009, Corradino, J.).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is treated as a motion to strike, and the motion to strike Count IV.C is granted.

THE COURT

CALMAR, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. As noted in the Memorandum of Decision, St. Onge is not the only defendant in this matter.  The other defendants include:  the Town of Killingly (the Town) and Town employees Bruce Benway and Bruce Chimento.  For the purposes of this order, however, St. Onge will be referred to as the defendant..  FN1. As noted in the Memorandum of Decision, St. Onge is not the only defendant in this matter.  The other defendants include:  the Town of Killingly (the Town) and Town employees Bruce Benway and Bruce Chimento.  For the purposes of this order, however, St. Onge will be referred to as the defendant.

Calmar, Harry E., J.