II v. CT (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

(Motion for Summary Judgment # 113, Short Calendar, September 8, 2015)

The defendant William St. Onge moves for summary judgment on the ground that the amended complaint, on its face, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the defect is such that it cannot be cured, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹

FACTS

On May 28, 2015, the plaintiff, Russell Lavigne, II, filed an amended complaint against the defendants, the Town of Killingly (Town), Bruce Chimento, Bruce Benway, and William St. Onge.² In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.  The plaintiff and the Town entered into a business arrangement in 2002, most of which was reduced to writing.  The contracts between the plaintiff and the Town called for the plaintiff to:  (1) operate the Town's recycling plant from 2002 to 2008, which included an oral agreement to consider renewal (first agreement), and (2) create, construct, and manage a processing plant (second agreement).  The plaintiff alleges that the first agreement was terminated by unlawful and dishonest means and for improper and unconscionable purposes.  Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that the second agreement was prematurely terminated because the Town successfully filed an eviction suit that was based on “trumped up” allegations of lease violations.

The six-count amended complaint alleges, in relevant part, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) against St. Onge. In count three of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the Town, Chimento, and Benway tortuously interfered with the plaintiff's contractual right, under the first agreement, to operate the recycling plant.  The plaintiff asserts that the Town terminated his contractual rights and put the operation out for public bid.  Further, the plaintiff alleges that, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was the low bidder, the contract was awarded to Willimantic Waste, Inc. (Willimantic Waste).  The plaintiff further alleges that it was Chimento that filled out the bid on behalf of Willimantic Waste while concurrently declaring it the low bid.  The plaintiff contends that St. Onge became a participant in the tortious interference by failing to counsel against the unlawful actions of Benway and Chimento and that St. Onge had a duty to assure that his client, the Town, and its employees/agents operated in a lawful and objective manner.  The plaintiff alleges that, but for St. Onge's breach of duty, the tortious interference would not have occurred.

Count four of the plaintiff's amended complaint alleges civil conspiracy against St. Onge. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that St. Onge, Chimento, Benway, and other servants/agents of the Town conspired amongst themselves and with or not with Willimantic Waste to ensure that the plaintiff would not be reappointed as the transfer station operator.³  The plaintiff further alleges that the Town, through St. Onge, wrongfully terminated the first agreement and the plaintiff's right to occupy the area containing the processing plant under the second agreement.  The plaintiff alleges that the termination was achieved by claiming that a hazard or environmental problem had been created, when the Town and St. Onge were aware that, at the time the eviction suit was filed, the State of Connecticut had certified that no such problem existed.

Count five of the amended complaint alleges violation of CUTPA, in that the Town wrongfully evicted the plaintiff from the buildings that the plaintiff constructed at his cost with the understanding that he was entitled to their occupancy throughout the duration of the twenty-year lease period.  The plaintiff further alleges that St. Onge's failure to properly curtail the unlawful acts of the other defendants thwarted the plaintiff's ability to comply with the terms of the contract.

On June 24, 2013, St. Onge filed a motion for summary judgment of counts three C, four C, and five C of the revised complaint.⁴  St. Onge submitted a memorandum of law in support of his motion.  The memorandum is accompanied by selected sections of the General Charter of the Town of Killingly.  The plaintiff filed multiple objections to St. Onge's motion for summary judgment.  On July 2, 2015, the plaintiff objected to the motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds, arguing that St. Onge was required to obtain the court's permission to file a motion for summary judgment because no scheduling order existed and the case has not been assigned for trial.  The plaintiff submitted a memorandum in support of his objection.  On July 21, 2015, the plaintiff objected to St. Onge's motion for summary judgment on substantive grounds, arguing that there is a material question of fact as to whether St. Onge was acting within the scope of his authority as Town Attorney.  The plaintiff submitted a memorandum in support of his objection.  St. Onge submitted a reply memorandum in response to the plaintiff's objection to summary judgment on July 23, 2015.  Further, the plaintiff submitted a response to St. Onge's reply memorandum on July 27, 2015.  This matter was heard at short calendar on September 8, 2015, where the parties confirmed that the plaintiff's procedural objection had been withdrawn.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ․ However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ․ of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment.”  (Citation omitted;  footnote omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534–35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 319–20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).  “Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferri v. Powell–Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact ․ but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011).  “Practice Book § 17–44 states that a motion for summary judgment may be filed ‘at any time’ prior to assignment for trial.”  Emmerson v. Super 8 Motel–Stamford, 59 Conn.App. 462, 469, 757 A.2d 651 (2000).

“[A]lthough, generally, the device used to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings is motion to strike;  see Practice Book § 10–39;  our case law [has] sanctioned the use of a motion for summary judgment to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading if a party has waived its right to file a motion to strike by filing a responsive pleading.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 306 Conn. 535 n.10. “[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading ․ [The Supreme Court] has recognized that there are competing concerns at issue when considering the propriety of using a motion for summary judgment for such a purpose.  On the one hand, [i]f it is clear on the face of the complaint that it is legally insufficient and that an opportunity to amend it would not [cure that insufficiency], we can perceive no reason why [a] defendant should be prohibited from claiming that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and from invoking the only available procedure for raising such a claim after the pleadings are closed ․ It is incumbent on a plaintiff to allege some recognizable cause of action in his complaint ․ [Indeed], [the Supreme Court] repeatedly has recognized that the desire for judicial efficiency inherent in the summary judgment procedure would be frustrated if parties were forced to try a case where there was no real issue to be tried ․ On the other hand, the use of a motion for summary judgment instead of a motion to strike may be unfair to the nonmoving party because [t]he granting of a defendant's motion for summary judgment puts [a] plaintiff out of court ․ [while the] granting of a motion to strike allows [a] plaintiff to replead his or her case.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferri v. Powell–Ferri, supra, 317 Conn. 236–37;  see American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 124–25, 971 A.2d 17 (2009) (holding that where the moving party fails to demonstrate that, if the nonmoving party were permitted to replead, the legal deficiency of the claim underlying a motion for summary judgment would not be cured, the trial court should treat the motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike).

I. Count Three C—Tortious Interference against St. Onge

In count three C of the amended complaint the plaintiff alleges that St. Onge tortuously interfered with the plaintiff's contractual right to operate the recycling center.  “This court has long recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights or other business relations ․ While our cases have not focused with particularity on what acts of interference are tortious, we have made it clear that not every act that disturbs a contract or business expectancy is actionable ․” Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 152, 166, 714 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516 (1998).  “A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish:  (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship;  (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship;  (3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship;  (4) that the interference was tortious;  and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.”  Metcoff v. Lebovics, 123 Conn.App. 512, 521, 2 A.3d 942 (2010).

“However, it is well-settled that the tort of interference with contractual relations only lies when a third party adversely affects the contractual relations of two other parties.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., supra, 49 Conn.App. 168.  “[T]here can be no intentional interference with contractual relations by someone who is directly or indirectly a party to the contract.  [T]he general rule is that the agent may not be charged with having interfered with a contract of the agent's principal.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Appleton v. Board of Education, 53 Conn.App. 252, 267, 730 A.2d 88, rev'd on other grounds, 254 Conn. 205, 757 A.2d 1059 (1999).  “[A]n agent acting legitimately within the scope of his authority cannot be held liable for interfering with or inducing his principal to breach a contract between his principal and a third party, because to hold him liable would be, in effect, to hold the corporation liable in tort for breaching its own contract ․ [the agent] could be held liable for such interference or inducement if he did not act legitimately within his scope of duty but used the corporate power improperly for personal gain.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., supra, 49 Conn.App. 168.⁵

In his motion for summary judgment, St. Onge seeks to apply the general rule, that as an agent of the Town, his principal, he may not be charged with having interfered with a contract where the Town was a party.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the general rule does not apply because whether St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment as Town Attorney is a question of fact that cannot be decided on summary judgment.  In reply, St. Onge argues that the revised complaint does not allege any conduct that is outside the scope of his employment.  Specifically, the defendant argues that all of the plaintiff's allegations as to the defendant's behavior under the tortious interference complaint could not have been carried out unless he was acting within the scope of his employment.

“In determining whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment, courts look to whether the employee's conduct:  (1) occurs primarily within the employer's authorized time and space limits;  (2) is of the type that the employee is employed to perform;  and (3) is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.”  Harp v. King, 266 Conn. 747, 782–83, 835 A.2d 953 (2003).  In Metcoff v. Lebovics, supra, 123 Conn.App. 522, the court, in granting the defendants' motion to strike, held that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that “the defendants' conduct in refusing to issue ․ shares of stock to the plaintiffs was outside the scope of their duties as officers and directors ․” Instead finding that, “the plaintiffs have ascribed sinister motivations to conduct taken in the normal course of corporate management ․ [T]here are no allegations that these decisions were concealed or made at a time, place or manner other than in the course of business normally transacted by corporate management.  Conclusory allegations of improper motivation are not sufficient in the absence of well pleaded facts to support them.”  Id., 523.

The present case has parallels to Metcoff v. Lebovics, as the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts indicating that St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment.  The revised complaint alleges that St. Onge “had a duty to assure that the Town, his client, and its employees and agents operated in a lawful, objective manner.”  Further, the complaint alleges “that but for Attorney St. Onge's neglect ․ or complicity, the tortious interference would not have occurred ․ [and that] by failing to counsel against the unlawful actions taken by [the][d]efendants Benway and Chimento ․ [St. Onge] became a participant in the tortious interference ․” Finally the amended complaint alleges that St. Onge “had an affirmative duty to the Town to identify malfeasance on the part of Town Agents and Employees.”  As plead, there are no allegations to support that claim that St. Onge was acting outside his role as Town Attorney.  The complaint merely alleges that St. Onge had duties to the Town that he either neglected or failed to provide appropriate counsel for.  As established in Metcoff v. Lebovics, the conclusory allegations of improper motive behind St. Onge's decision to take no action in response to the employees' conduct are not sufficient to support a claim that St. Onge acted outside the scope of his employment in the absence of well pleaded facts to support such claim.

While St. Onge contends that his alleged actions could not have occurred outside of his role as Town Attorney, he has not met the burden of proof required when bringing a motion for summary judgment based on the sufficiency of the pleadings.  In bringing a motion for summary judgment, as opposed to a motion to strike, St. Onge asks the court to determine that the tortious interference claim is legally insufficient because as an agent of the Town acting within the scope of his employment, he was a party to the contract that was allegedly interfered with, therefore negating any claim of tortious interference.  By bringing a motion for summary judgment as opposed to a motion to strike St. Onge necessarily asserts the defect in the tortious interference claim cannot be cured by repleading.  However, St. Onge has failed to show that the plaintiff cannot cure the defect in the tortious interference claim by repleading.

The Supreme Court has held that, “[the court] did not intend to suggest ․ that the moving party is required to speculate as to any hypothetical facts or theories that might save the opposing party's pleading, [in situations where] ․ the [moving party] was made aware of the [nonmoving party's] theory as to the [claims] ․ the trial court should have treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike.”  (Emphasis in original.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, supra, 292 Conn. 125.  The plaintiff has represented that the tortious interference claim does not fall under the general rule that agents are parties to their principal's contract, arguing that St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment when the alleged interference occurred.  As such, the motion for summary judgment as to count three C shall be treated as a motion to strike, and is granted.⁶

II. Count Four C—Civil Conspiracy against St. Onge

In count four C of the amended complaint the plaintiff alleges civil conspiracy against the defendant in that St. Onge's “tortious conduct was made in concert with Benway and/or Chimento, and/or with other unnamed agents of the Town.” “The [elements] of a civil action for conspiracy are:  (1) a combination between two or more persons, (2) to do a criminal or an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means, (3) an act done by one or more of the conspirators pursuant to the scheme and in furtherance of the object, (4) which act results in damage to the plaintiff.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Harp v. King, supra, 266 Conn. 779.  The plaintiff contends that Benway, Chimento, and St. Onge, among others, conspired to ensure that the plaintiff would not be reappointed as the operator of the transfer station.

St. Onge argues that the plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim fails because all of the alleged conspirators are agents/representatives of the Town and, therefore, cannot conspire.  Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, “employees [of the same corporation] acting within the scope of their employment cannot conspire with each other or with the corporation that employs them.”  Id., 777.⁷  “The same principles that preclude a conspiracy claim between principal and agent apply to a claim of conspiracy among employees acting on behalf of the same corporate entity.”  Id., 782.  The plaintiff, in turn, argues that the language of the revised complaint indicates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment as Town attorney.⁸

St. Onge argues that based on the allegations in the amended complaint, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the civil conspiracy claim.  St. Onge's argument hinges on the first element of civil conspiracy.  He argues that because his alleged conduct was as an agent of the Town, he cannot be held to have interfered with a contractual relationship between his principal, the Town, and another party, here, the plaintiff.  Though the plaintiff alleges a number of situations in which the named employees/agents of the Town conspired amongst themselves and/or other employees/agents of the Town, he has also alleged that the defendant and other town employees conspired with a third party, Willimantic Waste.⁹  Specifically, paragraph 43 of the amended complaint states that Chimento, Benway, St. Onge and other servants/agents of the Town “conspired amongst themselves and with or not with Willimantic Waste, Inc.;  and formed an agreement to ensure that [the] [p]laintiff would not be reappointed as Transfer Station Operator so that Willimantic [Waste] would become the new awardee.”  There is no evidence on the record that refutes this allegation.¹⁰  Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to count four C is denied.

III. Count Five C—Violation of CUTPA against St. Onge

In count five C the plaintiff alleges a violation of CUTPA, codified as General Statutes § 42–110b.  In his motion for summary judgment, St. Onge argues that as an attorney acting in a professional capacity in representing and acting on behalf of his client, he is not subject to the provisions of CUTPA.  Therefore, St. Onge asserts that the claim must fail as a matter of law.  Section 42–110b(a) provides:  “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”  The Supreme Court has found that “in general, CUTPA applies to the conduct of attorneys ․ The statute's regulation of the conduct of any trade or commerce does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law ․ Nevertheless, [courts] have declined to hold that every provision of CUTPA permits regulation of every aspect of the practice ․ [O]nly the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law are covered by CUTPA.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  Suffield Development Associates Limited Partnership v. National Loan Investors, 260 Conn. 766, 781, 802 A.2d 44 (2002).

Accordingly, “the most significant question in considering a CUTPA claim against an attorney is whether the allegedly improper conduct is part of the attorney's professional representation of a client or is part of the entrepreneurial aspect of practicing law.”  Id. “The entrepreneurial exception is just that, a specific exception from CUTPA immunity for a well-defined set of activities—advertising' and bill collection, for example.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.;  see also Haynes v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34–38, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (establishing solicitation of business and billing as entrepreneurial, but claims involving competency and strategy as part of professional representation).  Additionally, “[p]rofessional negligence, or malpractice, does not fall under CUTPA.”  Anderson v. Schoenhorn, 89 Conn.App. 666, 674, 874 A.2d 798 (2005).

In the present case, the plaintiff's allegations against St. Onge do not fall within the entrepreneurial exception that would allow the CUTPA claim to move forward.  The plaintiff's claims are directed toward St. Onge's conduct while he was acting as Town Attorney.  Specifically, the plaintiff argues that St. Onge failed in his affirmative duty to the Town to admonish the behavior of Benway and Chimento and that St. Onge failed to “properly curtail the unlawful acts which thwarted [the][p]laintiff's ability to comply with the [c]ontract terms.”  The allegations clearly establish that the CUTPA claim is based upon St. Onge's professional representation of his client, the Town, and not on an entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law.  Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five C is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court treats the defendant's motion as to count three (C) as a motion to strike, and grants it.  The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count four (C), and grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count five (C).

THE COURT

CALMAR, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendants in this matter include:  the Town of Killingly, Town employees Bruce Chimento, who serves as the Town Engineer, and Bruce Benway, who serves as the Town Manager, and William St. Onge, who serves as the Town Attorney.  This motion for summary judgment was brought solely by St. Onge, who will be referred to as the defendant in this memorandum..  FN1. The defendants in this matter include:  the Town of Killingly, Town employees Bruce Chimento, who serves as the Town Engineer, and Bruce Benway, who serves as the Town Manager, and William St. Onge, who serves as the Town Attorney.  This motion for summary judgment was brought solely by St. Onge, who will be referred to as the defendant in this memorandum.

FN2. Though the motion for summary judgment was brought by St. Onge, the four defendants will collectively be referred to as the defendants in this memorandum..  FN2. Though the motion for summary judgment was brought by St. Onge, the four defendants will collectively be referred to as the defendants in this memorandum.

FN3. The amended complaint is unclear as to whether the plaintiff is referring to the recycling plant which is the subject of the first agreement or the processing plant which is the subject of the second agreement..  FN3. The amended complaint is unclear as to whether the plaintiff is referring to the recycling plant which is the subject of the first agreement or the processing plant which is the subject of the second agreement.

FN4. The other defendants in this matter, the Town, Benway, and Chimento, filed a motion to strike (# 120) various counts of the revised complaint on June 29, 2015.  The plaintiff objected to the motion to strike on August 31, 2015 (# 139).  In a separate decision the court has granted the defendants' motion to strike as to count three (D) and count five, and denied the motion to strike as to count four and count six..  FN4. The other defendants in this matter, the Town, Benway, and Chimento, filed a motion to strike (# 120) various counts of the revised complaint on June 29, 2015.  The plaintiff objected to the motion to strike on August 31, 2015 (# 139).  In a separate decision the court has granted the defendants' motion to strike as to count three (D) and count five, and denied the motion to strike as to count four and count six.

FN5. It must be noted that Connecticut Appellate Courts have recognized an attorney-client relationship as one of agency.  Specifically stating, “[t]he law in Connecticut is [that] the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship.”  Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 633, 850 A.2d 145 (2004);  see also Jones v. Ippoliti, 52 Conn.App. 199, 210–11, 727 A.2d 713 (1999)..  FN5. It must be noted that Connecticut Appellate Courts have recognized an attorney-client relationship as one of agency.  Specifically stating, “[t]he law in Connecticut is [that] the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship.”  Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 633, 850 A.2d 145 (2004);  see also Jones v. Ippoliti, 52 Conn.App. 199, 210–11, 727 A.2d 713 (1999).

FN6. See St. Pierre v. Plainfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV–13–6007280–S (August 11, 2015, Boland, J.) (treating the Town of Plainfield's motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike while establishing that “however difficult it may be [for the plaintiff to overcome barrier of governmental immunity], [the] plaintiff should not summarily be precluded from attempting to do so.”.  FN6. See St. Pierre v. Plainfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV–13–6007280–S (August 11, 2015, Boland, J.) (treating the Town of Plainfield's motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike while establishing that “however difficult it may be [for the plaintiff to overcome barrier of governmental immunity], [the] plaintiff should not summarily be precluded from attempting to do so.”

FN7. The application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine pertains to the first element of a claim for civil conspiracy requiring that a plaintiff prove “a combination between two or more persons.”  Harp v. King, supra, 266 Conn. 779..  FN7. The application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine pertains to the first element of a claim for civil conspiracy requiring that a plaintiff prove “a combination between two or more persons.”  Harp v. King, supra, 266 Conn. 779.

FN8. The court need not rule upon the merits of the argument that St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment as the motion for summary judgment as to count four is denied on other grounds..  FN8. The court need not rule upon the merits of the argument that St. Onge was acting outside the scope of his employment as the motion for summary judgment as to count four is denied on other grounds.

FN9. The plaintiff has alleged that Chimento, Benway, St. Onge and other servants and/or agents of the Town conspired and formed an agreement to ensure that the plaintiff would not be reappointed as the operator of the transfer station.  The plaintiff further alleges, that he will “evince at trial that St. Onge's tortious conduct was made in concert with Benway and/or Chimento, and/or with other unnamed agents of the Town.”.  FN9. The plaintiff has alleged that Chimento, Benway, St. Onge and other servants and/or agents of the Town conspired and formed an agreement to ensure that the plaintiff would not be reappointed as the operator of the transfer station.  The plaintiff further alleges, that he will “evince at trial that St. Onge's tortious conduct was made in concert with Benway and/or Chimento, and/or with other unnamed agents of the Town.”

FN10. “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820–21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015)..  FN10. “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820–21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).

Calmar, Harry E., J.