James Swaney et al. v. Palaez Estrella et al. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE (# # 113, 115, 119)

The March 10, 2015, complaint in this case has six counts.  In each of three motor vehicle accidents alleged, one or both of the plaintiffs was injured when a defendant's vehicle struck his or their vehicle from behind.  In counts one and two, plaintiff James Swaney sues defendants Palaez Estrella and Estrella Cleaners, LLC, respectively, as driver and owner of the vehicle which struck the rear of his vehicle on May 10, 2013.  In counts three and four, plaintiffs James Swaney and Angela Daniels, respectively, sue defendant Julie Balsley as driver and owner of a vehicle which, on May 16, 2013, struck the rear of a vehicle driven by Swaney, in which Daniels was a passenger.  In counts five and six, Swaney and Daniels, respectively, sue defendant Gregory Lamb as driver and owner of a vehicle which, On September 19, 2014, struck the rear of a vehicle driven by Swaney, in which Daniels was again a passenger.  In each of the counts in which Swaney is plaintiff, and in each of the counts in which Daniels is plaintiff, injury to the respective plaintiff's back and/or backbone (spine) and nervous system is alleged.  Those allegations are the facts for present purposes.  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).

Each of the defendants has moved to strike, for misjoinder, each of the four counts in which it is not named:  the two Estrella defendants' motion # 113 was filed May 15, 2015;  Balsley's motion # 115 was filed on June 1, 2015;  and Lamb's motion # 119 was filed on June 12, 2015,¹ The plaintiffs filed separate objections and one brief in opposition to the defendants' motions to strike, which were all argued on June 29, 2015.  Though the details of the three accidents and the outcomes sought by the three motions differ,² the motions raise substantially identical claims and legal issues and share a general objective, i.e., to limit this case to claims arising from one alleged motor vehicle accident.  In particular, each motion claims, essentially, that the counts against the other defendants have no connection, or no sufficient connection, to the counts against the movant.  The court finds it appropriate to rule on the motions together.

Crucial to the consideration of the present motions is the requirement that the court “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).  In this process, the court considers what is alleged broadly, not narrowly.  Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

General Statutes § 52–97 provides, in pertinent part, “[i]n any civil action ․ if several causes of action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be brought to recover, either ․ or (7) upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.  The several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes, and ․ shall affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial ․” ³ § 10–21(a) of the Practice Book is substantially identical.  In essence, § 52–97 authorizes joinder of causes of action which a) are within one of the seven listed categories; ⁴  b) “affect all the parties to the action, and [c) do] not require different places of trial.”  See Mills v. Rita H. Carter Revocable Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–12–6015038–S (February 19, 2013) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 605].⁵  Because it is not claimed that any of the six counts cannot be tried in this judicial district, only the first two factors need to be discussed.

Construing the complaint in favor of its sufficiency, including as to joinder of claims and defendants, in this case requires liberal interpretation of the phrase in General Statutes § 52–97(7), “arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.”  The court cannot accept the movants' shared claim that this part of the statute, and of the rules of practice, should be interpreted to mean “[arising] out of the same transaction or occurrence” as the other claims with which a claim is joined.  Instead, the law regarding motions to strike requires interpretation of “arising out of the same ․ transactions connected with the same subject of action” to focus first on the subject of the action.  If the facts provable in the complaint would support joinder, the motion to strike must be denied.  See Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991) (if facts provable under expressed and implied allegations support a cause of action, motion to strike must be denied).

Viewing the complaint to sustain joinder if reasonably possible, if the court finds a common subject of the action connecting the transactions (also interpreted liberally), i.e., the events from which the claims arise, the plaintiff will have pled claims within one of the seven provisions of § 52–97, to wit, § 52–97(7).  In this case, that common subject is the plaintiff Swaney's injuries to his back and nervous system caused, variously, by the three accidents.  That the accidents, and therefore counts one, two, three and five, are connected in this way is obvious.  That the second accident on May 16, 2013, and the third accident, on September 19, 2014, are connected to Swaney's claimed back and nervous system injuries connect those accidents—and therefore Daniels's claims in counts four and six—to the common subject.  (If Daniels's claims were stricken from Swaney's claims, there would arise a chance of conflicting verdicts—an undesirable outcome the avoidance of which supports the present ruling.  See Mills v. Rita H. Carter Revocable Trust, supra (noting that, in Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 747 A.2d 32 (2000), separate juries might have arrived at inconsistent verdicts).

Turning to the second basic requirement for joinder, that each joined claim “affect all the parties to the action,” this requirement is also subject to interpretation favoring joinder, if reasonably possible.  That requirement is met in this case because, contrary to the movants' strict interpretation of “affect all the parties,” each party to this action is affected by each claim in the fundamental sense that, there being injuries of the same nature (with other injuries) to both plaintiffs, under General Statutes § 52–572h(f), the extent of negligence of each party claimed to have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries is determined by the trier of fact.  Card v. State, supra, 57 Conn.App. 143.  In Card, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's setting aside a verdict in one of three automobile accident cases which had been tried together.  Although joinder was not the issue on appeal, “Card is helpful [in considering a motion to strike for misjoinder] in that it resulted in approval of a single jury's hearing the claims against multiple defendants notwithstanding the unique circumstances creating liability on each of their parts.”  Orengo v. Leger, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV–14–6008529–S (November 24, 2014) [59 Conn. L. Rptr. 422].  The counterpart to this is the concern that separate juries might arrive at inconsistent verdicts.  See Mills v. Rita H. Carter Revocable Trust, supra.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motions to strike are all denied.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiffs object to consideration of Lamb's motion because it was filed after the plaintiffs moved for Lamb's default for failure to plead.  Because the latter motion had not been granted, Lamb's motion to strike was timely..  FN1. The plaintiffs object to consideration of Lamb's motion because it was filed after the plaintiffs moved for Lamb's default for failure to plead.  Because the latter motion had not been granted, Lamb's motion to strike was timely.

FN2. If the court granted each of the three motions, or even any two of them, all six counts of the complaint would be stricken.  In view of the present ruling, the court need not analyze the propriety of a defendant moving under Practice Book §§ 11–3 and 10–39 to strike counts against other defendants..  FN2. If the court granted each of the three motions, or even any two of them, all six counts of the complaint would be stricken.  In view of the present ruling, the court need not analyze the propriety of a defendant moving under Practice Book §§ 11–3 and 10–39 to strike counts against other defendants.

FN3. Sec. 52–97, provides as follows:  “In any civil action the plaintiff may include in his complaint both legal and equitable rights and causes of action, and demand both legal and equitable remedies;  but, if several causes of action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be brought to recover, either (1) upon contract, express or implied, or (2) for injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either, including a conversion of property to the defendant's use, or (3) for injuries to character, or (4) upon claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of the same, or (5) upon claims to recover personal property specifically, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, or (6) claims arising by virtue of a contract or by operation of law in favor of or against a party in some representative or fiduciary capacity, or (7) upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.  The several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes, and ․ shall affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial ․;  and, in any case in which several causes of action are joined in the same complaint ․ if it appears to the court that they cannot all be conveniently heard together, the court may order a separate trial of any such cause of action or may direct that any one or more of them be expunged from the complaint ․”.  FN3. Sec. 52–97, provides as follows:  “In any civil action the plaintiff may include in his complaint both legal and equitable rights and causes of action, and demand both legal and equitable remedies;  but, if several causes of action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be brought to recover, either (1) upon contract, express or implied, or (2) for injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either, including a conversion of property to the defendant's use, or (3) for injuries to character, or (4) upon claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of the same, or (5) upon claims to recover personal property specifically, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, or (6) claims arising by virtue of a contract or by operation of law in favor of or against a party in some representative or fiduciary capacity, or (7) upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.  The several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes, and ․ shall affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial ․;  and, in any case in which several causes of action are joined in the same complaint ․ if it appears to the court that they cannot all be conveniently heard together, the court may order a separate trial of any such cause of action or may direct that any one or more of them be expunged from the complaint ․”

FN4. The court views “[t]he several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes” as meaning that each cause of action in a complaint must be of the same class within § 52–97 as each other cause of action.  That is because otherwise—i.e., if the quoted phrase means combined causes of action can fit any of the seven categories—the phrase would be tautological, given the disjunctive list of seven classes, and not of any separate, particular and clarifying effect.  For this reason, and because Swaney's claims for injuries to his person are not directly affected by Daniels's claims for injuries to her person, the court does not find analysis of § 52–97(2), the category of claims “for injuries ․ to [one's] person,” helpful.  However, it is not necessary to discuss which interpretation of the phrase is correct because all six counts in the complaint fall within § 52–97(7) and Practice Book § 10–21(a)(7)..  FN4. The court views “[t]he several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes” as meaning that each cause of action in a complaint must be of the same class within § 52–97 as each other cause of action.  That is because otherwise—i.e., if the quoted phrase means combined causes of action can fit any of the seven categories—the phrase would be tautological, given the disjunctive list of seven classes, and not of any separate, particular and clarifying effect.  For this reason, and because Swaney's claims for injuries to his person are not directly affected by Daniels's claims for injuries to her person, the court does not find analysis of § 52–97(2), the category of claims “for injuries ․ to [one's] person,” helpful.  However, it is not necessary to discuss which interpretation of the phrase is correct because all six counts in the complaint fall within § 52–97(7) and Practice Book § 10–21(a)(7).

FN5. In Mills, the court applied the same first two factors—are the claims within one of the seven § 52–97 categories and do they affect all parties.  The court did not discuss the “require different places of trial” factor in the statutory sense, but did discuss the court's discretion to sever cases for convenience.  In this case, the defendants clearly claim inconvenience in trying the three accident claims together, but the court finds the defendants' preference insufficient to prevent the allocation of liability, if any, between the defendants by one jury.  See Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 143, 747 A.2d 32 (2000)..  FN5. In Mills, the court applied the same first two factors—are the claims within one of the seven § 52–97 categories and do they affect all parties.  The court did not discuss the “require different places of trial” factor in the statutory sense, but did discuss the court's discretion to sever cases for convenience.  In this case, the defendants clearly claim inconvenience in trying the three accident claims together, but the court finds the defendants' preference insufficient to prevent the allocation of liability, if any, between the defendants by one jury.  See Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 143, 747 A.2d 32 (2000).

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.