Steven Hyppolite v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 122)

On September 23, 2014, the plaintiff, Steven Hyppolite, filed a six-count amended complaint (the complaint) against the defendant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company.  Counts one and two allege the defendant's failure to pay the plaintiff underinsured and uninsured motorist benefits compensation, respectively.  Count three, which incorporates count one, and count four, which incorporates count three, seek damages and exemplary damages, respectively, for alleged violations of both the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), generally for the defendant's alleged failure to negotiate fairly about, and to pay the plaintiff, underinsured motorist benefits.  Count five, which incorporates count two, and count six, which incorporates count five, seek damages and exemplary damages, respectively, for alleged violations of CUIPA and CUTPA, for the defendant's alleged failure to negotiate fairly about, and to pay the plaintiff, his claim for uninsured motorist benefits.¹

On April 6, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts, with several exhibits,² on the ground that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff filed this action beyond the applicable three-year statutes of limitations and insurance policy limit on suit.  On May 5, 2015, the plaintiff filed a brief, with exhibits,³ in opposition to the motion, to which the defendant replied on June 3, 2015.⁴  The motion was argued on June 22, 2015.

FACTS

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the submissions in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).  Statements that are merely conclusions are not evidence.  See Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).  Viewing the parties' submissions in this light, the basic facts are as follows.

Effective July 7, 2010, the defendant issued to Pharrasolia Hyppolite an automobile insurance policy, number 48071701–3 (“the Progressive policy”),⁵ in which the plaintiff was a named insured.  The Progressive policy included UM/UIM coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.  The key terms of that UM/UIM coverage are set forth in an Appendix to this decision.  The premiums for the Progressive policy were paid.

On July 27, 2010, at approximately 5:00 P.M., the plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Jessica Olezewski in a northerly direction on Boswell Avenue in Norwich, Connecticut.  At the same time, Henry Golding was operating a motor vehicle also on Boswell Avenue in the same direction as, and behind, Olezewski's vehicle.  After Olezewski abruptly stopped for oncoming traffic in order to make a left turn, Golding's vehicle struck it from behind, resulting in injuries and damages to the plaintiff.  No police report was prepared.

The vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger was owned by Leonardo Fernandez and covered by an insurance policy issued by Dairyland Insurance Company (Dairyland), with coverage limits of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident for bodily injury, for uninsured motorist (UM) bodily injury, and for underinsured motorist (UIM) bodily injury.

On February 9, 2011, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he had an underinsured motorist claim under the Progressive policy.

On October 26, 2012, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against Golding entitled Hyppolite v. Golding, Docket No. KNL–CV–12–6014456–S.⁶  Golding appeared, representing himself, but was defaulted for failure to plead.  On November 6, 2013, in Hyppolite v. Golding, following a hearing in damages, judgment entered against Golding for $1,030,000.

By check dated December 26, 2013, Dairyland paid the plaintiff $20,000 under its automobile insurance policy issued to Fernandez.  As part of that transaction, the plaintiff, on December 31, 2013, executed a document entitled “UM RELEASE AND TRUST AGREEMENT,” which, in pertinent part, stated the following:  “[r]eceived of [Dairyland] ․ the sum of $20,000.00, in full settlement and final discharge of all claims under policy number 025536361, issued to [Fernandez], because of bodily injuries known and unknown and which have resulted or may in the future develop, sustained by [the plaintiff] by reason of any accident or occurrence arising out of the ownership or operation of an uninsured automobile by [Golding] ․ which occurred on or about July 27, 2010 at or near Boswell [Avenue] ․ NORWICH, CT.”

Neither Golding nor the vehicle he was driving at the time of the accident was insured.

Other than the Dairyland policy, there was no insurance covering the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

This action was initiated by service of process on the defendant on March 10, 2014.

DISCUSSION

Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment must be rendered if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is the sole conclusion that a fair and reasonable person could reach based on the evidence.  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).  Another way to view the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is that the court must find that all the evidence needed to make the required findings is before the court and that, without weighing the credibility of any of that evidence, the movant is entitled to judgment.  See Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647, 443 A.2d 471 (1982).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing that genuine issues of material fact do not exist;  however, after the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may still defeat the motion by presenting evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  In ruling on the present motion, the court's function is to determine whether any issues of material fact exist, not to decide any such issues.  Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010).

In the present case, the defendant argues that summary judgment should enter in its favor as to all counts because the plaintiff has failed to bring any of the counts of this action within the three-year limit on suit, in part III of the Progressive policy, which limit complies with the minimum established in General Statutes § 38a–336(g)(1).  Specifically, the defendant argues that this action is solely for UM benefits because there is no bodily injury policy or bond applicable to the present case; ⁷  that the plaintiff received $20,000 in UM benefits under the Dairyland policy;  and, therefore, that the plaintiff is, as a matter of law, limited to seeking “excess UM benefits” and has no claim for UIM coverage under the Progressive policy.  The defendant argues that the three-year limitation on suit bars the plaintiff's UM claim because it was not brought within three years of the accident and there was no tolling of that limit.  The defendant argues that all of the remaining counts of the complaint are also barred by the CUTPA statute of limitation, General Statutes § 42–110g(f), which is also three years.

General Statutes § 38a–336 ⁸ requires that “[e]ach automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage ․ for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury ․” § 38a–336(a)(1).  The statute goes on to provide details of the required coverage, including a minimum three-year policy limit on lawsuits for UM and UIM benefits.  See § 38a–336(g)(1).⁹  An underinsured motor vehicle is “a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made ․” § 38–336(e).  UM benefits claims and UIM benefits claims may be brought in actions involving multiple tortfeasors, as long as one of the tortfeasors is uninsured or the insurance coverage of one of the tortfeasors is exhausted.  See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 213, 603 A.2d 385 (1992).  Upon this background, the court will discuss the present motion as applied to the counts of the complaint, in order.

The first count claims UIM—underinsured motorist—benefits under the Progressive policy.  General Statutes § 38a–336(g)(1) provides that, for UIM claims, the three-year time limit is tolled if the insured a) notifies his insurer prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, in writing, that he has a UIM claim under the policy and b) commences suit on the policy not more than 180 days from the date on which the limits of liability under all automobile bodily injury liability bonds or policies applicable at the time of the accident are exhausted by settlement or final judgment after any appeals.  The defendant's claim that, as a matter of law, the first count is only a UM—uninsured motorist—claim is unpersuasive.  Even treating the Dairyland payment to the plaintiff as the UM payment the defendant claims it to be,¹⁰ the Dairyland policy is still “a bodily injury liability ․ policy [which applied] at the time of the accident” within the definition of underinsured motorist coverage in the Progressive policy's definition of “Uninsured motor vehicle,” policy section III(2)(d).  There being no other definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” or “underinsured motorist,” ¹¹ the Dairyland policy is also “a bodily injury liability ․ policy [which applied] at the time of the accident” within the definition of underinsured motorist coverage in the Progressive policy's definition of “Uninsured motor vehicle,” policy section III(2)(d).  At least as important, the Dairyland policy is also “a bodily injury liability ․ insurance polic[y] applicable at the time of the accident” within the statutory definition of underinsured motor vehicle in § 38a–336(e), whether or not “bodily injury” and/or “liability” modifies “insurance policies” in that statute.  Fundamentally, § 38a–336 does not treat UM and UIM coverage as anything but components—albeit required components—of “automobile liability insurance policies” in this state.  See § 38a–336(a)(1).

The plaintiff gave written notice to the defendant of his UIM claim.  That notice tolled the limitation on action against the defendant for UIM benefits under the Progressive policy.  See § 38a–336(g)(1)(A).  The plaintiff brought this action within 180 days of receiving the payment from Dairyland dated December 26, 2013.  See § 38a–336(g)(1)(B).  Viewed another way, the defendant claims, “[t]he issue presented by the facts of this case is whether the plaintiff could recover underinsured motorist coverage benefits when he has already received [what the defendant claims to be] uninsured motorist benefits.”  Even so framed, the court finds that the plaintiff has a triable claim to UIM benefits because the Dairyland policy is still automobile insurance within the meaning of both § 38a–336(e) and the Progressive policy.  The defendant offers no authority for the proposition that the availability of UM coverage under one policy means that an insured may not recover UIM benefits under his own policy.  At least, the defendant has failed to bear its burden of proof of its entitlement to judgment on the first count.¹²

In his second count, for UM benefits, the plaintiff alleges that Olezewski “abruptly stopped” the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger and Golding's vehicle struck the vehicle Olezewski was driving, causing the plaintiff's injuries.  Although the defendant submitted no affidavit in support of the present motion—not even to authenticate the submitted exhibits—it is undisputed, and the court finds, that Golding, and the vehicle he was driving, were uninsured on July 27, 2010, the day of the subject collision.  That is the only basis for the second count—it being undisputed that the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger was insured— by Dairyland.  This action was filed more than three years after the date of the accident.  It is barred by the three-year limitation in the policy, which is compliant with § 38a–336(g)(1), and the defendant is entitled to judgment on the second count unless the limitation is tolled.  Here the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 11.

The plaintiff alleges, in the second count, that he “timely filed his action after written Denial of Coverage was received.”  He repeats that basic claim in opposing the present motion.  If the plaintiff could show there was a bona fide question of fact whether “the motor vehicle [Golding was driving was] an uninsured motor vehicle because the automobile liability insurance company of such tortfeasor ․ denie[d] coverage,” the plaintiff would be entitled to have the limitation on a UM claim tolled up to “one year from the date of receipt by the insured of written notice of such ․ denial of coverage ․” § 38a–336(g)(2).  However, the plaintiff also submitted no affidavit, let alone one showing that Golding, or the vehicle he was driving, was insured on July 27, 2010, and that the insurer denied coverage to Golding, in general, or denied coverage of the plaintiff's claim against Golding.  That Golding, as “the person responsible for the accident,” had to have been insured on the day of the accident and then have coverage denied is clarified by the third paragraph of section III of the Progressive policy, on page 10:  that the person responsible for the accident has to become uninsured for the tolling provision to apply necessarily implies that that person had to be insured on the day of the accident.  The defendant has borne its burden of proof of entitlement to summary judgment on the second count, and that proof has not been defeated by the plaintiff.

The remaining counts of the complaint may be analyzed as a group.  CUTPA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in any trade or commerce.¹³  General Statutes § 42–110b;  see generally § 42–110a et seq.  The statute of limitations applicable to CUTPA is in General Statutes § 42–110g(f):  actions for violation of CUTPA may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of the violation.¹⁴  Similarly, CUIPA prohibits insurance companies from engaging in unfair practices in the business of insurance.¹⁵  General Statutes § 38a–815;  see generally General Statutes § 38a–815 et seq.  While there is no direct private right of action in CUIPA, the Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a private cause of action under CUTPA to enforce alleged CUIPA violations.  Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 663, 509 A.2d 11 (1986).

After review of defendant's motion, briefs (including reply brief) and exhibits, the court finds that the defendant has not met its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether § 42–110g(f) bars counts three, four, five and six.  (Count four could have been included in count three, as it alleges greater culpability—”willful, wanton, fraudulent, and reckless” conduct—justifying punitive damages and attorneys fees under CUTPA.  See General Statutes § 42–110g, subsections (a) [punitive damages] and (d) [attorney fees].  Count six could likewise be merged with count five.)  Specifically, while the bar of the statute of limitation has been pled as, and will remain, a defense;  see Practice Book § 10–50;  only if every alleged act of the defendant was barred by the applicable limitation would the defendant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  This is as true of the fifth count, which incorporates the allegations of the second count as to which the court is granting summary judgment, and the sixth count (same) as it is of the third and fourth counts because, though the second count is barred, the defendant has failed—indeed, did not attempt—to show that there was no conduct of the kind alleged by the plaintiff in counts three, four, five and six which took place since March 10, 2011—three years before the plaintiff initiated this suit by service on the defendant and the bar date for older violations of CUIPA and/or CUTPA.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party;  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010);  the court must conclude that the defendant has failed to bear its burden of proof as to the fourth through sixth counts.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to the second count and denied as to the first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts.

Cole–Chu, J.

APPENDIX A

PART III—UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGEINSURING AGREEMENT—UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

If you pay the premium for this coverage, we will pay for damages that an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:

1. sustained by an insured person;

2. caused by an accident;  and

3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

We will pay under this Part III only after the right to recover the limits of liability under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and policies has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.

Any legal action against us for uninsured motorist coverage must be brought within three years of the date of the accident.  However, if the person responsible for the accident becomes uninsured because that person's liability insurance company becomes insolvent or denies coverage at any time later than two years after the accident, then an insured person shall have one additional year from the date of that person's receipt of written notice of such insolvency or denial of coverage to file any legal action against us for uninsured motorist benefits.

An insured person must notify us, within three years of the date of loss, of any claim that the insured person may have for underinsured motorist benefits.  Any legal action against us for underinsured motorist coverage must be commenced within 180 days from the date that the limits of liability under all applicable bodily injury liability policies have been exhausted by payment of settlement or final judgment after any appeals, or within three years of the date of loss, whichever is later.

Any judgment or settlement for damages against an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle that arises out of a lawsuit brought without our written consent is not binding on us.

* * *

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS

* * *

2. “Uninsured motor vehicle” means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type:

a. to which no bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident;

b. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident, but the bonding or insuring company:

(i) denies coverage;  or

(ii) is or becomes insolvent;

* * *

d. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident, but the sum of all applicable limits of liability for bodily injury is less than the coverage limit for Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage shown on the declarations page.

EXCLUSIONS —READ THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIONS CAREFULLY.  IF AN EXCLUSION APPLIES, COVERAGE WILL NOT BE AFFORDED UNDER THIS PART III.

Coverage under this Part III will not apply:

* * *

4. to any punitive, exemplary, or statutory multiple damages;  or

* * *

LIMITS OF LIABILITY

* * *

The limits of liability under this Part III will be reduced by all sums:

1. paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of any persons or organizations that may be legally responsible;

* * *

No one will be entitled to duplicate payments for the same elements of damages.

* * *

OTHER INSURANCE

The limits of liability under this Part III shall not be added to or stacked upon any uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or underinsured motorist conversion coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine the amount of coverage available to an insured person who sustains bodily injury in any one accident.

If an insured person sustains bodily injury and is insured under any other policy, the insured person may only recover as the total uninsured, underinsured, or underinsured conversion benefits recoverable from all sources an amount which does not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability for one vehicle stated in one policy providing uninsured, underinsured, or underinsured conversion coverage to the insured person, and the following order of priority shall apply:

1. The policy covering the vehicle which the insured person is occupying at the time of the accident shall be primary;  then

2. Any other policy under which the insured person is a named insured shall be secondary;  then

3. All other applicable policies shall be excess.

If there is other applicable uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or underinsured motorist conversion coverage of the same priority, our coverage will pay the proportionate share that our limits bear to the total of all available uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or underinsured motorist conversion coverage of the same priority.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant filed an answer on December 12, 2014, which included the special defense of statute of limitations under General Statutes §§ 38a–336 et seq., particularly § 38a–336(g)(2), as to each count..  FN1. The defendant filed an answer on December 12, 2014, which included the special defense of statute of limitations under General Statutes §§ 38a–336 et seq., particularly § 38a–336(g)(2), as to each count.

FN2. The exhibits deemed pertinent to this motion are (A) plaintiff's amended complaint;  (B) plaintiff's responses to requests for admission;  (C) a court notice of judgment entered in Hyppolite v. Golding, Docket No. KNL–CV–12–6014456–S;  (D) a “UM Release and Trust Agreement” signed by plaintiff;  ․ (J) the defendant's answer and special defenses;  (K) the attachments to the amended complaint, including a “Policy Snapshot” concerning Leonardo Fernandez's insurance policy with Dairyland Insurance Company and a copy of a check from Dairyland for $20,000;  and (L) a copy of the defendant's insurance policy at issue..  FN2. The exhibits deemed pertinent to this motion are (A) plaintiff's amended complaint;  (B) plaintiff's responses to requests for admission;  (C) a court notice of judgment entered in Hyppolite v. Golding, Docket No. KNL–CV–12–6014456–S;  (D) a “UM Release and Trust Agreement” signed by plaintiff;  ․ (J) the defendant's answer and special defenses;  (K) the attachments to the amended complaint, including a “Policy Snapshot” concerning Leonardo Fernandez's insurance policy with Dairyland Insurance Company and a copy of a check from Dairyland for $20,000;  and (L) a copy of the defendant's insurance policy at issue.

FN3. The plaintiff submitted several exhibits in support of his objection:  (A) a notice of the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim to the defendant, along with certified mail receipts;  (B) a letter from Geico to Dairyland;  (C) Fernandez's Dairyland “Policy Snapshot” and the UM Release and Trust Agreement;  (D) an excerpt from the plaintiff's insurance policy with the defendant;  (E) an excerpt from the defendant's memorandum in support of its present motion..  FN3. The plaintiff submitted several exhibits in support of his objection:  (A) a notice of the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim to the defendant, along with certified mail receipts;  (B) a letter from Geico to Dairyland;  (C) Fernandez's Dairyland “Policy Snapshot” and the UM Release and Trust Agreement;  (D) an excerpt from the plaintiff's insurance policy with the defendant;  (E) an excerpt from the defendant's memorandum in support of its present motion.

FN4. The defendant submitted one more exhibit with its reply memorandum:  a letter from Geico Indemnity Company (Geico) to the defendant regarding Golding..  FN4. The defendant submitted one more exhibit with its reply memorandum:  a letter from Geico Indemnity Company (Geico) to the defendant regarding Golding.

FN5. The last digit of the Progressive policy number is different in the plaintiff's complaint..  FN5. The last digit of the Progressive policy number is different in the plaintiff's complaint.

FN6. Also named as a defendant in Hyppolite v. Golding was Joyce Bellisle–Golding, who was alleged to be the owner of the vehicle Golding was driving.  She appeared and denied such ownership..  FN6. Also named as a defendant in Hyppolite v. Golding was Joyce Bellisle–Golding, who was alleged to be the owner of the vehicle Golding was driving.  She appeared and denied such ownership.

FN7. During oral argument, the defendant conceded that it is essential to its motion for summary judgment that the court find that the present action is for UM benefits only..  FN7. During oral argument, the defendant conceded that it is essential to its motion for summary judgment that the court find that the present action is for UM benefits only.

FN8. The language of § 38a–336 quoted in this decision is from the statute as it read on July 27, 2010, the day of the accident;  on February 9, 2011, the date of the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of his UIM claim;  and when this action was commenced.  In ways inapplicable to the present motion, the statute was amended by No. 14–20 and No. 14–71 of the 2014 Public Acts..  FN8. The language of § 38a–336 quoted in this decision is from the statute as it read on July 27, 2010, the day of the accident;  on February 9, 2011, the date of the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of his UIM claim;  and when this action was commenced.  In ways inapplicable to the present motion, the statute was amended by No. 14–20 and No. 14–71 of the 2014 Public Acts.

FN9. § 38a–336(g) provides in pertinent part, “(1) No insurance company ․ may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it ․ on the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability insurance policy to a period of less than three years from the date of accident, provided, in the case of an underinsured motorist claim the insured may toll any applicable limitation period (A) by notifying such insurer prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, in writing, of any claim which the insured may have for underinsured motorist benefits and (B) by commencing suit ․ not more than one hundred eighty days from the date of exhaustion of the limits of liability under all automobile bodily injury liability bonds or automobile insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident by settlements or final judgments after any appeals.  (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) ․ in the case of an uninsured motorist claim, if the motor vehicle of a tortfeasor is an uninsured motor vehicle because the automobile liability insurance company of such tortfeasor ․ denies coverage, no insurance company ․ may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it ․ on the uninsured motorist provisions of [the] policy to a period of less than one year from the date of receipt by the insured of written notice of such ․ denial of coverage by ․ such automobile liability insurance company.”.  FN9. § 38a–336(g) provides in pertinent part, “(1) No insurance company ․ may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it ․ on the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability insurance policy to a period of less than three years from the date of accident, provided, in the case of an underinsured motorist claim the insured may toll any applicable limitation period (A) by notifying such insurer prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, in writing, of any claim which the insured may have for underinsured motorist benefits and (B) by commencing suit ․ not more than one hundred eighty days from the date of exhaustion of the limits of liability under all automobile bodily injury liability bonds or automobile insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident by settlements or final judgments after any appeals.  (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) ․ in the case of an uninsured motorist claim, if the motor vehicle of a tortfeasor is an uninsured motor vehicle because the automobile liability insurance company of such tortfeasor ․ denies coverage, no insurance company ․ may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it ․ on the uninsured motorist provisions of [the] policy to a period of less than one year from the date of receipt by the insured of written notice of such ․ denial of coverage by ․ such automobile liability insurance company.”

FN10. The only mention of either “UM” or “uninsured motorist” is in the title.  Although the plaintiff admitted, when requested, that he “duly executed the uninsured motorist release [of Dairyland],” and admitted the content of the “UM Release and Trust Agreement,” there is no evidence that the plaintiff was a named insured on the Dairyland policy such that he would, under typical automobile insurance policy terms in this state, be covered by such a policy's UM—or UIM—provisions.  Given that there is an obvious misstatement in that agreement—that he had not prosecuted any claim to judgment on December 31, 2013—it appears plausible that the plaintiff signed whatever was presented to him to obtain some money from Dairyland..  FN10. The only mention of either “UM” or “uninsured motorist” is in the title.  Although the plaintiff admitted, when requested, that he “duly executed the uninsured motorist release [of Dairyland],” and admitted the content of the “UM Release and Trust Agreement,” there is no evidence that the plaintiff was a named insured on the Dairyland policy such that he would, under typical automobile insurance policy terms in this state, be covered by such a policy's UM—or UIM—provisions.  Given that there is an obvious misstatement in that agreement—that he had not prosecuted any claim to judgment on December 31, 2013—it appears plausible that the plaintiff signed whatever was presented to him to obtain some money from Dairyland.

FN11. The alternative definition of “Uninsured motor vehicle” on page 10 of the Progressive policy under “Insuring Agreement—Underinsured Motorist Conversion Coverage,” which requires payment of an additional premium, is not claimed by either party to apply..  FN11. The alternative definition of “Uninsured motor vehicle” on page 10 of the Progressive policy under “Insuring Agreement—Underinsured Motorist Conversion Coverage,” which requires payment of an additional premium, is not claimed by either party to apply.

FN12. At trial, under the Progressive policy, the defendant is entitled by contract—the Progressive policy—to relitigate the plaintiff's claim of damages unless the defendant gave written consent to the plaintiff bringing the case of Hyppolite v. Golding.  See the fifth paragraph of section III of the Progressive policy..  FN12. At trial, under the Progressive policy, the defendant is entitled by contract—the Progressive policy—to relitigate the plaintiff's claim of damages unless the defendant gave written consent to the plaintiff bringing the case of Hyppolite v. Golding.  See the fifth paragraph of section III of the Progressive policy.

FN13. General Statutes § 42–110b states, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ․”.  FN13. General Statutes § 42–110b states, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ․”

FN14. General Statutes § 42–110g(f) states as follows:  “An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.”.  FN14. General Statutes § 42–110g(f) states as follows:  “An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.”

FN15. General Statutes § 38a–815 states, in pertinent part, as follows:  “No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined ․ as, or determined ․ to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance ․”.  FN15. General Statutes § 38a–815 states, in pertinent part, as follows:  “No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined ․ as, or determined ․ to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance ․”

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.