Rosemary Crabbe v. Suisman Shapiro Wool Brennan Gray & Greenberg, P.C. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE Motion for Summary Judgment # 115

The defendants, Suisman Shapiro Wool Brennan Gray & Greenberg, P.C. and Attorney Jeffrey Hill, move for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff Rosemary Crabbe's November 3, 2013, revised complaint (the complaint), sounding in legal malpractice, on the ground that the claim is time barred by the three-year statute of limitations for such actions set forth in General Statutes § 52–577.   In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that defendants negligently failed to ascertain that, on a date subsequent to April 1, 2008, the plaintiff's ex-husband, Henry Crabbe, unlawfully and in violation of court orders removed in excess of $450,000 from marital assets and converted those funds to his own personal use.   Furthermore, she alleges that the defendants negligently failed to act reasonably and promptly to cure the actions of her ex-husband and to restore to the plaintiff her fair share of assets, in that they failed to seek and obtain court orders holding Dr. Crabbe in contempt, imposing sanctions upon him, and requiring him immediately to replace the funds which he had misappropriated in violation of the standing orders.

Plaintiff does not dispute that this action was commenced more than three years after the judgment of dissolution in the underlying divorce was entered by Judge Purtill on April 22, 2010.   Instead, she argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuing representation doctrine.  DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 597, 821 A.2d 744 (2003).  “[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations special defense, a defendant typically meets its initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by demonstrating that the action had commenced outside of the statutory limitation period ․ When the plaintiff asserts that the limitations period has been tolled by an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, the burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish a disputed issue of material fact in avoidance of the statute.”  Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 321, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).   In the present case, plaintiff argues that the defendants' services in making sure the terms and conditions of the dissolution were carried out, assisting in post-judgment paperwork, and filing post-judgment motions for contempt constitutes a continuing representation that tolls the statute of limitations for the purposes of this claim.

In Reice v. O'Sullivan, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–10–5013487–S (January 29, 2014, Povodator, J.), the court addressed a nearly identical argument regarding a separation agreement and found that such post-judgment representation constituted representation after “the matter for which the attorney was hired [came] to a conclusion.”   DeLeo v. Nusbaum, supra, 263 Conn. 597.  “[R]epresentation continues for the purposes of the continuous representation doctrine until either the formal or the de facto termination of the attorney-client relationship.   The formal termination of the relationship occurs when the attorney is discharged by the client, the matter for which the attorney was hired comes to a conclusion, or a court grants the attorney's motion to withdraw from the representation.”   Id. Like in Reice, here the retainer agreement explicitly provided for representation as ending with a judgment in connection with the marriage dissolution.  Reice v. O'Sullivan, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–10–5013487–S.   Here, as in Reice, the April 22, 2010 judgment “itself inherently constituted a conclusion to the proceedings for which defendant was hired (with the necessary consequence that there no longer was an opportunity for defendant to mitigate any harm that might have resulted from her conduct).”  Id. “Conclusion of litigation might allow for motions to reargue, appeals, or other matters that might impact the finality of a decision, but seemingly would not and could not include disputes that, while perhaps grounded in the earlier matter/judgment, cannot be considered to be the same matter.”  Id. Like in Reice, the April 22, 2010 judgment concluded the defendant's representation of the plaintiff for the underlying matter and claims relating to events before that date are barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to § 52–577.   In adopting the reasoning and conclusions of Reice v. O'Sullivan, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–10–5013487–S, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Zemetis, J.

Zemetis, Terence A., J.