Julia Rice v. Ryders Health Management, Inc. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 161)

The plaintiff, Julia Rice, filed a twelve-count complaint in this action on April 14, 2011.   The plaintiff subsequently amended her complaint multiple times, most recently on April 9, 2013.   All of these counts are directed against the plaintiff's former employer, Ryders Health Management, Inc. (Ryders).  The plaintiff brings various claims arising out of her recruitment to Ryders and her employment and subsequent termination by Ryders.   On September 30, 2014, Ryders moved for summary judgment on counts six, ten, and eleven of the plaintiff's amended complaint for, respectively, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with business expectancies, and defamation.   The motion and brief are accompanied by three exhibits, including excerpts from the plaintiff's deposition and the affidavit of Ryders' Controller, Pamela Czapor.   On December 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed a brief opposing the motion as to count six only.   The motion was argued on April 6, 2015.

FACTS

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party;  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013);  the essential facts concerning count six are as follows.   Beginning in 1999, the plaintiff worked as an occupational therapist for the defendant, Ryders.   The plaintiff became unhappy at Ryders due to policies and practices established by a third-party company to which Ryders contracted certain management duties.   In 2004, the plaintiff accepted a new position as an occupational therapist with Genesis Health Care, a competitor of Ryders.   In 2007, a Ryders agent, Kellie Kulick, recruited the plaintiff to return to work at Ryders.   At first, the plaintiff resumed work at Ryders on a per diem basis, while still maintaining her position at Genesis.   Later, Kellie Kulick and Kenneth Kopchick, a co-owner of Ryders, persuaded the plaintiff to rejoin Ryders full time.   During their efforts to recruit the plaintiff to do so, Kopchick represented that, in consideration for the plaintiff developing new programs, the plaintiff's compensation package would increase.   On February 12, 2008, Ryders and the plaintiff entered into a services agreement for a period of five years.   Attached to that agreement was a written offer of employment with additional terms.   The plaintiff proceeded to develop profitable new programs for Ryders, but Ryders did not compensate her for the benefits it received from those programs.   In April 2010, Ryders terminated the plaintiff's employment.

DISCUSSION

Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment must be rendered if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   A genuine issue of material fact has been defined as a triable issue of fact, which can be maintained by substantial evidence.  United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.   After the movant has met that burden, however, the nonmoving party may still defeat the motion by presenting evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).   In ruling on the present motion, the court's function is to determine whether any issues of material fact exist, not to decide any such issues.   Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010).   Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is the sole conclusion that a fair and reasonable person could reach based on the evidence.  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).   Another way to view this standard is that the court must find that all the evidence needed to make the required findings is before the court and that, without weighing the credibility of any of that evidence, the movant is entitled to judgment.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the submissions in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).   Statements that are merely conclusions are not evidence.   See Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).   In this light, the court examines the claims and evidence concerning count six.

“Plaintiff's seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefit, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ayotte Bros. Construction Co. v. Finney, 42 Conn.App. 578, 581, 680 A.2d 330 (1996).   An employee cannot recover in unjust enrichment against her employer for failure to pay incentive compensation when her express employment contract comprehensively specifies the terms of her salary without providing for incentive compensation.  Kelley v. Five S Group, LLC, 136 Conn.App. 57, 67, 45 A.3d 647, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 904, 52 A.3d 731 (2012);  Meaney v. Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc., 250 Conn. 500, 523, 735 A.2d 813 (1999).   A plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment unless she has performed services not contemplated by her employment contract.  Kelley v. Five S Group, LLC, supra, 67.

Ryders argues that it is entitled to judgment on count six because the plaintiff was paid in full for the services she was hired to perform at its Mystic Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Mystic Manor) facility.   Ryders further argues that the plaintiff cannot avail herself of the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment because it is undisputed that the plaintiff performed her duties pursuant to a contract that set out her duties and hourly rate of pay.   The plaintiff counters that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she was compensated for additional program development services she provided beyond her responsibilities as an occupational therapist at Mystic Manor, including developing programs at other facilities operated by Ryders.

By affidavit, Ryder's Controller, Pamela Czapor, testifies that, “Ryders furnishes financial management services to nursing homes, including Mystic Manor ․ In that capacity, Ryders has custody and control of the payroll records of Mystic Manor.   The payroll records for Mystic Manor for 2010 show that Julia Gwen Rice was paid all wages due to her for hours worked through the date of her termination from employment.”   This testimony well shows a basis for the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was paid all hourly wages for her work at Mystic Manor.   It does not establish, however, that there was no services agreement, or equitable basis, for compensation beyond hourly wages.

The defendant attempts to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the effect of any such contract as the plaintiff alleges by citing its admission, in its answer, of certain allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint, specifically paragraph 62 of count one, paragraph 107 of count three, and paragraph 4 of count nine.   Setting aside the irregularity of the movant offering proof in support of a motion for summary judgment by its judicial admissions, paragraph 62 of count one and paragraph 107 of count three allege only the terms of a verbal offer of employment to the plaintiff by Ryders' Director of Human Resources, not that an employment contract was ever reached.   Paragraph 4 of count nine does imply that the parties entered into an employment contract, but it does not show that such contract was limited to the terms alleged, let alone that such contract bars the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as a matter of law.

The gist of count six, considering the plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the present motion, is that the defendant induced the plaintiff to leave her prior employment, where she was developing patient programs—work she enjoyed and which she had undertaken after leaving the defendant's employment in frustration—to do the same work well beyond routine occupational therapy for the defendant based on assurance of increased compensation and employment as long as she wished;  and that she might be expensive, but the defendant's CEO told her it would be worth it to hire her.   It is likely—and does not matter—that there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant's authorized representatives as to how the plaintiff would be compensated for “doing [the sort of program development work that the plaintiff had been doing for her then-employer] for Ryders and not another company,” as the plaintiff's affidavit says the defendant's chief executive officer told he wanted.   Unjust enrichment, being an inherently extra-contractual theory of recovery, does not require a meeting of the minds.

Ryders also argues that count six does not allege that the plaintiff negotiated for an incentive payment beyond her hourly wage.   This is essentially an argument that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is legally insufficient.   The court disagrees that count six fails to allege facts sufficient to show the elements of unjust enrichment.   See Ayotte Bros. Construction Co. v. Finney, supra, 42 Conn.App. 581.   Moreover, even if count six could be more clearly stated, Ryders would not be able to establish that this defect could not be cured by repleading.   See Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 535 n.10, 51 A.3d 367 (2012) (use of motion for summary judgment to challenge legal sufficiency is appropriate when complaint fails to set forth cause of action and defendant can establish that defect could not be cured by repleading).   On the contrary, curing the defect would be a simple matter of incorporating an allegation from counts three, four, and/or nine that the defendant promised that, once the plaintiff had created and developed new programs and new revenue generating programs, her compensation would increase commensurate with the value of those new programs and the effort and expertise put into creating them.

The motion for summary judgment as to counts ten and eleven for tortious interference with business expectancies and defamation, respectively, are granted, absent opposition.

For the foregoing reasons, Ryders' motion for summary judgment on count six is denied and granted on counts ten and eleven.

Cole–Chu, J.

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.