Louise Wilcox v. AI (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 102)

The defendant, AI Holdings, Inc., moved on November 3, 2014, to strike “the claims asserted in the plaintiff's [September 18, 2014, one-count] Complaint to the extent they are premised on Connecticut General Statutes § 31–71c and seek recovery of double damages, costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to § 31–72.”   The plaintiff filed an opposing brief, to which the defendant replied.   The motion was argued on February 23, 2015.

FACTS

In ruling on a motion to strike, the court takes the facts to be those alleged, construed in favor of the legal sufficiency of the pleading.   See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (complaint is construed broadly;  necessarily implied allegations are accepted as true).   In this light, the pertinent facts are as follows.

For many years, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and/or its affiliates.   On or about January 14, 2013, the parties entered into a written contract to employ the plaintiff.   That contract provided explicitly that, upon the termination of the plaintiff's employment or her resignation, the defendant agreed to pay her “certain compensation including salary in biweekly payments up to $50,000.” ¹  The plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of her intent to resign on May 27, 2013.   The plaintiff's resignation was accepted on June 1, 2013, at which time she was notified that her last day of work would be July 12, 2013, and that “[s]everance will be paid bi[-]weekly ․ assuming the terms of the agreement are met.”   Since that last day of work, the defendant has refused to honor its agreement with the plaintiff on false grounds and refused to pay the salary ² required in the parties' agreement.³

DISCUSSION

A motion to strike contests the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint or a count of a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

While it is puzzling to the court that neither party submitted a copy of the agreement in question, the motion must be denied because it attacks only part of the complaint.   If any part of a count is sufficient, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to strike superfluous allegations.   It is rarely appropriate to strike only a part of a count.   See Sheehy v. Big Y Foods, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06–CV–12–6014260–S (October 31, 2012, Agati, J.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 887, 889) (only an entire claim, not portions of a count that do not set forth all of the essential allegations of a cause of action or defense, may be subject to a motion to strike).   In simplest terms, even if the defendant's agreement “to pay the plaintiff certain compensation including salary” is not a clumsy way of alleging “to pay the plaintiff” wages—”compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation”;  General Statutes § 31–71a(3)—the facts, the allegations deemed true, include some component of compensation for labor and service.   Therefore, it is inappropriate for the court to interpret the complaint, let alone the agreement, as concerning only severance pay as distinguished from wages.

For these reasons, the motion to strike must be, and is, denied.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Because the court deems biweekly payments in five figures as unlikely, the court interprets these words as “certain compensation including salary, in biweekly payments, up to $50,000.”   The interpretation of pleadings is a question of law for the court.  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005)..  FN1. Because the court deems biweekly payments in five figures as unlikely, the court interprets these words as “certain compensation including salary, in biweekly payments, up to $50,000.”   The interpretation of pleadings is a question of law for the court.  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005).

FN2. The complaint, at paragraph 10, alleges that the “defendant has ․ refused to pay ․ salary in biweekly payments up to $50,000 as required in defendant's agreement ․” The court interprets “up to $50,000” here as surplusage because of the unlikelihood, in reason, that the plaintiff was paid biweekly, just not in amounts up to $50,000..  FN2. The complaint, at paragraph 10, alleges that the “defendant has ․ refused to pay ․ salary in biweekly payments up to $50,000 as required in defendant's agreement ․” The court interprets “up to $50,000” here as surplusage because of the unlikelihood, in reason, that the plaintiff was paid biweekly, just not in amounts up to $50,000.

FN3. With exceptions not essential to this decision, the other allegations of the complaint are legal conclusions or opinion, which are not deemed admitted.   See Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997)..  FN3. With exceptions not essential to this decision, the other allegations of the complaint are legal conclusions or opinion, which are not deemed admitted.   See Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.