Beatriz Andino et al. v. Lynn Carnaroli et al. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (# 102)

The defendants, Dr. Lynn Carnaroli and Chiropractic Center of Norwich, moved on September 24, 2014, pursuant to General Statutes § 52–190a(c) to dismiss the August 1, 2014, complaint of the plaintiffs, Beatriz Andino and Luis Andino.   The plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion on December 19, 2014.   The motion was argued on December 22, 2014.

FACTS

When the court's jurisdiction is challenged by a motion to dismiss, the court must take the facts to be those alleged in the challenged pleading and those necessarily implied by the explicit allegations and construe those facts in a manner most favorable to the pleader.  Lagassey v. State, 268 Conn. 723, 736, 846 A.2d 831 (2004).   Viewing the allegations in this light, the facts relevant to the present motions are as follows.

At the pertinent time, defendant Carnaroli was a chiropractor licensed by the state of Connecticut and engaged in the business of providing chiropractic treatment in Norwich, Connecticut, with co-defendant Chiropractic Center of Norwich (“Chiropractic Center”).   In June of 2013, Beatriz Andino (plaintiff) ¹ began to experience minor pain at the base of her neck and between her shoulder blades, with no radicular component, for which she sought treatment and adjustment at the Chiropractic Center.   On June 19, 2013, at the office of defendant Chiropractic Center, defendant Carnaroli treated the plaintiff for her neck pain in a forceful manner which the plaintiff had not experienced before, and without notice in advance.   Specifically, Carnaroli used her entire body weight and two hands to shove forcefully down the base of the plaintiff's neck and Carnaroli snapped or turned the plaintiff's head in a quick and forceful manner multiple times.   During this treatment, the plaintiff felt a sudden change in her neck pain from faint and dull to sharp, with numbness and heaviness extending into her arms.   The plaintiff immediately complained to Carnaroli about the new pain.   Carnaroli replied by instructing the plaintiff to wait a week and assuring her that she would be fine.   The plaintiff's symptoms got worse.   In particular, her arms became almost totally numb and her pain was so bad that she could not sleep.

The plaintiff consulted her primary care physician, who ordered magnetic resonance imaging, after review of which the plaintiff was immediately referred to a spine specialist.   From the spine specialist, the plaintiff learned she had a significant disc herniation at C5–C6–C7, with a loose disc fragment, spinal cord swelling and severe stenosis, requiring emergency surgery.   The plaintiff had a two-level spinal fusion surgery within a month after Carnaroli's treatment.

The plaintiff alleges medical malpractice by Carnaroli, and by Chiropractic Center based on vicarious liability, in multiple respects, including administration of excessive force to her neck, and injuries and losses caused by the malpractice.²

Attached to the complaint is an opinion letter which states, in unchallenged essence, the opinion required by § 52–190a(a) that there is evidence of medical negligence by Carnaroli and the basis for that opinion.   The letter states as the credentials of its author that he is a board-certified chiropractic physician from Newburgh, New York.³ The letter states that he holds a Doctor of Chiropractic degree and has been licensed by New York since 1988, by Pennsylvania since 1990, and by New Jersey since 2002.   The opinion letter author has “over 25 years of experience in the areas of multiple chiropractic techniques” and other treatment techniques.

It is undisputed that the author of the opinion letter is not licensed as a chiropractor by the state of Connecticut.   Other facts will be discussed as need arises.

DISCUSSION

Dismissal of a claim for “negligence of a health care provider” is the proper remedy for failure to comply with the opinion letter requirement of § 52–190a.  Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 29, 12 A.3d 865 (2011);  see § 52–190a(c).  The jurisdiction then challenged is personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.  Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401–02, 21 A.3d 451 (2011).   When an institutional defendant is alleged to be vicariously liable for the negligence of its agent, an opinion letter which is insufficient as to the agent is also insufficient as to the institutional defendant.  Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, 314 Conn. 709, 736, n.10, 104 A.3d 671 (2014).

Practice Book § 10–30(a) provides as follows:  “A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert:  ․ (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person ․” “A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).   It is the burden of the party who seeks the court to exercise jurisdiction in his favor to clearly allege facts demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction.  Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn.App. 513, 528–29, 89 A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014).

The defendants argue that the opinion letter, required by General Statutes § 52–190a(a) and attached to the complaint, is insufficient because it was not written by a similar health care provider as defined in General Statutes § 52–184c(b).⁴  General Statutes § 52–190a(a) requires a plaintiff alleging personal injury or wrongful death resulting from the negligence of a health care provider to attach to the complaint a written and signed opinion authored by a “similar health care provider” stating that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and providing a “detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.” ⁵  Section 52–190a(a) specifically refers to § 52–184c for the definition of a “similar health care provider.” § 52–184c has two definitions of “similar health care provider,” subsection (b) essentially for non-specialists (see note 4) and subsection (c) ⁶ essentially for specialists.

The essential basis for the present motion is that the author of the plaintiffs' § 52–190a(a) opinion letter is not a similar health care provider because that author is not licensed as a chiropractor in this state “or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications”;  see § 52–184c(b)(1);  and the letter omits “the necessary qualification that the author's training and experience is a result of ‘active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.’  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–184c(b).”  The defendants' demonstration of the pertinent differences between this states' and other states' qualifications for a license to practice chiropractic medicine is clear, but it depends on subsection (b) of § 52–184c being the source of the definition of the applicable similar health care provider.   The defendants' brief does not mention the possibility that that source is subsection (c), let alone explain why subsection (c) does not apply.   At oral argument, defendants' counsel admitted that, if a chiropractor is a “specialist” for purposes of § 52–184c(c), their motion must fail.

The question presented by this motion is one of statutory interpretation.   Interpreting a statute starts and, where its language and relationship to other statutes are clear, ends with its text.   See General Statutes § 1–2z.⁷  Section 52–184c addresses two different types of health care providers:  the “defendant health care provider” and the “similar health care provider.”  Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 722.   For § 52–184c(b) to apply—for the defendants to prevail—Dr.   Carnaroli must be none of the following:  “certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, ․ trained and experienced in a medical specialty, ․ or [held out by herself] as a specialist.”   At oral argument, the defendants argued that none of those three attributes do apply to Dr. Camaroli.⁸  They argued that the complaint does not allege that Dr. Carnaroli is a specialist ⁹ and that a Connecticut-licensed chiropractor is not inherently a specialist within the meaning of § 52–184c(c).

There is no statutory definition of “specialist” for purposes of § 52–190a or 52–184c.   In construing § 52–184c, it is appropriate to study the statutory scheme regulating chiropractic practice.   See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 732 (important to consider the statutory scheme governing nurse-midwives).   In interpreting statutory language, the ordinary meanings of words are to be used, in the absence of a statutory instruction to the contrary. § 1–1(a);  Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 186, 438 A.2d 859 (1981).  “Specialist” is defined as “[o]ne who is devoted to a particular occupation or branch of study or research ․ 2. A physician whose practice is limited to a particular branch of medicine or surgery, especially one who is certified by a board of physicians ․” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Ed. (2000).¹⁰  A chiropractor has been authoritatively defined as “[o]ne who is licensed and certified to practice chiropractic.”   Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 25th Ed. (1990).  “Chiropractic” has been defined as “[t]he system which utilizes the recuperative powers of the body and the relationship between the musculoskeletal structures and functions of the body, particularly of the spinal column and the nervous system, in the restoration and maintenance of health.”  Id. The Connecticut General Assembly has enacted statutes regulating the practice of chiropractic medicine separately from other branches of the medical sciences.   See General Statutes § 20–24, et seq.   The court must conclude that a chiropractor licensed by the state of Connecticut is a specialist, i.e., “[o]ne who is devoted to a particular occupation or branch of study or research ․ and [a health care provider] whose practice is limited to a particular branch of medicine” for purposes of § 52–184c.   The court cannot add limiting definitions of “specialist” and “specialty” to § 52–184c.  Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 731 n.5 (court will not add terms to the language of 52–184c).   As a matter of common sense, if specialties within practices requiring a degree of Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) abound, as they do, surely licensed health care professionals' practices not requiring an M.D. degree such as osteopathy,¹¹ natureopathy,¹² acupuncture ¹³ —and chiropractic—must, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, be regarded as specialties.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

Related not to the foregoing analysis or decision, but to the § 52–184c opinion letter disputes of which the present motion is an example, our Supreme Court has held that “the text of the related statutes and the legislative history support the ․ determination that ․ § 52–190a establishes objective criteria, not subject to the exercise of discretion, making the prelitigation requirements more definitive and uniform and, therefore, not as dependent upon an attorney or self-represented party's subjective assessment of an expert's opinion and qualifications.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 21, 12 A.3d 865 (2011).   Experience suggests that the details of § 52–184c, lawyers' imaginations, and the stakes in medical malpractice claims will make achieving the statutory goal of objectivity and removal of judicial discretion practically impossible.¹⁴  As gatekeepers under § 52–184c, courts have been required to determine whether a plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment was outside the defendant health care provider's specialty (if any),¹⁵ whether an injury to a bodily system normally treated by one specialty was allegedly caused during a procedure by a health care provider in another specialty,¹⁶ the effect of pleadings on whether the author of a § 52–190a opinion letter is a similar health care provider within the meaning of that statute and § 52–184c ¹⁷ and, today, whether a type of health care provider is a “specialist.”   Cases requiring determination of whether the defendant is “trained and experienced in a medical specialty” or “holds himself out as a specialist” seem inevitable.

In addition, careful reading of subsections (b) and (c) of § 52–184c, quoted in footnotes 4 and 6, reveals that it is logically possible for a health care provider to be both a non-specialist as defined in (b) and a specialist as defined in (c).  That is because the three criteria in each subsection are listed in the disjunctive:  it is possible that a health care provider is “trained and experienced in a medical specialty;” § 52–184c(c);  but is not “certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist” and does not “hold ․ himself out as a specialist.” § 52–184c(b).  The General Assembly could have listed the three criteria in one of the subsections and, in the other, said something like, “if the defendant health care provider does not meet the criteria listed in [the other subsection], a similar health care provider is one who [has the statutory qualities].”   The General Assembly did not do so.   While the result is academic here, it seems quite reasonable for the legislature to permit plaintiffs a choice of “similar health care provider” in such a situation:  if both subsections (b) and (c) of § 52–184c apply, as long as the opinion letter author meets the criteria of either one, the legislature could reasonably require that the door to the courthouse remain open.

As our Supreme Court has stated, understanding of § 52–184c is informed by the purpose of § 52–190a and that purpose is not to thwart, let alone defeat, meritorious medical malpractice claims.   See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 727, 736 n.9. Indeed, the policy of Connecticut courts is “to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court ․ Our practice does not favor the termination of proceedings without a determination of the merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of procedure.”  Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 558, 848 A.2d 352 (2004).

In this light, except where there is no reasonable dispute that subsection (b) of § 52–184c applies or that subsection (c) applies, courts will be required to apply discretion, at least as to what weight to give the evidence presented on motions such as this one.   Considering the ancient principle that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's specific and necessarily implied allegations are construed in a manner most favorable to the pleader;  Lagassey v. State, supra, 268 Conn. 736;  that discretion should be focused on whether there has been substantial compliance with § 52–190a and § 52–184c such that two policies merged into one—eliminating only baseless medical malpractice actions—can be said to have been accomplished with as much confidence as the law allows.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. It is not necessary to discuss plaintiff Luis Andino's loss of consortium claims against the defendants because they arise from, and depend on, Beatriz Andino's claims..  FN1. It is not necessary to discuss plaintiff Luis Andino's loss of consortium claims against the defendants because they arise from, and depend on, Beatriz Andino's claims.

FN2. In counts three and four, the plaintiff alleges battery by both defendants, without any explicit allegation of breach of a medical standard of care.   A battery is a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.   Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13.   A harmful contact is one that causes physical impairment of the condition of another's body, physical pain, or illness.   Id., § 16.   The contact must be the direct and immediate consequence of a force exerted by the defendant intentionally, wantonly, or without the exercise of due care.  Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980).   In medical treatment, the extension of contact beyond which that to which the patient has consented may constitute battery.  Krause v. Bridgeport Hospital, 169 Conn. 1, 9, 362 A.2d 802 (1975).   The defendants argue that battery is, here, just a different way to plead medical negligence and, therefore, the battery counts must be dismissed for failure to comply with § 52–190a(a).   The present ruling makes it unnecessary to address that argument..  FN2. In counts three and four, the plaintiff alleges battery by both defendants, without any explicit allegation of breach of a medical standard of care.   A battery is a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.   Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13.   A harmful contact is one that causes physical impairment of the condition of another's body, physical pain, or illness.   Id., § 16.   The contact must be the direct and immediate consequence of a force exerted by the defendant intentionally, wantonly, or without the exercise of due care.  Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980).   In medical treatment, the extension of contact beyond which that to which the patient has consented may constitute battery.  Krause v. Bridgeport Hospital, 169 Conn. 1, 9, 362 A.2d 802 (1975).   The defendants argue that battery is, here, just a different way to plead medical negligence and, therefore, the battery counts must be dismissed for failure to comply with § 52–190a(a).   The present ruling makes it unnecessary to address that argument.

FN3. Although § 52–190a directs that “the name and signature of the similar health care provider [shall be] expunged,” the opinion letter attached to the complaint in this case includes the name and signature of Dr. David Drier.   The defendants claim no defect on that ground..  FN3. Although § 52–190a directs that “the name and signature of the similar health care provider [shall be] expunged,” the opinion letter attached to the complaint in this case includes the name and signature of Dr. David Drier.   The defendants claim no defect on that ground.

FN4. General Statutes § 52–184c(b) provides as follows:  “If the defendant health care provider is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who:  (1) Is licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency of this state or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications;  and (2) is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice and such training and experience shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.”.  FN4. General Statutes § 52–184c(b) provides as follows:  “If the defendant health care provider is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who:  (1) Is licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency of this state or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications;  and (2) is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice and such training and experience shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.”

FN5. Specifically, General Statutes § 52–190a(a) reads, in relevant part, as follows:  “No civil action or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death ․ in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant ․ To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney ․, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52–184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion ․”.  FN5. Specifically, General Statutes § 52–190a(a) reads, in relevant part, as follows:  “No civil action or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death ․ in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant ․ To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney ․, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52–184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion ․”

FN6. General Statutes § 52–184c(c) provides the following:  “If the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who:  (1) Is trained and experienced in the same specialty;  and (2) is certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty;  provided if the defendant health care provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a ‘similar health care provider.’ “.  FN6. General Statutes § 52–184c(c) provides the following:  “If the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who:  (1) Is trained and experienced in the same specialty;  and (2) is certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty;  provided if the defendant health care provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a ‘similar health care provider.’ “

FN7. Sec. 1–2z, called the plain meaning rule, provides:  “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”.  FN7. Sec. 1–2z, called the plain meaning rule, provides:  “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

FN8. The plaintiffs argue that, to be licensed as a chiropractor in this state, General Statutes § 20–28 requires that Dr. Carnaroli be certified by the National Board of Chiropractic Examiners.   That is not true.   Section 20–28 only allows the state Board of Chiropractic Examiners to accept that national board's tests (provided they include physiotherapy) as the Connecticut written examination.   Dr. Carnaroli must know if she is “certified by the appropriate American board” and, if she were, her attorney would have a duty to inform the court of that fact..  FN8. The plaintiffs argue that, to be licensed as a chiropractor in this state, General Statutes § 20–28 requires that Dr. Carnaroli be certified by the National Board of Chiropractic Examiners.   That is not true.   Section 20–28 only allows the state Board of Chiropractic Examiners to accept that national board's tests (provided they include physiotherapy) as the Connecticut written examination.   Dr. Carnaroli must know if she is “certified by the appropriate American board” and, if she were, her attorney would have a duty to inform the court of that fact.

FN9. It is appropriate to consider the allegations of the complaint in determining who constitutes a similar health care provider.  Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 730–31.   However, for a plaintiff to allege that a defendant is a specialist would be to allege, at least in part, a conclusion of law.   The court perceives no reason to believe that the defendants would have accepted such an allegation as controlling on whether subsection (b) or (c) of § 52–184c applied to the criteria for a similar health care provider in this case..  FN9. It is appropriate to consider the allegations of the complaint in determining who constitutes a similar health care provider.  Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 730–31.   However, for a plaintiff to allege that a defendant is a specialist would be to allege, at least in part, a conclusion of law.   The court perceives no reason to believe that the defendants would have accepted such an allegation as controlling on whether subsection (b) or (c) of § 52–184c applied to the criteria for a similar health care provider in this case.

FN10. See also, Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 25th Ed. (1990):  “specialist ․ [o]ne who devotes professional attention to a particular specialty or subject area.”.  FN10. See also, Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 25th Ed. (1990):  “specialist ․ [o]ne who devotes professional attention to a particular specialty or subject area.”

FN11. Section 20–12 delineates licensing requirements for the practice of osteopathy..  FN11. Section 20–12 delineates licensing requirements for the practice of osteopathy.

FN12. Section 20–34, et seq. regulates the practice of natureopathy..  FN12. Section 20–34, et seq. regulates the practice of natureopathy.

FN13. Section 20–206aa, et seq. regulates the practice of acupuncture..  FN13. Section 20–206aa, et seq. regulates the practice of acupuncture.

FN14. The defendants' claim that “over 25 years of experience in the areas of ․ chiropractic techniques” by a doctor not licensed until 1988, and licensed in another state in 2002, is a fatally defective showing of “active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim” is an example of how the technicalities of § 52–184c can be used to discourage and burden apparently sound claims..  FN14. The defendants' claim that “over 25 years of experience in the areas of ․ chiropractic techniques” by a doctor not licensed until 1988, and licensed in another state in 2002, is a fatally defective showing of “active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim” is an example of how the technicalities of § 52–184c can be used to discourage and burden apparently sound claims.

FN15. See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 727 (two different types of medical professionals can be board certified in the same specialty, in which case the court can find the one with greater training and experience to be a similar health care provider for purposes of the § 52–190a opinion letter).   See also Kroha v. Lamonica, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–98–0160366–S (July 29, 2002);  Rivera v. Eastern Connecticut Health Network, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–5011282–S (January 20, 2009) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 103]..  FN15. See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, supra, 314 Conn. 727 (two different types of medical professionals can be board certified in the same specialty, in which case the court can find the one with greater training and experience to be a similar health care provider for purposes of the § 52–190a opinion letter).   See also Kroha v. Lamonica, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–98–0160366–S (July 29, 2002);  Rivera v. Eastern Connecticut Health Network, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–5011282–S (January 20, 2009) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 103].

FN16. See Torres v. Carrese, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–06–5011368–S (March 14, 2011)..  FN16. See Torres v. Carrese, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–06–5011368–S (March 14, 2011).

FN17. Nestico v. Weyman, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–09–6003675–S (May 20, 2011), aff'd, 140 Conn.App. 499, 59 A.3d 337 (2013);  Lohnes v. Hospital of St. Raphael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–09–5031448–S (April 6, 2010) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 594);  Tutillo v. Day Kimball Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03–CV–06–5009722–S (November 26, 2007) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 570];  Ellegard v. Hennessey, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03–CV–06–5008281–S (March 28, 2007) [43 Conn. L. Rptr. 195]..  FN17. Nestico v. Weyman, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–09–6003675–S (May 20, 2011), aff'd, 140 Conn.App. 499, 59 A.3d 337 (2013);  Lohnes v. Hospital of St. Raphael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–09–5031448–S (April 6, 2010) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 594);  Tutillo v. Day Kimball Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03–CV–06–5009722–S (November 26, 2007) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 570];  Ellegard v. Hennessey, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X03–CV–06–5008281–S (March 28, 2007) [43 Conn. L. Rptr. 195].

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.