Daniel Nagy et al. v. Joseph Arsenault (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In what appears to raise an issue of first impression, defendant contends that the individual plaintiff, a paramedic who entered defendant's premises in order to provide emergency medical services to a tenant in the building, should be subject to the so-called “firefighter's rule” after he sustained injuries at the site.   If so, defendant argues, he therefore owes plaintiff a diminished duty of care for the premises.   He further argues that the facts as revealed by discovery prove that he breached no duty which he owed to plaintiff and that he is therefore entitled to the entry of a summary judgment in his favor.

I. Parties and Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Nagy alleges in his complaint that on January 16, 2012, he was dispatched to a building in Norwich owned by defendant to transport a tenant suffering a medical emergency.   In the process of doing so, he fell and injured himself when one of the outside steps gave way beneath him.   He claims that the steps were in a defective and highly dangerous condition, and that defendant knew or could have discovered that condition by a reasonable inspection which he negligently ignored.   He claims to have suffered a series of injuries detailed in the complaint.

American Ambulance Service, Inc., an intervening plaintiff, alleges that on the date in question it was Nagy's employer and paid benefits to him pursuant to the workers' compensation statutes.   It sues for recovery of those payments.

By way of a first special defense pertinent to the applicability of the firefighter's rule, defendant asserts that Nagy was present on the premises in his capacity as an emergency responder without defendant's knowledge or consent, and should therefore be afforded the status of a licensee rather than an invitee.   The second special defense alleges various acts of negligence on plaintiff's part.   Nagy denies all these allegations.

II. Standards for Determining a Motion for Summary Judgment

In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the court adheres to the process recently articulated in Marinos v. Poirot, 308 Conn. 706 (2013), at pages 711–12, as follows:

Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   A party moving for summary judgment is held to a “strict standard.”   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § 17–45 (citations omitted).

In application of that process, the court requires of each moving party a showing excluding any real doubt as to any issue of material fact as to its right to a judgment on the allegations as they presently stand, and, if the moving party makes at least a prima facie showing that such is the case, then to require of each opposing party a showing revealing that there is evidence to establish that material facts are genuinely disputed and cannot be resolved summarily.

III. Are Emergency Medical Responders Subject to the “Firefighter's Rule”?

Determining whether the category of occupations to which the firefighter's rule is applicable includes “emergency medical responders” suitably begins with a review of the rule itself.  “The common-law ‘firefighter's rule’ provides, in general terms, that a firefighter or police officer who enters private property in the exercise of his duties occupies the status of a licensee and, therefore, is owed a duty of care by the property owner that is less than that owed to an ordinary invitee.   Thus, under the firefighter's rule, the landowner generally owes the firefighter or police officer injured on his property ‘only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly;’ “ Levandoski v. Cone, 267 Conn. 651, 653–4 (2004).   The rule arose in the earlier decisions of Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110 (1959), which first adopted the “firefighter's rule” for Connecticut, and Furstein v. Hill, 218 Conn. 610 (1991), which extended its reach to police officers.

Defendant here claims that the three factors articulated by those decisions as justifications for imposing a lower standard of duty upon landowners to members of those professions are all present.   Those factors are, in brief, (1) that both jobs are inherently hazardous since police officers and firefighters must often enter property at unforeseen times and be forced to enter unusual parts of the premises under emergency conditions, (2) that police officers and firefighters voluntarily choose their professions and thus by implication assume the risk of these hazards, and (3) that imposing the higher, invitee standard of duty upon landowners exposes them to double taxation in that the public already compensates police officers and firefighters for undertaking these expanded risks in the form of higher salaries and more readily available workers' compensation benefits.

Other than by a passing reference, however, defendant has not discussed the Levandoski case's gloss on these factors.   To be fair to defendant, that case is factually distinguishable from the cases upon which he relies;  plaintiff in Levandoski was a police officer injured on property belonging to a neighbor of the owner of land to which he had initially been directed to respond.   The Court rebuffed the neighbor's attempt to invoke the rule as a shield to his own liability.   Defendant here, in contrast, is the landowner whose property plaintiff was delegated to visit, and thus his posture is identical to that of the defendants in Roberts and Furstein.   Notwithstanding the factual differences, however, the reasoning in Levandoski deserves heed.

A. Assumption of the Risk

Beginning, first, with the assumption of the risk factor, Levandoski deemed the legislative abolition of that doctrine expressed in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–572h(l) to be sufficient authority rendering it “inconsistent with the policy of our general tort law to extend the [firefighter's] rule beyond its present confines;” 267 Conn. 651, 662.  “Present confines,” in the context of that case, happened to be spatial, referring to one parcel of real estate versus an abutting parcel.   The context of the instant case involves occupational confines, comparing one visitor's job to that of another.   This court views Levandoski 's reluctance to utilize an obsolete legal defense as a basis for extending the rule to new categories of sites where a plaintiff may have suffered an injury as warranting at least an equal degree of caution against extending the rule to new categories of workers as well.¹

B. Double Taxation

The double taxation argument, another of the historical rationales for the rule, has its genesis in the expectation that the public “should [and does] compensate its safety officers both in pay that reflects the hazard of their work and in workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered when the risks inherent in the occupation materialize;” Furstein, at 619.   Defendant's conjuring the specter of double taxation in the instant case is factually and legally off the mark.   American Ambulance filed an affidavit in response to the motion averring, inter alia, that plaintiff is not a public employee, but rather an employee of a corporation that is “a private domestic corporation ․ and is not a public entity officially affiliated with the Norwich Fire Department or the Norwich Police Department;” see, Affidavit of AAS employee Sonja Sieling–Boumenot.

Rather than refuting this private employment status, defendant attempts to have the court deem plaintiff to be the equivalent of a public safety employee.   He claims that certain statutes create parity between plaintiff's licensed job description and that of the personnel affected by those statutes, citing, specifically, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 7–314, 7–322c, 19a–193a, 31–291b, 31–294d(a)(2), and 31–294j.   Very briefly stated, § 7–314 relates to the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act, §§ 1–200 et seq., to municipalities and fire departments. § 7–322 provides statutory protection for volunteer firefighters against discharge from employment caused by attention to their volunteer duties. § 19– 193a deals with payment by a person transported of the ambulance bill for the service rendered. § 31–291b relates to workers' compensation benefits of municipal or volunteer firefighters. § 31–294j creates eligibility for certain workers' compensation benefits for municipal firefighters, police officers, and volunteer ambulance service providers.

Plaintiff's exact occupation is “paramedic”;  (see Sieling–Boumenot affidavit, and defendant's memorandum of law in support of this motion, p. 2), a term which is within the scope of the category “emergency service providers.”   The term is statutorily distinct even from the almost synonymous “emergency medical technician;” compare § 19a–175(5), defining that term, with $19a–175(15), defining “paramedic.”   Each of the five statutes discussed above deals with a different set of occupations and concerns.   Conflating privately-employed plaintiff with the public employees listed therein on the basis of the enumerated statutes is not even a remotely permissible reading of the legislative intent expressed in each.

Finally, § 31–294d(a)(2) does include paramedics in a single category along with many of those other job titles, but the category is one making applicable to all such workers a requirement that they be notified in the event that they are exposed in the line of duty to certain blood-borne diseases.   The minimal overlap created by this rather unique and focused statutory objective is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the legislature intended to erase the distinctions between public and private emergency service employees for all other purposes.

In short, the double taxation argument stems from circumstances and policy considerations wholly distinct from those presented by the actual details of this case.   Whatever value it provided for adoption of the firefighter's rule historically is entirely absent from the instant case.

C. The Job Equivalency Argument

The Furstein court, and in its wake the Levandoski court, too, viewed as “[t]he most compelling argument for the continuing validity of the rule ․ the recognition that firefighters and police officers often enter property at unforeseeable times and may enter unusual parts of the premises under emergency circumstances ․ Such public officers enter the land regardless of the owner's consent;  indeed, if the conditions for the exercise of their public duty exist, the owner would not be privileged to exclude them;” Furstein, supra, at 616.   Defendant argues that these observations accurately reflect the work of emergency medical providers also, and therefore, their work is the functional equivalent of police officers and firefighters.

In support of this argument he inventories some ways in which medical responders' work resembles that of those subject to the rule, including the potential for responding at all hours of the day or night, and the privilege of being on the premises without the express or implied permission of its owner.   It would be absurd to deny that these and other similarities exist.   On the other hand, emergency medical personnel are not routinely expected to climb a tall ladder and cut holes in a burning roof, as firefighters do, or chase an armed suspect throughout the inside or outside of a structure, as police may be called upon to do.

Depending upon one's goal, one can readily create a long list of similarities in or differences between the respective occupations.   One quality which strikes this court as a crucial if not determinative distinction is the Furstein court's allusion to “such public officers” (emphasis added).   Since plaintiff is not a public officer, he ought not to be viewed as situated similarly to those workers to whom the rule has previously been applied, as it is not true that he enjoys the distinctive benefits accorded to public employees which defendant attributes to him.   Additionally, whether a public or a private actor, he does not by virtue of his job have the training and authority afforded to firefighters and police officers.   The dissimilarities between the job descriptions of a publicly-employed safety officer and a privately-employed medical responder outweigh the similarities.

D. Other Policy Considerations

1. The Law in Other States

As further support for his argument, defendant claims that the extension of the firefighter's rule to emergency medical providers is the national norm, and as authority for that proposition cites Pinter v American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 236 Wis 2d. 137 (2000), Randich v. Pirtano Constr.   Co., 346 Ill.App.3d.   414 (Ill.App.2d.   Dist, 2003), Kapher v. MFG Chem., Inc., 277 Ga.App. 112 (2005), and Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d. 308 (Ind., 2009).  Randich and Babes Showclub afford little support for defendant's argument for expanding the firefighter's rule because the plaintiffs in the two cases were, respectively, a firefighter and a police officer;  extension of the rule to exclusively medical providers was not the issue in either case.  Pinter involved a plaintiff who was literally a public employee—he worked as an EMT and firefighter for a municipality—and Kapher involved an apparently privately-employed EMT but who, under state law, was defined by statute as a “public safety employee.”   Both cases analyzed the nature of the hazard confronting each plaintiff, and concluded that the firefighter's rule applied because the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned by the very negligence which gave rise to his presence at the emergency scene.   Thus in Pinter, plaintiffs sustaining an injury while attending to the victims of an automobile accident precluded him from suing the parties liable for the accident in negligence, since his response to the accident was the precise task his job imposed upon him.   In Kapher, an EMT injured at a fire—and by the fire—was held to have been injured by the very condition to which her job exposed her.   In each case, in holding that the specific injury made the rule applicable, the court distinguished other, imaginable circumstances, such as an independent act of negligence on the part of a party defendant, which would preclude application of the rule.   As Pinter put it, “the public policy limitation [reflected in the firefighter's rule] is so limited that it applies in few cases.   It bars a cause of action only when the sole negligent act is the same negligent act that necessitated rescue and therefore brought the firefighter to the scene of the emergency.   If the cause of action is based on any other negligent act (such as negligent failure to warn, negligent violation of an ordinance designed to protect the injured party, or negligent manufacture of a dangerous product), public policy does not bar recovery;  id., at 150.   Here, plaintiff went to defendant's premises to treat an injured tenant, not to repair the steps.   He could not anticipate that a defective step would collapse under his weight.   It is highly unlikely that either the Wisconsin or the Georgia courts would subject his claim to the firefighter's rule under the circumstances present here.

Since defendant has invited this court to take guidance from the case law of other states, this court notes that while he cited Kowalski v. Gratopp, 177 Mich.App. 448 (Mich.App.1989), he failed to analyze its very pertinent reasoning.   The case is factually similar to that at bar.   Kowalski was a privately-employed EMT who sued a landowner after he slipped and fell on ice while responding to an emergency medical call on private property.   Defendant claimed that the rule required that plaintiff only be afforded the status of a licensee.   First, confronting the distinction between public and private employment, the court held that “[a]pplication of the fireman's rule is limited by its very nature to public employees.   It is the public that hires, trains, and compensates fire fighters and police officers to confront danger.   Basic to the public policy rationale underlying the fireman's rule is the spreading to the public of the costs of employing safety officers and of compensating them for any injuries they may sustain in the course of their employment.   ‘Firefighters are present upon the premises, not because of any private duty owed the occupant, but because of the duty owed to the public as a whole ․ Here, the pleadings indicate that plaintiff was employed by a private company, Community EMS, when he was injured ․” id. at 150.

Secondly, and even more significantly, the court expressly declined to extend the rule to professions beyond firefighters and police officers because their roles are distinguishable from that of other persons who might be upon a property:

[In prior decisions] the Court did not contemplate an extension of the rule beyond fire fighters and police to other types of public employees.

[There is a] fundamental difference between the function of safety officers and that of other occupations peripherally involving danger.   The very nature of police work and firefighting is to confront danger.   The purpose of these professions is to protect the public.   It is this relationship between police officers, firefighters, and society which distinguishes safety officers from other employees ․ [F]irefighters and police officers are different than other employees whose occupations may peripherally involve hazards.   Safety officers are employed, specially trained, and paid to confront dangerous situations for the protection of society.   They enter their professions with the certain knowledge that their personal safety is at risk while on duty.   Property owners and occupiers cannot reasonably predict visits by safety officers or control their activities while on the premises.   Finally, injuries suffered by safety officers while in the course of their employment are compensable by workers' compensation, thereby spreading the cost and risk to the public.

Paramedics are employed and paid to treat injuries or illnesses which may arise out of dangerous situations.   The paramedic's occupation is one which may peripherally involve hazards, but they are not employed, trained, or paid specifically to confront those hazards.  Id., at 451–2.

Defendant implies that Kowalski is an outlier, but other states' courts have reached a similar conclusion as to the proper limits of the firefighter's rule.   These include California;  see Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., 8 Cal.4th 532, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 (1994) (refusing to allow rule to bar claim made by private safety inspector injured on a worksite, because, after extensive review of policy considerations, the court concluded that “we agree with the court in Kowalski v. Gratopp;” 8 Cal.4th 532, at 546);  Missouri;  see Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d. 708 (1990) (citing Kowalski as applicable precedent, and permitting suit by estate of ambulance attendant fatally injured at accident scene;  “rendering first aid and transporting patients by ambulance [are] duties ․ performed after the imminent peril of fire, crime or disaster has passed ․ Unlike firemen and policemen, ambulance attendants are not clothed with either the duty or the authority to control traffic, effect arrests, fight fires or enter collapsing buildings to save lives ․ [and] society does not expect ambulance attendants to throw themselves in harm's way;” 787 S.W.2d. 708, at 713;  Kentucky, see Sallee v. GTE South, Inc., (1992) (allowing firefighter/paramedic to sue for injuries inflicted due to defective premises near accident site;  “[the firefighters' rule] bars public employees [from suing] ․ who, as an incident of their occupation, come to a given location to engage a specific risk ․ and the policy extends only to that risk;” 839 S.W.2d. 277, at 279);  Maryland, see Tucker v. Shoemake, 354 Md. 413 (1999) (“This case is not one in which the Fireman's Rule applies to preclude recovery.   Officer Tucker was not injured by the negligently-created risk that occasioned his presence at the trailer park.   He was at the trailer park in response to a domestic dispute call, whereas he was injured as a result of stepping on the allegedly improperly seated metal cover to the underground valve compartment.   Thus, the negligence alleged to have caused Officer Tucker's injuries was independent and not related to the situation requiring his services as a police officer”);  and New Jersey, see Lees v. LoBosco, 265 N.J.Super. 95 (N.J.Super.A.D.1993).   The latter case distinguished emergency medical technicians from policemen and firefighters on the basis that “[p]olicemen and firemen have exceptional responsibilities.   At the scene of an emergency they are covered by a panoply of legal powers and duties necessary to control the people and place where rescue is required.   They are expected to act with daring and dispatch to protect life and property.   Other public servants may be sent to the scene to perform duties tangent to the emergency.   But the official whose primary duty is to confront danger is the fireman or policeman;” 265 N.J. Super 95, at 101.²

This court does not discern in the cases from other states any irresistible trend towards applying the firefighter's rule to privately-employed emergency medical personnel as defendant claims.   In fact, the contrary appears to be the majority position.

2. Connecticut Legislative History Relating to this Issue

Finally, as part of his objection to this motion, plaintiff Nagy argues that our legislature has considered and rejected the extension of the rule to emergency medical providers, and that this court should be guided by its decision.

Briefly, he singles out a recommendation made in 2000 by the Connecticut Law Revision Commission to the General Assembly, supporting such an extension.   In that and the following year, no action resulted.   In 2002, however, raised bill 603 was submitted, titled, in pertinent part, “An Act Concerning ․ The Standard of Care Owed to Emergency Personnel.”   Section 3(b) of the bill specified that “the standard of care owed by an owner of premises to a firefighter or police officer, or an ambulance driver, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as defined in section 19a–175 of the general statutes, who lawfully enters the premises in the performance of a public duty shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a licensee.”

The bill died in committee.   Defendant contends that as a matter of law the failure of the legislature to enact this change should not be considered to assist in resolution of the question now before the court.   But our Supreme Court has indicated that courts must not ignore what the legislature has done, or not done:  “[t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them.   And it is always presumed to have intended that effect which its action or non-action produces;” Perille v. Raybestos–Manhattan–Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 540 (1985).   While “non-action” may not be as clear an indicator of legislative intent as is “action,” the assembly's implicit rejection of the precise public policy expansion defendant here espouses is entitled to some consideration, and it contributes additional heft to the argument against the adoption of defendant's position.

E. Conclusion

Levandoski instructs us that “[b]ecause the firefighter's rule is an exception to the general rule of tort liability that, as between an innocent party and a negligent party, any loss should be borne by the negligent party, the burden of persuasion is on the party who seeks to extend the exception beyond its traditional boundaries;” Id., 661.   Here, where the rationales of “assumption of the risk” and “double taxation” are utterly absent, and the employment status of plaintiff is significantly distinguishable from those to whom the rule has historically been applied, defendant has failed to persuade this court that extending the firefighters' rule to this plaintiff in the circumstances of this case is appropriate.

IV. Has Defendant Succeeded in Refuting any Claim of Negligence?

Defendant makes a two-fold argument that the facts favor the granting of his motion.   First, he denies that he had any actual knowledge of the condition plaintiff says caused his injury, and second, he claims that plaintiff himself knew or should have known of the condition, and thus is barred from recovering against him.

A. Defendant's Knowledge

Plaintiff's complaint specifically alleges that “the tread and risers of the stairway were cracked, broken, misaligned, and deteriorated,” and that “said condition had existed for such a period of time prior to the plaintiff's fall that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable inspection should have known, [of] the dangerous and defective condition and should have taken steps to remedy the same;” (complaint, ¶ 5).   Instead, ¶ 6 alleges, defendant “allowed [the stairway] to become and/or remain defective;” “failed to use any preventative measures to render the area less dangerous;” “failed to post any warning signs or barriers;” “failed to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe;” or “had notice and knowledge or with reasonable diligence should have had notice and knowledge of the dangerous and defective conditions, then and there existing, but neglected to remedy same.”

In support of his motion, defendant supplies an affidavit indicating that he had no actual notice of the defect and therefore no duty to respond to it in any manner.   Assuming that he had no such knowledge, he might have sufficiently avoided liability to a licensee, since “[a] possessor of land is liable for bodily harm caused to a gratuitous licensee by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows of the condition, realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to the licensee and has reason to believe that the licensee will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and (b) invites or permits the licensee to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable care (1) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (2) to warn the licensee of the condition and risk involved therein;” Schiavone v. Falango, 149 Conn. 293, 296 (1962).³

Plaintiff's status, however, is that of an invitee.   Given that status, the duty defendant owed him was to “keep [his] premises in a reasonably safe condition ․ [and] ․ warn [him] of dangers that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover ․ [f]or [a] plaintiff to recover for the breach of a duty owed to [him] as [a business] invitee, it [is] incumbent upon [him] to allege and prove that the defendant either had actual notice of the presence of the specific unsafe condition which caused [his injury] or constructive notice of it ․ [a] defendant is held to the duty of protecting its business invitees from known, foreseeable dangers;.”  DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 116–7 (2012) (Emphasis added;  citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant has offered nothing in his motion to counter the existence of constructive notice on his part of the conditions plaintiff complains of.  “The controlling question in deciding whether the defendants had constructive notice of the defective condition is whether the condition existed for such a length of time that the defendants should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy it;” Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 238–39 (1978).  “What constitutes a reasonable length of time is largely a question of fact to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of a case;” Riccio v. Harbour Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 281 Conn. 160, 163–4 (2007).

In seeking summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party “to negate each claim as framed by the complaint ․ It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial;  Mott v. Wal–Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 625 (2012).   Defendant has failed to establish the lack of constructive notice on his part to discover the steps' defect, and thus plaintiff has no present burden to anticipate or respond to defendant's evidence on this point.

B. Plaintiff's Knowledge

The argument that plaintiff knew or should have known of the hazard which eventually injured him embodies the second special defense, which amounts to a claim of contributory negligence on his part.   Defendant cites some evidence that plaintiff recognized that the steps were rickety but used them anyway, rather than seeking an alternative means of egress.   Plaintiff counters that he did seek another way out, but found none.   This is a classic case of a factual controversy which the jury must resolve.   Even if defendant is correct, and plaintiff is found to have taken an undue risk, that may only lead to an allocation to plaintiff of part of the liability for his injury, not the award of virtual immunity which defendant seeks for himself

The motion for summary judgment is denied, and both objections sustained.

Boland, S.J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. No Connecticut trial court which has considered whether to expand the firefighter's rule to occupations other than firefighters and police officers has done so.   In each of the cases, the occupation involved was other than that of emergency medical provider.   In Gambardella v. Browning, CV–06–5002244S, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (Oct. 23, 2007;  Thompson, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 406] (declining to extend rule to probation officers), and Estefan v. Rolls, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 99 0336409 (April 28, 2000, Moraghan, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 130, 131–32) (declining to extend rule to public airport administrator), each court examined details of the job in question and determined that it was sufficiently dissimilar to those professions as to make extending the rule inappropriate.   Geherty v. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 95 0546860 (April 20, 1998, Teller, J.) (22 Conn. L. Rptr. 128, 132–33) (declining to extend rule to private security guard) held that the elimination of assumption of the risk as a defense precluded extension of the rule.   Finally, Fortin v. Adams, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 00149918 (September 20, 2000, Doherty, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 160) (declining to extend rule to canine control officer);  discerned in Furstein v. Hill a conclusion that the rule is expressly limited to the two professions indicated..  FN1. No Connecticut trial court which has considered whether to expand the firefighter's rule to occupations other than firefighters and police officers has done so.   In each of the cases, the occupation involved was other than that of emergency medical provider.   In Gambardella v. Browning, CV–06–5002244S, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (Oct. 23, 2007;  Thompson, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 406] (declining to extend rule to probation officers), and Estefan v. Rolls, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 99 0336409 (April 28, 2000, Moraghan, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 130, 131–32) (declining to extend rule to public airport administrator), each court examined details of the job in question and determined that it was sufficiently dissimilar to those professions as to make extending the rule inappropriate.   Geherty v. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 95 0546860 (April 20, 1998, Teller, J.) (22 Conn. L. Rptr. 128, 132–33) (declining to extend rule to private security guard) held that the elimination of assumption of the risk as a defense precluded extension of the rule.   Finally, Fortin v. Adams, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 00149918 (September 20, 2000, Doherty, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 160) (declining to extend rule to canine control officer);  discerned in Furstein v. Hill a conclusion that the rule is expressly limited to the two professions indicated.

FN2. Coincidentally, the Lee decision cites Furstein v. Hill as authority for categorically limiting the rule's application to firefighters and police officers..  FN2. Coincidentally, the Lee decision cites Furstein v. Hill as authority for categorically limiting the rule's application to firefighters and police officers.

FN3. But see Haffey v. Lemieux, 154 Conn. 185 (1966), holding that even as to a presumed licensee a landowner may have liability for a longstanding defect in an area of the premises (the steps, incidentally) which ought to have been discovered where visits by the plaintiff (in this case, a mailman) should reasonably have been anticipated..  FN3. But see Haffey v. Lemieux, 154 Conn. 185 (1966), holding that even as to a presumed licensee a landowner may have liability for a longstanding defect in an area of the premises (the steps, incidentally) which ought to have been discovered where visits by the plaintiff (in this case, a mailman) should reasonably have been anticipated.

Boland, John D., J.