Sermyra Brown–Newton v. LLC (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT # 134 AND OBJECTION THERETO # 135

Sermyra Brown–Newton timely moved the court to set aside the October 29, 2014 jury verdict in the captioned matter.   The defendant objected to the court taking either action, but instead seeks the verdict to become a final judgment.   The motions were orally argued on December 15, 2014.

The case arises out of a one-car accident that was alleged, September 11, 2012 Complaint paragraph 1, to have occurred on February 18, 2011, but, as was established during the trial more likely occurred on February 17, 2011,¹ near the intersection of Pine Street and Main Streets in Norwich, CT. The plaintiff was a right front seat passenger in an auto operated by defendant's employee who was admittedly acting within the scope of his authority.   The plaintiff testified that the defendant's driver so negligently steered, operated and controlled the vehicle ² in which she was a passenger as to cause the auto to leave the traveled portion of the roadway as it was turned from Main Street onto Pine Street, hit a little tree stump, traveled onto the sidewalk adjacent to Pine Street, and thereafter the driver backed the car onto the roadway and proceeded to the defendant's local business office.   The defendant's driver disputed that testimony.   He testified that the auto never left the roadway, did not strike a tree stump, did not travel onto the sidewalk adjacent to Pine Street, and that instead, when he was turning from Main onto Pine Street a tire of the auto ran over an accumulation of hardened ice or snow that was in the roadway causing the vehicle to slightly bounce.   He testified that he was operating at a reasonable speed, kept the vehicle under control, kept a proper lookout, and that the ‘bump’ caused by running over the accumulated hardened ice was akin to running over a golf ball.   He denied that the plaintiff complained of any injury at that time.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence of its agent.

The plaintiff alleged that as a proximate result of said negligence she suffered injuries and losses.

The defendant denied negligence, denied that the plaintiff suffered injuries or losses as a proximate result of any conduct of the defendant, and disputed that any compensation was due or appropriate.

The plaintiff offered her testimony, that of her mother, and the medical bills and reports from various medical providers.   Both the plaintiff and her mother testified as to the pain, swelling of the arm and neck areas, and limitations on activities of daily living that the plaintiff endured following the accident.   The plaintiff's medical reports described a history, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis for visits following the accident.

The defendant offered the testimony of the driver of the defendant's car and the manager of the defendant's local office.   The driver disputed the occurrence of an ‘accident,’ disputed all claims of negligence, and further contradicted the plaintiff's testimony concerning claims of injury.   The manager contradicted the plaintiff's testimony concerning the events that occurred in the car rental office in the moments following the plaintiff's arrival offering a contrasting version of events and a basis for the jury to disbelieve the testimony of the plaintiff.

The defense also presented two nurse practitioners who provided care and treatment to the plaintiff at the Backus Hospital Emergency Room during the weeks immediately following the accident.   That testimony sharply contrasted the testimony of the plaintiff and her mother.   This testimony, if believed, provided the jury with a basis to disbelieve the testimony of the plaintiff and her mother.

The issues of responsibility for the alleged accident, whether and to what extent, if there was an accident, the accident proximately caused any harm, and considerations of appropriate damages were sharply contested.

However, the jury rendered a general verdict ³ for the defendant.   No jury interrogatories were requested nor submitted to the jury.  “The jury in this case rendered a general verdict and was not provided any interrogatories.   Typically in situations such as this we would apply the general verdict rule.   The rule states that “if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party.'  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fabrizio v. Glaser, 38 Conn.App. 458, 461, 661 A.2d 126 (1995) aff'd, 237 Conn. 25, 675 A.2d 844 (1996).”  Bellsite Development, LLC v. Town Of Monroe, 155 Conn.App. 131, fn.15 (2015).

The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict for any of three reasons, see entry # 134:

1.  The jury ignored evidence as to whether the defendant was negligent”;

2. “The jury disregarded the fact that Brendan Butler (defendant's employee/driver, ed.) took a short cut to return to Enterprise Rent–A–Car when the most direct route would have been on a larger road that was well maintained”;  or

3. “The jury ignored the medical evidence of the plaintiff's injuries.

The first two reasons cited address issues of whether the plaintiff proved that the defendant was negligent.   The third issue addresses the issue of whether the plaintiff proved that she suffered injury or loss and that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of such.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

“The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion is against the law or the evidence.  (Citation omitted.)   The supervision which a judge has over the verdict is an essential part of the jury system.  [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality ․ The court has a duty to set aside the verdict where the jury's action is so unreasonable as to suggest that it was the product of such improper influences ․ A verdict may be set aside even if the evidence was conflicting and there was direct evidence in favor of the party who prevailed with the jury ․”Litigants, however, have a constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury ․ The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system, and this court has said that the right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Palomba v. Gray, 208 Conn. 21, 23–25, 543 A.2d 1331 (1988).

In this case, as noted above, the jury had sharply contrasting evidence as to whether the plaintiff proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that there was an accident, that the defendant negligently caused the accident, that the plaintiff suffered harm following the accident, and whether the harm the plaintiff suffered was proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant.

“In passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict.   The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motives which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and render his verdict accordingly ․ “The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same ․ and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict and to grant a new trial ․ The trial judge has a broad legal discretion and his action will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 329–30, 789 A.2d 459 (2002).

“Where the evidence allows room for reasonable differences of opinion among fair-minded people, if the conclusion of the jury is one that reasonably could have been reached, it must stand even though the trial court might have reached a different result.”  Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn. 415, 417 ((1980).

The plaintiff's credibility, uniquely a jury question, is the foundation upon which the claims of liability and damages rest.  “The jury was not required to believe the testimony of the plaintiff or her physician.”  Sigular v. Gilson, 141 Conn.App. 581, 594 (2013).   This court is not the ‘7th juror,’ “[T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror ․ but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did(.)”  Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 179, 994 A.2d 666 (2010).

It is the [jury's] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses ․ The [jury] can ․ decide what—all, none, or some—of a witness' testimony to accept or reject.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 421–22, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005).

CONCLUSION

The motion to set aside the verdict is denied.   The jury verdict reflects careful consideration of the evidence and an adherence to the applicable law, and while the result might not be what this court might have done in this case, that standard is not, and cannot be the applicable legal test.   The parties have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury.   They have exercised those rights.   Absent compelling evidence that the jury was motivated by passion, partiality, prejudice, mistake, corruption or other improper impulse, this court will not set aside the verdict.   As noted in the review of the evidence above, there was ample room for reasonable minds to differ on the issues of legal liability, causation of harm and/or appropriate compensation for proven harm caused by the accident.   The verdict stands as delivered.

The Objection to the Motion to Set Aside is sustained.

Zemetis, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Defendant's Ex. E and cross examination of plaintiff..  FN1. Defendant's Ex. E and cross examination of plaintiff.

FN2. Complaint, paragraph 3, allegations of statutory negligence for violation of C.G.S. 14–218(a) (unreasonable rate of speed), and common-law allegations of negligence of excessive speed, lack of reasonable control, braking, steering, and/or failure to pay attention..  FN2. Complaint, paragraph 3, allegations of statutory negligence for violation of C.G.S. 14–218(a) (unreasonable rate of speed), and common-law allegations of negligence of excessive speed, lack of reasonable control, braking, steering, and/or failure to pay attention.

FN3. The verdict form reads, “In this case, we, the Jury, find the issues for the Defendant, CAMRAC against the Plaintiff, SERMYRA BROWN NELSON.”.  FN3. The verdict form reads, “In this case, we, the Jury, find the issues for the Defendant, CAMRAC against the Plaintiff, SERMYRA BROWN NELSON.”

Zemetis, Terence A., J.