David Cutler v. Cody Broderick et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 103), MOTION TO DISMISS (# 106)

FACTS

The plaintiff, David Cutler, filed a recognizance and complaint on October 16, 2013, against the defendants, Cody Broderick, Colleen Valentine, Kyle Broderick, Deborah Dombek, and Christopher Cutler.   In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On June 15, 1998, Deidre Broderick (decedent) took sole title to property located at 139 Whittlesey Avenue, Wallingford, Connecticut (property) by virtue of a special warranty deed from Ocwen Federal Bank which was recorded on June 29, 1998.   On June 22, 2006, the decedent executed a quitclaim deed (Cutler deed) releasing all of her interest in the property to herself and the plaintiff as tenants in common.

In December 2007, the decedent executed a last will and testament, whereby she bequeathed twenty percent of her interest in the property at the time of her death to the plaintiff.   The defendant Dombek was named in the last will and testament as executrix of the decedent's estate.   On September 21, 2011, the decedent died.   On September 23, 2011, the plaintiff recorded the Cutler deed.   In November 2011, the Court of Probate, District of Wallingford accepted and probated the decedent's last will and testament as the operative and valid will of the decedent and appointed the defendant Dombek as executrix of the decedent's estate.   Based on the Cutler deed granting the plaintiff a 50% interest in the property and the decedent's will granting five individuals, including the plaintiff, each a 20% interest in the property, the plaintiff is now requesting that the court decree him to be the lawful owner of 60% of the property.

On November 25, 2013, the defendant Dombek filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a memorandum of law, on the plaintiff's complaint.   On November 27, 2013, the defendant Valentine adopted said motion for summary judgment and additionally filed a motion to dismiss.   This motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law and the following exhibits:  (1) a copy of the executrix's motion to quiet title to estate assets;  (2) a copy of Probate Magistrate James J. Lawlor's findings and conclusions;  (3) a copy of

Motion for Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).  “A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Shivers, 136 Conn.App. 291, 295, 44 A.3d 879, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 938, 56 A.3d 950 (2012).

“The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence.”  (Emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Shivers, supra, 136 Conn.App. 296.

The defendants argue that a motion for summary judgment should be granted on the ground that this matter was fully litigated before the Probate Court.   Specifically, the plaintiff's quiet title action to the property was fully and fairly litigated before the Probate Magistrate on September 12, 2012.   The Probate Magistrate determined that the Cutler deed had no effect and that the plaintiff had a 20% interest in the property pursuant to the decedent's will.   The Magistrate's report was accepted and confirmed by Judge Wright on February 27, 2013.   The plaintiff appealed this decree and the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.   Said dismissal is now on appeal before the Appellate Court.

A

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

“The fundamental principles underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well established.”  Henderson v. Lagoudis, 148 Conn.App. 330, 338 (2014).  “[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim ․ The doctrine of res judicata applies if the following elements are satisfied:  the identity of the parties to the actions are the same;  the same claim, demand or cause of action is at issue;  the judgment in the first action was rendered on the merits;  and the parties had an opportunity to litigate the issues fully.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Farmington Valley Recreational Park, Inc. v. Farmington Show Grounds, LLC, 146 Conn.App. 580, 588, 79 A.3d 95 (2013).

“The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality ․ Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim ․ For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action.   It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment ․ An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 588–89.

In the present case, the plaintiff claims that the Cutler deed was effective.   The Probate Court, however, had previously determined that the Cutler deed was of no effect.   The Probate Magistrate stated that “[t]he question presented [before the Probate Court was] whether the Cutler Deed [was] effective as a conveyance of an interest in property to [the plaintiff] ․ The question raised ․ [had] two parts:  The first [was] whether the [decedent] intended to convey an interest in her property to [the plaintiff], and if the answer to that [was] ‘yes' then the second [was] whether the conveyance [was] intended to create a present interest or, in the alterative, an interest which would become effective at a point in the future after the death of the Grantor.”   Defendant (Def.) Valentine's Ex. 2, 5. In determining the decedent's intent, the Probate Court considered “all relevant testimony and evidence presented to it.”   Def. Valentine's Ex. 2, 6. The Probate Court found that “the [decedent] intended to vest in [the plaintiff] an interest which would become effective at a point in the future after the death of the [grantor].”   Def. Valentine's Ex. 2, 7. Because “the transaction [did] not comply with the requirements of the statute of Wills, the conveyance by the decedent to [the plaintiff] ․ [was] found to be of no effect.   Rather, title [was] found to have vested in the beneficiaries under the [will] of [the decedent] upon her death.”   Def. Valentine's Ex. 2, 9. The plaintiff subsequently objected to the Probate Magistrate's findings and said objection was rejected by Judge Wright on February 27, 2013.   Def. Valentine's Ex. 2, 12.

The plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.   The plaintiff is requesting that the court decree the plaintiff to be the lawful owner of 60% of the property, but ownership of the property has already been determined by the Probate Court.   In both the current action and the action that took place before the Probate Court, the identities of the parties are the same, the plaintiff is asserting the same claim, the same quiet title action is at issue, the judgment in the Probate Court was rendered on the merits, and the parties had an opportunity to litigate the issues fully.   See Farmington Valley Recreational Park, Inc. v. Farmington Show Grounds, LLC, supra, 146 Conn.App. 588.

The plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.   The Probate Court made a determination on the issue vital to the plaintiff's quiet title claim—namely, that the Cutler deed had no effect and, therefore, the plaintiff did not have a 50% ownership interest in the property.   This issue was fully and fairly litigated, as the Probate Court took into consideration all relevant evidence—including the plaintiff's own testimony—and this determination was necessary to the judgment of the property.   See Def. Valentine's Ex., 2, 7.

Based on the foregoing, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

II

Motion to Dismiss

“[A] motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).  “The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;  (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  and (5) insufficiency of service of process.”  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10–31.

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413–14, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).  “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).

A

Prior Pending Action Doctrine

“[T]he prior pending action doctrine is properly raised via a motion to dismiss ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kleinman v. Chapnick, 140 Conn.App. 500, 503 n.5, 59 A.3d 373 (2013).  “[T]he prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dismiss a second case that raises issues currently pending before the court.   The pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties, brought to obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement.   It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious.   This is a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction ․ The policy behind the doctrine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a burden on crowded court dockets.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 505.

In determining whether the prior pending action doctrine applies, “the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the two actions are:  (1) exactly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction;  (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking different remedies;  or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine's application.   In order to determine whether the actions are virtually alike, we must examine the pleadings ․ to ascertain whether the actions are brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

“Following that initial determination, the court must proceed to a second step.   If the court has concluded that the cases are exactly alike or insufficiently similar, the court has no discretion;  in the former situation, it must dismiss the second action, and in the latter, it must allow both cases to proceed ․ Where actions are virtually, but not exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify dismissal of the second action.”  Id., 506.

In the present case, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the decision of the Probate Court District of Wallingford dated February 27, 2013, to the Superior Court District of New Haven.   The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, noting the procedural defects related to the named defendants and further stating that “the documents filed by the pro se plaintiff regarding the Probate Court order as well as the report of the Probate Magistrate clearly support the order of Judge Phillip A. Wright that the deed dated June 26, 2006 was ineffective after the death of the decedent.”   Def. Valentine's Ex. 5, 3. On August 21, 2013, the plaintiff appealed the Superior Court's dismissal to the Appellate Court.   The plaintiff's appeal states that the following issues are on appeal:  (1) Did the court err in entering judgment of dismissal on the basis of the plaintiff's claim before a trial or other fact-finding process and (2) Did the trial court err in entering a judgment of dismissal on the basis of alleged procedural and pleading matters that did not affect its subject matter jurisdiction.   Def. Valentine's Ex. 6, 2. The case is currently pending before the Appellate Court.

The current case and the case pending before the Appellate Court are virtually alike as both cases seek to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties.   In this case, the plaintiff is requesting the court to declare him to be the lawful owner of 60% of the property on the ground that the Cutler deed is effective.   In the case pending before the Appellate Court, the plaintiff had appealed the decision of the Probate Court to the Superior Court, which deemed the Cutler deed ineffective.   In dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, the Superior Court stated that the findings of the Probate Magistrate in determining the Cutler deed to be ineffective supported Judge Wright's order.   The only difference between the two cases is that one originated in the Wallingford Probate Court and the current action originated in the New Haven Judicial District.

As the two actions are virtually alike, the court has discretion in determining whether circumstances justify dismissal of the second action.   The two cases are alike in all respects except the court of origin.   Additionally, the case is still pending before the Appellate Court and there is a chance that it will be remanded.   Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the defendant's motion to dismiss.¹

Brian T. Fischer, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Additionally, in his objection, the plaintiff contends that the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction to reach the devised real property owned at the time of death by the decedent because it had not found the estate to be insolvent.   This argument, however, is unavailing.  General Statutes § 45a–98 provides in relevant part that:  “Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to ․ determine title or rights of possession and use in and to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute ․ any decedent's estate ․ which ․ estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, including the rights and obligations of any beneficiary of the ․ estate ․”.  FN1. Additionally, in his objection, the plaintiff contends that the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction to reach the devised real property owned at the time of death by the decedent because it had not found the estate to be insolvent.   This argument, however, is unavailing.  General Statutes § 45a–98 provides in relevant part that:  “Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to ․ determine title or rights of possession and use in and to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute ․ any decedent's estate ․ which ․ estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, including the rights and obligations of any beneficiary of the ․ estate ․”

Fischer, Brian T., J.