Mallisai Itha et al. v. Alexa Stafford et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR STAY, NO. 104.00

FACTS

The plaintiffs in the above captioned action, Mallisai Itha, Pramod Gawande and Rajesh Yedoti, allege the following facts in their complaint:  In the late evening hours of January 11, 2013, Alexa Stafford, the first named defendant herein, was operating a motor vehicle eastbound on North State Street in Stamford.   Stafford had rented the automobile from the other named defendants.   The plaintiffs, who were stopped at the traffic signal at the intersection of Canal Street and North State Street, had just entered the intersection when their motor vehicle collided with the motor vehicle operated by Stafford.   They allege that Stafford was operating her motor vehicle at that time and place:  (1) against a red traffic signal;  (2) at an excessive rate of speed;  and (3) under the influence of alcohol when her vehicle collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle, causing the plaintiffs to suffer severe and lasting physical injuries.   Very soon thereafter Stafford was arrested by warrant and charged with two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–60d, one count of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14–227a, one count of possession of alcohol by a minor in violation of General Statutes § 30–89, one count of reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statues § 14–222 and one count of failure to obey a traffic control signal in violation of General Statues § 14–299.

On or about May 13, 2013, the plaintiffs brought this civil action for money damages against Stafford and the other defendants alleging, inter alia, that her negligence and recklessness caused their injuries.   On January 29, 2014, Stafford filed a motion for stay in this civil action pursuant to Practice Book § 13–5, requesting that this court issue an order staying all discovery proceedings against her pending final resolution of the criminal charges she now faces.   Stafford asks only for a stay of all discovery actions directed against her (not the other defendants), and argues that a stay of discovery is necessary lest she be forced to choose between vigorously defending herself in the civil action or exercising her rights not to incriminate herself.   The plaintiffs strongly object to any stay of discovery against this defendant, arguing that a stay is not necessary to protect her rights and would also be highly prejudicial to the plaintiffs' case.

There are, therefore, parallel cases now pending against the defendant and the issue squarely before the court is whether it is appropriate to suspend discovery in the civil action at the defendant's request until final resolution of all criminal charges.

ANALYSIS

Practice Book § 13–5 provides in relevant part as follows:  “[u]pon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:  (1) that the discovery not be had;  (2) that the discovery be had only on specified terms and conditions, ․” The parties agree that the decision to grant a protective order rests within the court's discretion.  Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 16–17, 905 A.2d 55 (2006);  Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 459, 493 A.2d 229 (1985);  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–5010093–S (January 11, 2008, Bellis, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 786, 787);  Ritchie v. Nyfix, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, CV–06–4009324–S (February 21, 2007, Nadeau, J.).

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is no prohibition on parallel civil and criminal proceedings.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970).   In such situations, the decision on whether to grant a stay must be decided on a case-by-case basis.   State v. Tomasso, 49 Conn.Sup. 327, 335, 878 A.2d 413 [38 Conn. L. Rptr. 304] (2004).  “It is unequivocally a discretionary power of a tribunal to stay proceedings where there are parallel civil and criminal proceedings.   The Constitution, therefore, does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings, pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.   Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone civil discovery or impose protective orders and conditions when the interests of justice seem to require such action ․ The court must make such determinations in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.”   Farricielli v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV–96–05386369–S (January 8, 1997, McWeeny, J.) (18 Conn. L. Rptr. 520, 521).

In deciding whether a stay of discovery should be ordered, and the form such order should take, the court is required to apply a balancing test, and consider the following five factors:  “(1) the interests of the plaintiff in an expeditious resolution and the prejudice to the plaintiff in not proceeding;  (2) the interests of and burdens on the defendants;  (3) the convenience to the court in management of its docket and in the efficient use of judicial resources;  (4) the interests of other persons not parties to the civil litigation;  and (5) the interests of the public in the pending civil and criminal proceedings ․ The general rule is that parallel proceedings may proceed;  not that they generally should be prohibited.   Courts have frequently stayed discovery in civil proceedings when a related criminal prosecution may be undermined.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Lenarz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–05–4012970–S (July 5, 2006, Tanzer, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 586, 587);  accord State v. Tomasso, supra, 49 Conn.Sup. 334–35.

Counsel for Stafford argues that the civil case is still in its earliest stages, and therefore suspending discovery against her until the criminal charges are resolved will not result in significant prejudice to the plaintiffs.   Second, they argue that requiring Stafford to answer interrogatories, production requests and to sit for a deposition will impose a constitutionally prohibited burden on her.   Defense counsel argues that Stafford should not be forced to make the choice between, on the one hand, answering questions truthfully and thoroughly in the civil case and on the other, invoking her rights not to incriminate herself, which might jeopardize her defense.   Defense counsel also argue that there is or may be evidence helpful to Stafford in the civil case that will not be available to her until after the conclusion of all criminal proceedings.   With respect to the other factors to be considered by the court, the defense argues that a “temporary stay” of discovery will not inconvenience the court or adversely affect the public interest or any other person not a party to the civil action.   Defense counsel cite Wilcox v. Webster Ins., supra, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 786, and Doe v. Lenarz, supra, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 586, as precedent for their argument that similar temporary stays have been granted in similar parallel proceedings and should be granted in the present case.

Defense counsel's reliance on these two cases is misplaced.   The courts in Wilcox and Lenarz did order stays of discovery in the civil actions, but not at the request of the defendant.   In both cases the State of Connecticut through the Department of Criminal Justice (“DCJ”) intervened in the parallel civil action and requested a stay of discovery in the civil case pending completion of each companion criminal case.  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., supra, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 787;  Doe v. Lenarz, supra, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 586.   Limited stays were granted in both cases not for the benefit of the defendant, but to ensure the integrity of the criminal cases.   See id.   The Wilcox court took note of the DCJ's argument that “the factual issues in the civil and criminal proceedings are substantially similar, and that the majority of the state's witnesses at the criminal trial are likely to be called to testify in the civil trial.   The DCJ argued that the plaintiffs would be able to circumvent the more restrictive rules of criminal discovery should they be permitted to proceed with the depositions and discovery in this civil matter.   They further contend that the discovery, should it be had, would reveal the state's strategy, allow the plaintiffs a ‘dry run’ on the state's witnesses and not allow the state to protect the public's interest in prosecuting crime.”   Wilcox v. Webster Ins., supra, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 788.   Based on these considerations, the court granted a limited stay of discovery of only 14 weeks.  Id., 789.

In the present case, by contrast, it is the defendant asking for the stay, with a request for an indeterminate stay of discovery until full and final resolution of all criminal charges pending against Stafford.   The plaintiffs argue in response that granting such a stay would be the equivalent to an indefinite stay, and therefore highly prejudicial to the plaintiffs' interests.

This court agrees with the plaintiffs.   The Lenarz court, while discussing the length of the stay requested, observed that “[a]t least one federal court has cautioned ․ against granting a motion to stay in which the duration is indefinite.  ‘In light of the fact that one of the functions of discovery is to preserve testimony while recollection is relatively fresh, an indefinite stay, of their taking should not be entered unless no alternative is available.’   McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 672 (D.C.Cir.1970).”  Doe v. Lenarz, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 5867.   At this point it is impossible for this court to know with any specificity how long the criminal case will take, even not taking into account time for appeals, and therefore Stafford's request would be the functional equivalent of an indefinite stay.   So long as Stafford's constitutional rights are respected, the plaintiffs are entitled to continue their discovery now, while memories are fresh and other evidence is still available.

Second, this court is not persuaded by defense counsel's argument that there is or may be evidence helpful to Stafford's case that will be available only after resolution of the criminal case and expiration of all appeals.   Defense counsel does not specify what that evidence might be, and in any event, Connecticut Rules of Practice require prosecutors to release any and all evidence (including exculpatory evidence) upon demand.  Practice Book §§ 40–11 et seq.;  General Statutes § 54–86a.   The court therefore disagrees with defense counsel's argument that a stay is necessary to procure this necessary evidence for their client in the civil case.

Third, Stafford has already asserted her Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate herself in her responses to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for production.   She can do the same at her deposition, or opt to say as little or as much as she chooses.

Applying the five-part “balancing of the equities” test to the present case, the court finds that Stafford's request for a temporary stay until final resolution of the criminal charges would cause undue prejudice to the plaintiffs in this case, and that denying it does not impose on her an unconstitutionally proscribed burden.

The court also finds that there are no other parties whose interests need to be accounted for by the court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above the defendant's Motion for Stay is denied.

By the Court,

Anthony D. Truglia, Jr., J.

Truglia, Anthony D., J.