Donna Stewart et al. v. Ramona Ciccaglione et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT # 179

This court issued its memorandum of decision in this case on February 8, 2012 following a nine-day trial and receipt of post-trial briefs.   On June 7, 2012, the defendants, Ramona Ciccaglione, Laura McConville, Mary Booth, Rozalie Quick, and Robert Testo, Jr., filed this motion to open judgment in order to determine whether paragraph 23 of the trust ¹ is valid and enforceable and to allow additional evidence, if necessary, on this issue.   They allege that, on or around April 1, 2012, the trustees sent a letter to various beneficiaries of the trust, including, among others, the defendants.   In this letter, the trustees informed the defendants that, as they had contested the validity and/or enforceability of the trust, they would be treated as having died without issue on the date of the litigation pursuant to the terms of paragraph 23.   On April 31, 2012, the parties appeared before Judge Kurmay of the Milford Probate Court to request a hearing on the validity and enforceability of paragraph 23.   On May 31, 2012, however, Judge Kurmay issued a decision declining to consider the validity of paragraph 23 due, in part, on concerns about judicial economy and advised that the parties should bring the issue before this court.

On June 18, 2012, the plaintiffs, Donna Stewart, Millie Sacks, and Diana Ricitelli, filed their objection to the motion to open judgment.   In it, they argued that the court should not open judgment to allow evidence and argument on the validity and enforceability of paragraph 23 because this issue was not part of the underlying declaratory judgment action.

On September 27, 2012, the court ordered the parties to file briefs concerning the court's perimeters when opening the judgment.   In their briefs, dated November 30, 2012, and December 21, 2012, the defendants argued that the court opening the judgment and retaining jurisdiction of this case would further the goals of judicial economy as this court was present for the complete trial, would be familiar with the issues, and the matter would most likely not require additional evidence.   On the other hand, they argue, if the motion is not granted, a new complaint would have to be filed which could, if this court was not assigned the matter, require additional or new testimony be taken.   On December 3, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their memorandum, in which they withdrew their objection, informed the court that they did not object to the motion to open, and pointed to provisions of the prayer for relief that they believed authorized the court to consider the import, effect, and enforceability of paragraph 23.   They did note, however, their position that additional evidence and testimony was not required for this court to render a decision.

For several months, the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations, which the court learned had reached an impasse on or near July 31, 2013.   On November 5, 2013, the plaintiffs clarified that they had no objection to the motion to open judgment as long as no new testimony was taken or given.   If the court were to order that new and additional testimony be taken or given concerning the defendant's motion to open judgment, the plaintiffs would instead object to the motion to open.

The court heard argument on the matter on January 21, 2014.   The same day, the plaintiffs submitted a memorandum in support of their objection to the motion to open judgment, arguing that the motion to open should not be granted to address issues not raised as an issue in the prayer for relief in the underlying declaratory judgment.

Practice Book § 17–4(a) provides in relevant part:  “Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent.”  “It is familiar law that a court has the inherent authority to open, correct or modify its judgments.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Marshall v. Marshall, 119 Conn.App. 120, 134–35, 988 A.2d 314, cert. granted on other grounds, 296 Conn. 908, 993 A.2d 467 (2010).  “Because of the important consideration of finality of judgments, however, a judgment should not be opened without a strong and compelling reason.”  Martin v. Martin, 99 Conn.App. 145, 156, 913 A.2d 451 (2007).   This concern for the finality of judgments arises, in part, out of a concern for judicial economy.   See Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. New London, 135 Conn.App. 167, 192, 43 A.3d 679 (affirming trial court's denial of motion to open when effort to present evidence amounted to “do over” which “would have been entirely inconsistent with judicial economy and the principles on which our system of justice is founded” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 905, 53 A.3d 220 (2012).  “While ․ a motion [to open] should not be readily granted nor without strong reasons, it ought to be when there appears cause for which the court acting reasonably would feel bound in duty so to do.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710–11, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983).

This determination is left to the court's discretion.  TLC Development, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 215 Conn. 527, 533, 577 A.2d 288 (1990).  “Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Turk v. Silberstein, 48 Conn.App. 223, 225, 709 A.2d 578 (1998).

In the present matter, this case was filed in May 2007.   It has involved various parties, some of whom have changed judicial posture over the course of these proceedings,² and ultimately culminated in a highly contested and acrimonious trial that lasted nine days over two months.   The defendants do not seek in this motion to vacate the entire underlying judgment but merely seek clarification as to one particular clause of the trust, namely paragraph 23.   Indeed, at one point, the plaintiffs agreed to open the judgment for these limited purposes and pointed to several provisions of their prayer for relief on which it said that the court could have made a determination with regards to the validity and enforceability of paragraph 23.   Additionally, although it has been their position since their withdrawal of their objection and their initial acquiescence to the motion on December 3, 2012 that they do not believe additional evidence or testimony would be required for the court to make a determination concerning paragraph 23's validity or enforceability, the plaintiffs only made it an explicit condition of their acquiescence in their November 5, 2013 supplemental memorandum.   Finally, were the court to deny this motion to open, the parties would have to initiate an entirely separate action to address this matter.   Thus, under the circumstances of this case, judicial economy, which usually counsels against opening judgments, counsels strongly that this limited matter be considered by this court when doing so will not defeat, but rather further, the ends of substantive justice.

The motion to open the judgment for the limited purposes of offering evidence, if needed, and determining the validity and enforceability of paragraph 23 of the trust is granted.

The Court

John W. Moran, Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Paragraph 23, entitled “Ad Damnum,” is in function a “no-contest” clause.  “An in terrorem, or no-contest, clause is [a] provision designed to threaten one into action or inaction;  esp., a testamentary provision that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who challenges the terms of the will.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  McGrath v. Gallant, 143 Conn.App. 129, 132 n.1, 69 A.3d 968 (2013)..  FN1. Paragraph 23, entitled “Ad Damnum,” is in function a “no-contest” clause.  “An in terrorem, or no-contest, clause is [a] provision designed to threaten one into action or inaction;  esp., a testamentary provision that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who challenges the terms of the will.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  McGrath v. Gallant, 143 Conn.App. 129, 132 n.1, 69 A.3d 968 (2013).

FN2. Mary Booth, a defendant for the purposes of this motion to open, was a plaintiff in the initial complaint to this action.   As the court noted in a footnote to its February 8, 2012 memorandum of decision, however, she eventually removed herself as a plaintiff and withdrew her complaint..  FN2. Mary Booth, a defendant for the purposes of this motion to open, was a plaintiff in the initial complaint to this action.   As the court noted in a footnote to its February 8, 2012 memorandum of decision, however, she eventually removed herself as a plaintiff and withdrew her complaint.

Moran, John W., J.T.R.