Sunset Gold Realty v. Premier Building & Development, Inc. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS FOR COUNSEL FEES (# # 123, 131) AND MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE AND FILE A SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT (# 139)

This case involves a claim by the plaintiff, Sunset Gold, for a commission pursuant to an exclusive right to sell/lease/exchange agreement regarding certain property.   After a trial to the court, the court, by decision dated June 25, 2010, found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment in the amount of $137,500 plus attorneys fees and costs, as provided in the listing agreement, against both defendants, Premier Building & Development, Inc. and Cobblestone Associates, LLC [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 183].   The court ordered that the clerk set the matter for further proceedings upon the submission by the plaintiff of affidavits regarding its claims for attorneys fees and costs.   Judgment was also entered for the plaintiff, Sunset Gold, on the defendant, Premier's, counterclaim.   A motion to reargue was filed by the defendants on July 13, 2010 and denied by the court on September 17, 2010.   On July 26, 2010 Attorney Eugene Marconi filed an affidavit of attorneys fees for the plaintiff, as did Attorney Thomas Lonardo.   On July 29, 2010, the defendants filed an objection to Attorney Marconi's request for fees.   On October 4, 2010 the plaintiff moved for approval of attorneys fees.   On that same day, the defendants filed an appeal to the Appellate Court from the court's judgment.   On October 13, 2010 the defendants filed an objection to the motion for approval of attorneys fees for the same reasons stated in their July 29th objection.

On February 14, 2012, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.  133 Conn.App. 445.   On March 1, 2012, the defendants filed a petition for certification for review with the Supreme Court, which was denied on March 27, 2012.  304 Conn. 912.

On September 10, 2012 the plaintiff filed a motion for approval of attorneys fees and Attorney Marconi filed an affidavit regarding his request for fees.   On September 19, 2012 the defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion.   The requests for attorneys fees and the objections thereto, from a review of the court's records, appeared on various short calendars, but were not marked, and, therefore, never adjudicated.

On October 11, 2012, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of judgment, dated October 9, 2012, stating that the judgment and costs in its favor against the defendant Cobblestone only had been paid and satisfied.   In response to an examination of judgment creditor proceeding commenced by the plaintiff against Premier in May 2013, and continued over numerous dates until October 25, 2013, the court raised the issue of the effect of the satisfaction of judgment regarding one defendant where the court had entered judgment against both defendants jointly.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law dated November 8, 2013 in support of its position that the partial satisfaction of judgment did not operate as a discharge against both defendants.   The defendant Premier filed a motion, dated November 11, 2013 seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to file a satisfaction of judgment as it relates to Premier.   On November 18, 2013 the court ordered that all collection efforts against Premier be stayed until further order of the court.   Oral argument on the issues presented was held on December 9, 2013.

It is undisputed that Sunset released Cobblestone from the judgment in this matter pursuant to a release executed October 9, 2012 and the payment of $150,000 to Sunset Gold. Therefore the plaintiff collected $12,500 more than the amount of the judgment.

“Although the filing of a notice of satisfaction of judgment is commonplace ․ our courts have not directly addressed the elements of the motion at issue in this appeal, namely, a motion to determine that a money judgment has been satisfied.   That is not to say such a motion is improper.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 52–350d(a), ‘[f]or the purposes of postjudgment procedures, the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction over all parties of record in an action until satisfaction of the judgment ․’ As used in § 52–350d(a), a postjudgment procedure is ‘any procedure commenced after rendition of a money judgment’;  General Statutes § 52–350a(15);  and a money judgment ‘means a judgment, order or decree of the court calling in whole or in part for the payment of a sum of money ․’ General Statutes § 52–350a(13) ․ Accord 50 C.J.S. 226, Judgments § 910 (2009) (‘court may, on motion and satisfactory proof that a judgment has been paid and satisfied in whole or in part by the act of the parties thereto, order it discharged and canceled of record, to the extent of the payment or satisfaction’);  47 Am.Jur.2d 382, Judgments § 804 (2006) (courts have inherent power to entertain action to determine whether judgment has been satisfied).   Moreover, our rules of practice specifically authorize the filing of a motion to determine that a judgment has been satisfied.  Practice Book § 6–5 provides in relevant part that ‘[w]hen the judgment is satisfied in a civil action, the party recovering the judgment shall file written notice thereof with the clerk, who shall endorse judgment satisfied on the judgment file ․ The judicial authority may, upon motion, make a determination that the judgment has been satisfied.’   The question pertinent to our inquiry, then, is what issues necessarily must be determined in order for a trial court properly to grant such a motion.   A satisfaction of judgment is the discharge of an obligation under a judgment by payment of the amount due ․ The satisfaction of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfillment of the mandate thereof ․ There is realistically no substantial difference between the words paid and satisfied in the judgment context ․ A determination that a judgment has been satisfied operates to extinguish [the judgment] for all purposes ․ It is absolutely determinative of the rights of the parties ․ Further proceedings may not commence upon a judgment which has been satisfied ․ Where a judgment creditor has received actual payment of the judgment or any equivalent therefor ․ but [the judgment creditor] refuses to acknowledge or enter satisfaction, the court having control of the judgment may ․ order satisfaction to be entered officially ․ In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the following issues are prerequisites to the rendering of a determination by the court that a money judgment has been satisfied.   First, the judgment creditor must have obtained a valid money judgment against the judgment debtor.   Second, the judgment debtor must have paid the amount of that judgment.   In so doing, the court must find that the judgment debtor either made actual payment to the judgment creditor or a payment equivalent thereto ․ Because a satisfaction of judgment operates to extinguish [the judgment] for all purposes [and] is absolutely determinative of the rights of the parties ․ the court on those two predicate findings therefore could extinguish [the defendant's] legal obligation to the plaintiff by rendering a valid satisfaction of judgment.”  (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, 137 Conn.App. 540, 550–53 (2012).

The first issue the court must decide is whether the satisfaction of judgment acts as a satisfaction of the judgment against Premier in addition to Cobblestone.   Generally the satisfaction of a judgment as to one tortfeasor is satisfaction as to all.  Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 73 (1989).   Here, where the satisfaction is based on payment of an amount in excess of the amount of the judgment, there can be no doubt that any liability on the part of the other defendant has been discharged.   In fact, there is no amount left to be recovered from the co-defendant.   The plaintiff claims that the satisfaction of judgment, by its terms, as well as the release, was not intended to release Premier.   That may be, but a plaintiff can recover only once for its just damages for an injury.  Id., p. 71.   The plaintiff acknowledges that Premier would only be responsible for any remaining balance of the judgment.

The next issue is whether there was any balance due on the judgment after the filing of the satisfaction of judgment.   At the time that the satisfaction of judgment was filed, the judgment amount was $137,500 and it is undisputed that a sum in excess of that amount was paid to the plaintiff.   Therefore the judgment has been satisfied as to each defendant.

Lastly, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the requests for attorneys fees.   The court finds that it does not.   The plaintiff claims that attorneys fees were awarded as part of the judgment.   It cites Practice Book § 11–21.   That section states:  “Motions for attorneys fees shall be filed with the trial court within thirty days following the date on which the final judgment of the trial court was rendered.   If appellate attorneys fees are sought, motions for such fees shall be filed with the trial court within thirty days following the date on which the appellate court or supreme court rendered its decision disposing of the underlying appeal.   Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect an award of attorneys fees assessed as a component of damages.”   Even assuming that the award of attorneys fees here would be a component of damages, and arguably not subject to the time limitations of § 11–2, since the judgment has been satisfied, any claim for such fees has also been satisfied.   In any event, in light of the fact that the judgment entered by the court has been satisfied, the court no longer has jurisdiction of this matter.

Therefore the plaintiff's motions for counsel fees (# # 123, 131) are denied and the defendant Premier's Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Prepare and File a Satisfaction of Judgment (# 139) as it relates to Premier is granted.

Jane S. Scholl, J.

Scholl, Jane S., J.