Frank Germano et al. v. Katherine Germano–Delorfano (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In the above entitled action, the plaintiffs are Frank and Jeanine Germano and the defendant is their daughter Katherine Germano. (The defendant is referred to in the complaint as “Katherine Germano–Delorfano” but she stated in court that her correct legal surname is simply “Germano”). The plaintiffs seek visitation with the defendant's daughter I.D., i.e. their granddaughter. The trial of the matter, including closing arguments, was conducted over a period of four court dates from March 12, 2014 to March 17, 2014. Witnesses included the parties, Dr. Stephen Humphrey, Dr. Bruce Freedman, and the court-appointed Guardian ad Litem, Mark Ferraro, Esq.

For the sake of clarity and ease of reference, and with the court's apologies for the informality, the parties will sometimes be referred to herein by their first names as they all share the same last name. Thus, unless otherwise indicated any reference to “Frank” shall mean the plaintiff Frank Germano, to “Jeanine” shall mean the plaintiff Jeanine Germano, and to “Katherine” shall mean the defendant. The minor child who is the subject of this matter is alternately referred to herein as “I.D.,” “minor child,” “minor,” and “child.”

FINDINGS OF FACT

Katherine is the mother of I.D., born on December 20, 2001. The father of the child is Anthony Delorfano, the former husband of the defendant. The father has no custody rights to I.D., the defendant having been awarded sole custody in the parties' 2003 judgment of dissolution of marriage. The father was not named as a defendant in this matter and has been determined by the court not to be a necessary party to this action.

During or about October 2012, when I.D. was approximately nine months old, Katherine and her then husband were separating and their divorce case had either recently been filed in court or was about to be filed. Katherine had an apartment in New Haven, Connecticut at that time, but she and I.D. often stayed at the home of the plaintiffs in East Hartford due to the problems in her marriage.

During this time period, there came a day when Katherine, who was at her New Haven apartment at the time with the child, called her parents on the phone to tell them she needed help because the police were at her home and I.D. was about to be taken away from her.

Frank and Jeanine immediately drove to Katherine's home, where they saw her handcuffed and being placed into a police squad car. They also observed the child crying while being held by someone who was a stranger to them. The plaintiffs learned that Katherine's arrest was the result of conditions in her apartment, where it was discovered over thirty cats and one dog were being kept. At least one employee of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) was on the scene. When the plaintiffs identified themselves and their relationship to the child, they were permitted to take I.D. home with them. Had they not arrived it is likely that I.D. would have been placed into foster care at least temporarily. The plaintiffs later assisted with arrangements to have Katherine released from police custody. Both Katherine and I.D. then went to stay at the plaintiffs' home.

DCF supervisors visited the plaintiffs' home within a day of these events and met with the parties. Under an arrangement made with DCF, the department agreed that it would take no further action in the case on condition that the child must reside with the plaintiffs for a minimum of two years. Thus Katherine and I.D. began to live in the plaintiffs' home on a full-time basis.

The two-year period became, in practice, much longer. After two years had elapsed, Katherine had a series of jobs culminating in her present position with the Film Studies department of Yale University in New Haven. For much of the period of approximately ten years beginning with the incident described above and ending in 2012, Katherine maintained a separate apartment in New Haven. While she would sometimes stay in her New Haven apartment for work-related reasons, and there were some weekends when the child would stay there with her, Katherine stayed in her parents' home most overnights, and I.D. lived with the plaintiffs for the vast majority of the time whether Katherine was present or not. Katherine testified that her main reason for continuing to live with her parents in their home, as opposed to moving full-time into her New Haven apartment, was her inability to arrange reliable day care for I.D. in New Haven.

During this time the plaintiffs provided regular daily care for the child when I.D. was in the home and the defendant was not, which was much of the time. The plaintiffs assisted Katherine with many of the functions and duties of a parent, including feeding and daily care of I.D., finding and paying for pre-school programs and private elementary school, and enrolling her in activities such as karate, the Girl Scouts, guitar lessons, and academic enrichment programs. The plaintiffs regularly transported the child to and from school and activities.

Katherine has two brothers, Frank, Jr. and Michael, both of whom are married with families of their own. The Germanos have a large extended family which is in the habit of having annual summer reunions, alternating between Connecticut and the Ohio home of some of the relatives. In most years, both I.D. and Katherine have accompanied the plaintiffs to these reunions. However, in 2012 the plaintiff took I.D. to the reunion in Ohio without the defendant, who was unable to attend due to being involved at the time in the purchase of a new home.

Katherine and I.D. continued to reside in the plaintiffs' home until August 2012. At that time a bitter altercation occurred at the home of the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs' son Frank Jr. and his daughter were visiting. As might be expected, the parties' recollections of the event differ as to details. It is clear that the altercation began with an argument between Katherine and her brother Frank, Jr., and escalated into an ugly scene which, while not becoming physically violent, included expletives hurled by the defendant at her brother and a vehement argument between Katherine and Jeanine. All of this occurred in the presence of I.D., ten years old at the time, who became visibly upset.

The outcome of the August 2012 event was that Katherine moved with the child out of the plaintiffs' home and into her New Haven apartment. (She has since moved to her current home in East Hampton.) Katherine ceased any visits between the plaintiffs and the child. For several weeks after the altercation she allowed Frank—but not Jeanine—to have weekly telephone conversations with the child. However, during one of those conversations Frank expressed to I.D. his concerns about her safety at her new school, even though he had no firsthand information about the school. Katherine disapproved of the comments, viewing them as her father's attempt to manipulate the child into wanting to return to her old school in East Hartford, and as a result she caused even telephone contact between the plaintiffs and the child to cease. The plaintiffs did not see or speak to I.D. again until they were permitted to do so under the temporary orders entered in the present case.

Katherine testified about the way she feels she was mistreated by her parents, especially her mother, throughout her life. She describes her mother as having been overly critical and verbally abusive to her, and voiced her view that Jeanine is treating I.D. the same way. She considers it her duty as a parent to keep I.D. away from Frank and Jeanine in order to spare her the kind of abuse she herself suffered.

In support of her views, Katherine emphasized several incidents that she feels demonstrate her parents' inappropriate treatment of her daughter. Along with the August 2012 altercation, these incidents resurfaced repeatedly throughout the trial, both in the testimony of the parties themselves and in that of the expert witnesses who described the incidents related to them. While the details of the incidents varied somewhat from witness to witness, the essence of each incident was consistent across the testimony and the court for the most part does not find the discrepancies in the details significant. The relevant facts of each incident as found by the court are summarized below.

The Bicycle Trip Incident

This incident occurred when the child was nine or ten years old and still living in the home of the plaintiffs. On the day in question I.D. was home with the plaintiffs and the defendant was not home. The minor expressed the desire and intention to ride her bicycle alone to the home of a local friend. Frank did not believe the trip would be safe for I.D. to take alone in view of the usual car traffic along the route, and he told her she did not have permission to go. I.D. insisted she wanted to go and threatened to leave on the bike trip despite her grandfather's efforts to prevent her. Frank told I.D. that if she left on the trip he would have to call the police to bring her back. I.D. finally relented and went to her room. Frank did not in fact call the police.

The defendant characterizes this incident as an example of her father's inability to control the minor with appropriate measures. She is critical of Frank's use of the threat to call police as an action harmful to her daughter. Frank testified that while he regretted having to take this action—a regret that he expressed to the child herself minutes after the situation had defused—he saw no other recourse short of an ill-advised attempt to restrain her physically. He did what he felt was necessary to insure the minor's safety.

The Mall Incident

On or about December 22, 2013 the plaintiffs took I.D. and her friend Robin on a shopping trip to a mall to have I.D. pick out her Christmas gifts from her grandparents. The mall was very crowded due to the date being so close to Christmas, and Frank was worried about being able to find the girls should they become separated from him. He gave I.D. instructions that she and Robin could browse within the stores to which they were headed, but always had to remain in the same store as the plaintiffs.

The court concludes that what transpired next was the result of a miscommunication. In his instructions about roaming within a store, Frank was referring to specific stores to which the group was headed to buy I.D.'s gifts, but I.D. apparently thought the instruction also related to the store (Dick's Sporting Goods) through which they had entered the mall and were passing at the time. When the children began to browse on their own within Dick's, Frank reiterated that they could not wander off from the plaintiffs. I.D. became extremely upset to the point of crying and screaming.

The defendant characterizes the mall incident as another example of her father's inability to control the child appropriately and set clear rules. Frank, in turn, characterizes it as another situation in which his primary concern was for the child's safety and in which he did the best he could to keep her safely with the adults.

The Karate School Incident

I.D. has for several years taken lessons at a karate school near the plaintiffs' home. Her most recent lessons have occurred on days when she is not scheduled to see the plaintiffs;  she is transported to and from the karate school by Katherine. On one evening during the week ending March 1, 2014, the plaintiffs had gone out for dinner and, on their way home, were passing the strip shopping center in which the karate school is located. Instead of continuing home past the center, Frank turned into the shopping center and pulled into a space near the school. Almost immediately, Katherine and I.D. walked in front of the plaintiffs' car on their way into the school and saw the plaintiffs.

Katherine's perception of the incident is that her parents were “stalking” I.D. and had no right to approach her on that evening, or any time at the karate school. Frank testified that he turned into the shopping center on impulse, knowing that it was the night of I.D.'s regular lesson and simply hoping to find Katherine's car in the parking lot. He said that he wasn't trying to see I.D., but that he missed her and would have derived comfort from knowing that she was doing a regular activity that she enjoyed.

The Video

The final incident is directly related to the previous one. After the karate school incident, I.D.'s next scheduled visit to the plaintiffs was on Sunday, March 2, 2014. On that date, the minor used her smartphone to make a digital audiovisual recording of the beginning of her visit. This video was cited several times during the trial by the defendant as evidence of Jeanine's “mocking” and “verbally abusive” behavior toward I.D..

The video was admitted into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit A, without objection by the plaintiffs following discussions outside the courtroom among the defendant, the plaintiff's attorneys, and the guardian ad litem.

The audiovisual recording was played in the courtroom on the child's phone during Jeanine's testimony. The phone was marked as an exhibit for the sole purpose of use of the recording in question, with an order providing for the later substitution of a separate copy of the video if the substitute's accuracy were confirmed in writing by all parties and the Guardian ad Litem.

Testimony of the plaintiffs establishes that the video recording begins at the outset of I.D.'s visit on March 2, 2014, shortly after her entry into their home. The recording is about two to three minutes in length and shows the plaintiffs in what appears to be the front hallway of their home, with Jeanine sitting on the stairway to the second floor and Frank standing to the side of the stairway. For much of the video Frank is speaking to I.D.. The video is choppy and unsteady, and occasionally moves somewhat wildly;  frequently neither Frank nor Jeanine is centered in the viewing frame. At one point Frank asks I.D. why she isn't looking at him as she speaks to him. From these facts the court concludes that I.D. was attempting to make the recording surreptitiously and that the plaintiffs were not aware they were being recorded.

I.D.'s voice is heard off-camera, and it is quite strident. She asks her grandparents why they were stalking her at the karate school. She tells them she dislikes coming to see them and only does so because she has to.

Frank remains calm in the face of his granddaughter's questions and comments. He does virtually all of the talking in response, attempting in between I.D.'s interruptions to give essentially the same explanation of his visit to the karate school that he gave in his testimony. Jeanine says little other than an occasional, relatively innocuous comment. She does laugh during the exchange, as claimed by the defendant. But the court does not find it to be the type of mocking or bullying laughter that the defendant perceives. Rather, the court finds it to be the brief, nervous laughter of a person who is at a loss for words in the face of a difficult situation.

APPLICABLE LAW

The plaintiffs' application is governed by Section 46b–59 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which provides in part as follows:

(b) Any person may submit a verified petition to the Superior Court for the right of visitation with any minor child. Such petition shall include specific and good-faith allegations that (1) a parent-like relationship exists between the person and the minor child, and (2) denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm. Subject to subsection (e) of this section, the court shall grant the right of visitation with any minor child to any person if the court finds after hearing and by clear and convincing evidence that a parent-like relationship exists between the person and the minor child and denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm.

(e) If the Superior Court grants the right of visitation pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the court shall set forth the terms and conditions of visitation including, but not limited to, the schedule of visitation, including the dates or days, time and place or places in which the visitation can occur, whether overnight visitation will be allowed and any other terms and conditions that the court determines are in the best interest of the minor child, provided such conditions shall not be contingent upon any order of financial support by the court. In determining the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the wishes of the minor child if such minor child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent opinion.

The applicable statute is generally recognized as the legislative codification and amplification of the principles established by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 (2002). In that case, the court outlined the circumstances in which a third party, such as a grandparent, might obtain a court order allowing visitation with a child over the objection of the child's parent(s). The case recognized. the constitutional right of a fit parent to make decisions about his or her child in matters such as whom the child should visit.

The statute establishes two prongs that must be satisfied before such visitation may be ordered against a parent's wishes. The first is that the applicant must establish that he or she has a “parent-like relationship” with the child. Subsection (c) of the statute sets forth several factors to be considered by the court in evaluating the existence of the requisite relationship.

If a parent-like relationship is found to exist, the second prong of the statute applies. In order to grant visitation, the court must find that “real and significant harm” would be caused by the denial of visitation. Under the definitional subsection of the statute, a finding of “real and significant harm” for this purpose is the equivalent of a finding that the minor is “neglected” or “uncared for” within the meaning of Section 46b–120 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The pertinent subsections of the latter statute define those terms as follows:

(6) A child or youth may be found “neglected” who, for reasons other than being impoverished, (A) has been abandoned, (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth;

(8) A child or youth may be found “uncared for” who is homeless or whose home cannot provide the specialized care that the physical, emotional or mental condition of the child or youth requires.

Section 46b–120 of the Connecticut General Statutes, subsections (6) and (8).

Under Section 46b–59, in order to grant visitation the court must find that both prongs of the statutory test, i.e. a “parent-like relationship” and “real and significant harm,” have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

DISCUSSION

Parent–Like Relationship

In the present matter, the court has previously found the existence of the parent-like relationship required by statute for the plaintiffs to seek an order of visitation. See orders dated January 9, 2013. Thus the plaintiffs had satisfied the first prong of the statutory test prior to the trial of the matter.

In any event, the court finds that the evidence presented at the trial again amply demonstrates the existence of the requisite relationship. The court finds that for the great majority of the first ten years of the child's life she resided in the home of the plaintiffs, who throughout that period engaged in numerous parent-like activities such as those described in the findings above. The plaintiffs for all practical purposes acted as co-parents of the child along with Katherine. Indeed, for a significant period of time near the beginning of the child's life, the parent-like involvement of the plaintiffs may have been all that prevented DCF from seeking to take the child into its custody and control.

Therefore, the court reaffirms here that the plaintiffs have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that they have a parent-like relationship with I.D. within the meaning of Section 46b–59 of the Connecticut General Statutes.

Real and Significant Harm

A parent-like relationship having been established, the crucial issue becomes whether the plaintiffs have proven by clear and convincing evidence that real and significant harm to the child would result from a denial of grandparent visitation. The law requires more than a showing that visitation would be in the child's best interests. Rather, the court must find harm to the child analogous to being neglected or uncared for within the meaning of Section 46b–120 of the Connecticut General Statutes. See Warner v. Bicknell, 126 Conn.App. 588, 593 (2011).

In the present case, no evidence was presented to cause the court to find that the denial of visitation would result in I.D. being “uncared for” within the meaning of Section 46b–120(8) of the Connecticut General Statutes. On the contrary, the court finds that even during periods when the plaintiffs have been denied visitation, the defendant has provided I.D. with a suitable home. The court finds it likely that this would continue to be the case whether or not visitation is ordered.

The focus of the court's analysis thus turns to whether the denial of visitation would cause harm to I.D. analogous to being “neglected” as defined in Section 46b–120(6). The court further narrows the inquiry by finding no basis upon which to conclude that the denial of visitation would result in I.D. being abandoned, or neglected physically or educationally.

Rather, the evidence presented at trial goes to the effect of the denial of visitation on the child's emotional care and on conditions which affect her general well-being. The question for the court thus becomes whether the plaintiffs have shown that the denial of visitation would result in I.D. being denied the proper care emotionally within the meaning of Section 46b–120(6)(B), or whether she would be living under conditions or circumstances injurious to her well-being within the meaning of Section 46b–120(6)(C).

Two expert witnesses and the Guardian ad Litem testified about their observations and opinions relevant to the issue of the harm to I.D. of denying the plaintiffs visitation.

Dr. Stephen M. Humphrey, a licensed clinical psychologist, was retained pursuant to the written agreement of the parties made a court order on May 8, 2013 to conduct a comprehensive access evaluation. Dr. Humphrey testified at length and his detailed 65–page evaluation report was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

Dr. Humphrey described the extremely strained and uncomfortable relationship between Katherine and her parents. He reported that in his meeting with Katherine she expressed the view that the best thing that could happen for I.D. and herself would be for her parents to die. (Katherine later unequivocally expressed the same sentiment during her own testimony.) While he considered Katherine to be a good parent in many ways, he opined that she is paranoid when it comes to her parents and is instilling a similar paranoia in her child. She has isolated the child from her extended family, especially Katherine's parents and her brothers and their families.

Despite the defendant's claims about the plaintiffs' behavior, Dr. Humphrey found them to pose no risk of abuse or neglect to the minor. He concluded that the defendant has a greatly exaggerated view of any shortcomings her parents may have, and that I.D. must share this extremely negative opinion of her grandparents to avoid disrupting her relationship with her mother. He found that I.D.'s expressed desire not to see her grandparents, and her denial of any past positive relationship with them despite evidence to the contrary, show that she has adopted her mother's negative views. In his opinion, precluding the child from access to the plaintiffs will make I.D. even more susceptible to the pressures exerted by her mother.

In his evaluation, Dr. Humphrey expresses his opinion that Katherine “exhibits affective instability, intense anger and paranoid ideation that are typical of borderline personality features.” He further concludes that “I.D. has been indoctrinated by her mother into the belief that her grandparents are dangerous and malevolent individuals.” (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at 58, 59.)

Dr. Humphrey expressed a serious concern that I.D. is not demonstrating signs of “individuation” from her mother. She has been required to accept and echo her mother's opinions, even to the point of stating that she wishes her grandparents would die—a view, in his opinion, that “an intelligent, sensitive child would almost never articulate.” Dr. Humphrey opined that for I.D. the process of individuation from her mother has been stunted by a lack of exposure to anyone who does not share her mother's opinion of her grandparents.

In Dr. Humphrey's analysis, further harm to I.D. from denying visitation with her grandparents would be to isolate her from, and cause her to reject, people who would otherwise provide help and support to her during her life. This is especially a concern in that the plaintiffs have traditionally been the ones to facilitate contact between I.D. and her extended family.

On the other hand, having visitation with her grandparents would better equip I.D. to form her own judgments about them rather than just adopting her mother's. This, in turn, would likely lead to the development of beneficial relationships with relatives who care about and can provide support to her.

Dr. Bruce Freedman is a clinical psychologist who was retained, pursuant to the agreement of the parties made a court order, to provide family therapy services in two areas:  reunification therapy for the relationship between the plaintiffs and I.D., and conflict management counseling between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Dr. Freedman testified that he discontinued his efforts on the second issue after minimal time in joint sessions with the plaintiffs and the defendant. Katherine's vehement verbal attacks on her parents during those sessions, using words that Dr. Freedman described as “horrible,” convinced him that further efforts along these lines would be futile.

Dr. Freedman's professional conclusions were remarkably similar to those of Dr. Humphrey. He found several areas of actual or potential harm to I.D. from denying visitation with her grandparents. He concluded that I.D. has been manipulated by her mother against her grandparents in a dramatic way, interfering with the child's development of her own mind and ideas. Dr. Freedman described it as an “outrageous manipulation” to coerce a child into disliking someone who loves her, as he feels Katherine has done to I.D..

Dr. Freedman further testified that isolating I.D. from her grandparents and, by extension, other relatives, deprives her of the benefit of contact with loving people who would help her indefinitely if given the opportunity. He concluded that Katherine's psychological problems have an effect on I.D., and that if she does not have other caring adults involved in her life her mother's problems “can thwart her healthy emotional and social development.” He described Katherine's approach to relationships as “black and white thinking,” whereby anyone who disagrees with her is viewed as an enemy. His concern is that if I.D. is subjected to this kind of black and white thinking, and cut off from her “natural biological support network,” she will be more likely to have difficulties in her own interpersonal relationships and to be isolated in a way that makes her vulnerable to many kinds of problems.

The court finds the testimony and report of Dr. Humphrey and the testimony of Dr. Freedman, and their respective conclusions, to be credible, well-founded, and well-reasoned.

The Guardian ad Litem, Mark Ferraro, testified as to his communications with I.D. and his impressions and recommendations. His testimony was largely consistent with that of the two expert witnesses referenced above. He concluded that I.D. does want a relationship with her grandparents but that she must say otherwise so as not to disappoint her mother. He gave examples of incidents in his dealings with Katherine where she displayed what Dr. Freedman had called “black and white thinking.” Mr. Ferraro also expressed his concern that I.D. was being required by her mother to spy on her grandparents while visiting with them, resulting in her taking the cell phone video placed into evidence and photographing a minor crack in her bedroom ceiling that Katherine considered a threat to her daughter's safety.

Mr. Ferraro also described some genuine grievances expressed by I.D. about her grandparents, which resulted in his compiling with her a set of “rules” for them. For example, Jeanine was not to be so strict and was not to laugh at I.D.;  Frank was to be less confusing when prescribing punishment for misbehavior. The rules were shared with the plaintiffs, and I.D. was encouraged to talk with Mr. Ferraro about any violations. Based on his discussions with the child, Mr. Ferraro concluded that the rules have generally been respected by the plaintiffs.

In the testimony she elicited on cross examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, and in her own testimony, Katherine consistently stated her view of the case and the facts she believes support that view. She states that she was verbally abused by Jeanine throughout her childhood and adolescence, and that her parents permitted her brother Frank Jr. to abuse her physically. She related incidents where she has witnessed her mother being critical of I.D. in the way she eats, the way she sits, and other basic activities. Katherine sees it as her parental duty to protect her child from such abuse, and she believes the only way she can do so is by completely prohibiting contact between I.D. and the plaintiffs. Because she has been unsuccessful in this effort to date, due to the court-ordered temporary visitation, and because she feels that the experts, the Guardian Ad Litem, and the court are all powerless to prevent the abuse if visits do occur, the only true solution she sees is for her parents to die.

Katherine emphasizes, and all of the witnesses agree, that I.D. is an extremely intelligent child who excels at academics and her other activities. There is no evidence that I.D. has had any significant difficulties in her other interpersonal relationships, except for some testimony that she was teased or bullied in school at times when she was younger. Katherine testified that she has facilitated some contact with other relatives independent of her parents' efforts. She stated that she has no relationship difficulties with anyone outside her immediate family, and testified that she is very successful at a demanding job at Yale University. In short, she testified that her only real issues are with her parents, that she has good reason to feel as she does toward them, and that there is no reason to force her as a parent to allow visitation with people she believes will be harmful to her child.

The court has no doubt about the sincerity of Katherine's love for, and desire to protect, her daughter. However, on the basis of the evidence, the court calls into question both the premise of Katherine's concern for her daughter where the plaintiffs are concerned and the rationality of her reaction to that concern.

The evidence includes several examples of Katherine's exaggeration of perceived wrongs and unreasonable isolation of I.D. from her grandparents. She describes a childhood full of abuse by her mother. Yet she chose to continue living in her parents' home with I.D. for almost ten years, including eight years beyond the time that DCF required the child to remain there. During most of this period, Katherine maintained her own apartment in New Haven yet did not move there with I.D.. Her explanation is that she was unable to find reliable child care for I.D. in New Haven while she worked. The court has difficulty accepting that the risk posed by her parents to I.D. is so great that Katherine now wishes them dead, yet it was not enough to spur her to make the kinds of child care arrangements that other parents make routinely. The court can only conclude that Katherine, in her testimony and in her mind, has greatly exaggerated the conduct that she now considers abusive.

The court has no issue with Katherine's decision to move with I.D. from her parents' home to her own house after the August 2012 altercation. Indeed, the court would find such a move understandable whether there had been an altercation or not. But her decision never to return to their home for a visit after having lived with them for ten years, due to an altercation with a different family member who did not even reside there, is one the court finds unreasonable. More to the point, it was contrary to I.D.'s best interests for Katherine to remove her suddenly and traumatically from the only real home she could remember and from the grandparents who helped raise her, with the intention of never allowing her to return to that home to see them.

The subsequent telephone contact between I.D. and Frank was short-lived. The court agrees with Katherine that it was highly inappropriate for Frank to express to the child his fear for her safety in a school about which he had no personal knowledge. Nevertheless, Katherine's response to that unfortunate error by Frank—to seek to terminate permanently any and all contract between I.D. and her grandparents—was an extreme overreaction.

Katherine discusses the above bicycle trip and mall incidents as if they constitute searing indictments of her father's ability to care for I.D.—another exaggeration, in the court's view, and while Frank's conduct in those situations may have left room for improvement, Katherine herself does not quite state what that improvement would be. Rather than suggest better approaches to her father, she seeks to eliminate her daughter's access to him because of the steps he took to try to insure I.D.'s safety.

The incident at the karate studio represents another lapse in judgment by Frank, however well-intentioned it may have been. The court finds Frank's explanation of the incident to be credible, noting that in the video of March 2, 2014 he gives essentially the same explanation to I.D. even though he does not appear to know he is being recorded. But in Katherine's mind this impulsive action by Frank immediately becomes “stalking” as she refuses even to consider the possibility that her father may be telling the truth. It is instructive that Katherine appeared incredulous at her father's testimony that he did not recognize her car in front of him as they entered the shopping center at night, yet she later testified that she looked at his car twice without realizing it was his. The incident is another example of Katherine interpreting her parents' conduct in the worst light possible.

The video recording of March 2, 2014 brings home the point that Katherine is manipulating I.D.'s view of the plaintiffs. I.D. enters the plaintiffs' home making the same accusation of stalking as her mother, and perhaps hoping to capture a confession on the recording which will soon be shared with Katherine. But the conclusions the court draws from the video are very different from Katherine's. The defendant sees in the video a grandmother who is mocking and laughing at I.D.. The court sees Jeanine listening to a torrent of complaints and accusations from I.D. with relative calmness and restraint. To the extent that she laughs, it is the short, quiet, nervous laughter of someone who finds herself in a tense situation and is unsure of what to say. Frank also shows admirable calm as he tries to explain his actions to I.D., and Jeanine does not say or do anything to inflame the situation.

The court finds credible the testimony of Katherine that Jeanine has criticized I.D. and spoken to her sarcastically at times. Such criticisms over minor matters are an inevitable part of helping to raise a child for ten years, and the court does not doubt that there were occasions when the criticism was unwarranted or more intense than necessary. The court also observed firsthand instances of Jeanine using sarcasm in response to questions on cross examination, so it is clear that sarcasm is part of her verbal repertoire. Once again, however, the court finds that the defendant has both exaggerated Jeanine's conduct and overreacted to it.

Drs. Humphrey and Freedman both opined that Katherine greatly exaggerates her parents' weaknesses and foibles. The video provides the court with an opportunity to see an event as it happened and to hear Katherine's perception of it. The comparison of reality with Katherine's description of it supports the correctness of the psychologists' analysis. Indeed, the evidence as a whole supports their findings.

It is clear to the court that the plaintiffs have not been perfect in their relationships with their daughter and granddaughter. It is equally clear that they love and care about I.D. and that no evidence of anything approaching abuse of her by them has been presented. But Katherine's “black and white thinking” causes her to magnify their slightest error in her mind. Rather than helping them, or even allowing independent professionals to try to help them to improve their conduct, she wishes for their deaths.

Katherine exhibits the same type of behavior when it comes to the independent professionals in the case. When Dr. Humphrey expresses opinions different than hers, she questions his ethics. When Dr. Freedman promotes visitation, she demands that he be removed from the case. When Mr. Ferraro expresses an innocuous sentiment about forgiveness in his first meeting with I.D., Katherine—who has been eavesdropping—vows that he will never see her daughter again. She later demands his removal and questions his ethics as well.

Based upon all of the evidence, the court finds that the plaintiffs have proven by clear and convincing evidence that the denial of visitation by I.D. with the plaintiffs would cause real and significant harm to the child in the following respects:

1. It would isolate her from loving relatives who have played a critical role in her life, including keeping her from a likely placement into temporary foster care in 2002 and performing ten years of co-parenting, and who continue to be ready, willing and able to provide support and assistance to her;

2. It would cut her off from her normal support network of extended family members with whom her past contact has been facilitated primarily by the plaintiffs;

3. It would stunt the process of her individuation from her mother, especially in the area of forming her own opinions of her relatives and others with whom she may have relationships;

4. It would make her emotional development unduly susceptible to the intense pressure of conforming to the extreme attitudes of her mother. In particular, it would subject I.D., without the moderating influence of other loving adults, to her mother's approach to interpersonal associations, reinforcing in the child the view that the appropriate response to another person's minor transgression is to sever completely an otherwise valuable relationship with that person.

More specifically, the court finds that preventing such visitation would constitute denying I.D. the proper emotional care within the meaning of Section 46b–120(6)(B) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Furthermore, the court finds that denying such visitation would permit the child to live under conditions, circumstances or associations that are injurious to her well-being within the meaning of Section 46b–120(6)(C) of the Connecticut General Statutes—including the harmful limitation of her associations.

Katherine argues that I.D.'s relationship with her parents is the only area in which the child has any problems, and that it is unnecessary for the court to interfere in this one area. The court is very sensitive to a fit parent's right to control her child's associations. But the court also recognizes that the analysis required by Section 46b–59 will typically occur in just such a situation;  i.e., where a fit parent has provided for her child in such a way that there is no need for more extensive intervention by a court or the child protection system. The statute recognizes that there can be cases where an otherwise well-cared for child is being tangibly harmed by a fit parent's denial of visitation. The court concludes, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that this is just such a case.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings of the court, the plaintiffs are granted the right of visitation on the terms and conditions contained in its orders below. Those terms and conditions have been formulated on the basis of the court's consideration of the best interests of I.D., with the assistance of the recommendations by Dr. Humphrey and Mr. Ferraro.

The court has also considered the wishes of I.D. as required by Section 46b–59(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Based on all the evidence, the court concludes that the minor is of sufficient age and generally capable of forming an intelligent opinion. However, the court also finds that I.D.'s ability to form a truly independent opinion on the issue of visiting with her grandparents has been severely compromised by her mother's pressure to cause the child's opinion to be a negative one.

I.D. has clearly stated on multiple occasions her preference not to be required to visit the plaintiffs. Outweighing those statements, in the court's view, are two factors. The first is that notwithstanding her protests, there is ample evidence that I.D.'s attitude toward her grandparents changes considerably when the child is separated for a time from her mother's influence. The second is that, as found by the court, one of the elements of harm to I.D. from denying visitation is that it would stunt her ability to form opinions of third parties, such as the plaintiffs, that differ from the opinions of her mother. Her negative statements about visiting her grandparents are not found by the court to be cause to deny or restrict such visitation;  rather, they are symptoms of a primary reason the court finds it to be in her best interests for visits to occur as ordered herein.

Despite the recommendations by Dr. Humphrey and Mr. Ferraro that Katherine be ordered to participate in individual therapy, the court has declined to so order at this time, for two reasons. The first is the court's concurrence with Dr. Humphrey's assessment that Katherine is likely to be resistant to therapy if she were to begin treatment now, and to have little real involvement in therapeutic efforts. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at page 41.) The second is Katherine's testimony about her difficulty in arranging time in her schedule even to bring I.D. to therapy appointments. The court determines that therapy for I.D. is critical under the circumstances and likely to be helpful, and orders the same notwithstanding Katherine's request at trial that it be discontinued. The goal of the court in declining to order therapy for Katherine as well is to avoid a forced burdening of her schedule with therapy for herself to which she is unlikely to be receptive, so that it will be easier for her to make time to transport I.D. to her own therapy appointments.

Notwithstanding the absence of an order for therapy for Katherine at this time, it is clear to the court that she would benefit from such treatment. A genuine engagement in therapy would likely help Katherine in her relationship with her parents, which would in turn be beneficial to the minor. It would be in the best interests of I.D. for her mother and grandparents at least to be able to have a reasonable discussion about the child's visitation. This is likely to become even more important as I.D. enters her teen years and begins to have more social, educational, and extracurricular demands on her time. Katherine's willing participation in therapy, in combination with the family therapy for the plaintiffs which is ordered herein, would increase the likelihood that the parties can develop the ability to agree on adjustments in visitation to meet the child's needs without further court intervention. For these reasons, while the court does not order individual therapy for Katherine at this particular time, it strongly suggests that she do so voluntarily.

ORDERS

Visitation ScheduleRegular Visitation

The plaintiffs shall have visitation with the minor child, I.D., on the second and fourth weekend of each calendar month commencing in April 2014. In numbering weekends within any given month, the first weekend of the month which includes a Saturday shall be deemed the first weekend.

On the second weekend of the month visitation shall be begin on Friday at 7 p.m. and shall end on Sunday at 5 p.m. Such weekends are sometimes referred to herein as the “Long Weekends.” Provided, that if the child expresses to the plaintiffs in advance a desire to attend a Friday night school or extracurricular activity for which scheduling is beyond the control of I.D. or the defendant, the plaintiffs may commence the visitation that weekend on Saturday at noon, or if I.D. attends karate class on that day, immediately following karate. In such event the plaintiffs and defendant shall discuss the same in advance via email, with the final decision to be that of the plaintiffs.

On the fourth weekend of the month visitation shall begin on Saturday at noon or, if I.D. attends karate class on that day, immediately following karate, and shall end on Sunday at 5 p.m. Such weekends are sometimes referred to herein as the “Short Weekends.” In the event that a Monday school holiday shall immediately follow a Short Weekend, the visit for that weekend shall be extended until Monday at 5 p.m.

Holiday Visitation

The plaintiffs shall have holiday visitation as follows:

1. Christmas Eve Day each year from 11 a.m. to 9 p.m.

2. The Friday immediately following Thanksgiving Day each year from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m., but only if the plaintiffs have no regular visitation scheduled during the weekend immediately following Thanksgiving Day.

3. Easter Sunday each year from noon until 7 p.m., which shall be the only visitation the plaintiffs shall have from Good Friday through Easter Sunday regardless of whether their regular visitation would otherwise be scheduled to occur that weekend.

The plaintiffs shall have no visitation for any portion of Mother's Day each year.

Vacation Visitation

The plaintiffs shall have vacation visitation as follows:

1. Two consecutive weekdays during the school Christmas vacation (but not to include Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year's Eve or New Year's Day), from 10 a.m. on the first day until 7 p.m. on the second day. After inquiry of the defendant via email to identify potential schedule conflicts, the plaintiffs shall select the two days and notify the defendant via email at least two weeks before the commencement of the school vacation.

2. Two consecutive weekdays during the school spring vacation, from 10 a.m. on the first day until 7 p.m. on the second day. After inquiry of the defendant via email to identify potential schedule conflicts, the plaintiffs shall select the two days and notify the defendant of them via email at least two weeks before the commencement of the school vacation.

3. Two weeks, which may be consecutive (with a week defined as the period beginning on a Sunday and ending on the immediately following Saturday), between July 1 and August 15 during each summer school vacation, to be selected by the plaintiffs each year as follows. The defendant may notify the plaintiffs by email on or before May 15 that she wishes to reserve up to two specified weeks during the summer that she prefers the plaintiffs to avoid selecting and stating the reason therefor, such as the defendant's own planned vacation time or the child's planned activities. The plaintiffs shall then select two weeks, avoiding those (if any) so specified by the defendant except as hereinafter permitted, and shall notify the plaintiff of same via email by June 1. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to select one of the two weeks reserved by the defendant if the extended family gathering traditionally attended by the plaintiffs is scheduled to occur during that week. During their summer vacation visitation the plaintiffs may travel overnight with the child, including out-of-state travel within the United States, in which case they shall provide the following information to the defendant at least two weeks before their departure:  the beginning and ending dates of travel;  travel information that includes, as applicable, flight or other transportation information, destination(s), and details of hotel or other overnight accommodations (including each physical address where the child will be staying overnight and a telephone number for each such address);  and other telephone contact information including cell phone number(s) of the plaintiffs. Any changes in such contact information which may arise during the course of the trip shall be conveyed promptly to the defendant.

4. Telephone Contact

On Tuesday and Thursday of each week, the plaintiffs shall have the right to one telephone conversation of up to fifteen minutes in duration with the child commencing at 6:30 p.m. The defendant shall initiate the call to such phone number as the plaintiffs may direct. The defendant shall insure that the child has privacy during the entire call and shall not discourage the child from making, cause or encourage the child to terminate, or eavesdrop upon the call. If the child is scheduled to participate in a scheduled activity that will conflict with a phone call ordered hereby, the defendant shall notify the plaintiffs at least 24 hours in advance and coordinate an alternative time for the call.

Further Orders Regarding Visits

1. Unless otherwise expressly stated in these orders, the defendant will transport the child to the plaintiffs' residence at the beginning of each visitation period and the plaintiffs will transport the child to the defendant's home at the end of each visitation period. At each exchange of the child between the parties at one of their homes, the transporting party shall remain in the car and the receiving party shall remain in the home, unless emergency circumstances require otherwise. On any given occasion either party may designate a responsible adult to transport the child in accordance with said procedures, provided that the plaintiffs shall not so designate their son Frank Germano, Jr.

2. The plaintiffs shall allow I.D. to participate in, and shall provide for her transportation to, her usual and normal events and activities which are scheduled to occur during a visitation period, beyond the reasonable control of I.D. or the defendant, subject to the following limitations:

a. If more than one such activity is scheduled during a given day, the plaintiffs may limit the child to one activity chosen by the plaintiffs;

b. The plaintiffs shall not be required to transport, or arrange transportation for, I.D. to an activity or event which is not within 30 minutes of traveling time (one way) from either the home of the plaintiffs or the home of the defendant, unless they have agreed in advance by email with the defendant to do so.

c. The plaintiffs shall not be required to allow I.D. to participate in events which occur during any period when they are traveling away from home with I.D. as permitted by these orders.

3. In scheduling any activity or event for I.D., the mother shall schedule the same for a time which does not conflict with the plaintiffs' visitation if an alternate time is available. The defendant shall not schedule activities or events for the purpose of interfering with the plaintiffs' visitation or in a manner which unreasonably occupies their visitation time.

4. In the event that an order for Holiday or Vacation Visitation shall at any time conflict with an order for Regular Visitation, the Holiday or Vacation order shall control.

5. During any period of visitation by the child with the plaintiffs, the defendant will not communicate or attempt to communicate with the child, directly or indirectly, by telephone, text, email, internet, or any other electronic or other means, except:

a. The defendant may communicate with the child in the event of a bona fide emergency for purposes reasonably related to the emergency;  and

b. On each calendar day in which the period of visitation encompasses the entire 24 hours of the day, the defendant may have one telephone conversation of up to fifteen minutes in length, for which the plaintiffs shall provide the child with a phone if she does not use her own cell phone.

6. The visitation orders set forth herein shall supersede all prior visitation orders as of the date of judgment.

Special Events

Except as provided herein, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to attend events and ceremonies in which I.D. is involved, including but not limited to concerts, plays, school events, award ceremonies, and graduations, to the same extent as the organizers or sponsors of such events permit attendance by grandparents generally. Defendant shall provide plaintiffs with information about such events in the form of copies of school or activity calendars and flyers, URL addresses of internet web sites containing such information, and shall cause or allow the plaintiffs to receive copies of emails that announce such events. If parental consent or invitation is required to enable the plaintiffs to attend such an event, the defendant will provide same. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiffs shall not attend the child's karate lessons or events except as follows:

1. The plaintiffs may bring the child to any karate lesson which occurs during any of their visitation periods and remain throughout the lesson. The defendant shall not attend any karate lesson to which the child is so transported by the plaintiffs.

2. After the period of two months after the date of judgment, the plaintiffs may attend the child's karate lessons and events if and to the extent that such attendance is recommended by Dr. Bruce Freedman in the course of the family therapy ordered herein.

Professional Services

Family therapy

1. Dr. Bruce Freedman. The plaintiffs and I.D. shall continue to receive family therapy services from Dr. Bruce Freedman, at the expense of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs shall attend sessions with Dr. Freedman with such frequency as he recommends. I.D. shall attend such sessions with such regularity as Dr. Freedman shall prescribe, and the defendant shall arrange for the child to attend such sessions to the extent that they occur outside of the plaintiffs' visitation time. Dr. Freedman's work as family therapist shall include (1) reunification therapy for the relationship between the plaintiffs and I.D.;  (2) providing instruction and guidance to the plaintiffs addressing visitation concerns or issues, including conflicts with the defendant regarding such issues;  and (3) to the extent that Dr. Freedman deems appropriate, conflict management counseling between the plaintiffs and the defendant regarding the child and any issues relating to these orders. To clarify the foregoing, the court makes it clear that in view of his past negative experience with the defendant and her expressed hostility to his viewpoint, the court does not intend to obligate Dr. Freedman to communicate with the defendant unless he elects to do so in his sole discretion. However, should the defendant voluntarily commence individual therapy as suggested by the court and provide any releases necessary for Dr. Freedman to discuss such conflict management issues with her therapist, the court anticipates that Dr. Freedman will do so absent good cause in his professional judgment to refrain from doing so.

2. The parties shall not have any expectation of confidentiality or privilege with respect to their communications with Dr. Freedman. In the event of further court proceedings in this matter, Dr. Freedman may be called to testify (but shall not be limited to such subjects in his testimony) concerning each party's cooperation and demeanor, each party's willingness to discuss issues in good faith, his recollections of the discussions and his recommendations, and his opinions related to his observations of the parties and the child.

Child Therapy

The minor child shall continue in therapy with Christine Gaudio, with sessions to occur once every three weeks or at such other frequency as may be recommended by the therapist. The costs of such therapy shall be paid one-half by the plaintiffs and one-half by the defendant.

Scheduling

No party shall delay, hinder, or otherwise attempt to frustrate the scheduling and holding of sessions with Dr. Freedman or Ms. Gaudio. If the defendant schedules any session for the child with Christine Gaudio for the afternoon of a Friday commencing a Long Weekend, or if a session with Dr. Freedman which is to be attended by I.D. is scheduled for such a Friday afternoon, then the defendant shall have the option to request the plaintiffs by advance email to pick the child up at her school on such Friday to commence the visit early, in lieu of transporting the child to the appointment herself. In such event the plaintiffs shall pick the child up at school and transport her to the appointment, with the visitation to commence immediately upon conclusion of the appointment. The defendant shall not exercise this option unless she has first taken the appropriate steps to notify the child's school that the plaintiffs are authorized to pick up the child from school. The plaintiffs shall not attempt to use the authorization to pick the child up at school except at the times permitted by these orders, or as may be agreed in advance by the parties, or in the event of a bona fide emergency which renders the defendant unable to pick up the child at school without having made alternate arrangements.

Guardian ad Litem

The appointment of Mr. Ferraro as Guardian ad Litem shall remain in effect for four months from the date of judgment, whereupon it will terminate subject to further extension or reappointment by the court.

Releases

To the extent such releases have not already been provided and remain in effect, the parties shall promptly execute releases to enable free and open access between and among Dr. Freedman, Ms. Gaudio, the child's teachers and instructors, the Guardian ad Litem, and such other individuals as the Guardian ad Litem may direct. The Guardian ad Litem is hereby authorized to provide a copy of Dr. Humphrey's evaluation report (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) to Ms. Gaudio, Dr. Freedman, and in the event the defendant voluntarily commences therapy, to her therapist. No party shall obtain or seek to obtain a copy of such report from any such therapist.

General Orders

1. Until otherwise ordered the parties shall use email as their primary method of communication regarding any matters or issues relating to I.D.. The parties shall check their respective email accounts for messages from the other at least three times per week on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. If a party's email requests or reasonably requires a response, the other party shall respond by email within 24 hours of receipt. The defendant shall provide on a weekly basis a brief summary of I.D.'s activities, special homework assignments or school projects, medical concerns, and other child-related issues.

2. In the event of an emergency or time sensitive issue, the parties shall communicate via telephone or other appropriate method.

3. Neither party shall make disparaging remarks about the other to, or within the hearing or access of, I.D.. “Disparaging remarks” for purposes of these orders shall mean any written, oral, or electronic communication made, intended, or reasonably likely to demean, discredit, insult, belittle, undermine, or devalue the person who is the subject of the communication.

4. To the extent that it is reasonably within their control, neither party shall permit third persons to make disparaging remarks about a party to this action to, or within the hearing or access of, I.D..

5. Neither party shall directly or indirectly cause, permit, or assist I.D. to obtain copies of, read, review, or discuss the pleadings, proceedings, court orders, testimony, evidence, or exhibits (including but not limited to the report of Dr. Humphrey) in this case, except that I.D.'s cell phone may be returned to her in accordance with the prior order of the court.

6. No information or communication between the parties shall be exchanged through I.D., either as a verbal conduit or physical messenger.

7. Neither party shall, without prior order of the court, take action to relocate the child outside the State of Connecticut or change her permanent residence outside the State of Connecticut, or to increase the distance between the parties' residences to one which is greater than the current distance.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Albis, J.

Albis, Michael A., J.