Adrian Klufas et al., Individually and as Parents of Timothy Klufas v. The Winston Preparatory School, Inc. et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MATTERA'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (126.00)

I. Background

The plaintiffs, Adrian and Anna Klufas, individually, and as parents of Timothy Klufas, served a complaint on the defendant Winston Preparatory School (Winston), a school which Timothy attended from 2008 to 2011, and on the defendant Walter Mattera (Mattera), father of Gabriella Mattera, a classmate of Timothy.   In four counts the plaintiffs alleged claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional harm, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract against Winston based on events and occurrences mainly in October 2011.   The plaintiffs also alleged claims against Mattera of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional harm on Timothy arising from alleged actions and statements of Mattera on October 16, 2011.

Mattera has moved for summary judgment dismissing the two counts against him.   The motion was extensively briefed and counsel argued the motion on January 27, 2014.

II. Scope of Review

Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209 (2000).   Summary judgment “is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.”  Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751 (1985).  “The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.”  Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 209.  “A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379 (1969).   The trial court, in the context of a summary judgment motion, may not decide issues of material fact, but only determine whether such genuine issues exist.  Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500 (1988).

“Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact [question] ․ a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.   It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.”  Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 554 (1998).  “[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”  Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 209.   See generally, Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 406 (2013);  Mott v. Wal–Mart Stores East L.P., 139 Conn.App. 618, 624–25 (2012).

III. Discussion

As Mattera correctly points out in his motion papers and oral argument, the claim of negligent infliction of emotional harm, and particularly, the claim of intentional infliction of such harm, involve high standards of proof.   The elements required for the latter claim are:  (1) that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or that he should have known such distress would likely result from his conduct;  (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) it caused the distress;  and (4) the emotional distress was severe.   Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253 (1986);  see, Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 492 (2010) (claim “requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” and “mental distress of a very serious kind”).

To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional harm, a plaintiff must establish:  (1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress;  (2) the distress was foreseeable;  (3) it was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm, and (4) the conduct was the cause of the harm.  Carroll v. Allstate Insurance Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444 (2003).

In considering the summary judgment motion at issue this court has, besides hearing a spirited oral argument and reading the briefs, reviewed the several affidavits and the numerous excerpts from deposition transcripts presented by the parties.   Winston is a school that specializes in teaching children with learning disabilities.   As noted, both Timothy Klufas and Gabrielle Mattera attended the school in tenth grade.   The critical event involving Mattera was a meeting called by the head of Winston, Beth Sugarman, on October 16, 2011 at 5:00 p.m., a Sunday, on the school premises.   The meeting involved Adrian and Timothy Klufas and Walter and Gabrielle Mattera and concerned purportedly inappropriate and/or threatening instant messages sent by Timothy to Gabrielle and Ian Gordon, another classmate and perhaps Gabrielle's boyfriend.   Sugarman told the Klufases and Matteras that she thought this was not a school matter and should be settled between the two families.   Thereafter, the four met in a room at the school.

About the only fact that is not disputed is that the meeting lasted approximately forty-five minutes.   Everything else about what occurred at the meeting which gives rise to the two counts against Mattera is disputed in the affidavits of Adrian Klufas and Mattera, the excerpts from their depositions, and the affidavit of Timothy.¹

From the Klufas side, Mattera is described as very loud, very aggressive and intimidating, apparently shocking both Klufases into near silence by accusations of computer hacking and sending threatening messages.   According to the Klufases, Mattera threatened to send Timothy to jail, to get him expelled from school, and said that an FBI (or ex-FBI) operative was working on the case.   Timothy subsequently denied sending at least some of the messages, but he and his father agreed to let Mattera remove certain matters from Timothy's computer.

The senior Mattera denies he was threatening, loud or aggressive, or that he directly threatened the prospect of jail, or brought up any reference to the FBI. He expresses concern for his daughter and claims that when the meeting ended he thought the matter closed except for removing some things from Timothy's computer.   At all times he describes himself as calm during the meeting.

The Klufases claim severe emotional injury, and have submitted statements of Dr. Kljusev, a psychotherapist and Michael Reitman, LCSW, who opined that Timothy has suffered “significant negative impact” from “the incident at Winston” (Reitman) and “this incident can have a huge impact on Timothy's future” (Kljusev).

This court has the responsibility, if the undisputed facts warrant, to initially determine whether the claim of intentional infliction of emotional harm is supported by facts evidencing extreme and outrageous behavior.   Where reasonable minds could disagree on this issue, it is a case for the jury.   See Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 210.   Similarly only if the material facts are undisputed can a court dismiss a negligent infliction of emotional harm claim.   See Section II, supra.

In this case there are material facts at issue concerning Mattera's demeanor, conduct, actions and statements at the October 16, 2011 meeting.   There are also material facts at issue as to Timothy's reaction to Mattera's conduct.   These unresolved facts are critical to a resolution of the issue of whether Mattera's conduct was extreme and outrageous.   While that standard is a difficult one to achieve, the resolution of that issue must be made by a jury, given the present state of the record, after the jury has had an opportunity to hear all the relevant testimony under oath and subject to cross examination as well other evidence.   The court reaches the same conclusion with respect to the negligent infliction of emotional harm count.

The motion for summary judgment is denied.

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Apparently the deposition of Timothy has not been completed.   There was no affidavit from Gabrielle and no indication whether her deposition is scheduled or contemplated.   Thus, the evidence available about this meeting is incomplete..  FN1. Apparently the deposition of Timothy has not been completed.   There was no affidavit from Gabrielle and no indication whether her deposition is scheduled or contemplated.   Thus, the evidence available about this meeting is incomplete.

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.