Angelica M. Llanos v. City of Norwalk et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This will serve to further articulate the basis for this court's Memorandum of Decision in which it concluded, based on the court's determination of the most credible testimony and credible evidence that the accident which we are concerned was caused exclusively by the defendant, Ronald Pine, who was a sergeant in the Norwalk Police Department at the time of this accident which occurred on July 15, 2008.   The plaintiff, Angelica Llanos, was a 24–year–old woman who had arrived in this country several years earlier from Colombia and was not completely familiar with the English language.   She testified through an interpreter.

There is a traffic control stop sign on Elizabeth Street in Norwalk at its intersection with Main Street.   Norwalk has apparently identified the northerly lane of Main Street as North Main St. and the southerly lane of Main Street as South Main St. As described in the memorandum, the defendant Pine testified he stopped at the stop sign at N. Main St. moved up a bit and then moved up a bit and then stopped again.   After a vehicle stopped to let him cross North Main Street, defendant testified that he stopped at the intersection with S. Main St. and was intending across S. Main St. in order to enter the Norwalk Police Department headquarters which was located directly on the westerly side of S. Main St.

He testified that as he was stopped before crossing S. Main St. noticed the plaintiff operating her vehicle on S. Main St. roughly 30 to 40 feet from where he was located.   In somewhat inconsistent versions of his observations of the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant testified that the plaintiff was traveling at a high rate of speed.   He then said that she slowed down and then that she came to a stop.   The defendant admitted at the trial that he never actually saw the plaintiff's vehicle stop although he did make a claim to the investigating police officer that he had.   He admitted that after he noticed the plaintiff's vehicle 30 to 40 feet away, he never bothered to observe her vehicle but started crossing S. Main St. and was only concentrating on entering the driveway entrance to the police station.   The defendant admitted to plaintiff's counsel, and in answer to the specific question by the court, that he never bothered to look again at the plaintiff's vehicle after first noticing it.   He testified he was only concentrating on the incline of the driveway across S. Main St. He further admitted that the second time he was aware of the vehicle was when the accident occurred.

If the plaintiff had stopped 30 to 40 feet when the defendant started to cross S. Main St. or had the defendant even bothered to observe her vehicle, the accident would probably never have occurred.   Although there was a vehicle to his right 30 to 40 feet away which was not subject to any traffic control, the defendant attempted to cross S. Main St. and drove into the path of the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle which had not stopped and was proceeding in a normal manner.

It is noteworthy that the damage to the defendant's vehicle was the right front corner and the damage to the plaintiff's vehicle with the left front corner which would indicate that the plaintiff was either in or at the intersection at the time the defendant, again, without even looking drove into the path of her vehicle.

As was indicated in its decision, the court found the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout, failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle, failed to obey a traffic control signal and failed to grant the plaintiff, approaching from the right, the right-of-way.   On that basis the court found that the defendant's negligence was the cause of the accident.

At the scene of the accident the defendant testified to the investigating police officer that he seen the plaintiff's vehicle stopped, which was not correct.   He also told investigating that the plaintiff indicated to him that she was distracted by a Colombian bakery located at the corner and he instructed her to tell that to the investigating officer.

The plaintiff testified that immediately after the collision she was scared and doesn't remember what else.   Her whole body was shaking and she had a laceration of her right hand and pain in both knees.   She testified that she did not want to go to the hospital in an ambulance but wanted her sister to take her.   At the hospital she was diagnosed with posterior neck upper back and left and the cervical sprain and hand contusions as well as cervical and lumbar pain.

Incredibly, before the police would allow her sister to take the injured young plaintiff to the hospital, she was taken to a room in the headquarters where she was interrogated by the defendant's fellow police officers.   The only obvious reason for the interrogation was to get the plaintiff to admit she was distracted at the time of the accident.   Although the investigating police office, Sgt. John and the defendant, indicated she had admitted she was distracted, both the defendant and Sgt. John did not speak Spanish.   Sgt. John then brought in a Spanish speaking police officer to the station who was able to actually communicate with the plaintiff.   Although Officer Velez testified he heard her admit she was looking at a Colombian bakery, he further testified, “it occurred to me that she was very frightened” he further testified “it was like watching my children say something that they didn't want to admit and it was childlike.   I felt sorry for her, I did in my heart.   Because like she was very young and very scared and I think she—she was, you know, just trying to deal with everything.”

The plaintiff, whom this Court found to be credible, testified that she was never distracted in any way while driving on S. Main St. and did not remember ever saying that she had.   Regardless of anything the plaintiff may or may not have said during this interrogation, the court would find it had little or no probative value as it was the result of an unacceptable intimidation by the defendants fellow police officers of a young injured scared plaintiff who was hoping to become an American citizen.

The defendants never produced a report or signed or written statements.   There was no record of anyone at any time interrogating the defendant at headquarters with respect to the operation of his vehicle.

The court considers it significant that an independent witness identified himself and left his phone number.   One of the officers said he actually spoke to him and witness by phone.   At the time trial the court inquired as to why the witness was not being produced and the police officer said he could not locate him, a claim that this court finds is questionable.

The plaintiff is a gracious 25–year–old mother of two.   She recently arrived from Colombia five years ago and was in the process of becoming an American citizen.   In addition to raising her two minor children, she works as a full-time waitress in Norwalk.   She does not speak English fluently.

She testified that as she was coming back from buying medicine for her mother.   She was driving at about 15 to 20 miles an hour with no incidents, then suddenly defendant's car was right in front of hers it was too late to avoid a collision.   She denied ever saying she was distracted by a Colombian bakery and was not even aware of a Colombian bakery being located at the intersection where they claim she was distracted.   At no time did she bring her car to a stop while she was traveling on S. Main St. prior to the collision.   At all times she was looking straight ahead and was not distracted, nor did she ever say she was.

“It is an abiding principle of our jurisprudence that sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact].  [N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony.   The trier has the witnesses before it and is in the position to analyze all the evidence.   The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981).

It is the finding of this court that the plaintiff was a credible witness and accepts her testimony entirely as a factual finding of fact.

It was on that basis this court concluded that no negligent conduct on the part of the plaintiff contributed to the cause of this accident.

Immediately after the collision, the plaintiff suffered bleeding cuts and bruises on her left hand and pain in both knees.   Later, on the day of the accident she was brought to the Norwalk hospital by her sister.   Her complaints at that time were up to her posterior neck, upper back and left hand.   She was diagnosed with a cervical strain and left hand contusions.

On January 23, 2008.   She sought treatment at the Advanced Health Professionals.   She was treated at the group, by a Doctor Mullin.   He diagnosed the plaintiff with mechanical neck pain of facet discogenic origin, cervical sprain and strain as well as pain in the trapezius muscle.   He also diagnosed a contusion of the left hand and left knee.

She was released from treatment on September 17, 2008 and subsequently evaluated with a 6% permanent impairment in relation to her cervical spine.   The plaintiff had never before or since suffered any similar injuries.

As a result of the injuries the plaintiff experiences difficulty on a daily basis with respect to taking care of her children as well as the physical requirements of working full-time as a waitress.   Her life expectancy is actuarially 58.3 years.

It was the finding of this court that the plaintiff suffered $3,967.49 in economic damages, as well as $23,000 in noneconomic damages.   Accordingly, judgment was entered for the plaintiff on the complaint for damages of $26,967.49 plus costs.   The court further finds for the plaintiff on a counterclaim filed by the defendants but never pursued.

GILARDI, J.T.R.

Gilardi, Richard P., J.T.R.