Jane Anderson–Eacueo et al. v. Gail Rooke–Norman, Executrix of the Estate of John M. Arnold et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS [# 101]

The present action is an appeal from two orders entered by the Norwich Probate Court.   On November 6, 2012, the defendants, Gail Rooke–Norman as an interested party and as trustee, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal was filed with the Superior Court more than thirty days after the mailing of the decision of the Probate Court.   The defendants submitted a memorandum of law in support as well as a copy of the Probate Court decision, which the defendants' counsel attests is a complete copy.   The plaintiffs, Jane Anderson–Eacueo and Carroll Arnold, submitted a memorandum of law in opposition on December 26, 2013.   The defendants filed a reply memorandum on January 6, 2014, and the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum on January 13, 2014.   The court heard argument on the motion at short calendar on January 21, 2014.

BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a complaint appealing the Norwich Probate Court's September 17, 2013 order admitting John M. Arnold's will to probate as well as the Probate Court's October 7, 2013 order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a stay.   Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the Probate Court's determination that the decedent was of sound mind to execute the instrument despite alleged medical evidence to the contrary.

LAW RE MOTION TO DISMISS

“[A] motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).  “Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”   St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).

ANALYSIS

The defendants' primary argument in support of their motion to dismiss is that the court is without subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because it was filed more than thirty days after the mailing of the Probate Court's order admitting the will to probate.   The plaintiffs' rebuttal is twofold.   The plaintiffs first argue that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the complaint was filed within thirty days of the denial of the stay.   Second, the plaintiffs contend that the court has the authority to extend the thirty-day period for equitable reasons.

“The right to appeal from a decision of the Probate Court is statutory ․ It is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation ․ Our courts of probate have a limited jurisdiction and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by statute ․ They have jurisdiction only when the facts exist on which the legislature has conditioned the exercise of their power ․ The Superior Court, in turn, in passing on an appeal, acts as a court of probate with the same powers and subject to the same limitations ․ In acting on an appeal from probate, the Superior Court does not exercise the jurisdictional powers vested in it by the constitution but, instead, exercises a special and limited jurisdiction conferred on it by the statutes.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Corneroli v. D'Amico, 116 Conn.App. 59, 63, 975 A.2d 107, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 928, 980 A.2d 909 (2009).  “The issue of whether the appeal was timely commenced under the applicable statute implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  Gates v. Gates, 51 Conn.Sup. 148, 150, 975 A.2d 147 [46 Conn. L. Rptr. 102] (2008), aff'd, 115 Conn.App. 293, 294, 971 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 924, 980 A.2d 910 (2009).

General Statutes § 45a–186(a) provides in relevant part:  “[A]ny person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may ․ not later than thirty days after mailing of an order, denial or decree for any other matter in a court of probate, appeal therefrom to the Superior Court.   Such an appeal shall be commenced by filing a complaint in the superior court in the judicial district in which such court of probate is located ․ The complaint shall state the reasons for the appeal.   A copy of the order, denial or decree appealed from shall be attached to the complaint.”  (Emphasis added.)   The Norwich Probate Court's order admitting the testator's will to probate was issued on September 17, 2013 and mailed that same day.   The plaintiffs filed their appeal forty-four days later on November 1, fourteen days too late.

The plaintiffs, relying on VanBuskirk v. Knierim, 169 Conn. 382, 362 A.2d 1334 (1975), contend that this court has the authority to waive the thirty-day filing period in light of equitable considerations.  “Although a Probate Court has the discretion and power to allow an appeal after the expiration of the time limitation ․ [it] is not required to do so.”  Byrne v. Spurling, 105 Conn.App. 99, 100, 937 A.2d 70 (2007), quoting VanBuskirk v. Knierim, supra, 169 Conn. 387.   The Court in VanBuskirk explicitly envisioned such discretion being exercised to grant relief against decrees of the Probate Court procured by fraud, accident, mistake and the like.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  VanBuskirk v. Knierim, supra, 169 Conn. 388.

The defendants respond that the Supreme Court's ruling in VanBuskirk was abrogated by the 2007 amendments to the probate appeal statutes which removed the need for an aggrieved party to seek the probate court's permission to file an appeal.   While the defendants' argument is logically persuasive, this court need not rule on the continued validity of Vanbuskirk to find that it does not apply here.

The plaintiffs have failed to identify any equitable considerations that would merit deviation from the statutory thirty days.   The plaintiffs' pleadings merely indicate that they disagree with the Probate Court's weighing of the evidence in determining the decedent's mental capacity at the time of will execution.   There is no suggestion of fraud, accident, or mistake—merely an objection to the Probate Court's judgment which, presumably, is the same objection levied by all aggrieved parties bringing a probate appeal under § 45a–186(a).   The plaintiffs' broad interpretation of VanBuskirk would essentially read the thirty-day filing period out of the statute which would, in turn, defeat the legislature's preference for the “speedy settlement of estates.”  Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44 (1963).   With respect to the appeal from the Probate Court's September 17 order, the complaint was untimely filed and this court is, therefore, without subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs' complaint also appeals the Probate Court's October 4, 2013 denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a stay pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–186(f).¹  The plaintiffs claim that they timely appealed that denial within thirty days of its mailing.  “It is well settled that the purpose of a stay is to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of [an appeal] ․” ² (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 503 n.4, 72 A.3d 367 (2013).   The motion for stay filed by the plaintiffs was a motion to stay enforcement of the decree that admitted the will to probate not the decree itself.   The plaintiffs are bound by the thirty-day limitation to appeal the decree admitting the will to probate under § 45a–186(a).   Given that the court must dismiss the underlying appeal, the stay would serve no purpose and, therefore, the appeal of the denial of stay is moot.

“A case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242, 255, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009).   While the defendants did not raise mootness in their motion to dismiss, mootness “implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Batchelder v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 133 Conn.App. 173, 180, 34 A.3d 465, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 913, 40 A.3d 319 (2012).   Given that the court must dismiss the appeal from the September 17 order admitting the will to probate, the court cannot grant any practical relief to stay the distribution of the estate pending review of that order.³

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

Devine, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 45a–186(f) provides:  “The filing of an appeal under this section shall not, of itself, stay enforcement of the order, denial or decree from which the appeal is taken.   A motion for stay may be made to the Court of Probate shall not preclude action by the Superior Court.”.  FN1. Section 45a–186(f) provides:  “The filing of an appeal under this section shall not, of itself, stay enforcement of the order, denial or decree from which the appeal is taken.   A motion for stay may be made to the Court of Probate shall not preclude action by the Superior Court.”

FN2. The decision to grant or deny a stay requires the court to balance the equities taking into consideration the following four factors:  “(1) the likelihood that the appellant will prevail;  (2) the irreparability of the injury to be suffered from the immediate implementation of the [probate court's] order;  (3) the effect of the stay upon other parties to the proceeding;  and (4) the public interest involved.”  Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 456, 493 A.2d 229 (1985)..  FN2. The decision to grant or deny a stay requires the court to balance the equities taking into consideration the following four factors:  “(1) the likelihood that the appellant will prevail;  (2) the irreparability of the injury to be suffered from the immediate implementation of the [probate court's] order;  (3) the effect of the stay upon other parties to the proceeding;  and (4) the public interest involved.”  Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 456, 493 A.2d 229 (1985).

FN3. By way of analogy, our Supreme Court, in 2009, dismissed (as moot) an appeal from a denial of continued visitation pending review of the trial court's termination of parental rights.  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 171, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).   The Court began by affirming the trial court's termination of parental rights after concluding that the termination was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.  Id., 166.   With regards to the denial of continued visitation, the Court observed that the motion for continued visitation was originally predicated upon review of the termination of parental rights.  Id., 171.   Once the Court affirmed the trial court's termination of parental rights, there was no practical relief to be granted to the appellants on the continued visitation motion and that appeal was dismissed as moot.  Id., 171–73.   Similarly, in this case, given the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal of the Probate Court's admission of the will, there is no practical relief possible on the motion to stay pending that appeal..  FN3. By way of analogy, our Supreme Court, in 2009, dismissed (as moot) an appeal from a denial of continued visitation pending review of the trial court's termination of parental rights.  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 171, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).   The Court began by affirming the trial court's termination of parental rights after concluding that the termination was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.  Id., 166.   With regards to the denial of continued visitation, the Court observed that the motion for continued visitation was originally predicated upon review of the termination of parental rights.  Id., 171.   Once the Court affirmed the trial court's termination of parental rights, there was no practical relief to be granted to the appellants on the continued visitation motion and that appeal was dismissed as moot.  Id., 171–73.   Similarly, in this case, given the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal of the Probate Court's admission of the will, there is no practical relief possible on the motion to stay pending that appeal.

Devine, James J., J.