IN RE: Kylik A.1 (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Kylik A., born March 29, 2007, Avion A., born April 3, 2008, and their parents, Denice S. and Michael A., are the subjects of litigation first initiated by the Commissioner of Children and Families (DCF or the department) in 2009.   Twice subject to emergency removals and twice committed to DCF, Kylik and Avion remain in foster care.

The court now addresses and resolves the termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions filed by DCF on March 1, 2012 and subsequently amended.   The parties had due notice of the proceedings which do not involve any “Indian child” as that term is used by Practice Book § 32a–3;  no claims affecting the children's custody have been shown to be pending elsewhere;  and the court has jurisdiction over the matter.   Each party has been represented by skilled and experienced counsel.

Finding all issues in favor of the department, the court grants the TPR petitions.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The attenuated procedural history is relevant to the TPR issues.²  See In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 480, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013).

On January 6, 2009, DCF imposed ninety-six-hour holds upon Kylik and infant Avion, removing them from Michael A.'s physical custody and placing them in non-relative foster care.   On January 9, 2009, the court (Wolven, J.) granted DCF's ex parte motions for Orders of Temporary Custody (OTC) which alleged that the children were physically endangered due to Denice S.'s confrontation with Michael A.'s girlfriend, Clarice D. On that same date, DCF filed neglect petitions for Kylik and Avion alleging that:  Denice S. had unstable housing, anger and parenting issues;  and that Michael A. had persistent marijuana abuse, parenting deficits, and needed counseling.

On January 15, 2009, the court (Wolven, J.) sustained the OTCs by agreement;  the children remained with the department.   On May 8, 2009, the court (Frankel, J.) adjudicated the children uncared for and ordered their commitment to DCF. On April 20, 2010, the court (Frankel, J.) modified the dispositions, placing the children with Michael A. under six months of protective supervision.   On September 16, 2010, the court (Wolven, J.) terminated protective supervision.

On December 18, 2010, DCF imposed its second ninety-six-hour holds upon Kylik and Avion, as Michael A. was under arrest for domestic violence with Clarice D. On December 22, 2010, the court (Stevens, J.) granted DCF's second OTCs, vesting custody in the children's paternal aunt Deandre H. On that date, DCF filed its second round of neglect petitions, now alleging that:  Michael A. had been physically and verbally abusive to the children, and that Denice S. had not maintained a relationship with either child for six months.  (Addendum, 12/22/10.)

On December 30, 2010 OTC, Michael A. agreed to sustain the new OTCs. On January 7, 2011, the court (Elgo, J.) accepted Denice S.'s like agreement, and ordered specific steps.  (Exs.17, 19, AA.) On December 1, 2011, the court (Baldwin, J.) adjudicated both children for the second time, finding them neglected;  ordered Kylik's and Avion's second commitment;  and issued specific steps for each respondent complimenting the steps issued on January 7, 2011.³

On March 1, 2012, DCF filed the pending TPR petitions which allege, as amended, that:  it had made reasonable efforts to locate and to reunify the children with the respondents, but Denice S. and Michael A. were unable and/or unwilling to benefit from those efforts;  it is in the children's best interests to terminate parental rights;  each parent had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation;  and neither respondent had an ongoing statutory parent-child relationship with either child.

The TPR trial commenced on September 4 and continued on September 5, 2013.   On November 27, 2013, the court heard oral argument, and the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of the child protection litigation involving Denice S.'s son Damion, born while Kylik and Avion were in DCF's care.⁴  DCF filed its TPR trial brief on December 27, 2013.

II

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [in General Statutes § 17a–112(j) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence.   If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child ․ In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469–70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 610–11, 9 A.3d 417 (2010).  “While there are two phases to a hearing on a termination of parental rights petition, adjudicatory and dispositional;  see In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 664, 783 A.2d 534 (2001);  the two phases may be combined in a single, nonbifurcated proceeding.   See In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 494, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003);  In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 197, 205, 763 A.2d 45 (2000), [cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001) ].”  (Footnote omitted.)  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 226, 15 A.3d 194 (2011).   In such a nonbifurcated proceeding, “disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.”   Practice Book § 35a–7(b).⁵

General Statutes § 17a–112(j) sets forth the elements DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence to prevail in this TPR matter:  that “(1) the Department ․ has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․ (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  [and/or] (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․” ⁶

Construing the “reasonable efforts ․ to reunify” element of § 17a–112(j)(1), our courts have stated that “[t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible ․ In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 668, 6 A.3d 86, [cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051] (2010).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 618, 621, 9 A.3d 413 (2010).  “[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.   Section 17a–112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances.   Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205, quoting In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).

The best interest element of § 17a–112(j)(2) has been defined as follows:  “The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her ] environment ․ In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child ․ In re Sarah O., 128 Conn.App. 323, 340, 16 A.3d 1250, [cert. denied, 301 Conn. 298, 22 A.3d 1275] (2011).”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18, (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).  “In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ] ․ The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Alison M., [supra, 127 Conn.App. 211].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 762, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).   See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 734, 994 A.2d 233 (2010), appeal dismissed, 300 Conn. 294, 12 A.3d 566 (2011).  “The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in [a child's] best interest to permit further time for a relationship with [his parent] to develop include (1) the length of stay with [his] foster parents, (2) the nature of [his] relationship with [his] foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent and (4) the nature of [his] relationship to the natural parent ․ In addition, the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999) (affirming TPR on basis of lack of rehabilitation or ongoing parent-child relationship).

Our courts have also defined the ground of statutory rehabilitation.   “[P]ersonal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) ] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [This ground] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the] child's life ․ In re Kaitlyn A., 118 Conn.App. 14, 26, 982 A.2d 253 (2009).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.  “Rehabilitation does not require the parent to be able to assume full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs ․ An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities ․ In re Stanley D., [61 Conn.App. 224, 230–31, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) ].”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Tremaine C., 117 Conn.App. 521, 597, 980 A.2d 317, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 920, 984 A.2d 69 (2009).   In other words, “[i]n order for the court to make a determination as to the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation ․ [b]ecause the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate the respondent's parental rights ․ The parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time.   The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority.  In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998).”  (Internal quotation marks and internal citation omitted.)  In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949 (2007).

As the court must focus upon the particular needs of each child subject to termination, DCF's decision to allow a sibling to remain in a respondent's care does not establish that parent's “ability to care for the specific needs of [the] children at issue” in the pending TPR petition.  (Citation omitted.)   In re Anthony H., 104 Conn. 744, 760, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   Moreover, the court may consider evidence of a respondent's unlawful conduct that has not resulted in conviction;  such evidence is relevant to establish that whether the respondent's pattern of misconduct has or will deny a child the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being.   See In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 828–29, 719 A.2d 907 (1998) (no error in admitting evidence of respondent's arrests, which did not result in conviction);  In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814 (all relevant facts and family history should be considered by trial court when deciding whether to terminate parental rights).

“Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights.”  In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507–8, 78 A.3d 797 (2013).   Specific steps are an express element of § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i);  upon execution, they become enforceable court orders.   See In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 194, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).  “The specific steps are ․ considered ‘fair warning’ of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a–112.”  In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).   However, “a parent's compliance with rehabilitative programs, while relevant, is not dispositive as to the rehabilitation finding.  In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.  “Failure to complete specific steps is evidence that the respondent has not achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation.  In re Ashley M., [82 Conn App. 66, 72, 842 A.2d 624 (2004) ].”  In re Shane M., 148 Conn. 308, 321–22, (2014).  “Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding.”  In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003).

Our courts have instructed that “[t]o establish the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child [is lacking] and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 122–23, 972 A.2d 258 (2009).   This element “requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ․ Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only ․ In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 422, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87(2003).   See also In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 468–70, 586 A.2d 597 (1991);  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 485–86, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011);  In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006).   This standard applies to formerly custodial and noncustodial parents alike.   See In re Jessica M., supra, 470.   Where lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship is at issue, “[w]hen the child does have present memories or feelings, there must be a finding that ‘no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.’  “ In re Christian P., supra, 269.

When considering both whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time and whether a parent-child relationship can be developed within a reasonable period of time, the court may rely on events occurring after the filing of the TPR petition.   See In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 227 (2011);  In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 469, 21 A.3d 858 (2011);  In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 457 n.12, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010);  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 495;  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.

For TPR purposes, our courts have defined the minimal parental responsibilities in the conjunctive:  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88 (identifying minimal parental obligations for TPR based on abandonment).

III

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has used appropriate standards for assessing the weight of the evidence as a whole.⁷  Witnesses included:  Frances M., a family reunification worker;  Christina I., a substance abuse clinician;  Deirdre A., a foster mother;  DCF social workers Jill K. and Theresa G.;   and evaluating psychologists Tina Schiappa, Psy.D. and Eric Frazer, Ph.D. Exhibits included:  court and DCF documents;  correspondence and records from treatment providers;  curriculum vitae and psychologists' reports.⁸

The following facts have been proved by clear and convincing evidence: ⁹

A

MICHAEL A., THE FATHER

Michael A., born June 19, 1984, is the father of five children:  Kylik and Avion have an older half-brother, Michael, and two younger half-siblings, Aries and Chidori.¹⁰  (Exs.6, 9, 12, B, D.) Abused and neglected in his own mother's care, Michael A. sustained head trauma following a gas explosion and was in a coma from ages two to three;  he was raised by his great grandmother and a maternal aunt.¹¹  Of average intelligence and a high school graduate, Michael A. started smoking marijuana daily during adolescence.   He has exhibited situational depression and anger, with violent, threatening or aggressive behavior.   Michael A. was employed at Walmart from 2007–2008, but has otherwise only worked sporadically.  (Exs.1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 13.)

Michael A. met Denice S. while she was in high school.   They married after Kylik was born on March 29, 2007.   Avion was born to the respondents on April 3, 2008.   The respondent-parents are separated, but remain lawfully wed.  (Ex. 6.)

DCF became involved with the family in December 2008 when a clinic reported that baby Avion had a burn on his leg.   Avion was hospitalized for three days.   Michael A. then entered into a safety plan with the department, and the children were placed in his care.  (Exs. 3, 12;  Tes. Jill K.) When, as found in Part I, DCF took custody of Kylik and Avion in January 2009, the respondent-father's issues included domestic violence, parenting deficits, and marijuana use.  (Tes. Jill K.)

In March 2009, at DCF's referral, Michael A. commenced Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP) treatment for marijuana use at Southwest Community Health Center (SCHC).  Attending only three sessions from through April 2009, he did not complete that service.  (Ex. 12.)

Aries was born to Michael A. and Clarice D. on March 24, 2010.   As found in Part I, Kylik and Avion had been returned to Michael A.'s custody by April 20, 2010, and DCF supervision ended on September 16, 2010.

On December 18, 2010, Kylik and Avion witnessed Michael A.'s involvement in domestic violence with Clarice D. Michael A. was arrested, charged with Threatening and Assault in the third degree, and was briefly incarcerated.¹²  DCF responded and noted bruises upon Clarice D., Kylik and Avion.   As found in Part I, Kylik and Avion were removed from Michael A.'s care on that date, and have never since been in his custody.  (Exs.3, 6, 12.)

On February 3, 2011, at DCF's referral, Michael A. was re-evaluated at SCHC. He admitted being depressed when he was not using alcohol or drugs;  that his marijuana use was relatively severe when he was not experiencing mental health symptoms;  and that he needed to “quit smoking marijuana.” ¹³  (Ex. 12;  see also Ex. 13;  Tes. Jill K.) Diagnosing Michael A. with alcohol and cannabis dependence, SCHC scheduled IOP group therapy for him, three times a week from February through March 2011.  (Exs. 12, 13;  Tes. Jill K.) He attended only three appointments, and was discharged for “[e]xcessive absenteeism [and c]ontinued use of Cannabis and Alcohol.”  (Ex. 13;  Tes. Jill K.) When, at the respondent-father's request, DCF referred him for a third round of SCHC treatment, the provider declined, finding that Michael A. needed to “enter and complete an inpatient substance abuse treatment program” given his inability to initiate or maintain abstinence.  (Ex. 13;  Tes. Jill K.) Michael A. refused to undergo residential treatment, choosing outpatient substance abuse treatment at Connecticut Renaissance (CTR) instead.  (Tes. Jill K., Theresa G.)

On March 1, 2011, Michael A. started domestic violence and anger management treatment at the Optimus program, to which he had been referred by the criminal court.  (Exs.6, B, D, F.)

From March 5 through May 17, 2011, at DCF's referral, Michael A. attended Child Guidance's seven-week video-based “Active Parenting Now” education program.  (Ex. C;  Tes. Jill K.)

On June 27, 2011, Michael A. started IOP treatment at CTR. (Exs. 6, E;  Tes. Christina I.)

On July 12, 2011, Michael A. completed the Optimus program.   Although the provider reported that Michael A. had “learned many strategies to control his behavior in interpersonal conflicts,” he failed to attend the court-ordered psychological evaluations with Dr. Schiappa on July 14, 2011.  (Exs.3, 6, B, D, F.)

Chidori was born to Michael A. and Clarice D. on December 31, 2011.  (Exs.1, 2, 6.)

At DCF's referral, Michael A. was assessed at Family Services Woodfield (FSW) on February 3, 2012.   Although FSW “supported [his] participation in individual therapy voluntarily, [Michael A.] had no interest in treatment ․” (Ex. 6;  see Ex. 1;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

Despite more than eight months of CTR treatment, Michael A. continued his chronic marijuana use, still yielding “positive drug screens for marijuana up until March 12, 2012 ․” (Ex. 6;  see Ex. E, Tes. Christina I.) On April 5, 2012, because he had rendered two negative urine screens, CTR deemed Michael A. to have “completed” its IOP program even though he had attended only nine out of the nineteen group sessions scheduled between March and April 2012.   CTR then assigned him to a ten-week “Relapse Prevention Group Education beginning on April 11, 2012.”  (Ex. E;  see Ex. 6, Tes. Christina I.) Michael A. “had negative drug screens” through mid-May 2012, but then stopped attending CTR sessions, as he did not want further treatment.  (Ex. 6.)

On May 30 and 31, 2012, Michael A. underwent court-ordered individual and interactional psychological evaluations by Dr. Frazer.   At that time, the respondent-father resided with Clarice D., who worked while he cared for Aries and Chidori.   Dr. Frazer found Michael A. to have Cannabis Dependence with unknown remission status, but with a negative prognosis for any valid, sustained recovery due to the respondent-father's:  brief period of current abstinence;  lengthy history of failed treatment;  lack of commitment to the rehabilitation process;  lack of insight into the recovery process;  failure to comprehend the negative impact of his marijuana upon his capacity to make good judgments in general;  and lack of understanding how his marijuana use would negatively impact his ability to serve as a safe, emotionally and cognitively available parent for Kylik and Avion.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Dr. Frazer found that although Michael A. had a clear and present need for individual counseling, consistent with the specific steps, the respondent-father denied the need for therapy and disingenuously denied that FSW supported such treatment.  (Tes. Dr. Frazer;  see Ex. 6.)

Dr. Frazer's interactional evaluation revealed that in May 2012 Michael A. had only a casual connection to his sons.   While the respondent-father engaged in some physical affection, activities and conversations with Kylik and Avion, and was familiar with their areas of interest, he was unduly focused upon the children's appearance.  (Ex. 6.) The evaluation raised “concerns about [the respondent-father's] interpersonal functioning in general particularly with respect to his ability to prioritize his children's needs over his own and consider their point of view ․ He was not able to recognize the loss or confusion [Kylik and Avion ] may experience when visits are canceled regardless of the reason.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 6.)

Despite CTR's IOP and relapse prevention programs, Michael A. continued to use marijuana after he stopped attending sessions in May 2012.   After testing positive for marijuana in October 2012, DCF re-referred Michael A. to CTR, his chosen treatment provider.¹⁴  (Ex. 9;  see Ex. 10;  Tes. Theresa G., Christina I.)

On March 4, 2013, Michael A. started another round of CTR treatment.   Although the provider recommended twelve weeks of group sessions, after again testing positive for marijuana on April 19, 2013, he again unilaterally stopped attending.   CTR discharged Michael A. as unsuccessful, noting his continued need for treatment.  (Ex. 10.)

DCF offered Michael A. supervised visits while Kylik and Avion have been in foster care.   After the December 2010 OTC, visits took place most often at DCF's office and sometimes in the community.¹⁵  The respondent-father attended four visits in February 2011, but visited the children only once in March, in May and in June 2011.   He did not visit the children at all in April, July or August 2011, attempting to excuse his absences by explaining that he had no minutes left on his cell phone so could not call to cancel;  that he was ill;  or that he had to work.  (Tes. Jill K.)

From November 2011 until January 2012, Michael A. attended only half the visits available to him.   In January 2012, DCF accommodated Michael A.'s request to schedule visits on Fridays.   Although his attendance generally improved, he failed to attend three out of the four visits with Kylik and Avion scheduled for August 2012, without advance notice.  (Tes. Theresa G.)

In September 2012, DCF acceded to Michael A.'s request to change visits to Saturdays, so he could care for Aries and Chidori during the week.   Although the respondent-father started attending visits more consistently, he had little interaction with Kylik or Avion during their meetings, predominately watching the children play electronic games or watch videos.  (Tes. Theresa G.)

From October 2012 until January 2013, Michael A. “received parent support through the Exchange Club per the recommendations of Dr. Frazer ․ [However, the respondent-father] was not receptive to the suggestions or advice from the parent coach.   During the visits, [Michael A.] watched cartoons and played video games with his children on his laptop computer.”  (Ex. 2.) In April 2013, DCF reasonably moved visits to Sundays, so the children could participate in age appropriate activities such as swimming and gymnastic lessons, which were held on Saturdays.   The children visited at the home of Michael A. and Clarice D. twice in April 2013;  Aries and Chidori were present.   Despite the spring season and Kylik and Avion's high activity levels, Michael A. preferred indoor visits;  he did not cooperate with DCF's decision to move visits to a nearby park, because he would have had to take Aries and Chidori with him.  (Exs. 2, F;  Tes., Theresa G.)

Despite appropriate affection shown at the start or end of their meetings, the children's interactions with their father continue to be relatively impersonal at visits, as it was at Dr. Frazer's May 2012 evaluation.   Some more recent visits have included conversation or physical games, paternal direction, and reflected the children's happiness to see their father.   However, more often than not, Michael A. scarcely communicates with Kylik and Avion during visits, allowing the children to occupy themselves without his attention.   Concomitant with that aspect of the respondent-father's conduct, his attendance at visits has languished as time has gone on.   Belying his claim to desire reunification, Michael A. failed to attend visits scheduled for April 14;  May 5, 12, 19, and 25;  and on June 1, 9, 16 and 23, 2013.   Kylik and Avion were away from July 5 through August 13;  when they returned, Michael A. attended only two of the three visits that were offered in August 2013, just prior to trial.  (Exs. 2, 6, F;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G.)

B

DENICE S., THE MOTHER

Born on April 22, 1987, Denice S. spent two years in DCF foster care due to maternal abuse;  this abuse continued when Denice S. was returned to her mother's care.  (Exs.3, 4.) The respondent-mother also suffered childhood trauma through abuse in her foster home, sexual abuse, the death of a close relative, bullying and victimization at school.   She had behavioral problems in middle and high schools, suffered from depression and received medication therapy as a teenager.   Denice S. attended school through the 12th grade, but did not graduate.   Historically she has abused both alcohol and marijuana;  she has had scant employment.  (Exs.1, 2, 3, 6.)

Denice S. has three children.   She met Michael A. a while she was still in high school;  Kylik was born on March 29, 2007.   Denice S. and Michael A. then married, but she was physically and verbally abused by the respondent-father and “experienced a great deal of stress due to altercations with [his] ex-girlfriend which eventually prompted the couple to move to Virginia during her second pregnancy.”  (Ex. 6.) Avion was born to the couple on April 3, 2008.   Although they remain legally married, Michael A. and Denice S. ended their liaison after the family came to DCF's attention in late 2008.   The respondent-mother has not since had custody of either Kylik or Avion.  (Ex. 3.)

In January 2009, Denice S. assaulted Clarice D. in front of Kylik and Avion, leading to the respondent-mother's arrest and to the first OTC.¹⁶ (Exs.3, 6.) Denice S.'s issues included anger, violence, parenting deficits, unstable mental health, substance abuse and homelessness.   She was involved with a substance abuse treatment program in 2009, and lived with friends, at shelters, and at a rooming house.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Jill K.)

Denice S. then became romantically involved with Damian B.;   they have separated, but their child Damion was born on May 7, 2010.   Following domestic violence between Denice S. and Damian, occurring when both parties were intoxicated, DCF took custody of Damion.   In July 2010, DCF returned Damion to Denice S.'s care.¹⁷  (Exs.1, 3, 6.)

On June 7, 2010, at DCF's referral, Denice S. had started individual counseling and substance abuse treatment at SCHC. The respondent-mother had Depressive Disorder and lacked the skills to cope with her multiple life stressors including separation from Kylik and Avion, and homelessness.   After SCHC's psychiatric and psychosocial assessments, Denice S. refused to even try the medication recommended to reduce her mental health symptoms;  she claimed to prefer counseling, yet only sporadically attended scheduled therapy sessions.  (Exs. 3, 6, 14, Tes. Jill K.)

In July 2010, DCF referred Denice S. to anger management treatment at CTR. She did not complete the program, and was discharged in August 2010 for non-attendance.  (Ex. 2.)

On March 7, 2011, at DCF's referral, Child Guidance's Reconnecting Families program (RCF) began providing Denice S. with wrap-around services including;  one supervised and one therapeutically supervised home visit with the children each week;  parenting training with modeling of positive interaction and nurturance for Kylik, Avion, and Damion;  help in meeting the children's medical and practical needs;  education in anger management, impulse control, domestic violence prevention, and the negative impact of aggression upon children.   RCF encouraged Denice S. to attend additional parenting classes, and assisted her in obtaining employment and adequate housing to become self-reliant.  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Frances M., Jill K.)

On March 30, 2011, SCHC discharged Denice S. for failure to progress and noncompliance with therapy.   SCHC recommended that she continue behavioral health treatment for the generalized anxiety with panic symptoms that were affecting her at discharge.  (Ex. 14;  see Ex. 6, Tes. Jill K.)

Consistent with the lack of improvement noted by SCHC, Denice S. maintained uneven contact with RCF during the spring of 2011;  she made little progress in developing parenting skills, anger management, or self-sufficiency.  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Jill K.) The respondent-mother's continuing lack of control over her anger was obvious on March 30, 2011, when Denice S. and her neighbor engaged in “a physical altercation ․ right in the hallway” outside her room, in which the RCF worker and the children were present to celebrate Kylik's fourth birthday.  (Ex. 11.)   Denice S. argued loudly, yelled, and threw things;  banging, thudding sounds were heard;  the police responded;  and the respondent-mother returned to her room with scratches and ripped clothing.   (Tes. Frances M.) Experiencing this, the children became nervous;  the RCF worker took Kylik and Avion “outside of the home so as to remove them from any possible danger.”  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Frances M.)

In April 2011, DCF gave Denice S. funds for use as a security deposit for a one-bedroom apartment.   DCF also re-referred Denice S. to SCHC in April 2011, but the respondent-mother did not access the behavioral health services then available to her.  (Tes. Jill K.)

On June 29, 2011, when Denice S. cancelled the visit scheduled for that day, RCF discharged her for failure to progress despite its support services.  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Frances M., Jill K.)

On July 6, 2011, at DCF's referral, Denice S. commenced SCHC's IOP anger management program;  the provider diagnosed her with generalized anxiety and alcohol abuse.  (Ex. 15;  Tes. Jill.)

On July 26, 2011, Dr. Schiappa performed a psychological evaluation of Denice S. and an interactional evaluation with the children.   Denice S. denied having substance abuse problems despite a hair test that was positive for marijuana;  she admitted previous daily marijuana use, but claimed not to have smoked “for a while now.”  (Ex. 3.) The respondent-mother “reported symptoms of anxiety, including ‘panic attacks' “ which occur when she is stressed, but claimed to have missed SCHC treatment sessions “due to issues with child care.”  (Ex. 3.) Denice S. has borderline range intelligence, and low average “ability to sustain attention, concentrate, and exert mental control ․” (Ex. 3;  Tes. Dr. Schiappa.)   Denice S.'s interactions with Kylik and Avion were observed to be positive, and the respondent-mother remained calm without frustration “[d]espite Avion's extremely active behavior and the fact that the boys appeared to push limits with their behavior ․” (Ex. 4.) However, the respondent-mother did not appropriately physically intervene when Kylik and Avion engaged in potentially dangerous conduct such as jumping off furniture.   (Ex. 4.) Dr. Schiappa found that Denice S. needed to complete substance abuse and domestic violence treatment, and to undergo “individual therapy to address her mental health concerns, specifically anxiety and depression (PTSD).”  (Ex. 4.)

On August 9, 2011, while she was still enrolled in SCHC's anger management IOP program, Denice S. was admitted to SCHC's IOP for treatment for alcohol abuse, but she did not cooperate with the available treatment protocol.   SCHC discharged Denice S. for “sporadic attendance” and “no participation” on August 31, 2011.  (Ex. 16;  Tes. Jill K.)

On September 13, 2011, having missed three sessions and having appeared at a morning session in a highly intoxicated state, SCHC discharged Denice S. from its anger management IOP program due to noncompliance.   Still diagnosed with generalized anxiety and alcohol abuse, SCHC encouraged her to re-engage in treatment.  (Ex. 15;  Tes. Jill K.)

In November 2011, DCF referred Denice S. to Recovery Management Services (RMS) for substance abuse case management services.  (Ex. 1.) Also in November 2011, at DCF's referral, Denice S. began IOP drug treatment and mental health counseling at Project Courage.   On January 18, 2012, after negative drug and alcohol screens, she transitioned into the program's group and individual therapy;  domestic violence, trauma and parenting sessions.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Theresa G.)

In January 2012, DCF referred Denice S. to the Supportive Housing program, and informed her about the counseling available at the Center for Women and Families (CWF).  (Exs.1, 2.)

On May 30 and 31, 2012, Dr. Frazer performed an individual psychological evaluation of Denice S. and an evaluation of her interaction with Kylik and Avion.   Denice S. presented with PTSD and Depressive Disorder, and admitted still using alcohol and marijuana “to cope with stress and ‘self medicate’ emotional hardship.”  (Ex. 6.) Despite years of support services, the respondent-mother faced difficulties in the areas of “[s]tress management and support,” legal issues, employment, and housing, although she claimed that Project Courage had helped her “overcome the domestic violence in her past.”   (Ex. 6.) During the interactional evaluation, the respondent-mother was appropriately physically and emotionally affectionate, and showed an adequate ability to manage the children in highly structured environment.   However, Denice S. denied parenting problems while acknowledging her weakness in “giving in” to the children's demands and “that her use of marijuana and alcohol to cope with depression reflected poor decision-making.”  (Ex. 6.)

On June 13, 2012, Denice S. “unexpectedly dropped out of” Project Courage without explanation;  she did not return to complete the program.  (Ex. 6;  see Tes. Theresa G.)

Denice S.'s August 2012 “drug hair test at [SCHC] was negative for all substances.”  (Ex. 2.)

In October 2012, Denice S. started CWF counseling “to address relationship issues and her emotional functioning.”  (Ex. 2.) With CWF through February 2013, she improved her personal stability.  (Ex. 2.)

In November 2012, Supportive Housing provided Denice S. with a three-bedroom apartment.   After DCF's referral for employment training and case management at Goodwill, Denice S. briefly worked at a restaurant, but she has had no other employment.   As of August 2013, Supportive Housing was still paying all the respondent-mother's rent and utility bills.  (Exs.1, 2.)

DCF has provided Denice S. visits with Kylik and Avion supervised by its staff, RCF or the Exchange Club;  after his birth in May 2010, the respondent-mother often brought Damion to visits.   Some visits were held at Denice S.'s residence or in the community;  others were at DCF's office.   Kylik and Avion were rambunctious and their behavior was often uncontrolled during early visits;  although Denice S.'s parenting improved somewhat between January 24 and September 9, 2011, she had difficulty paying adequate attention to baby Damion while trying to meet her older sons' needs.   During this period, Denice S. missed approximately one visit per month, citing problems with weather, transportation, medical issues or child care.  (Ex. 1;  Tes. Jill K.)

To reduce the children's distress at Denice S.'s failure to attend visits as planned, DCF reduced the frequency of visits starting in September 2011.   The low quality of Denice S.'s interaction with Kylik and Avion remained apparent during those visits that did occur, as Denice S. primarily cared for Damion without communicating or interacting with Kylik and Avion.  (Ex. F;  Tes. Theresa G.) Denice S. still failed to visit regularly, missing at least one and sometimes two visits per month, again providing a variety of excuses such as weather, other appointments, her own or Damion's illness.  (Tes. Theresa G.)

In January 2012, DCF referred Denice S. to the Exchange Club for weekly therapeutic visitation and parenting education.   The Exchange Club instructed Denice S. in how to provide:  age-appropriate activities for Kylik and Avion;  necessary safety, structure and routine;  discipline and behavior management.   Although the Exchange Club worked with her for more than a year, Denice S. made limited progress, cancelling the visits scheduled for July 10;  August 14;  September 18;  October 9, 16 and 23;  November 6;  and December 18, 2012.   She also cancelled her visits on January 15 and 22;  and February 5, 2013.   When the Exchange Club's year long parenting service ended in February 2013, the respondent-mother had only partially learned to appropriately control the children's behavior.  (Ex. 2;  Tes. Theresa G.)

In March 2013, DCF met Denice S.'s request that the children's visits be moved to Sundays to accommodate her restaurant work schedule.   But when the respondent-mother left that work, she attempted to excuse her further absences from half the scheduled visits with Kylik and Avion by explaining that she had to go out of town or was babysitting for a friend's children.   Denice S. canceled visits with the children planned for March 5 and 12;  April 2 and 14;  May 5, 19 and 23;  June 1 and 23, 2013.   Kylik and Avion were out of state from July 5 to August 7, 2013.   When they returned to Connecticut, Denice S. did not attend two of the visits available prior to the start of the TPR trial.  (Ex. 2;  Tes. Theresa G.)

C

KYLIK AND AVION, THE CHILDREN

Kylik and Avion have had numerous foster placements throughout the years, sometimes separated but more often living together.   Upon their first removal in January 2009, DCF placed them in non-relative care, where they remained until April 2010 when DCF placed them with Michael A. After their second removals in December 2010, Kylik and Avion were placed with Deandre H., who in turn placed the children with their great Aunt Sylvia.   By June 2011, Deandre H. had became overwhelmed with responsibility of caring for Kylik and Avion, so DCF returned the children to their previous non-relative foster home.   In December 2011, the children were separated;  DCF returned Kylik to Deandra H. while Avion was placed with Deandre H.'s twin sister, paternal aunt Deirdre A. (Exs. 1, 2, 7;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K., Deirdre A.)

In June 2012, Kylik was removed from Deandre H.'s home where he had first lived from December 2010 through June 2011, and again since December 2011, as the paternal aunts had decided that the children should live together with Deirdre A. Kylik's specialized needs became evident after his June 2012 move.   Anxious and fragile, Kylik had difficulty with the transition, crying daily both at school and at Deirdre A.'s home, experiencing enuresis, and asking to return to Deandre H. (Exs. 2, 7;  Tes. Deirdre A., Dr. Frazer.)

Both children were timely evaluated by Birth–to–Three;  Kylik was found to have no need for services but Avion's identified specialized needs included mild developmental delays in cognition, socialization, speech and language.   Avion required special education support in preschool.   In December 2011, when he was first separated from his older brother at age three and a half, Avion began banging his head when he was upset.   Avion's head banging behavior was still occasionally apparent a year after his placement with Deirdre A. (Exs. 1, 7;  Tes. Jill K.)

The children have received inconsistent attention from Denice S. since their January 2009 entry into foster care.   As found in Part III. B., when they were younger, visits were somewhat chaotic when Kylik and Avion engaged in disorderly behavior while ignoring Denice S.'s efforts to control them;  also, as previously found, the children were exposed to her unregulated anger during her 2009 altercation with Clarice D. and during a March 2011 visit.   Kylik and Avion retain some affection for Denice S. although she has little interaction with them during visits and although they are disappointed by her failure to attend scheduled visits.  (Exs. 4, 6;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K.)

Kylik and Avion generally enjoy visits with Michael A., are happy to see him and appreciate the gifts and snacks he brings, even though the respondent-father sometimes struggles to initiate an appropriate degree of enthusiasm or affection for the boys.   Both boys are distressed at Michael A.'s inconsistent attendance at visits;  they have voiced concern about whether he will appear, asked whether they will again live with him, and also indicated a desire to live with others.¹⁸  (Exs.6, F.)

When Kylik was five and Avion was four years old, their “emotional attachment with their father appeared qualitatively lower than that between the mother and the children.”  (Ex. 6.) The children were then developmentally appropriate despite their multiple placements;  as Dr. Frazer explained, the boys' historically challenging conduct was “related to the separation from their parents and transition between foster homes resulting in attachment difficulty taking the form of some behavioral unrest.”  (Ex. 6.) While their behaviors have moderated as they have matured, due to the multiplicity of their foster placements, each child has a specialized need for permanent resolution of the question whether either Michael A. or Denice S. will function as their parent in the future.   Psychologically, permanency “is of critical importance” for Kylik and Avion.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)

Living together with Deirdre A. since June 2012, the children are well-bonded to each other and to their custodial aunt.   Deirdre A. is a full-time teacher;  Both Kylik and Avion attend after-school day care.   Neither Kylik nor Avion now initiates conversation about either respondent, although they understand their biological relationship.   Estranged from Michael A., Deirdre A. is willing to adopt both boys.  (Ex. 7;  Tes. Deirdre A., Jill K.)

IV

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

From the first report of neglect in 2008, clear and convincing evidence establishes DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate and contact the respondent-parents, as required by § 17a–112(j)(1).

A

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR MICHAEL A.

Clear and convincing evidence also establishes both that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Michael A. during the adjudicatory period and that the respondent-father was “unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․” ¹⁹ § 17a–112(j)(1).  In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483–84;  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 621;  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205.   Thus, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

As found in Part III, DCF's multiple, reasonable reunification efforts for Michael A. during the adjudicatory phase included:  case management and administrative review;  foster care for the children;  Birth to Three referrals and services;  protective supervision from August to December 2011;  supervised visitation;  substance abuse, mental health treatment and counseling through SCHC and CTR;  referral to Child Guidance for parent education;  and referral to FSW for mental health assessments and individual counseling.   Michael A. also had anger management and domestic violence classes through the criminal court's referral to Optimus.²⁰  (Exs.1, 2.)

However, as also found in Part III, Michael A. has been unable or unwilling to benefit from the services reasonably extended in an effort to address his mental health issues, his parenting deficiencies, and his chronic drug use.²¹  As previously found, Michael A. refused to attend the individual therapy that FSW supported, and that Dr. Frazer found necessary;  his unwillingness to participate rendered him unable to benefit from this reasonable referral.  (Exs. 6, 10;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   The respondent-father achieved minimal, if any, benefit from the mental health aspects of treatment he attended at SCHC and CTR, gaining no insight into his chronic need for marijuana even through CTR's specialized Motivational Enhancement Therapy/Cognitive Behavioral Therapy treatment, and consistently relapsing as a result.  (Exs. 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, E;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G., Christina I.)

Michael A. was also unable or unwilling to achieve sufficient benefit from the parenting education resources made available to him through Child Guidance or the Exchange Club;  he did not accept the recommendations of the Exchange Club's parenting coach, and he cannot or will not put the needs of Kylik and Avion ahead of his own interests, as is evident through his lack of appropriate, personal attention to the children at visits.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6, 11, C, E, F;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Theresa G.) Having refused individual counseling, despite the psychosocial aspects of his treatment at Optimus, SCHC, CTR and the Exchange Club, Michael A. cannot or will not “show the type of motivation and child-centric thinking of parents whose priority is centered on reunification with their children.”  (Ex. 6;  see Exs. 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, B, D, E, F.) He was too often unable or unwilling to cooperate with the department's efforts to schedule visits, infrequently providing advance warning that he would be unavailable for Kylik and Avion as scheduled.²²  (Ex. F;  Tes. Theresa G.) Michael A. is unable or unwilling to acknowledge or respond, as would an effective parent, to the children's sense of loss when he cancels or fails to attend visits.   The quality of father-son meetings has deteriorated as Kylik and Avion have grown older.   Now, during visits, Michael A. most often leaves the children to be entertained by electronics rather involving them in direct, personal conversation or interaction.  (Exs. 2, 6, 9, 10;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Theresa G.)

Michael A. also is unable or unwilling to benefit from the services reasonably directed at resolving his chronic marijuana use, and remains unable or unwilling even to come to terms with the fact that he must be abstinent to meet Kylik's and Avion's needs for a sober and responsible parent.   The respondent-father has never satisfactorily completed substance abuse treatment.   He was unsuccessfully discharged from SCHC in 2009 and again in March 2011;  refused to accept SCHC's recommendation for inpatient drug care;  continued using marijuana for a long time after his June 2011 entry into outpatient treatment at CTR, testing positive for marijuana through March 12, 2012 and clearly indicating his inability or unwillingness to achieve timely benefit even from this long-term service.   Michael A.'s lack of commitment to treatment or to abstinence was further evident in his decision to attend only nine of the nineteen CTR sessions available to him in March and April 2012, and in his abrupt departure from the ten-week relapse prevention program that followed.   (Exs. 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, E;  Tes. Jill K.) In January 2013, Michael A. admitted to CTR that he still had major substance abuse problems with “Marijuana, Hashish, [and] THC” and that he had smoked marijuana “28 out of the past 30 days” despite all his past treatment.  (Ex. 9.) The respondent-father's inability or unwillingness to achieve a measurable benefit from drug treatment services was further evident in that after starting a twelve-week IOP program at CTR in March 2013, he tested positive for marijuana in April 2013, failed to return for further treatment and was yet again discharged as unsuccessful.²³  (Ex. 10.)

Despite the services available to him, Michael A. further remains unable or unwilling to appreciate the negative impact his chronic marijuana use has upon his capacity to meet Kylik's and Avion's needs for an accessible parent who can be relied upon to use good judgment, nurture them, protect them, and keep them safe.   He is unwilling or unable to accept the reality that the effects of marijuana are inimical to effective parental functioning.²⁴  As Dr. Frazer clearly opined, the very nature of Michael A.'s claims “about regular marijuana use and its effect on behavior and more specifically parenting is not consistent with the model of recovery ” and have not changed despite years of remedial services.²⁵  (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 6;  see Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

Michael A. may argue that the court is constrained from finding him unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, or that the department extended such efforts, because DCF did not cooperate with his requests to reschedule visits.   Although this may have occurred occasionally, DCF much more frequently acted reasonably in deciding to provide visits at times and locations that were appropriate for Kylik and Avion, particularly in light of the respondent-father's failure to attend many visits that were scheduled at his convenience.²⁶  (Exs. 1, 2, F, G;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G., Dr. Frazer.)   In addition, although Michael A. may argue that the department interfered with his evaluation by Dr. Frazer, there is no evidence to support such a claim, particularly in light of his failure to attend Dr. Schiappa's 2011 evaluations as ordered.  (Ex. 3;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Michael A. also may argue that DCF did not provide him with reasonable reunification efforts because he was not referred to RCF, while Denice S. had the benefit of that program.   This position is also unpersuasive, as Michael A.'s continuing marijuana use and complaints that he was exhausted by work rendered him unsuitable for RCF's services.  (Tes. Jill K.) Notwithstanding his completion of parenting education through Child Guidance and his support from the Exchange Club, the respondent-father's failure to adequately interact with the children at most recent visits, together with his pattern of avoiding visits and noncompletion of programs that addressed his other issues, compels the conclusion that he would have been unable or unwilling to benefit from an RCF referral.

B

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR DENICE S.

Clear and convincing evidence also establishes both that DCF extended reasonable reunification efforts to Denise S. during the adjudicatory phase and that she was “unable or unwilling to benefit from” these efforts.²⁷ § 17a–112(j)(1).   See In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483–84;  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 621;  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205.   Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proof on this TPR element as to Denise S.

DCF's multiple, reasonable reunification efforts proffered to Denise S. during the adjudicatory phase included:  case management and administrative case reviews;  foster care for the children;  Birth to Three referrals and services;  housing assistance through department subsidies, RCF and Supportive Housing;  employment assistance through RCF and Goodwill;  parenting education and supervised visitation, including therapeutic sessions, through DCF, RCF and the Exchange Club;  referrals for anger management at CTR and SCHC;  referrals for mental health assessment and treatment, individual counseling, parenting education and substance abuse support services at SCHC, RMS, and Project Courage.  (Exs.1, 2.)

As found in Part III, however, Denice S. long remained unable or unwilling to participate in or to benefit from any treatment available to address her drug and alcohol abuse, anger issues, mental health problems, and parenting deficits;  her parenting and mental health issues remain extant.   Denice S. had drug and alcohol abuse treatment in 2009;  had access to anger management at CTR in July 2010 but was discharged in August 2010 for non-attendance;  and rejected the medication that was recommended following her August 2010 psychiatric evaluation at SCHC, losing a valuable opportunity for timely, effective mental health treatment.   She started SCHC's substance abuse and individual counseling in June 2010, but was discharged in March 2011 for non-compliance and non-attendance.   Her inability or unwillingness to benefit from these services was patently obvious through Denice S.'s altercation during Kylik's fourth birthday party, referenced above.   Similar inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is evident from Denice S.'s failure to appear at SCHC in April 2011 for individual counseling and substance abuse treatment sessions, and from her enrollment in SCHC's treatment in August 2011 followed by sporadic attendance and lack of participation, leading to her unsuccessful discharge;  and from her access to SCHC's anger management program in July 2011 followed by her September 2011 unsuccessful discharge after appearing intoxicated at one session, and after multiple absences.   The protracted nature of Denice S.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from services was further evident when she walked away from the Project Courage program in June 2012, abdicating access to that provider's multi-faceted reunification and support services.  (Exs. 1, 3, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Jill K.)

Although she has apparently gained some control over her substance and anger issues, Denice S. remains unable or unwilling to benefit from relevant reunification efforts directed at attaining minimum levels of self-sufficiency.   Despite RCF's employment assistance, the Goodwill training program and her restaurant work, she is still unable or unwilling to secure lawful employment.   As found in Part III, although the respondent-mother and Damion now reside in an apartment, Denice S. remains unable or unwilling to maintain her occupancy without Supportive Housing's rent and utilities payments.  (Ex. 2.)

Denice S. is also unable or unwilling to benefit from the services directed at improving her capacity to safely and effectively parent Kylik and Avion.   Despite RCF's wrap-around services, available from March through June 2011, her limitations and/or disinterest in the reunification process were evident through cancellation of valuable therapeutic visits so that she could instead attend to personal affairs, establishing that she considered neither of her older sons to have the requisite level of importance in her life.  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Jill K.) While Denice S. sometimes followed the RCF “worker's advice and suggestions, [at] other times [she] displayed actions of regression toward a successful reunification,” lacking motivation to change personal habits;  unreasonably refusing to participate in Avion's school planning;  and exposing Kylik and Avion to her violent behavior, leading to unsuccessful discharge from RCF's program.  (Ex. 11;  Tes. Frances M.)

Denice S.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from appropriate parenting training is further evident in her more recent failed experiences with both Project Courage and the Exchange Club. During her January through June 2012 work with Project Courage, Denice S. obtained only minimal improvement from parenting education services then, as previously found, terminated her connection with that provider.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Theresa G.) Her difficulties in caring for Damion while managing the behaviors of Kylik and Avion, and interacting with the children as a unit, obvious in January 2012 when Denice S. started the Exchange Club's weekly parent education services, only slightly improved after more than a year of therapeutic visitation;  she rarely interacted with Kylik and Avion during Exchange Club visits, rarely initiated any activities with them, and rarely joined in play that the older children had started on their own.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Theresa G.) By February 2013, Denise S. remained unable or unwilling to put into use what she had been taught about behavior management for Kylik and Avion, could not or would not implement structure and routine during visits, identify or engage in age-appropriate activities for the older children.²⁸  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Theresa G.)

In addition, despite the multi-modal services of all her providers, Denise S. remains psychologically unwilling or unable to benefit by gaining insight into the negative impact her own violent conduct, her history of substance abuse, her limited parenting skills or her cancellation of visits from August 2012 through late June 2013 have had upon Kylik and Avion.   Denice S.'s assaultive behavior taught her children that violence is acceptable, limited their ability to tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong, and reduced their ability to benefit from schooling.  (Tes.Dr. Schiappa.)   When Dr. Frazer learned that the respondent-mother “had voluntarily withdrawn from treatment” at Project Courage in June 2012, he concluded that “the abrupt nature of her withdrawal and absence of explanation to her clinician raises concerns about either a relapse, or another type of setback ․” ²⁹ (Ex. 6.) Given her too frequent cancellation of visits with Kylik and Avion in 2012 and 2013, even during the peri-TPR trial period, it is evident that Denice S. remains unable or unwilling to develop an appropriate parenting-connectedness with these children, or to attain a reasonable degree of the “child-centric” thinking that is necessary to provide appropriate, effective parental interaction with her older sons.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)

Denice S. may argue that DCF's reunification efforts were not reasonable because they did not explicitly follow Dr. Schiappa's 2011 recommendations.   Such argument must fail in view of the clear and convincing evidence establishing the multi-faceted, one-on-one supervised weekly visitation sessions, and the weekly one-on-one therapeutically supervised home visits DCF provided through RCF and the Exchange Club, which fully provided the respondent-mother with the hands-on experiential teaching methods that were appropriate for her.   Moreover, given Denice S.'s history of failed treatment with other providers, her abrupt cessation of work with Project Courage, her failure to obtain anything but minimal improvement in parenting skills notwithstanding the extended RCF and Exchange Club services, there is no basis upon which the court could reasonably conclude that any other services or training would have had any positive impact upon her parenting deficiencies.   (Exs. 1, 2, 11;  Tes. Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer, Theresa G., Frances M., Jill K.) In re Harlow P., 146 Conn. 664, 672, 78 A.3d 281, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 957, 81 A.3d 1183 (2013).

V

TPR GROUNDS AS TO MICHAEL A.

DCF has met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Michael A. has failed to achieve personal rehabilitation and that there is no ongoing parent-children relationship within the meaning of §§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) and 17a–112(j)(3)(D).

A

FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

It is uncontested that Kylik and Avion:  first entered the department's care in January 2009;  were first adjudicated in May 2009;  remained under protective supervision until September 2010;  returned to DCF's custody in December 2010;  were adjudicated neglected on December 1, 2011, and have since been committed to DCF. The children's specialized needs include permanency, given the many placements to which they have been subjected.   In addition, Avion's developmental and cognitive delays and Kylik's fragile emotional status require close surveillance and consistent support by a parent figure who “show(s) concern and awareness over their emotional functioning, their need for stimulation and affection, and their underlying need for stability.”  (Ex. 7;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Although Kylik and Avion have been in foster care for the better part of five years, Michael A. is not yet a safe, predictable or reliable resource for these boys.   Instead, the respondent-father has failed “to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of [Kylik and Avion, he] could assume a responsible position in the life of [either] child.” ³⁰ § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   Given the circumstances, of this case, Michael A.'s rehabilitation cannot be foreseen within a time that is reasonable given the children's ages, stages of development and specialized needs, and any level of rehabilitation he may have achieved “falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [either child's] life.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 622.   Thus, the department has met its burden of proof on this TPR ground.   See In re Kamora, 132 Conn.App. 179, 187, 31 A.3d 398 (2011);  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

Divers features of the evidence, discussed throughout, establishes both that the respondent-father has not yet achieved personal rehabilitation and that he will not achieve this status within § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)'s time constraints.   Michael A. remains adversely impacted by his long-standing, and as yet unresolved mental health issues, substance abuse, and parenting deficits, without the capacity to meet the needs of the children.³¹  Psychologically, as Dr. Frazer found, Michael A. has never acquired the ability or willingness to place the needs of Kylik and Avion above his own, a characteristic necessary to adequate parenting Kylik and Avion.   His recurrent absence from visits indicates his failure to effectively and consistently express love and affection for Kylik and Avion, and his failure to engage them in conversation indicates his relative disinterest in the status of their health, education, emotional concerns and general well-being.   See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.  (Ex. 6.) He has never developed the insight sufficient to understand the negative impact that his absence from scheduled visits would have upon Kylik and Avion, and even when he attends visits, Michael A. does not assume a parenting role.   His interaction with the children is limited as he most often occupies an observational role rather than providing them with the guidance, support, and healthy adult encouragement these children dearly require.   Knowledgeable about the popular culture and fashions that may attract the children, Michael A. attempts to present himself as a peer, not as a parent.   The persistence of the respondent-father's lack of child-centric thinking, despite appropriate services, establishes that he will not be able to serve Kylik and Avion as an adequate parent within the foreseeable future.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Moreover, working only sporadically and dependent on the housing provided by his girlfriend, the respondent-father retains the “significant limitations pertaining to his independent and autonomous capacity to meet the children's needs independently” that Dr. Frazer recognized in May 2012.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   The “legitimate risk factors” with which Michael A. then presented, including unstable, mental health, drug use, lack of self-reliance and absence of child-focused thinking, still impede his ability or willingness to serve as a valid parenting resource.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Even if the respondent-father has gained control over his domestic violence issues, multiple parenting risk factors, including his failure to acknowledge the serious, negative effect of his conduct upon the children over the years, are unremediated, indicating a failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation.

Michael A.'s lack of rehabilitation is also prominently evident in his failure to achieve lasting sobriety, as fully discussed throughout.   His continued marijuana use leaves him void of good judgment, and thus unable to serve as a safe, effective, or reliable parenting resource who can meet the children's needs.³²  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Michael A.'s failure to effectively control his substance abuse issues, despite myriad referrals for treatment, is manifest in his absence from so many available visits in 2013, and in the poor quality of his participation at more recent visits, during which he most often would passively observe, watch cartoons or play video games with the boys without enlisting them in conversation or exerting himself to show significant degrees of paternal affection.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Theresa G.) Although Michael A. has maintained some periods of abstinence, Dr. Frazer's 2012 admonition, that the respondent-father's continued drug use and his failure to accept the negative effects of marijuana “continues to be an area of concern for relapse ․” have proved to be true.  (Ex. 6;  see Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Michael A. has regularly returned to drug use and he so even after the TPR petitions had been filed.   Refractory to treatment, as fully discussed in Parts III. A, and IV. A, the respondent-father stopped attending his CTR relapse prevention program in the spring of 2012;  again defaulted to using marijuana, admitting that he had used almost every single day in January 2013;  still tested positive for that drug in April 2013 after re-accessing CTR treatment;  and yet failed to attend any CTR sessions after April 19, 2013, while the TPR remained pending.  (Exs. 6, 9, 10;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   The inescapable inference is that Michael A. will continue his chronic use of marijuana and that thus “he has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age[s) and needs of [Kylik and Avion, he] could assume a responsible position in the [lives of these children].” § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

Michael A.'s failure to comply with significant aspects of the final specific steps, documented in Parts III. A. and IV. A., further establishes that he has not made sufficient progress toward improving his personal status and has not achieved statutory or personal rehabilitation.³³  In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 507–8;  In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584;  In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn. 321–22.   For instance, Michael A. violated the steps by rejecting the individual counseling that was available at FSW, as individual counseling was an express element of the steps.³⁴  He further violated the steps' requirement to follow recommendations for treatment by refusing to cooperate with SCHC's referral for an inpatient substance abuse regimen.   Even if he was present at some of the drug treatment programs available to him at SCHC or CTR, his failure to cooperate with those rehabilitation services, a requirement of the specific steps, is evident from his repeated relapses and from his repeated departures from treatment without the provider's approval.³⁵  Michael A. repeatedly violated the steps' prohibition of the use of illegal drugs, continuing to use marijuana, a substance for which the state of Connecticut prescribes penalties for possession even of small quantities.   Instead of moderating his attitude toward drug use, he chose continued use of marijuana, never acknowledging the negative impact this conduct has on his ability to use good judgment or upon his capacity to serve as an effective parent, violating the steps's requirement that he learn to provide Kylik and Avion with a safe and nurturing home, and further establishing his failure to achieve rehabilitation.   See In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn.App. 322 (“respondent's failure to acknowledge the underlying personal issues that form the basis for the department's concerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation”).  (Exs. 1, 2, 9, 10, 20;  Tes. Theresa G., Dr. Frazer, Christina I.)

Michael A.'s additional violation of the steps include his failure to obtain legal income, a goal that is consistent with the minimum attributes of parenting.   Although he had brief, temporary work at a plastic company in June 2013, Michael A. has not otherwise met this aspect of the steps.   See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.  (Exs. 1, 2;  Tes. Jill K., Tes. Theresa G.)

As fully discussed above, Michael A. too frequently violated the steps' obligation to visit Kylik and Avion as often as permitted by DCF, indicating a grave lack of concern for the very children with whom he claims to desire reunification.   Overall, Michael A. visits when he finds it personally convenient.   Inconsistent with achievement of rehabilitation, although Kylik and Avion were available, the respondent-father visited them only seven times from December 18, 2010 until October 24, 2011, and did not visit them at all from June 15 until October 24, 2011.  (Ex. 1.) Even after the TPR petition was filed, Michael A. cancelled visits on August 3, 10, and 17;  and on November 6, 2012.   In 2013, he cancelled or failed to attend visits scheduled for January 11;  April 14;  May 5, 12, 19 and 26;  June 1, 9, 16, and 23;  and missed one of the three visits scheduled for August 2013.  (Ex. 2;  Tes. Theresa G.)

Michael A. may argue that DCF cannot prove his failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation because he has obtained sufficient housing.   As with his claim that he can serve as an effective parent even while regularly using marijuana, this argument must fail.   Michael A.'s housing is at the discretion of Clarice D. There is no reliable evidence that Clarice D. is willing to house Kylik and Avion on a permanent basis, and the respondent-father has no other residence available.

If Michael A. has made any progress in rehabilitation since the children's January 2009 removal, it is insufficient in view of Kylik's and Avion's critical needs for a permanent, stable home environment with a reliable, attentive, and child-focused parenting resource.   Even if the respondent-father has improved his ability to manage his personal life, that improvement is too small and too untimely to support the belief that he will be able or available to fulfil a responsible parenting role for Kylik and Avion within the period contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).³⁶

B

NO ONGOING PARENT–CHILD RELATIONSHIP

The evidence further establishes that between the respondent-father and either Kylik or Avion, “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child[ren] ․” § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Accordingly, DCF has also prevailed on this ground of the TPR petition.  In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 468;  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86;  In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269.

As to the first prong of the statutory analysis, even if parent-child relationship once existed between Michael A. and Kylik, and/or Avion, it has not been extant for many years.   When they were babies, the children were in non-relative foster care from their January 2009 removal until their Spring 2010 return to Michael A. When the children were again removed in December 2010, Kylik was two and a half and Avion was one and a half years old.   Neither child can recall ever living with the respondent-father;  has not met either boy's needs for day-to-day love or affection, housing and food, medical attention, educational support, religious or moral guidance since the second 96–hour hold, at best.  (Exs. 1, 2;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G.)

The children recognize Michael A. as their biological father and appreciate enjoy some aspects of the visits he attends.   However, by late May 2012, it was already clearly and convincingly evident that they had no “primary attachment” to him “in which they anticipate and depend upon” a parent figure “to meet their needs.”  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   The children may warmly greet the respondent-father and be pleased to see him, but they do not initiate conversation, express no interest in his activities outside their presence and, despite their ages and stages of development, do not request to call him on the phone or communicate outside the visitation process.   The respondent-father's disengaged demeanor during visits, his election to almost exclusively merely observe Kylik and Avion as they play computer games or watch electronic media, and the children's satisfaction with contact of that limited nature, indicate the absence of the ongoing parental relationship contemplated by the statute.   (Exs. 1, 2, F;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G.) The father-children connection, if measurable, is akin to that of a friendly acquaintanceship, not approaching that of children and a parent upon whom they can rely for security, consistency, nurturance, and unconditional support.

Michael A.'s inconsistent visitation, as fully discussed above, diffused the value of any parent-children relationship he might possibly once have had with Kylik and/or Avion.   As Dr. Schiappa persuasively explained, frequent and consistent contact is necessary to maintain a relationship between a child and a non-custodial adult.   Moreover, as Dr. Frazer established, when children expect a parent to attend a planned visit but the parent fails to attend, the children react negatively, worrying whether they have done something wrong or otherwise caused the anticipated meeting to be cancelled.  (Tes.Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer.)   The respondent-father's frequent absence from visits, and the unpredictable nature of his attendance, described in Parts III, IV. A and V. A, have not have led Kylik and Avion to trust or rely upon him.   Instead, they view Michael A. as an adult with whom they may occasionally spend some time, but not as a person who cares for them, protects them, upon whom they can depend for assistance or who demonstrates a valid interest in their well-being.   Even if Kylik and Avion have memories of living with Michael A., or if they care for or about him, no positive emotional aspects amounting to a § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) parent-children relationship now exist.  In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269.

As to the second prong of the § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) analysis, looking into the future, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that it would be detrimental to Kylik or Avion to permit further time within which a parenting relationship could be developed with Michael A. As found above, the respondent-father has had many years to achieve a degree of personal stability sufficient to serve as a dependable custodian for the children, but has made little progress in achieving the minimal parental attributes.  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.   Kylik and Avion will soon reach their seventh and sixth birthdays, yet Michael A. is still unable or unwilling to fulfill a responsible, attentive, care taking role for the boys.   Despite genetic ties, given Kylik's fragile emotional status, Avion's need for special educational support, and their joint history of multiple placements, the permanency that can only be accomplished by severing their legal connection to the respondent-father “is of critical importance” to the best interests of these children.   (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)   There is no reasonable basis upon which the court could find that allowing additional time would result in any measurable improvement in Michael A.'s capacity to serve as an appropriate parenting resource, but even if a parent-children relationship could be reinstated or created with an extension of time, additional months or years of impermanent foster-care would be required for Kylik and Avion.   These children, who have already suffered far too much disruption in their lives, should not be burdened with having to wait for termination of Michael A.'s parental rights.   Any other outcome other than TPR would be detrimental to the children's security and well-being.   Accordingly, DCF has met its burden of proving the § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) element as alleged.

VI

TPR GROUNDS AS TO DENICE S.

DCF has met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Denice S. has failed to achieve personal rehabilitation and that she has no ongoing parent-child relationship with either Kylik or Avion, within the meaning of §§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) and 17a–112(j)(3)(D).

A

FAILURE TO REHABILITATION

Kylik's and Avion's history of adjudications and their specialized needs have been found above, and are incorporated into this discussion.   Since their entry into DCF care in 2009, Denice S. has had more than sufficient time to become able and willing to function as a safe, predictable or reliable parental resource for these children.   Instead, she has failed “to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of [Kylik and Avion, she] could assume a responsible position in the life of [either child].” ³⁷ § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   As any level of rehabilitation Denice S. may have achieved with regard to her older sons “falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [either child's] life,” the department has prevailed on this TPR ground.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 622.  In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187;  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

The evidence as found in Parts III and IV. B, impels the finding that the respondent-mother has not achieved personal rehabilitation despite the many years her children have spent in foster care, even though she has not had custodial responsibility for either Kylik or Avion since the implementation of DCF's December 2008 safety plan.   Denice S.'s long-standing psychosocial instability and concomitant lack of statutory rehabilitation was manifest in her “inconsistent involvement with mental health treatment at [SCHC]” and her failure with multiple other providers as found in Parts III. B and IV. B.³⁸ (Ex. 6.) As Dr. Frazer explained, Denice S.'s abrupt withdrawal from Project Courage in mid-June 2012, when she had described [this program] as “highly supportive,” indicated that any progress Denice S. may have made in managing her mental health and parenting deficiencies as of the summer of 2012 was relatively fragile and not likely to last.   Significant concerns then remained as to when, if ever, Denice S. could achieve control of her mental health issues, parenting limitations, housing and employment deficits so as to fulfil a valid role in the lives of her growing, school-aged sons.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Fortunately, Denice S. does appear to have achieved some improvement in her ability to maintain relationships with some persons, to moderate her anger, and to avoid involvement with drugs or alcohol since engaging in CWF's services in October 2012.   Thus, even DCF admitted in August 2013 that the respondent-mother “has shown progress in the areas of securing housing and maintaining sobriety [and] has maintained custody of her three-year-old son.”  (Ex. 2.)

However, any advances in Denice S.'s ability to manage her personal life are insufficient to overcome the reality that for too many years, notwithstanding the myriad, appropriate services extended to her, she did not develop the ability or willingness to provide the consistent attention, structure and discipline needed by Kylik and Avion;  she lacks these critical skills even today.   Psychologically, Denice S. has never acquired capacity for the child-centric thinking by Kylik's and Avion's parent-figure;  she still fails to acknowledge that she has not achieved the essential parental characteristic that leads the responsible adult to place her personal interests secondary to those of the children with whom she claims to desire reunification.  In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn.App. 322.   This parenting deficit was evident in the earlier visits with Kylik and Avion that were marked by chaos or punctuated by Denice S.'s inability or unwillingness to control their behavior, and is still evident the fact that while she may show them affection, the respondent-mother does not effectively engage with the older boys, and cannot or will not give them the direction, guidance or support they need, even in a circumscribed setting.   Thus, in 2013, Denice S. continued her pattern of missing a substantial number of opportunities for visits with Kylik and Avion.   When she did attend, while her manner was easy going, she had limited interaction with her older sons, largely participated only as an attendee, and focused upon Damion without actively engaging the older boys in planned, age-appropriate activities such as interactive play or conversation.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K., Dr. Frazer.)

Unfortunately, Denice S. still does not acknowledge how negatively her absence from visits impacts the children, further evincing her failure to achieve rehabilitation insofar her parenting deficits and mental health are concerned.  In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn.App. 322.   From September 2011 through the time of trial, the respondent-mother missed one-quarter of the total visits available with Kylik and Avion, leaving them confused and disappointed when she did not appear.   Yet Denice S. has not even attempted to remediate or address the children's resulting sadness in any meaningful way despite all the parenting and counseling services she has received.   Even with an apparent present degree of control over her substance abuse and domestic violence issues, as far as her older sons are concerned, the respondent-mother still lacks the ability to effectively parent Kylik and Avion, despite the treatment at SCHC, RCF, the Exchange Club, Project Courage, and CWF described in Parts III. B. and IV. B. (Exs. 1, 2, 6;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K., Dr. Frazer.)

Kylik's and Avion's history of multiple removals from parental custody and multiple placements renders critically necessary their placement in a well-organized home environment in which they receive consistent attention and care, in which their physical health is maintained through regularly scheduled activities, and in which their cognitive and developmental levels are honed through communication with a caretaker who can stimulate them appropriately, while delivering security and affection.  (Ex. 7;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Although the children have been out of her care for five years, Denice S. still cannot adequately address Kylik's or Avion's specialized needs;  she either chooses not to apply or has never learned to adequately interact with these children as a parent.   Even if she can care for Damion, Denice S. has failed to achieve the “ability to care for the specific needs of [the] children at issue” in the TPR petition.  In re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn. 760.   Under the circumstances of this case, which reflect the great length of time that Kylik and Anthony have required foster care or DCF supervision as well as the children's needs for a focused and able parenting resource, and which also reflect Denice S.'s minimal progress in her ability or willingness to meet those needs, it would be unreasonable to find that the respondent-mother could achieve rehabilitation within the time frame contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(B)(i).

Denice S.'s failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation, and her failure to sufficiently progress in improving her personal status to enable her to meet Kylik's and Avion's specialized needs, is further evident through her failure to comply with many aspects of the specific steps.³⁹  In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 507–8;  In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584;  In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn. 322.   For instance, despite the steps' requirement that she do so, Denice S. has not visited Kylik and Avion as often as permitted by DCF. In addition to visits missed in 2011, Denice S. violated the steps by cancelling or failing to meet with the children on July 10;  August 14;  September 18;  October 9, 16, 23;  November 6;  and December 18, 2012.   She further violated the steps through her absence from visits scheduled for January 15 and 22;  February 5;  March 5 and 12;  April 2 and 14;  May 5, 19, and 26;  June 1 and June 23;  and from two visits in late summer 2013.   This conduct clearly and convincingly establishes exodus that Denice S. has never achieved the goals of learning to serve as a “nurturing” resource for the children.  (Exs.18, BB.) Children who expect their mother to visit them, and who are repeatedly disappointed by her absence, are not being nurtured but are unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed to a harmful level of unpredictability that is inconsistent with effective parenting.   Moreover, the relatively limited quality of her involvement with these children during visits and her self-interested excuses for her absences, discussed above, clearly indicate a sustained lack of interest in spending time with Kylik and Avion, a fact that is also inconsistent with the steps' nurturance goal and with effective parenting.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6, 11, 18, BB;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G., Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer.)

Denice S. further violated the steps' requirements to take part in counseling and cooperate with service providers through her failure to follow the recommendations or succeed with SCHC, RCF or Project Courage, as fully discussed in Parts III. B and IV. B. Even if she attended group and individual therapy, parenting classes, domestic violence and trauma groups, and rendered negative drug tests at Project Courage, Denice S. did not successfully complete that program.   Instead, by walking away from this service without explanation in June 2012, she yet again demonstrated that she had made only limited progress despite many years of multi-modal treatment, that her priorities did not lie with the reunification process, and that she had still failed to achieve rehabilitation.  (Exs. 2, 6, 18, BB;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

Similarly, the respondent-mother violated the specific steps, and exhibited her failure to achieve rehabilitation, through her lack of success with the Exchange Club's parenting program.   Despite over a year of that provider's services, as found in Parts III. B and IV. B, by February 2013 Denice S. had made only limited progress in developing skills necessary to safely and effectively parent Kylik and Avion.   She had no reliable capacity to identify or implement age-appropriate activities, to manage their behaviors by providing necessary structure and routine for them, or to meet their needs in a positive manner while caring for Damion.  (Exs. 2, 18, BB;  Tes. Theresa G.)

Denice S. also violated the steps' anticipation that she achieve the ability to earn legal income.   As found above, despite employment support from RCF and Goodwill, the respondent-mother secured only a single, inappropriate job, working for no remuneration.   While she may have used good judgment in declining to work under unlawful conditions, Denice S. has not otherwise been employed, again establishing her failure to achieve rehabilitation.  (Exs. 2, 18, BB;  Tes. Theresa G.)

Finally, Denice S. did not satisfactorily comply with the steps' requirement to provide a home for Kylik and Avion.   Although her present apartment may be physically large, her occupancy is fully dependent upon Supportive Housing's payment of all rent and utility bills, as found above.   There is no evidence from which the court could conclude that this financial assistance will continue indefinitely, and Denice S. has not achieved the ability to maintain this residence without total support.   Thus, her housing status is not adequately stable insofar as Kylik and Avion are concerned, and she has not achieved rehabilitation, given the children's overwhelming needs for permanency and consistency in their placement.  (Exs. 1, 2, 18, BB;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Theresa G.)

Denice S. may argue that her failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation cannot be proved in this case because she has been allowed to keep Damion in her custody.   Such argument carries no weight in view of the clear and convincing evidence establishing that she lacks the ability to care for Kylik's and Avion's specific needs.   See In re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn. 760.

Any progress in rehabilitation Denice S. may have made while the children have languished in foster care is insufficient and untimely, in view of their critical needs for a stable home environment with an appropriately stimulating, functionally and emotionally attentive parenting resource.  (Ex. 7;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Even if Denice S. has improved her ability to manage her personal life, that improvement is too little and too late to support the belief that she can serve as a responsible parent for Kylik or Avion within the time contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   See In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187;  see also In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn. 622.

B

NO ONGOING PARENT–CHILD RELATIONSHIP

The evidence, as a whole, further clearly and convincingly establishes that between the respondent-mother, Kylik and/or Avion, “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child[ren] ․” § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Accordingly, DCF has also prevailed on this ground of the respondent-mother's TPR petition.  In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 468;  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86, In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269.

As to the first prong of the requisite analysis, although Denice S. is their biological mother, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that a statutory parent-child relationship ever actually existed between Denice S. and Kylik or Avion prior to the younger child's injury in late 2008;  if such a relationship once existed, it has been absent for many years.   Kylik, who will soon turn seven, may have lived with Denice S. until he was twenty-one months old;  Avion, whose is approaching his sixth birthday, may have been with her for the first eight months of his life.  (Ex. 1.) Neither child has since resided with Denice S. and neither child can have any positive memories of that remote experience.   Since that time, Denice S. has not fulfilled the minimum criteria of parenting other than showing them some affecting when she has elected to attend scheduled visits.   Despite her repeated access to remedial services, the respondent-mother has not since met either boy's general needs for day-to-day love or attention, housing and food, medical or educational support, religious or moral guidance;  she has never met their need for a consistent, reliable, predictable adult caretaker who is aware of and able to address their emotional and developmental concerns.   See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86.   Instead, both children were adversely impacted by Denice S.'s domestic violence with Clarice D. in January 2009, which led to their first entry into DCF custody, and again by their exposure to her violence with her neighbor in March 2011, described in Parts I, III. B, IV. B and V.A. (Exs. 6, 7;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

Thus, Kylik and Avion do not now maintain positive feelings for Denice S. While they know that Denice S. is their mother, sometimes enjoy contact with her and voluntarily show her affection, their feelings do not approach those that children would have for an adult who serves them in the parental context contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Any positive emotional response Kylik and Avion may have for Denice S. has been dissipated by her absence from one-fourth of the many visitation opportunities that made available to her since September 2011.   By failing to attend all of the scheduled visits, the respondent-mother clearly and convincingly demonstrated what Kylik and Avion are old enough to comprehend:  that their mother frequently chooses to attend to priorities other than spending time with them.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6;  Tes. Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer, Jill K., Theresa G.) As such, Denice S. actively interfered with the opportunity for the consistent interaction that was essential to her older sons' development or maintenance of a positive relationship with an adult who does not provide their daily care.  (Tes.Dr. Schiappa.)   Thus, as Dr. Frazer clearly established, it was evident by late May 2012 that the children had no “primary attachment” to Denice S. “in which they anticipate and depend upon” a parent figure “to meet their needs.”  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Kylik and Avion are ready to leave visits when they are through, and despite their ages and stages of development, do not ask to call, electronically communicate, or spend more time with the respondent-mother or her son Damion.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer, Theresa G.) Even though the children have some positive feelings for her, those feelings are insufficient to satisfy the elements of § 17a–112(3)(D)'s first prong.  In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269–70.   In this way, a statutory mother-children relationship is clearly and convincingly lacking in this case.

As to the second prong of the statutory analysis, looking into the future, it is also clear that to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of a parenting relationship with Denice S. would be detrimental to Kylik's and Avion's best interest.   As found in Parts III. B, IV. B, and VI. A, despite the many years these children have languished in foster care, the respondent-mother has never acquired the ability or willingness to provide them with the consistent attention, structured and supportive activities, or reliable guidance that is necessary for their healthy growth and development.   Even if Denice S. can continue to occupy the Supportive Housing residence, maintain sobriety, and avoid violence, many years of appropriate counseling and parenting education have not yielded any measurable improvement in capacity to meet the children's need for a reliable parent-figure who shows “concern and awareness over their emotional functioning, their need for stimulation and affection, and their underlying need for stability.”  (Ex. 7;  see Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Even if Denice S. could make slow progress toward these parenting goals, allowing additional time for her to create a statutory relationship with Kylik and Avion would require the children to remain in the impermanent, detrimental state of foster care for an even longer period.   Kylik and Avion, for whom past placement disruptions have made their need for permanence “critical,” should not be burdened by having to wait for termination of the respondent-mother's parental rights.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)   Denice S.'s genetic tie to Kylik and Avion can never be severed, but the value of that connection is far outweighed by the value of TPR, the only outcome can effectively meet the children's needs for a secure, stable future.   See In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816.

As neither Kylik nor Avion maintains positive statutory parent-related feelings for Denice S., as no ongoing parent-child relationship exists, and as it would be detrimental to the children's best interests to allow more time for the respondent-mother to meet the too-long unfulfilled expectation that she could serve as their custodian within any reasonable time, DCF has met its burden of proving the § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) element as alleged.

VII

BEST INTERESTS

The court next turns to the issue of the children's “best interests” and finds that the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Kylik and Avion will best be served by terminating parental rights.⁴⁰  In this way, these children may, at last, attain stable access to the permanency in placement, sustained healthy growth, personal development, well-being, and environmental continuity to which they are surely entitled.⁴¹  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611;  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733–34.

A

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The § 17a–112(k) findings are based on the clear and convincing trial evidence:

(1 ) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

The reunification services that DCF offered and/or provided for the respondents and the children in this case were both timely and appropriate, including:  foster care, Birth to Three and special education support;  case management and administrative services;  protective supervision;  supervised and therapeutic visitation;  substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health treatment for the respondent parents through FSW, SCHC, CTR, RMS, Project Courage, and CWF;  parent training through RCF, Child Guidance and the Exchange Club;  and anger management through SCHC. Michael A. also had treatment through the criminal court's referral to Optimus.

(2 ) Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family in compliance with federal law.

As found in Part IV, the department made the requisite reasonable reunification efforts.

(3 ) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

As found in Parts IV, V and VI, neither parent has satisfactorily complied with multiple aspects of the juvenile court's specific steps.   The criminal court apparently found that both respondent-parents complied with its orders.

(4 ) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

As of late May 2012, any bond Kylik and Avion had with either respondent was based on biology, familiarity and expectation, not arising to a parent-child tie, as found in Parts V. B, and VI. B. Although they continued to cooperate with the visitation process, the absence of any measurable emotional tie is apparent in that neither child asked for either Denice S. or Michael A. Generally, the children enjoy visiting with the respondent-father, but neither Kylik or Avion has any emotional tie to his other three children or to his girlfriend, Clarice D. The children are affectionate with Denice S., but have limited interaction with her or Damion, and have no problem leaving their mother after visits.   Both Kylik and Avion have current positive emotional attachments to Deirdre A., their foster mother and caretaker.   They are comfortable with Deirdre A., look to her for guidance and direction, and appreciate her attention to their basic and overall needs.

(5 ) The ages of the children.

Born on March 29, 2007, Kylik will soon turn seven.   Born on April 3, 2008, Avion is approaching his sixth birthday.

(6 ) The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A ) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B ) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

As found throughout, neither respondent-parent has made adjustments so as to effectively benefit from the available reunification and rehabilitative service, attending at their convenience and not in accordance with the providers' schedules;  each remains unable or unwilling to meet the children's identified needs.   Although they have largely kept in contact with DCF, each respondent has attempted to excuse absences from visits with the children by referencing obligations they found more pressing than spending time with Kylik and Avion.   Neither parent has come to acknowledge or appreciate the negative effect their inattention to Kylik and Avion has had upon these children.

(7 ) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Neither unreasonable action or conduct by any other person nor either parent's economic circumstances has prevented the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with either child.   The respondent-parents' choices, not financial factors, impeded their development of parental-connectedness to the children.   Although DCF implemented RCF for the respondent-mother and allowed the children to visit at her residence, but did not provide RCF's services for Michael A. and delayed in acceding to his request for home visits, there is no evidence to support the conclusion either that the department's conduct was unreasonable or that it had any impact upon the respondent-father's relationship to the children.   While Kylik and Avion went on a month-long vacation during the summer of 2013, the absence of parent-child visits during this period had no measurable effect upon the respondents' relationships with the boys.   Even if DCF staff has, from time to time, talked to the children about their feelings for their foster parents, and even if such communications were unreasonable, and even if the department elected to place the children with paternal family members from whom the respondent-father is estranged, there is insufficient basis for concluding that the department thereby prevented, or even influenced, either Kylik's or Avion's relationship with any adult.   Michael A. claimed to have had difficulties working with DCF social worker Jill K.;   however, there is no basis for concluding either that she acted unreasonably or that her conduct prevented the respondent-father from maintaining a relationship with the children.

B

BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS

In deciding § 17a–112(j)(2)'s best interest element, the court has considered the children's intrinsic need for sustained growth, healthy development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment, along with the necessity for consistent, structured care by a responsible parent figure who is ready, willing and able to address to their needs without further delay.   See In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611;  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733–34;  In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816.   As previously noted, psychologically, these children have already endured so many changes in their placements that permanency “is of critical importance”;  here, the issue of permanency is related to whether or not it is in the best interests to continue the respondents' legal relationships with their children, or whether those ties should be severed.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)

Kylik and Avion are resilient, despite their specialized needs;  they have made positive gains since their joint placement with Deirdre A. in June 2012.⁴²  (Ex. 7.) As fully discussed above, during the children's prolonged period of DCF supervision and foster care, neither Denice S. nor Michael A. has developed the ability or willingness to focus upon Kylik's or Avion's needs for a parent-figure who is demonstrably concerned about and aware of their emotional status, who will show them consistent affection, who will constantly survey and attend to their stages of development, and who will provide a stable, structured residential environment in which they personally thrive.   (Ex. 7;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)   Allowing more time for Denice S. or Michael A. to become able and willing to provide safe, reliable care for Kylik and Avion would unreasonably relegate the children's best interests to an unacceptable level of uncertainty, without a valid basis for determining that a different outcome will be reached by the biological parents.   Given the children's past experiences, delaying TPR would irreparably interfere with their access to a permanent placement that will enhance their opportunities for healthy human growth and maximize their potentials.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)

The court has balanced the children's need for permanency against a benefit that might be achieved through denying TPR. Under such scrutiny, it is overwhelmingly apparent that Kylik's and Avion's fundamental need for stability and permanency far outweighs any benefit of continuing a legal connection with either respondent.   See In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 495, 940 A.2d 733 (2008);  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 216 n.12;  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 623.   The permanency attendant TPR will most promptly enabling Kylik and Avion to enjoy their remaining childhood years in a predictable, appropriate “forever home” in which they are nurtured and supported on a continuous basis, without risk of removal.  (Tes.Dr. Frazer.)   In re Heather L., 49 Conn.Sup. 287, 313, 877 A.2d 27 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 174, 874 A.2d 796 (2005).

Therefore, “termination is in the best interest” of both children. § 17a–112(j)(2).

VIII

ORDERS

The court terminates the parental rights of Denice S. to Kylik A. and Avion A.

The court terminates the parental rights of Michael A. to Kylik A. and Avion A.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), and within thirty days shall report to the court on a case plan which includes measurable objectives and time schedules for the children.

The Clerk of the Probate Court or any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Bridgeport of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly this seventeenth day of March 2014.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated to judicial notice of Kylik's and Avion's prior child protection files, Docket Nos. F04–CP09–008138–A and F04–CP09–008139–A..  FN2. On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated to judicial notice of Kylik's and Avion's prior child protection files, Docket Nos. F04–CP09–008138–A and F04–CP09–008139–A.

FN3. Among other things, the December 1, 2011 specific steps ordered both respondents to:  undergo parenting and individual counseling;  “[n]ot use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine”;  “[s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment ․”;  “[g]et and maintain adequate housing and a legal income;” “․ avoid more domestic violence”;  “[a]ccept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them”;  and “[t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals.”  (Exs.BB, 20.)   Denice S. was ordered to “[l]earn to manage children's behavior and provide [a] safe and nurturing home.”  (Exs.18, BB.) Michael A. was ordered to “address mental health conditions as identified by clinician, including Attachment Disorder,” “[l]earn to manage children's behavior and provide [a] safe and nurturing home.”  (Ex. 20.).  FN3. Among other things, the December 1, 2011 specific steps ordered both respondents to:  undergo parenting and individual counseling;  “[n]ot use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine”;  “[s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment ․”;  “[g]et and maintain adequate housing and a legal income;” “․ avoid more domestic violence”;  “[a]ccept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them”;  and “[t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals.”  (Exs.BB, 20.)   Denice S. was ordered to “[l]earn to manage children's behavior and provide [a] safe and nurturing home.”  (Exs.18, BB.) Michael A. was ordered to “address mental health conditions as identified by clinician, including Attachment Disorder,” “[l]earn to manage children's behavior and provide [a] safe and nurturing home.”  (Ex. 20.)

FN4. The court adopts the spelling of Damion's name used in Docket No. CP10–008787–A..  FN4. The court adopts the spelling of Damion's name used in Docket No. CP10–008787–A.

FN5. “When making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ․ See Practice Book § 35a–7(a) ․;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (reasonable efforts finding is distinct from analysis of whether there exist grounds for termination of parental rights);  In re Shaiesha O., [93 Conn.App. 42, 48–49 and 49 n.5, 887 A.2d 415 (2006) ] (in determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child ․ the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed).”  (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483–84.   See also In re Paul M., 148 Conn.App. 654, 662–63 (2014), quoting In re Albert M., 124 Conn.App. 561, 562, 6 A.3d 815 (“․ department required to make reasonable efforts to reunify child with parents prior to filing petition for termination of parental rights”), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1050 (2010).   DCF has not claimed that its amendments affect the TPR adjudicatory date..  FN5. “When making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ․ See Practice Book § 35a–7(a) ․;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (reasonable efforts finding is distinct from analysis of whether there exist grounds for termination of parental rights);  In re Shaiesha O., [93 Conn.App. 42, 48–49 and 49 n.5, 887 A.2d 415 (2006) ] (in determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child ․ the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed).”  (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483–84.   See also In re Paul M., 148 Conn.App. 654, 662–63 (2014), quoting In re Albert M., 124 Conn.App. 561, 562, 6 A.3d 815 (“․ department required to make reasonable efforts to reunify child with parents prior to filing petition for termination of parental rights”), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1050 (2010).   DCF has not claimed that its amendments affect the TPR adjudicatory date.

FN6. Each of the grounds for termination set out in § 17a–112(j)(3) is “an independent ground for termination.”  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail with regard to a respondent-parent, DCF is required “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specified statutory bases for termination has been established.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id..  FN6. Each of the grounds for termination set out in § 17a–112(j)(3) is “an independent ground for termination.”  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail with regard to a respondent-parent, DCF is required “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specified statutory bases for termination has been established.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.

FN7. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ The credibility, and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ․ It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․ The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’  ․ In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611–12.  “ ‘Furthermore, [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases.’  ․ In re Tabitha P., [supra, 39 Conn.App. 364–65 n.8].” In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court [is] free to believe all, some or none of [a witness's] testimony.”   See In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 729.   “The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’  ․ Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).  ‘In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door ․’ In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006)..  FN7. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ The credibility, and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ․ It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․ The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’  ․ In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611–12.  “ ‘Furthermore, [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases.’  ․ In re Tabitha P., [supra, 39 Conn.App. 364–65 n.8].” In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court [is] free to believe all, some or none of [a witness's] testimony.”   See In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 729.   “The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’  ․ Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).  ‘In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door ․’ In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006).

FN8. The court fully credits the evaluating psychologists' evidence related to the TPR issues, as it was founded upon their:  considerable skill, training, education, and experience;  reliable testing and personal interviews;  and cogent analysis of multiple collateral resources made available by the court service officers.   Subject to vigorous cross examination, the psychologists' opinions were independent of bias, detailed and well-founded.   See In re Jason R., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73;  see also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161..  FN8. The court fully credits the evaluating psychologists' evidence related to the TPR issues, as it was founded upon their:  considerable skill, training, education, and experience;  reliable testing and personal interviews;  and cogent analysis of multiple collateral resources made available by the court service officers.   Subject to vigorous cross examination, the psychologists' opinions were independent of bias, detailed and well-founded.   See In re Jason R., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73;  see also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.

FN9. Additional facts will be found as required..  FN9. Additional facts will be found as required.

FN10. Michael, born on July 9, 2003, lives with his mother, Sheriffa S. Clarice D. is the mother of Aries and Chidori.  (Exs.1, 2, 6.) Herein, Kylik and Avion are referenced as “the children.”.  FN10. Michael, born on July 9, 2003, lives with his mother, Sheriffa S. Clarice D. is the mother of Aries and Chidori.  (Exs.1, 2, 6.) Herein, Kylik and Avion are referenced as “the children.”

FN11. Both of Michael A.'s parents used crack cocaine;  his mother died in 1998 and he is estranged from his father.  (Ex. 6.).  FN11. Both of Michael A.'s parents used crack cocaine;  his mother died in 1998 and he is estranged from his father.  (Ex. 6.)

FN12. Throughout, the court has considered the respondent parents' arrests not to discredit them or to establish their community reputation, but to enable valid assessment of their abilities and/or willingness to fulfill parental responsibilities and to provide the children with a safe, secure home in the context of the pending TPR allegations.   See, e.g., In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn.App. 830;  In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814..  FN12. Throughout, the court has considered the respondent parents' arrests not to discredit them or to establish their community reputation, but to enable valid assessment of their abilities and/or willingness to fulfill parental responsibilities and to provide the children with a safe, secure home in the context of the pending TPR allegations.   See, e.g., In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn.App. 830;  In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814.

FN13. Michael A. self-reported that his average weekly marijuana use was one blunt per day and that his longest period of abstinence was one year.   (Exs.12, 13.).  FN13. Michael A. self-reported that his average weekly marijuana use was one blunt per day and that his longest period of abstinence was one year.   (Exs.12, 13.)

FN14. At his January 30, 2013 CTR assessment, Michael A. presented with “4 prior outpatient substance abuse treatment episodes”;  reported being unemployed;  identified “Marijuana, Hashish, THC as the major substance problem in his life”;  and admitted that, despite all the previous treatment he had received, he had used these illegal drugs during 28 of the 30 past days.  (Ex. 9;  see Ex. 10;  Tes. Theresa G., Christina I.).  FN14. At his January 30, 2013 CTR assessment, Michael A. presented with “4 prior outpatient substance abuse treatment episodes”;  reported being unemployed;  identified “Marijuana, Hashish, THC as the major substance problem in his life”;  and admitted that, despite all the previous treatment he had received, he had used these illegal drugs during 28 of the 30 past days.  (Ex. 9;  see Ex. 10;  Tes. Theresa G., Christina I.)

FN15. DCF sometimes cancelled visits or was late to visits due to weather, state holidays, transportation, department training scheduled or staffing issues.  (Exs. 2, F;  Tes. Theresa G.).  FN15. DCF sometimes cancelled visits or was late to visits due to weather, state holidays, transportation, department training scheduled or staffing issues.  (Exs. 2, F;  Tes. Theresa G.)

FN16. See footnote 12..  FN16. See footnote 12.

FN17. On November 12, 2010, the court (Wolven, J.) adjudicated Damion neglected, with a disposition of protective supervision with Denice S. that was terminated on February 10, 2011..  FN17. On November 12, 2010, the court (Wolven, J.) adjudicated Damion neglected, with a disposition of protective supervision with Denice S. that was terminated on February 10, 2011.

FN18. In the past, Kylik expressed ambivalence about his relationship with Michael A. In Dr. Frazer's presence on May 31, 2012, “Kylik asked his father, ‘Dad when can I stay with you?   I hope today.’  “ (Ex. 6.) However, on September 7, 2012, Kylik stated that he wished to live with his aunt, and on September 14, 2012, Kylik stated that he did not wish to live with Michael A. (Ex. F.).  FN18. In the past, Kylik expressed ambivalence about his relationship with Michael A. In Dr. Frazer's presence on May 31, 2012, “Kylik asked his father, ‘Dad when can I stay with you?   I hope today.’  “ (Ex. 6.) However, on September 7, 2012, Kylik stated that he wished to live with his aunt, and on September 14, 2012, Kylik stated that he did not wish to live with Michael A. (Ex. F.)

FN19. As found in Part III, DCF also made reasonable reunification efforts for Michael A. after March 1, 2012, through referrals to:  CTR's relapse prevention program that commenced in April 2012;  the Exchange Club's parent education commencing in October 2012;  CTR's substance abuse assessment in January 2013;  and CTR's twelve-week IOP sessions commencing in March 2013..  FN19. As found in Part III, DCF also made reasonable reunification efforts for Michael A. after March 1, 2012, through referrals to:  CTR's relapse prevention program that commenced in April 2012;  the Exchange Club's parent education commencing in October 2012;  CTR's substance abuse assessment in January 2013;  and CTR's twelve-week IOP sessions commencing in March 2013.

FN20. There is no basis, in law or reason, establishing DCF's obligated to duplicate services being provided to a parent through an entity such as the criminal court.   See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56–57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998)..  FN20. There is no basis, in law or reason, establishing DCF's obligated to duplicate services being provided to a parent through an entity such as the criminal court.   See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56–57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

FN21. There is no evidence indicating that Michael A. has recently engaged in domestic violence..  FN21. There is no evidence indicating that Michael A. has recently engaged in domestic violence.

FN22. DCF reasonably attempted to accommodate the respondent-father's requests to reschedule visits with Kylik and Avion to suit his convenience or to end visits early so he could provide care for his other children;  because he overslept;  because of weather conditions;  or so he could engage in undocumented work activities.   Michael A. caused some visits to be cancelled due to his failure to cooperate with DCF's reasonable request that he call to confirm that he would visit the children before a visit as planned.  (Ex. F;  Tes. Theresa G.) This aspect of the respondent-father's conduct further indicates his inability or unwillingness to benefit from the parent education services that directed him to focus upon Kylik and Avion, not upon himself..  FN22. DCF reasonably attempted to accommodate the respondent-father's requests to reschedule visits with Kylik and Avion to suit his convenience or to end visits early so he could provide care for his other children;  because he overslept;  because of weather conditions;  or so he could engage in undocumented work activities.   Michael A. caused some visits to be cancelled due to his failure to cooperate with DCF's reasonable request that he call to confirm that he would visit the children before a visit as planned.  (Ex. F;  Tes. Theresa G.) This aspect of the respondent-father's conduct further indicates his inability or unwillingness to benefit from the parent education services that directed him to focus upon Kylik and Avion, not upon himself.

FN23. The portent of Michael A.'s persisting inability or unwillingness to benefit from his multiple referrals for drug treatment is summarized by a California court's observation:  “It is unquestionably true that the acquisition of knowledge is normally accompanied by a free election on the part of the learner to benefit by his opportunity.   This fact is evidenced by the peasant wisdom incorporated in the saying:  ‘You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.’   Unwilling students are never good learners.”  Fischler v. Municipal Court, 233 Cal.App.2d 780, 783, 43 Cal.Rptr. 882 (1965) (affirming judgment dismissing appeal by convicted driver who attended only one session of court-ordered traffic school and then abandoned attempts to complete course)..  FN23. The portent of Michael A.'s persisting inability or unwillingness to benefit from his multiple referrals for drug treatment is summarized by a California court's observation:  “It is unquestionably true that the acquisition of knowledge is normally accompanied by a free election on the part of the learner to benefit by his opportunity.   This fact is evidenced by the peasant wisdom incorporated in the saying:  ‘You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink.’   Unwilling students are never good learners.”  Fischler v. Municipal Court, 233 Cal.App.2d 780, 783, 43 Cal.Rptr. 882 (1965) (affirming judgment dismissing appeal by convicted driver who attended only one session of court-ordered traffic school and then abandoned attempts to complete course).

FN24. Marijuana is “classified medically as a hallucinogen ․” State v. Clark, 260 Conn. 813, 826, 801 A.2d 718 (2002).  “ ‘Effects of smoking [marijuana] are generally felt within a few minutes and peak in [ten] to [thirty] minutes.   They include dry mouth and throat, increased heart rate, impaired coordination and balance, delayed reaction time, and diminished short-term memory.   Moderate doses tend to induce a sense of well-being and a dreamy state of relaxation that encourages fantasies, renders some users highly suggestible, and distorts perception (making it dangerous to operate machinery, drive a car or boat, or ride a bicycle).   Stronger doses prompt more intense and often disturbing reactions including paranoia and hallucinations.’   American Council for Drug Education, ‘Basic Facts About Drugs:  Marijuana,’ (1999) at http://www.acde.org/youth/Research.htm;  see also National Institute of Drug Abuse, ‘Marijuana:  Facts for Teens,’ (November 1998) at http://www.nida.nih.gov/MarijBroch/Marijteenstxt.html (‘short-term effects of marijuana include:  problems with memory and learning;  distorted perception [sights, sounds, time, touch];  trouble with thinking and problem-solving;  loss of coordination;  and increased heart rate, anxiety’).”  (Emphasis added.)   State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 825 n.8 (finding that effects of marijuana are within common knowledge of jurors).   Accord, State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 151 n.14, 869 A.2d 192 (2005)..  FN24. Marijuana is “classified medically as a hallucinogen ․” State v. Clark, 260 Conn. 813, 826, 801 A.2d 718 (2002).  “ ‘Effects of smoking [marijuana] are generally felt within a few minutes and peak in [ten] to [thirty] minutes.   They include dry mouth and throat, increased heart rate, impaired coordination and balance, delayed reaction time, and diminished short-term memory.   Moderate doses tend to induce a sense of well-being and a dreamy state of relaxation that encourages fantasies, renders some users highly suggestible, and distorts perception (making it dangerous to operate machinery, drive a car or boat, or ride a bicycle).   Stronger doses prompt more intense and often disturbing reactions including paranoia and hallucinations.’   American Council for Drug Education, ‘Basic Facts About Drugs:  Marijuana,’ (1999) at http://www.acde.org/youth/Research.htm;  see also National Institute of Drug Abuse, ‘Marijuana:  Facts for Teens,’ (November 1998) at http://www.nida.nih.gov/MarijBroch/Marijteenstxt.html (‘short-term effects of marijuana include:  problems with memory and learning;  distorted perception [sights, sounds, time, touch];  trouble with thinking and problem-solving;  loss of coordination;  and increased heart rate, anxiety’).”  (Emphasis added.)   State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 825 n.8 (finding that effects of marijuana are within common knowledge of jurors).   Accord, State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 151 n.14, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).

FN25. General Statutes 21a–279a establishes fines and self-financed drug education for those who possess “․ less than one-half ounce of a cannabis-type substance ․” in this state.  General Statutes 21a–279(c) provides fines and incarceration for those who possess “․ one-half ounce or more but less than four ounces of a cannabis type substance ․” Nonetheless, as Dr. Frazer reported, “[Michael A.] does not view smoking marijuana as a hindrance to his life but believes that society has negatively stigmatized marijuana and pointed out that ‘they legalized it in Connecticut.’   He reported that it is not detrimental to his parenting skills, though he does not smoke in front of his children or want them exposed to marijuana.   He added that he experiences no difficulty parenting while high and is minimally concerned about the risks of being arrested or incarcerated on possession charges since he was only ‘a casual smoker.’   “ (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 6.).  FN25. General Statutes 21a–279a establishes fines and self-financed drug education for those who possess “․ less than one-half ounce of a cannabis-type substance ․” in this state.  General Statutes 21a–279(c) provides fines and incarceration for those who possess “․ one-half ounce or more but less than four ounces of a cannabis type substance ․” Nonetheless, as Dr. Frazer reported, “[Michael A.] does not view smoking marijuana as a hindrance to his life but believes that society has negatively stigmatized marijuana and pointed out that ‘they legalized it in Connecticut.’   He reported that it is not detrimental to his parenting skills, though he does not smoke in front of his children or want them exposed to marijuana.   He added that he experiences no difficulty parenting while high and is minimally concerned about the risks of being arrested or incarcerated on possession charges since he was only ‘a casual smoker.’   “ (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 6.)

FN26. In concluding that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts, the court acknowledges the circumstances described in footnote 15..  FN26. In concluding that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts, the court acknowledges the circumstances described in footnote 15.

FN27. As found in Part III, DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Denise S. after the TPR petition was filed through its referral to CWF for counseling and support.  (Ex. 2.).  FN27. As found in Part III, DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Denise S. after the TPR petition was filed through its referral to CWF for counseling and support.  (Ex. 2.)

FN28. Although the children were better behaved at visits after Kylik joined Avion at Deirdre A.'s home in June 2012, the change in their conduct did not result from the respondent-mother's parenting skills..  FN28. Although the children were better behaved at visits after Kylik joined Avion at Deirdre A.'s home in June 2012, the change in their conduct did not result from the respondent-mother's parenting skills.

FN29. After learning of Denice S.'s unilateral decision to leave Project Courage, Dr. Frazer concluded that she had not yet learned how the “trauma in her background, active drug use of marijuana and alcohol, domestic violence victimization, and psychosocial instability” would have to be conscientiously managed to avoid negatively affecting the boys.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.).  FN29. After learning of Denice S.'s unilateral decision to leave Project Courage, Dr. Frazer concluded that she had not yet learned how the “trauma in her background, active drug use of marijuana and alcohol, domestic violence victimization, and psychosocial instability” would have to be conscientiously managed to avoid negatively affecting the boys.  (Ex. 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

FN30. In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the respondent-father's rehabilitative status as it relates to Kylik and Avion;  considered the respondent-father's parenting history and the evidence in its entirety;  acknowledged the implications of the children's particular needs;  and remained aware that Michael A.'s own childhood was ridden with hardship and trauma..  FN30. In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the respondent-father's rehabilitative status as it relates to Kylik and Avion;  considered the respondent-father's parenting history and the evidence in its entirety;  acknowledged the implications of the children's particular needs;  and remained aware that Michael A.'s own childhood was ridden with hardship and trauma.

FN31. At his May 2012 evaluation, Dr. Frazer ominously found that Michael A.'s “progress in treatment interventions was mixed” and “[a]lthough he passed through these services, it was not with a degree of motivation and commitment.”  (Ex. 6.).  FN31. At his May 2012 evaluation, Dr. Frazer ominously found that Michael A.'s “progress in treatment interventions was mixed” and “[a]lthough he passed through these services, it was not with a degree of motivation and commitment.”  (Ex. 6.)

FN32. See footnotes 24 and 25..  FN32. See footnotes 24 and 25.

FN33. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges Michael A.'s compliance with some of the final steps including:  cooperation with Dr. Frazer's psychological evaluation;  signing releases;  avoiding further arrests and domestic violence;  and attending some of the proffered treatment programs.  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   However, the court also notes that Michael A.'s failure to attend Dr. Schiappa's psychological evaluation violated the January 2011 specific steps.  (Exs. 1, 2, 19, 20;  Tes. Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer, Jill K., Theresa T.).  FN33. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges Michael A.'s compliance with some of the final steps including:  cooperation with Dr. Frazer's psychological evaluation;  signing releases;  avoiding further arrests and domestic violence;  and attending some of the proffered treatment programs.  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   However, the court also notes that Michael A.'s failure to attend Dr. Schiappa's psychological evaluation violated the January 2011 specific steps.  (Exs. 1, 2, 19, 20;  Tes. Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer, Jill K., Theresa T.)

FN34. The court does not credit Michael A.'s claim that FSW found no cause for involving him in individual therapy.  (Exs. 1, 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.).  FN34. The court does not credit Michael A.'s claim that FSW found no cause for involving him in individual therapy.  (Exs. 1, 6;  Tes. Dr. Frazer.)

FN35. See footnote 31..  FN35. See footnote 31.

FN36. “ ‘Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation ․ [Even] if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issues of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children.’  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.) ln re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450.”   In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 760, 78 A.3d 295 (2013)..  FN36. “ ‘Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation ․ [Even] if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issues of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children.’  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.) ln re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450.”   In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 760, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).

FN37. In reaching this conclusion, the court has:  remained respectful of the challenges the respondent-mother faced during her own childhood;  analyzed Denice S.'s rehabilitative status as it relates to Kylik and Avion;  considered her parenting history and the children's need for permanency;  and acknowledged that she maintains custody of Damion..  FN37. In reaching this conclusion, the court has:  remained respectful of the challenges the respondent-mother faced during her own childhood;  analyzed Denice S.'s rehabilitative status as it relates to Kylik and Avion;  considered her parenting history and the children's need for permanency;  and acknowledged that she maintains custody of Damion.

FN38. As found in Part IV. B., Denice was unable or unwilling to achieve personal stability with regard to her underlying mental health and parenting issues despite the drug and alcohol treatment she attended in 2009;  despite the substance abuse and mental health treatment, including psychiatric evaluation with medication management, individual counseling and anger control classes available to her through SCHC in 2010 and 2011;  despite RCF's wrap-around parenting education and support services, RMS's case management and the multi-focal Project Courage program in 2011;  and despite services from Project Courage, the Exchange Club and CWF in 2012–2013.  (Exs. 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G., Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer.).  FN38. As found in Part IV. B., Denice was unable or unwilling to achieve personal stability with regard to her underlying mental health and parenting issues despite the drug and alcohol treatment she attended in 2009;  despite the substance abuse and mental health treatment, including psychiatric evaluation with medication management, individual counseling and anger control classes available to her through SCHC in 2010 and 2011;  despite RCF's wrap-around parenting education and support services, RMS's case management and the multi-focal Project Courage program in 2011;  and despite services from Project Courage, the Exchange Club and CWF in 2012–2013.  (Exs. 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16;  Tes. Jill K., Theresa G., Dr. Schiappa, Dr. Frazer.)

FN39. Denice S. partially complied with the steps by:  keeping some appointments set by DCF;  cooperating with psychological evaluations;  signing releases;  cooperating with probation and avoiding further arrests;  keeping the department aware of her location;  attending some treatment and gaining ostensible control over her substance abuse and violence issues.  (Exs. 1, 2;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K.) See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   However, on March 30, 2011, while RCF services were being directly provided to her, Denice S. engaged in and exposed the children to her disruptive conduct as found in Part III. B. This behavior resulted in Denice S.'s arrest, and violated the January 17, 2011 OTC steps.  (Exs. 18, AA;  Tes. Jill K., Frances M.).  FN39. Denice S. partially complied with the steps by:  keeping some appointments set by DCF;  cooperating with psychological evaluations;  signing releases;  cooperating with probation and avoiding further arrests;  keeping the department aware of her location;  attending some treatment and gaining ostensible control over her substance abuse and violence issues.  (Exs. 1, 2;  Tes. Theresa G., Jill K.) See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   However, on March 30, 2011, while RCF services were being directly provided to her, Denice S. engaged in and exposed the children to her disruptive conduct as found in Part III. B. This behavior resulted in Denice S.'s arrest, and violated the January 17, 2011 OTC steps.  (Exs. 18, AA;  Tes. Jill K., Frances M.)

FN40. “ ‘After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under ․ § 17a–112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest.   That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged.   Although a judge is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is intensely human.   It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’  In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).”  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 210 n.9..  FN40. “ ‘After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under ․ § 17a–112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest.   That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged.   Although a judge is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is intensely human.   It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’  In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).”  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 210 n.9.

FN41. Given the facts of this case, no less restrictive alternative than TPR is viable for either Kylik or Avion.   See, e.g., In re Brayden E.-H., 309 Conn. 642, 645, 72 A.3d 1083 (2013)..  FN41. Given the facts of this case, no less restrictive alternative than TPR is viable for either Kylik or Avion.   See, e.g., In re Brayden E.-H., 309 Conn. 642, 645, 72 A.3d 1083 (2013).

FN42. In determining that TPR will serve the children's best interests, the court is mindful that Michael A. has “an estranged relationship with [the] sisters” whom DCF has selected to serve as the children's foster parents.  (Ex. 6.) The lack of a relationship between Michael A. and his sisters does not impact the court's decision that TPR is in Kylik's and Avion's best interests;  “a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable parent.”  In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280.   See also In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009)..  FN42. In determining that TPR will serve the children's best interests, the court is mindful that Michael A. has “an estranged relationship with [the] sisters” whom DCF has selected to serve as the children's foster parents.  (Ex. 6.) The lack of a relationship between Michael A. and his sisters does not impact the court's decision that TPR is in Kylik's and Avion's best interests;  “a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable parent.”  In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280.   See also In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009).

Rubinow, Nicola E., J.