Rudolph Fiorillo v. City of Hartford (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

On October 16, 2013, this court heard evidence on the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for contempt, which claimed that the defendant City of Hartford (City) had violated provisions of a settlement agreement and release (Agreement) entered into by the plaintiff and the City on June 15, 2003.   Said Agreement became an order and judgment of the court on July 15, 2003, thereby resolving an action brought by the plaintiff and other retired City firefighters claiming a breach of contract with respect to retirement benefits.

Post-hearing briefs and replies were filed by both parties, the last having been filed on December 23, 2013.

The plaintiff claims that upon reaching retirement age, he has been required to pay Medicare Part B premiums for which he has not been reimbursed by the City, in violation of the terms of the Agreement.   Plaintiff testified that it was and is his understanding that under the terms of the Agreement, he is entitled at age sixty-five to receive all of his medical insurance benefits at no cost to him, including Medicare Part B premiums.   The City agrees that that the Stipulation provides that at age sixty-five the plaintiff is entitled to receive his entire health insurance package at no cost to the plaintiff, but argues that said entire health insurance package does not include the cost of Medicare Part B premiums.

“A stipulated judgment has been defined by our Supreme Court as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction ․ The essence of the judgment is that the parties to the litigation have voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute at rest and that, upon this agreement, the court has entered judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn.App. 178, 186 (2011).

When construing a contract, “the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ․ the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract ․ Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.   A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ․ Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 188–89, 819 A.2d 765 (2003).

“Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense ․ [A]nalysis of a judgment of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry.   First, [the court] must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt ․ This is a legal inquiry ․ Second, if ․ the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous ․ the trial court [exercises] its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a ․ determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 692–94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).

“When the conduct underlying the alleged contempt does not occur in the presence of the court, a contempt finding must be established by sufficient proof that is premised upon competent evidence presented to the trial court in accordance with the rules of procedure as in ordinary cases.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bryant v. Bryant, 228 Conn. 630, 637, 637 A.2d 1111 (1994).

“Unsworn representations of counsel are not evidence ․ A judgment of contempt cannot be based on representations of counsel in a motion, but must be supported by evidence produced in court at a proper proceeding ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dickinson v. Dickinson, 143 Conn.App. 184, 189–90, 68 A.3d 182 (2013).

Both parties point, inter alia, to the following language in the Agreement in support of their positions.

Paragraph two of the Agreement provides in pertinent part:  “The Plaintiff's current medical benefits will be replaced with the Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield Century Preferred with Point of Service RX Rider (the rider for a prescription drug card) as presently in place for Group Policy Number 000675–129 and the Full Service Dental Plan, Number 000671–126, including Riders A, B, C, D, and E. Said benefits, shall hereinafter be referred to as the “entire health insurance package” and shall be deemed to be the entire health insurance package in effect at the Plaintiff's date of retirement.”

Paragraph three of the Agreement provides in pertinent part:  “For a Plaintiff ․ who is age 55 or older at the time of retirement, or upon reaching age 55 after retirement, the City shall provide, at no cost to the Plaintiff, the entire health insurance package in effect at his/her date of retirement.   At age 65, the City shall provide, at no cost to the Plaintiff, the same entire health insurance package pursuant to subsections A & B below.”

Said subsections A and B provide

(A) In the event the Plaintiff, his/her spouse, or a surviving spouse is eligible for Medicare Plans A and B, each of them will continue to receive the entire health insurance package, in a “carve out.”   There will be a coordination of benefits between it and Medicare (a medicare “carve out”).

(B) In the event the Plaintiff, his/her spouse, or a surviving spouse is not eligible for Medicare Plans, each of them will continue to receive the entire health insurance package.

After considering the evidence, the court is simply unable to find that the terms of the Agreement clearly and unambiguously obligate the City to pay for the plaintiff's Medicare Part B premiums.   Rather, the Agreement provides that upon the plaintiff's reaching the age of sixty-five, the City was obligated to provide the plaintiff, at no cost to him, with the same “entire health insurance package” that he was already receiving, and that there would be a coordination of benefits between the entire health insurance package and Medicare.   The referenced “entire insurance package” to be provided at no cost to the plaintiff is defined in paragraph two as consisting of “Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield Century Preferred with Point of Service RX Rider (the rider for a prescription drug card) as presently in place for Group Policy Number 000675–129 and the Full Service Dental Plan, Number 000671–126, including Riders A, B, C, D, and E,” and said definition does not include any reference to Medicare.

As the plaintiff has not met his burden to prove that there was a court order that would support a judgment of contempt, consideration of the second level of inquiry as to whether a wilful violation occurred is unnecessary.   See In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 692–94.

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for contempt is denied.   It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

Gleeson, J.

Gleeson, Marcia J., J.