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Monique Mooney v. Michael Mooney
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed an action to dissolve her marriage on May 10, 2012 with a return date of May 22, 2012. Counsel appeared on behalf of defendant and filed an Answer and Cross Complaint on May 17, 2012. The matter proceeded to trial on plaintiff's complaint on three separate days in November 2013: the 5th, 6th and 19th.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court makes all its findings by a preponderance of the evidence, having assessed the credibility of all witnesses. The court considered the exhibits, assigning all due weight. The court took into account the arguments and proposed orders of trial counsel as well as their post-trial stipulation dated February 26, 2014. The court took judicial notice of the entire court file and ordered the parties' Financial Affidavits unsealed for the court's review.
From the credible, sworn testimony the court finds that the allegations of the complaint have been satisfactorily proven and are found to be true. The court has jurisdiction over this matter, and all statutory stays have expired. Both parties lived continuously in Connecticut at least 12 months prior to the filing of the Complaint. The parties married on November 4, 1995. They have three children: Jerry, their adopted son, born October 12, 1992; Evan, born February 9, 2001 and Jillian, born March 25, 2003. Defendant is not now pregnant. No one in the family has or is receiving state aid or welfare. Based on the evidence, there is no realistic hope that the parties will reconcile. The court concludes that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, and it is dissolved. The parties are declared to be single and unmarried.
The parties submitted a post-trial stipulation on February 26, 2014 providing that their former home would be sold pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 15, 2014 and that the anticipated closing date was March 5, 2014. They expect to realize net proceeds of $26,666.71 from the sale. They also expect a refund of $3,053.54 from their mortgage company. The court has reviewed the stipulation in its entirety and finds it to be voluntarily entered into, fair, reasonable and equitable. Its provisions pertaining to the children are found to be in their best interests. The stipulation is made the order of the court.
The stipulation further provides that the children would attend school in Griswold 1 and that plaintiff will have primary residence of the children only for the purpose of determining their school district. They still disagree on an access schedule. Plaintiff proposes that the children spend all school nights with him in Griswold to be close to their new school. Defendant has not amended her proposed orders in light of the post-trial developments.
Plaintiff Wife
Plaintiff (“wife” or “mother”) is 43 years old, and she enjoys good physical health. She testified that she has never been diagnosed with mental health issues during the time of the marriage. She takes Prozac as prescribed as an anti-depressant and mood stabilizer. Defendant countered that his wife suffered from depression, anxiety and panic disorder prior to the marriage. He claims she “frequently” spoke of suicide, and she received counselling and medication. After Evan's birth, he asserts that she withdrew and isolated herself; that she would lock herself in the bedroom and cry because she found it difficult to bond with her children. The court finds that defendant was well aware of plaintiff's ongoing mental health issues prior to the marriage.
Plaintiff earned her BA in Education from UConn and her Masters' degree from Assumption College. She began her career as a social worker, and for nearly eight years prior to the marriage, she earned $25,000–$30,000 a year through the mid–1990s. She made $50,000 per year as a DCF social worker until 2003. She took six months off around the time of Evan's birth, returned to DCF part-time and eventually resumed a full schedule until Jillian was born.
She then left full-time work to care for the children. However, she continued her social work part-time for about two years with United Community Services and the Lighthouse organization. She founded Nutmeg Family Services (“Nutmeg”) in 2005–2006. This business contracted with the State of Connecticut to provide parenting education, child and adolescent mentoring and supervised visitation. This business largely ended early in 2013. She took a position with North American Family Institute at $46,000 a year to gain needed health benefits. She makes an additional $300 a week by maintaining a few open files for Nutmeg, but the court finds that this business now has no significant value.
Plaintiff reconnected with a former friend, Michael Shannon, on Facebook in January 2012. They became more than friends about a year later, and she visited him in Alabama for several days in mid-April 2013. He moved in with her after this visit, and the couple is now together in Connecticut.
Defendant Husband
Defendant is 45 years old. He describes his health as “perfect.” He graduated from UConn in 1991 with a BS in Psychology. At the time of the marriage and for ten months thereafter, he worked for the Warwick (RI) Country Club. He then joined Putnam (CT) Country Club as superintendent for the care and maintenance of their golf course. He grossed between $700 and $800 a week. After 18 months he took a similar position with Pequot Golf Course (“Pequot”) in Stonington at $1,000 weekly plus health benefits and stayed with them for eight years. During his years at Pequot he began a hydro-seeding business. In 2002 he purchased a used 1994 International Truck for $21,250 and a new Finn hydro-seeder and trailer for around $30,000. Plaintiff also claims he purchased a Ford F250 pickup truck and other equipment with “expensive” loans. On his current Financial Affidavit, defendant values this equipment for which he paid well over $50,000 at $15,000. He testified about other lesser equipment his business owns. He claims the value of the ongoing business is “unknown.” He has $2,000 in an account for the business.
Defendant worked for Nutmeg Family Services from 2006 to 2012 performing mentoring services. His flexible hours allowed him to continue his hydro-seeding work. Defendant has a Commercial Driver's License, and he began driving delivery trucks after he left Nutmeg. He is now employed by Cryogenic Transportation, Inc. He earns a weekly net of about $600. See, Defendant's Exhibit G. He has additional earnings from his ongoing hydro-seeding business.
Defendant moved out of the marital premises in May 2012 and into the home of his friend, Pamela Patelano, in Rhode Island. He, Pamela and her three children have since relocated to a four-bedroom house in Griswold. The adults now share a bedroom, and there is sufficient room for the entire blended family.
Jerry
Jerry is the parties' adopted son. He is currently over 21 years old. Defendant originally mentored the young man as part of his work for Nutmeg. Defendant described him as “troubled,” “abused” and with low self-esteem. Jerry struggled in school. The parties took him into their home as a DCF foster child, but plaintiff felt very strongly about making parental decisions without DCF's input. Defendant felt less strongly, but he acquiesced to an adoption in April 2008 when Jerry was about 15 years old.
Defendant claimed plaintiff favored Jerry over the other children and spoiled him with material possessions like expensive sneakers. He asserts that Evan and Jillian noticed and resented their mother's attention and affection towards Jerry. Defendant claims that plaintiff did not instill respect or appreciation in Jerry; that she did not adequately discipline him and undercut defendant's attempts to do so. Plaintiff testified that she only tried to make up for the boy's poor upbringing prior to their involvement. She felt that defendant became jealous of her attention to Jerry, and he treated the boy differently from the other children as a result. Jerry eventually left the household. He lives on his own. He is not in school and neither party has proposed any orders pertaining to this young man.
The court finds that the parties' clashes over Jerry were the first indications of their vastly different, irreconcilable parenting styles. This insight is instructive as applied to the other children.
Jillian and Evan
Jillian is a strong-willed fifth grader who is articulate, but not talkative. She loves clothes shopping, board games and her iPod. She is compassionate and doing well in school. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) attributes on any problems she has as a reaction to her parents' conflict.
Evan is an intelligent, articulate 13–year–old who loves art. He has a “big heart” and loves to “help people.” He is “sensitive” and has been bullied at school. He has a diagnosis on the autism spectrum. He reacts badly to conflict and disorder. He once fashioned a noose and placed it in plain view. He hid in the woods to avoid his mother. He tied a knife to a stick and chopped at a tree. He swears at Jillian and his mother when stressed. He once pushed his sister down some stairs.
Pamela Patelano offered credible testimony about Evan that matches observations of the GAL. The boy had difficulty adjusting to his parents' conflict and separate households at first. He was volatile and angered easily. He would lash out physically at others, especially his sister. He would speak about harming himself. However, with set rules, obligations, consequences and consistent medication he has become more stable, less impulsive and without suicidal thoughts.
The court highly credits the thorough investigation and thoughtful testimony of the GAL. The court has reviewed her hours, fees and costs in this contentious case and finds them to be reasonable.
The GAL reports that all of the many professionals involved with this family—counselors, teachers and police officers—agree that the parents place their children in the middle of chaos and conflict. Evan's counselor, Richard Drena, told her that at a joint counseling session he instructed the parties to stop verbally fighting in front of Evan. They were able to control their behavior for only ten minutes.
Both parents have involved the children in their conflict. Evan told the GAL that his mother's boyfriend is an “alcoholic” and that “Dad wants me to tell you this.” Jillian “knows” that her father doesn't like mother's boyfriend, “so she can't either.” Mother kept her travel plans to Alabama a secret instead of arranging parental responsibility with defendant. She discussed their father's “leaving the marriage” with the children leading to Jillian telling her father that she “hated him” because he “stole all their money and abandoned them.” Plaintiff disconnected the house phone interrupting father's contact with the children. She refers to defendant as “Peter” in front of Evan and Jillian to disguise her derogation of their father, but these intelligent children are not fooled by such a transparent ruse.
These parents could not agree on Evan's counselor, prescriber, medications or their levels. They battle over school recommendations like his participation in the Extended Day Treatment program at school or others at the Joshua Center. They mistake their personal conflict and parental power struggle as objective advocacy for the children. They fail to realize that Jillian—and especially Evan—suffer when they are exposed to this obvious hatred and irreconcilable conflict.
The court finds that the parental responsibility plan suggested by the GAL essentially calls for “parallel parenting.” It provides workable mechanisms for resolving conflict while keeping the parties apart as much as possible.
The court finds that in the latter stages of their marriage, the parties treated each other with contempt, disdain and disrespect. That they did so in front of their children is shameful. They are equally at fault for the breakdown of their marriage. The court's orders are an attempt to reflect their roughly equal contribution to the marriage, both monetary and non-monetary. Rolla v. Rolla, 48 Conn.App. 732 (1998). Despite their shortcomings, the court finds that these parents truly love their children and had this family remained intact, it is more likely than not that each parent would have provided post-secondary educational support to their children.
Real and Personal Property
The Strip Mall
Plaintiff began Nutmeg Family Services in 2006. The business appears to have thrived early on because plaintiff decided to expand in 2007. She and defendant planned to build a small strip mall with four rental units on Route 138 in Griswold. The largest would house Nutmeg, and the combined rent from all tenants would pay their mortgage obligations. They formed Jemm Property Management (JPM) to hold the deed and signed personal guarantees for a mortgage with Eastern Federal Savings. They also tapped their home's equity for this purpose. Defendant testified that he borrowed an additional $20,000 cash from his father, Bob Mooney. This loan was not documented. Bob Mooney testified, but he did not confirm that the $20,000 was actually used for construction of the strip mall. Defendant testified that plaintiff was not involved in any aspect of the mall's construction. Bob Mooney also testified that he was never paid for professional carpentry services he performed putting up the building during 2008. The court finds that Mr. Mooney gifted these monies, his labor and expertise to his son.
The plan worked for a while. However, by January 2012 tenant turnover, broken leases and unpaid rent put JPM behind in its obligations. A few months later the bank took back the property by means of a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. This action avoided a deficiency judgment, but the investment was totally lost. The court concludes that the parties who once enjoyed any benefit from this project must now also equitably share in the loss.
Defendant and Nutmeg Family Services
Plaintiff asked defendant to help at Nutmeg when she began planning the business in late 2005. He agreed and took charge of Nutmeg's mentoring program in January 2006. He worked with as many as 10 to 18 children in the DCF system. He designed activities for them to develop self-esteem, life-skills and interpersonal cooperation. He provided transportation and oversight for children going to supervised visitation. In 2010 he took over the company billing. The parties contradict each other's assertions about defendant's hours for Nutmeg. Plaintiff says he worked part-time, anywhere from 12 to 20 hours a week. She asserts that he did not receive a regular paycheck because Nutmeg provided him a vehicle 2 and paid all his credit cards, medical insurance and gas both for his personal use and for his hydro-seeding business. Plaintiff claims and the court credits that defendant always segregated his seeding earnings and used the income to pay for his business equipment and whatever else he chose. She further credibly claims that at least some of the “expensive loans” as defendant characterized them were actually credit card charges paid through Nutmeg. In effect, defendant's hydro seeding business equipment was part of his compensation for his work with Nutmeg.
Defendant claims that some weeks he worked upwards of 100 hours a week for Nutmeg. The parties agree that defendant did not receive a paycheck for his work with Nutmeg for years until he filed a complaint with the state's Labor Department around the same time that plaintiff commenced the divorce.
The court finds plaintiff's testimony more credible in this regard. Defendant was clearly satisfied for years that his contribution to Nutmeg benefitted him, although perhaps indirectly, until the marriage fractured entirely. Only then did he complain to the State Department of Labor. His initial claim for unpaid wages at the onset of the divorce was for between $175,000.00 and $250,000.00. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 13. He eventually recovered an award of $14,000.00 that currently remains unpaid. The court finds that defendant's ongoing business and its equipment is marital property and that plaintiff's share of these assets coupled with an equalization of the parties' retirement assets offsets defendant's Department of Labor award.
Child Support
Based on the parties' sworn Financial Affidavits and the Child Support Guidelines, the court finds:
if plaintiff is the custodial parent of the children, the presumptive amount of child support flowing to her from defendant is $173.05. The split of unreimbursed health-related expenses and work-related daycare expenses is presumptively 65% to plaintiff and 35% to defendant;
if defendant is the custodial parent of the children, the presumptive amount of child support flowing to him from plaintiff is $208.95. The split of unreimbursed health-related expenses and work-related daycare expenses is presumptively 42% to plaintiff and 58% to defendant.
The court further finds that it would be inappropriate and inequitable to apply the Guidelines first because of the court's coordination of total family support, its division of assets and liabilities, the non-provision of alimony and tax planning. Regs., State Agencies, 46b–215a–3(b)(5). Second, the court intends to adopt a shared parenting plan and specifically finds that this plan requires each parent to maintain a household capable of receiving and adequately providing for the children. There will be sufficient funds for each household to do so after the deviation. Id., 46b–215a–3(b)(6)(A).
Marital Assets
Plaintiff has a State of Connecticut ING retirement account currently valued at $4,732 on her Financial Affidavit. Defendant's Roth IRA is worth $7,600. There is also a “529” plan for the benefit of one or both children. The court finds that to equalize these accounts requires a transfer of $1,434 to plaintiff from defendant. There is other marital personal property that the parties have not yet divided.
Reconciliation of Obligations Due from Prejudgment Motions and Orders
The parties entered into a Stipulation on September 20, 2012 (# 134) that the court adopted as an order. In it, defendant agreed he owed plaintiff $965.00 for back child support. They also agreed to share all child-related expenses equally. The court finds that plaintiff paid $1,032.69 for the children's health care. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. She paid $900.00 for their dental care. Defendant owes one-half of each: $516.35 and $450.00, respectively.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 shows she paid $368.00 for what she termed children's “activities.” The court closely reviewed this evidence. As defendant asserted, the court finds that most of these expenses were for Evan's school lunch program and a haircut. While these are not children's “activities,” they are child-related expenses. Defendant owes plaintiff $184.00 for them.
She expended $2,697.50 on work-related day care for the children. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. He is obligated to pay half: $1,348.75.
The sum of these amounts defendant owes plaintiff is $3,464.10.
The parties stipulated on November 5, 2012 that they would liquidate two stock funds and apply the proceeds to their delinquent home equity loan. Plaintiff fulfilled her court-ordered obligation by paying $2,032.83 toward the HELOC. See, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6 and 7. Defendant did not follow the court order. Instead, he applied $2,000.00 to the parties' mortgage on the business premises and about $800.00 to the HELOC. The court finds that had he paid the home equity loan as ordered, there would have been less to pay off at the time of the sale of the marital premises. The court determines the loss to plaintiff to be $1,000.00.
Plaintiff sold marital property during the pendency of the divorce contrary to the court's Automatic Orders: a refrigerator, a television and a generator for a total of $485.00. The court finds that she owes defendant $242.50 as his share of these items. Defendant has paid the children's health insurance premiums, $75 per week, from November 19, 2013 to at least the date of their post-trial Stipulation, February 27, 2014. The court finds that plaintiff should bear half this expense. Through February 27, 2014, her one-half share is $525.00.
Plaintiff owes defendant a total of $767.50.3 Defendant owes plaintiff $4,464.10. Netting these amounts, defendant owes plaintiff $3,696.60.
Plaintiff paid $4,000.00 toward the 2010 federal tax bill and seeks an order that defendant pay that same amount. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 indicates that the parties owe federal income taxes of nearly $18,500.00 for tax year 2011. There are also taxes owed to the state and federal government for 2012. The grand total owed is about $23,000.00. Defendant claims that plaintiff should be fully responsible for these tax deficiencies because they were generated by income from her business.
Defendant worked for his wife's business for years without taking a formal paycheck. The court finds that he benefitted from Nutmeg during the time that these tax bills accrued by having a company vehicle to drive, getting gas, expenses and equipment for himself and his separate business paid by Nutmeg and having at least indirect enjoyment of his wife's earnings. He cannot accept these benefits and then shift the full responsibility for bills and costs to plaintiff. The court has taken into account that her earnings were higher than his and finds that equity requires the parties to share the current remaining tax obligation to the state and federal governments equally without adjustment for past payments by either party.
ORDERS
In making its orders, the court has considered all applicable statutes, particularly C.G.S. §§ 46b–56, 62, 81, 82 and 84. The court especially applied the guiding criteria of 46b–81, 82 and 84.
1. Child Custody and Access
The parties shall share joint legal custody of the children except that if they cannot agree after reasonable discussion, plaintiff shall have final decision-making authority for medical, mental health and educational issues.
The parties shall share parental responsibility for the children as they may reasonably agree, but if they cannot agree then as follows:
During the school year: with plaintiff from Friday at school dismissal until Monday morning's return to school; each Wednesday from school dismissal to 7:30 p.m. for a dinner visit in the Town of Griswold; with defendant at all other times.
During the summer school vacation: with defendant from Friday at 5:30 p.m. to Monday at 9:30 a.m.; each Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; defendant's vacation time (see below); with plaintiff at all other times.
A) The court intends for as many exchanges of the children as possible to take place at their respective schools. The party beginning their time of parental responsibility shall pick them up and drop them off at school whenever possible. When school is not in session, the party beginning their time of parental responsibility shall pick up the children at a convenient location as agreed by the parties in writing.
B) “Vacation” and “Holiday” schedules supersede the foregoing “regular” schedule if there is a conflict. The regular schedule shall begin again at the end of any holiday or vacation.
1) Holidays
a) CHRISTMAS: The parties shall alternate Christmas such that in odd-numbered years defendant shall have the children from December 24th at noon overnight until December 25th at noon and the plaintiff shall have the children from December 25th at noon overnight until December 26th at noon. In even-numbered years this schedule shall be reversed.
b) THANKSGIVING: Defendant shall have the child for Thanksgiving from after school on Wednesday through Friday at 7:30 p.m. in odd-numbered years, and plaintiff in even-numbered years.
c) MOTHER'S DAY: Plaintiff shall have the child from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on Mother's Day.
d) FATHER'S DAY: Defendant shall have the child from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on Father's Day.
e) MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND and LABOR DAY WEEKEND: The parties shall alternate these weekends in turn. Memorial Day and Labor Day shall be defined as the Friday prior to the holiday at 3:00 p.m. overnight until Monday at 7:30 p.m.
f) FOURTH OF JULY and NEW YEAR'S EVE: Defendant shall have the children Fourth of July and New Year's Eve in even-numbered years; plaintiff in odd-numbered years.
g) Other HOLIDAYS: Any holidays not previously covered by these orders shall be alternated between the parties. If they cannot agree, then plaintiff shall have the children in the first year.
h) BIRTHDAYS: Defendant shall have the children on her birthday from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m., and plaintiff shall have the children from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on his birthday.
2) Vacation
Both parties shall be entitled to two non-consecutive weeks each year for vacation with the children. This includes the school year and summer recess. They must agree to these vacations and any additional vacation time in writing. Each party shall notify the other party 45 days in advance of the dates sought for vacation. Should either parent plan to travel out of the country with the children, the other parent shall provide the appropriate paperwork to allow that to happen. If the parties cannot agree, then plaintiff's choices prevail in even-numbered years; defendant's in odd.4
2. General Orders
A) Both parties shall subscribe to Our Family Wizard.com (OFW) at their own expense. The parties shall communicate solely through OFW. They shall monitor and update the calendar at least once every three days and respond promptly to the other. The GAL shall have full access to the OFW accounts, but the children shall have no such access.
B) Both parents shall keep the other apprised of their address and contact information at all times.
C) Each parent shall be entitled to reasonable telephone access with the minor children when they are in the care of the other parent.
D) Neither party shall denigrate the other in any manner in the presence of the children nor allow third parties to do so.
E) Neither party shall remove the children from the State of Connecticut for a continuous period of more than 72 hours unless they have provided the other party with an itinerary, including the address and phone number of any place the children will stay overnight.
F) Relocation. Should either party relocate within 25 miles of their current residence, they shall give to the other 60 days prior written notice of their intention to do so. Should either party relocate more than 25 miles from their current residence they shall give 120 days prior written notice of their intention to do so. They shall not alter this Parenting Plan absent further order of the court.
3. Decisions on Routine Issues
Day-to-day decisions of a routine nature, including, but not limited to bedtime, homework, health care, and day-to-day school, religious, social, athletic activities customary for the age and maturity of the minor children, shall be made by the parent having parental responsibility. Each shall immediately notify the other of any emergency involving either or both children.
4. School, Medical and Activity Information
Each parent shall be entitled to complete detailed information from any teacher, doctor, dentist, therapist, medical provider or school and shall be entitled to be furnished with copies of all reports or records with respect to the children. The parties shall each use best efforts to insure that all information pertaining to the children's school activities, educational progress, physical and emotional health, sports activities, and all other extracurricular activities are provided to both parents. Further, the parties shall use best efforts to insure each party receives all information regarding opportunities for the child to become involved in school, sports and other activities.
5. Child Support and Provisions Concerning the Children
Neither party shall pay child support to the other. Each party shall be solely responsible to pay for child care required during their time of parental responsibility. The parties shall share the costs and fees of the children's extra-curricular activities equally up to an annual maximum of $750.00 per child. The parties shall agree in writing to any new such activities before incurring any expense. Such agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Plaintiff shall claim Jillian and defendant shall claim Evan as dependency exemptions for state and federal income tax purposes. If only one child is available to claim, then plaintiff shall do so in even-numbered years; defendant in odd. The court retains jurisdiction over the minor children's post-secondary education costs per the applicable state statute.
6. Health Insurance
Plaintiff shall provide health insurance for the minor children so long as it is available to her through her employer or other reasonable sources at reasonable cost to her. The parties shall share any unreimbursed health-related expenses for the children equally. The provisions of C.G.S. § 46b–83(e) shall apply. Any such coverage defendant currently has in place may be designated as “secondary” or ended in his discretion.
Each party shall be solely responsible for the provision and cost of their own health insurance.
7. Life Insurance for Children's Benefit
Both parties shall maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $150,000.00, naming each other as irrevocable beneficiary for the benefit of the children. These policies shall remain unencumbered and stay in effect at least until the parties' youngest child reaches age 23. Each party shall provide proof of his/her compliance with this provision to the other by January 1st each year. Each shall execute all necessary authorizations and releases to the applicable life insurance agent and/or company so that the other shall be notified of any changes in the amount of the death benefit or beneficiary or in the event of default or notice of cancelation. In the event that one is notified of default or cancellation, that party may cure any defect by making payment and the other shall immediately reimburse him/her for any such payments.
8. Alimony
Neither party shall pay alimony to the other.
9. Life Insurance
The defendant shall retain his two life insurance policies free of any claim of right, title or interest by the plaintiff.
10. Automobiles
Each party shall retain his or her respective vehicles and be solely responsible for any debts associated with them and indemnify and hold the other harmless.
11. Personal Property
Plaintiff's share of defendant's business and business equipment equity and equalization of retirement assets shall be offset by defendant's Department of Labor award for back wages.
Any “529” plan shall be used solely as intended for such a plan under all applicable law and solely for the benefit of the parties' children. The parties shall mutually agree upon a division of any personal property not previously divided. Should the parties not agree then all disputed items shall be sold with the proceeds divided equally between the parties after all reasonable costs of sale are deducted.
12. Bank Accounts
Each party shall retain as his or her separate property the bank accounts listed on his or her respective financial affidavit filed with the court at the time of the dissolution of marriage.
13. Real Property Proceeds
The balance due the GAL shall be paid in full from the remaining proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. Plaintiff shall receive the next $3,696.60. Any remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. Any tax benefits or burdens from the property or its sale shall be shared equally.
14. Time Share
The time share at Mystic Dunes, Orlando, Florida shall be sold and the net proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. Net Proceeds shall be defined as the sale price less any sales commission, any outstanding taxes, maintenance fees or any other reasonable, customary costs of the sale. Until such sale, the parties shall remain equally responsible for all costs, fees, expenses, taxes, maintenance, assessments, etc., pertaining to this property. They shall share use and occupancy of the time share equally with plaintiff having its use in even-numbered years, defendant in odd.
15. Businesses
The plaintiff shall retain as her sole and separate property free of any claim of right, title or interest by the defendant her business known as Nutmeg Family Services and she shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless from liability on any debts associated therewith except for the state and federal tax liabilities set forth in paragraph 18, below.
Except as ordered in paragraph 11, above, the defendant shall retain as his sole and separate property free of any claim of right, title or interest by the plaintiff his business known as M & M Hydroseeding together with the business equipment and the defendant shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from liability on any debts associated therewith except for the state and federal tax liabilities set forth in paragraph 18, below.
16. Bank and Retirement Accounts: Each party shall retain the bank retirement accounts listed on his or her respective financial affidavit free of any claim of right, title or interest by the other party.
17. Attorneys Fees.
Each party shall be responsible for the payment of their own attorneys fees.
18. Bills, Debts, Obligations and Liabilities.
The parties shall be equally responsible for the following bills and debts:
Any outstanding federal or state taxes from tax years 2010, 2011 and 2012.
The Capitol One credit card with an approximate balance of $14,000.00.
The Cabella's credit card.
Any outstanding debt owed on the Jeep Liberty to Fifth Third Bank or its assigns.
The Visa card in the name of Nutmeg Family Services and Michael Mooney.
Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for payment of Kohl's, Gap, AMEX, L & M Hospital and any debt due on the Jeep Commander. She shall indemnify and hold defendant harmless regarding these debts. Defendant shall be solely responsible for the payment of the Capital One credit card with an approximate balance of $19,000.00. He shall indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless regarding this debt.
Except as set forth above, each party shall be solely responsible for the payment of the balance of the debts listed on his or her financial affidavit and each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless from liability thereon.
SO ORDERED.
Carbonneau, J.
FOOTNOTES
FN1. The children were enrolled in the Voluntown school district at the time of trial, but plaintiff has since moved to Ledyard. The Voluntown school district will not allow the children to complete the school year in Voluntown because no parent currently lives there.. FN1. The children were enrolled in the Voluntown school district at the time of trial, but plaintiff has since moved to Ledyard. The Voluntown school district will not allow the children to complete the school year in Voluntown because no parent currently lives there.
FN2. A Jeep Liberty that has been repossessed.. FN2. A Jeep Liberty that has been repossessed.
FN3. $242.50 plus $525.00 = $767.50.. FN3. $242.50 plus $525.00 = $767.50.
FN4. This means when the vacation is to occur, not the time of the decision.. FN4. This means when the vacation is to occur, not the time of the decision.
Carbonneau, John L., J.
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Docket No: FA124118861S
Decided: March 18, 2014
Court: Superior Court of Connecticut.
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