Jeffrey Grimes v. Commissioner, Dept. of Mental Health and Addiction Services (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendant, Patricia Rehmer, Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action, and the complaint fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.

Factual Background

On July 31, 2013, the plaintiff, Jeffrey A. Grimes, filed a complaint ¹ against the defendant, Patricia Rehmer, the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services.   The complaint alleges that the institution of the ban on tobacco products, including but not limited to electronic cigarettes, tobacco cigarettes, chewing tobacco, pipe tobacco, and/or cigars, at facilities including but not limited to the Connecticut Valley Hospital, Whiting Forensic Division, River View Children's Hospital, and Blue Hills Hospital by the defendant violates the provision set forth by the Connecticut legislature in General Statutes § 19(a)(2) ² “to include smoking areas in psychiatric facilities.”

On October 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss.   The defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action.   Moreover, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.   On October 29, 2013, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss.   The matter was heard at short calendar on November 25, 2013.

Discussion of the Law and Ruling

“Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it ․ [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ․ The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531–32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).  “A motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the jurisdiction of the court ․ The grounds which may be asserted in this motion [include] ․ lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ․” (Citation omitted.)  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985).   “[B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss ․ [S]ee Practice Book § 10–31(a)(1).”  (Citation omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).  “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 413–14.  “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, supra, 531.

“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).  “If ․ the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011).

The defendant argues in her motion to dismiss that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   In particular, she argues that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit because the plaintiff has failed to allege that he has suffered any injury from the smoking ban, that he is a patient at a Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services facility, and that he smokes or smoked before the smoking ban was implemented.   The plaintiff counters that the court has jurisdiction over the law and facts of the action, and that he has standing because he is a member of the group that would be affected by the outcome of the action.   Moreover, the plaintiff is a smoker and patient at Connecticut Valley Hospital.³

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.   One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ․ When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue ․ Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury;  a [party] ordinarily establishes ․ standing by allegations of injury.   Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests ․

“Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved ․ The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination:  first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole.   Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] ․ Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ․ has been adversely affected.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education supra, 303 Conn. 411–12.

The plaintiff argues that the institution of the ban on tobacco products by the defendant violates a provision set forth by the Connecticut legislature “to include smoking areas in psychiatric facilities.”   The plaintiff, however, has not demonstrated that he is authorized by statute to bring this suit, nor that he has been classically aggrieved.   The plaintiff fails the first prong of the test for classical aggrievement because the plaintiff has not demonstrated a specific, personal and legal interest in the inclusion of smoking areas in psychiatric facilities, as distinguished from a general interest.   Although his complaint, construed in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff alleges that he is a patient at the Connecticut Valley Hospital, he has not alleged that he has suffered any injury from the ban.   More specifically, he fails to allege that he smokes or that he smoked before the ban was implemented.   Moreover, the plaintiff fails the second prong of the test for classical aggrievement because the plaintiff has not established that any interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the ban on tobacco products by the defendant.   As a result, this court finds that the plaintiff has not shown himself to be statutorily or classically aggrieved, and he therefore has no standing to assert the claim set forth in his complaint.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.⁴

By the court,

Aurigemma, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The summons attached to the plaintiff's complaint labels this matter as a habeas corpus petition..  FN1. The summons attached to the plaintiff's complaint labels this matter as a habeas corpus petition.

FN2. General Statutes § 19(a)(2) does not exist.   In the plaintiff's response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleges that the ban of tobacco products violates General Statutes § 19a–342(2)(b), by which the court assumes he meant to cite General Statutes § 19a–342(b)(2)(B).  Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not amend his complaint pursuant to either Practice Book § 10–59 or Practice Book § 10–60.   Accordingly, the court is limited to considering the statutory provision alleged in the complaint..  FN2. General Statutes § 19(a)(2) does not exist.   In the plaintiff's response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleges that the ban of tobacco products violates General Statutes § 19a–342(2)(b), by which the court assumes he meant to cite General Statutes § 19a–342(b)(2)(B).  Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not amend his complaint pursuant to either Practice Book § 10–59 or Practice Book § 10–60.   Accordingly, the court is limited to considering the statutory provision alleged in the complaint.

FN3. In the plaintiff's response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleges that he is a smoker and patient at Connecticut Valley Hospital.   As noted in footnote 2, the plaintiff did not amend his complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10–59 or Practice Book § 10–60.   Accordingly, this assertion in the plaintiff's memorandum will not be considered in resolving this motion..  FN3. In the plaintiff's response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleges that he is a smoker and patient at Connecticut Valley Hospital.   As noted in footnote 2, the plaintiff did not amend his complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10–59 or Practice Book § 10–60.   Accordingly, this assertion in the plaintiff's memorandum will not be considered in resolving this motion.

FN4. The defendant also seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of a habeas corpus matter.  “A motion to strike ․ rather than a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle to attack the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”  Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 629–30, 941 A.2d 266 (2008).  “[T]he primary difference between the granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the granting of a motion to strike is that only in the latter case does the plaintiff have the opportunity to amend its complaint.   See Practice Book § [10–44].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 501, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   Since the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim is dispositive, the court does not need to address this argument at this stage of the proceedings..  FN4. The defendant also seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of a habeas corpus matter.  “A motion to strike ․ rather than a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle to attack the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”  Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 629–30, 941 A.2d 266 (2008).  “[T]he primary difference between the granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the granting of a motion to strike is that only in the latter case does the plaintiff have the opportunity to amend its complaint.   See Practice Book § [10–44].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 501, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   Since the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim is dispositive, the court does not need to address this argument at this stage of the proceedings.

Aurigemma, Julia L., J.