Esperanza Aviles v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is an employment compensation appeal to the Superior Court by the plaintiff employee, Esperanza Aviles (plaintiff).   Aviles is appealing the May 15, 2012, decision of the Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review (Board) in which the Board affirmed the referee's determination that Aviles was ineligible to receive benefits.

The following procedural background is relevant to the appeal.   On October 7, 2011, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) found that Aviles was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because she had left suitable work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer, Fosdick Fulfillment Corporation (employer).   Aviles timely appealed the decision of the administrator.   The appeal was heard by a referee, who conducted a hearing de novo, made findings of fact, and affirmed the decision of the administrator.   In a decision issued December 23, 2011, the referee found that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to her employer, and disqualified Aviles from receiving benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A).   The referee found that the plaintiff's medical problems did not qualify as good cause.   In order to establish good cause for leaving a job due to such health reasons, the individual must present competent evidence that:  (i) the medical condition required the individual leaving the employment;  (ii) the individual advised the employer of his/her condition;  and (iii) the individual unsuccessfully sought a remedy through those means reasonably available to the individual before leaving the employee's employment.  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31–236–22(2).

The referee found that the plaintiff mentioned her medical issues to her supervisor but never presented any doctor's note informing the employer of her inability to work.   The referee concluded that since the plaintiff presented no medical documentation to the employer and did not offer the employer the ability to present alternatives, the plaintiff therefore left suitable employment without good cause attributable to the employer.   The referee concluded that the plaintiff quit her employment for personal reasons and personal reasons are not good cause.   The referee therefore found, as a result, that the plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits effective September 18, 2011 ¹ pursuant to General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A) and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.

Thereafter, Aviles filed a timely appeal to the Board.   The Board reviewed the record, including the recording of the referee's hearing, and issued a written decision on May 15, 2012.   Therein, the Board found based on the existing record, that the referee's findings were supported by the record, and that the conclusions reached by the referee was consistent with those findings and the provisions of the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act. In so concluding, the Board adopted the referee's findings of fact and decision, except that they substituted “March 22, 2010” for “March 22, 2011” in the referee's finding of fact no. 1. The Board added the following finding of fact no. 11:

11.  Soyara Ospina oversaw the claimant's department on September 15, 2011.   Ospina advised the claimant that she could submit medical documentation to human resources to determine whether she qualified for a leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act.

The Board, based on the record, therefore concluded that the plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits effective September 11, 2011, and therefore affirmed the decision of the referee and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.

On June 7, 2012, the plaintiff filed a timely motion to reopen the Board's decision of May 15, 2012.   The Board again reviewed the record and on July 20, 2012, in its decision denying the plaintiff's motion to reopen, concluded that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to her employer.   The Board concluded that the plaintiff did not produce any medical documentation to establish that, as a result of a medical condition, she was incapable of forming the intent to leave or of rationally identifying and exploring alternatives to leave the job.   The Board concluded after having reviewed the plaintiff's motion to reopen and the record, she failed to show that the ends of justice required the Board to reopen its decision.   The Board therefore denied the plaintiff's motion to reopen.

Thereafter, on August 20, 2012, the plaintiff appealed the Board's decision to the Superior Court.   The Board then certified the record to this court, and the parties filed briefs in support of their positions.   The court held a hearing on the plaintiff's appeal on September 30, 2013.   The attorney on behalf of the Administrator appeared.   The plaintiff failed to appear.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“As a general rule, [t]he application of statutory criteria to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation under General Statutes §§ 31–235 and 31–236 involves mixed questions of fact and law in which the expertise of the administrative agency is highly relevant.”  United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, 209 Conn. 381, 386, 551 A.2d 724 (1988).   Moreover, the construction placed upon a statute or regulation by the agency responsible for its enforcement and administration is entitled to great deference.  Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986).

Under General Statutes § 31–249b, the court does not undertake a de novo review of unemployment compensation appeals from the employment security board of review and is bound by those facts found by the board and the reasonable conclusions it reached therefrom.   The court may go no further than to determine whether the decision appealed from is unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.  Burnham v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 184 Conn. 317, 321–22, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981).   A party is barred from challenging the board's findings of fact on appeal to the court unless that party has timely filed a motion to correct the findings pursuant to Practice Book § 22–4.   JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422, 828 A.2d 609 (2003);  Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 114 Conn.App. 170, 176, 968 A.2d 971 (2009).

In this case, Aviles did not file a motion to correct with the Board within two weeks of the filing of the record with the court, as required by Practice Book § 22–4.   Accordingly, this court is bound by those facts found by the board and prevented from further review of those facts, and the court's review is limited to determining whether the decision appealed from is unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.  Burnham v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 184 Conn. 317, 321–22, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981).

B. Analysis

General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits “[i]f, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work and without good cause attributable to the employer ․” In determining whether an individual's reason for leaving suitable work is for good cause attributable to the employer, it must be found that the reason for leaving relates to wages, hours or working conditions that comprise the employment that the individual voluntarily left.  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31–236–19.

In the present case, the plaintiff felt that the job was not suitable for her due to her back issues, menstrual bleeding and anxiety.   An individual has good cause for leaving work if “․ working conditions threatened the individual's health, either by causing illness or by contributing to the aggravation or worsening of the individual's medical condition.”  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31–236–22(1)(C).  The referee found and the Board affirmed that the plaintiff's medical issues did not qualify as good cause.   The referee and Board concluded, that although the plaintiff mentioned her medical issues to her employer, she never presented the employer with any medical documentation informing the employer of her inability to work.   The referee further found and the Board affirmed that because the plaintiff did not provide her employer with medical documentation regarding her health issues, she did not offer the employer the ability to present alternatives to leaving.   As the Board found, Soraya Ospinosa, a supervisor who was assigned to the plaintiff's department informed the plaintiff about the process of applying and qualifying for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. However, the plaintiff chose to leave her employment immediately rather than explore this alternative.

In addition, although the plaintiff claimed she experienced an anxiety attack which led her to walk off the job, the Board found that she failed to provide medical documentation corroborating that she suffered from a medical condition that precluded her from rationally identifying alternatives to leaving the job.   The Board therefore concluded that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable employment without good cause attributable to the employer.

The Board is free to weigh the opposing testimony and to accept or reject the competing arguments.   Based upon the record before the court, the Board's ruling is reasonable and consistent with the applicable statutes, regulations and case law.   The record supports its finding that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable employment without good cause attributable to her employer.   There was ample evidence to support in law the conclusions reached.   Accordingly, there is no basis for this court to conclude that the board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or otherwise abused its discretion in reaching its decision.   Likewise, the Board's decision denying the plaintiff's motion to reopen was supported by the record and not unreasonable, illegal or arbitrary.   The decision of the board is affirmed and the plaintiff's appeal is therefore dismissed.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The Board corrected the effective date in the referee's Disposition and Order to September 11, 2011..  FN1. The Board corrected the effective date in the referee's Disposition and Order to September 11, 2011.

Wilson, Robin L., J.