State of Connecticut v. Kristen Anderson (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The acquittee, Kristen Anderson, seeks an order discharging her from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (the Board) pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–593.   The state opposes the application.   The court held a hearing on the application on November 25, 2013, at which the parties were heard and evidence was presented.   Having considered the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the court concludes that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged from custody, and therefore, orders her discharged from the custody of the Board.

The court finds the following facts:

The acquittee was committed to the jurisdiction of the Board on March 27, 2003, for a period not to exceed after 45 years, after she was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect of killing her fourteen-month-old son.¹  The charge stemmed from the following events.   On June 24, 2001, the acquittee experienced command auditory hallucinations to “take a leap of faith.”   She jumped off her second floor deck holding her son, because “God would catch” them.   She then used a kitchen knife to stab herself and her son in response to voices saying she and her son would go to heaven.   She then built a fire outside and placed herself and her son onto the flames.   Although she survived these events, her son did not, and he died of blunt force trauma and stab wounds.

At the time of these tragic events, the acquittee was suffering from psychosis, and experienced paranoia and hallucinations, mostly of a religious nature.   Although prior to these events, she sought and received psychiatric treatment, she was not properly diagnosed or treated.

After her acquittal, the acquittee was committed to the custody of the Board and placed in patient at the Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH), where she was diagnosed with and treated for Bipolar Disorder, among other conditions.   While in-patient at CVH, the acquittee received appropriate mental health treatment and medications and as a result, her mental condition was stabilized.   She has not exhibited any psychotic symptoms since 2003, when her physiatrist adjusted her medications.   She has been in full remission since 2003.

Beginning in 2006, the Board granted the acquittee temporary leave to spend time with her family two times per month.   These temporary leaves were extended in August 2007 to include the acquittee's participation in day treatment services.   In November 2008, the Board granted the acquittee permission to transition to spending overnights in the community in an apartment setting with therapeutic and residential supports.   Because of her success and participation and cooperation in treatment, the acquittee was granted conditional release in May 2009, which allowed her to live on her own in the community full time.   While on conditional release, the acquittee continued to participate and cooperation in treatment, independently took all of her medications, and went regularly to alcoholics' anonymous meetings.

On December 12, 2012, the acquittee applied for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Board pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–593.   The purpose of the Board is “to manage monitor and review the status of each acquittee to ensure the protection of the general public.”  State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 519, 847 A.2d 862 (2004).   Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–593(d), the court forwarded the application to the Board.   On March 8, 2013, the Board held a hearing on the application, at which it heard from a number of witness.   The Board found the following facts:

[The acquittee] is an individual with a psychiatric illness and her diagnoses are Bipolar Disorder, Most Recent Episode Mixed Severe, with Mood Congruent Psychotic Features, with Full Inter–Episode Recovery;  Cannabis Abuse;  Cocaine Abuse;  Alcohol Abuse by History and Personality Disorder, Not otherwise Specified, with Dependent Traits.   Following the birth of [the acquittee's] baby in 2000, she developed increasingly serious symptoms of a psychiatric illness.   Those symptoms included depression, paranoia and psychotic delusions regarding the devil.   Following her acquittal and subsequent confinement at CVH, her mental status stabilized and she has maintained clinical stability over an extended period of time.   Owing to her continued psychiatric stability and engagement in treatment, [the acquittee] progressed to residing in the community with increasing responsibility and decreased supervision by the board.   She developed solid therapeutic relationships with her community providers.   She demonstrated good engagement in treatment, compliance with medication and a commitment to remaining free from drugs and alcohol through an active involvement in recovery oriented services and activities.   She has independently managed her own home and advanced her vocational skills through competitive employment and responsible financial management.   She has exhibited an ability to identify and report psychiatric symptoms in a timely manner.   [The acquittee] has consistently demonstrated good insight into the relationship between her psychiatric illness, index offense and the importance of continued treatment and medication compliance to her psychiatric stability.   Given her demonstrated progress and the continued availability of treatment services if discharged from the Board, the Board finds that [the acquittee] can reside safety in the community without the continued oversight of the Board.

Based on these facts, the Board concluded that the acquittee “is no longer so psychiatrically disabled as to pose a danger to herself or others if discharged from the Board's jurisdiction.”   The Board recommended that this court grant the application for discharge.

At the hearing before this court in support of her application, the acquittee introduced witnesses including her conditional release supervisor, an expert psychiatrist, and a department of mental health and additional services forensic mental health evaluator, who evaluated the acquittee every six months and reported her progress to the Board.   All of these witnesses testified consistently with the Board's factual findings above.   They testified enthusiastically and credibly as to the acquittee's excellent progress, and, in particular, that:  (1) her mental illness, although not “cured,” is in full remission and has been in remission for the last ten years;  (2) she is self-aware of her mental illness and committed to her continued mental health stability and her demonstrated her willingness to self-report any decline in her mental health to her providers;  (3) she is able to, and does in fact, independently take all prescribed medications and based on her demonstrated ability and willingness to take her medications, will continue to do in the future;  (4) she engages in, and will continue to engage in, all necessary mental health treatment and therapy;  (5) she has an excellent support system of friends and family, including a new spouse;  (6) she has a long and solid affiliation with alcoholics anonymous and is living a sober lifestyle;  and (7) she is functioning well in the community, which has been proven by her work history, purchase of a home, ability to manage a household, and getting married.

There was no evidence presented to suggest that since her confinement, the acquittee has been violent, or demonstrated any violent tendencies to herself or others.   Since she was conditionally released and has been living in the community she has not been arrested.   Both expert witnesses opined that she is not currently a danger to herself or others.

DISCUSSION

General Statutes § 17a–593 permits a person found not guilty by reason of a mental disease or defect, and who has been committed to the custody of the Board, to apply to the court for a discharge from Board custody.   The acquittee has “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.”  General Statutes § 17a–593(f).

“The court shall make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concern is the protection of society, make one of the following orders:  (1) If the court finds that the acquittee is not a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the recommendation or the application for discharge be dismissed;  or (2) if the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the acquittee discharged from custody ․” Section 17a–580(11) defines “person who should be discharged” as “an acquittee who does not have psychiatric disabilities or does not have intellectual disability to the extent that such acquittee's discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others.”

[A]s a matter of due process, an acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.”  State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 418, 645 A.2d 965 (1994).  “ ‘[T]he confinement of insanity acquittees, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, is not ‘punishment’ for a crime.   The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.'  “ State v. Jacob, supra, 69 Conn.App. 673, quoting Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683–84, 578 A.2d. 1025 (1990).

The word “danger” has not been defined but has been interpreted to have the same meaning as that provided in the civil commitment statute—that is to mean “there is a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his or her own person or upon another person.”  State v. Jacobs, 69 Conn.App. 666, 673, 798 A.2d 974 (2002).   The determination of “dangerousness” is a “societal rather than a medical judgment, in which the rights and needs of the [acquittee] must be balanced against the security interests of society.”  Id. Factors to be considered in deciding dangerousness include:  “the [acquittee's] history of mental illness, his present and past diagnoses, his past violent behavior, the nature of the offense for which he was prosecuted, the need for continued medication and therapy and the prospects for supervision if released.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).   Although the court may attach special weight to the testimony of expert witnesses, “the ultimate determination of mental illness and dangerousness is a legal decision.”  Id., 681.

Upon consideration of all of the credible evidence presented at the hearing, the court finds that the acquittee has met her burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she is a person who should be discharged under § 17a–593(g), and in particular that she does not presently have a psychiatric disability to the extent that such acquittee's discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others.  General Statutes §§ 17a–593(g) 17a–580(11).   In other words, she has established that she has recovered her sanity and is not a danger to herself or the public.  State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 418.

The acquittee's crime was truly tragic, but was the result of a mental disease or defect as determined by the trier of fact at her criminal trial.   The crime was the result of an undiagnosed serious mental illness, which progressed significantly after the birth of her child.   Once her illness was properly diagnosed and she was receiving the proper medications, after she was committed to the custody of the Board, her psychotic symptoms decreased and were eventually stabilized.   Her condition is presently in full remission and has been in full remission for a decade.   Although the acquittee will continue to need psychiatric treatment and medications to maintain her present mental health stability, she has proven, by her actions over the last several years while she was living independently in the community, that she is committed to maintaining her present mental health and sobriety, continuing to participate in all necessary psychiatric treatment and self-help programs and taking all prescribed medications.

The acquittee has been living successfully in the community since 2009, building a supportive group of friends and family, getting married, buying and managing a home.   Throughout her commitment, she has been consistently cooperative with her therapists, physicians, and Board supervisors and employees.   They testified enthusiastically in favor of her application.   Of significant import, the acquittee has demonstrated self-awareness about her condition, and a proven willingness to self-report concerns about her mental health to her providers.

Both expert witnesses testified credibly that the acquittee is not dangerous toward herself or others.   Moreover, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that the acquittee has exhibited any violent behavior toward herself or others since her condition was stabilized ten years ago.

Although the cases recognize that it is difficult to predict future behavior, they also recognize that “past behavior is a good indicator of future behavior.”  State v. Jacob, supra, 69 Conn.App. 684.   The court finds that the evidence establishes that the acquittee has a proven track record, established over the last ten years, and more recently since she has been living in the community, of her commitment to her mental health and sobriety, and her ability to independently continue her psychiatric treatment, which includes taking all prescribed medications.   If she continues on this path, and there was no evidence to suggest that she will not, the acquittee should be able to maintain her sanity, and is not, and will not, be a danger to the public.

Accordingly, the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged and orders that she be discharged from custody.

Cobb, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. “Under Connecticut law, a defendant charged with a crime may plead as an affirmative defense that at the time he committed the offense, he lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the charged offense due to a mental disease or defect ․ If the trier of fact finds that the defendant has proven this defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court then commits the defendant to the jurisdiction of the board for a maximum term of commitment not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense ․” State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 519, 847 A.2d 862 (2004) (internal quotations and footnote omitted)..  FN1. “Under Connecticut law, a defendant charged with a crime may plead as an affirmative defense that at the time he committed the offense, he lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the charged offense due to a mental disease or defect ․ If the trier of fact finds that the defendant has proven this defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court then commits the defendant to the jurisdiction of the board for a maximum term of commitment not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense ․” State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 519, 847 A.2d 862 (2004) (internal quotations and footnote omitted).

Cobb, Susan Quinn, J.