Turn of River Fire Department, Inc. et al. v. City of Stamford et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR A JURY TRIAL

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is brought by six plaintiffs against the City of Stamford and its director of public safety, health and welfare alleging that certain City of Stamford Charter amendments approved by the Stamford electorate as well as actions taken by the defendants subsequent to those charter amendments and ostensibly pursuant to those charter amendments violated the plaintiffs' rights in multiple ways.   The defendants have claimed the case for the jury docket and the plaintiffs have objected to the jury docket claim.

The narrow issue before the court is whether or not the defendants are entitled to have this action heard in whole or in part by a jury.   While the issue is narrow, its importance is of constitutional proportions as the Connecticut constitution provides “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate” Constitution of the State of Connecticut, Article 1, sec. 19.   While the right is inviolate, like many other constitutional rights, it is not unlimited and its limitations have been defined by applying an historical test.

II. THE COMPLAINT

The six plaintiffs are comprised of three specific volunteer fire departments (collectively referred to as the plaintiff departments) and three individuals (collectively referred to as the individual plaintiffs) who hold specific positions within the plaintiff departments.   The plaintiff Stuart Teitelbaum (Teitelbaum) is the chief of the plaintiff Long Ridge Fire Company (LRFC);  the plaintiff Peter Bernstein (Bernstein) is the fire marshal of the plaintiff Turn of River Fire District;  and the plaintiff Antonio L. Olive, Jr. (Olive) is the fire marshal of the Long Ridge Fire Service district.   The complaint alleges that prior to November 6, 2012 the Stamford charter designated the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department as the provider of fire and emergency services to those residents and businesses located in the city fire service district as specifically designated;  that prior to November 6, 2010 the charter also recognized five “independent or autonomous volunteer fire departments which had exclusive fire and emergency services jurisdiction in their respective volunteer fire service districts as designated.   Three of those departments are the plaintiff departments.   The complaint further alleges that under Connecticut General Statutes section 29–297 the plaintiff TRFD and the plaintiff LRFC were the authorities authorized to appoint the local fire marshals, specifically Bernstein and Olive.   The complaint further alleges that the charter amendments adopted by the Stamford City electors on November 6, 2012 “purported to combine and unilaterally merge the volunteer departments” including the plaintiff departments into a single department “under the administration supervision discipline and direction of the newly created position identified in the charter amendments as the “the chief” who is to be appointed by the mayor.”   The complaint further alleges that under the charter amendments the “status” of the volunteer fire departments “has been materially affected by the city in that the volunteer fire departments including the plaintiffs ․ are no longer recognized as independent autonomous volunteer fire departments having exclusive fire and emergency services jurisdiction in their respective volunteer fire service districts.”

The complaint alleges that the charter amendments violate the rights of the plaintiff departments guaranteed by Connecticut General Statutes section 7–301 which provides that no municipal fire department “shall supercede any volunteer fire department which is the owner of any building, fire apparatus or other property without having first come to an agreement with such company with regard to the disposition of and compensation for such building, apparatus or other property”;  that the charter amendments purport to unilaterally reduce the rank command and authority of the volunteer chiefs including Teitelbaum and effectively act to dismiss Teitelbaum from his position as the active head of LRFC in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 7–302;  that the defendant director has issued self-described “directives” to the plaintiff fire departments ordering “how the volunteer fire department shall respond to fire and medical emergencies and conduct fire marshal duties in their own respective fire service districts” in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 7–313e and the National Incident Management System (NIMS);  that the newly appointed Chief Conty issued different and inconsistent directives to the plaintiff departments also in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 7–313e and NIMS;  and that the city appointed a city wide fire marshal effectively dismissing Bernstein and Olive from their positions as local fire marshals in violations of the provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes 29–300.

The complaint alleges that the charter amendments and the actions of the city are illegal and violate the charter because they affect the organization status or property of the plaintiff departments;  because they violate the plaintiff departments' respective bylaws and rights of their respective members thereunder;  because they violate Teitelbaum's rights as elected chief of the LRFC;  because they violate the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes section 7–301, 7–302 and section 7–313e;  because the implementation of the charter amendments by the city violates the charter itself and because the charter amendments violate certain management agreements that have been entered into between the city and TRFD and the plaintiff Springdale Fire Company (SFC).  The complaint further alleges that the actions of the city violate the provisions of two separate collective bargaining agreements and that they tortiously interfere with the plaintiff LRFC's collective bargaining agreement with its union, and that the amendments violate the TRFD and LRFC's rights to appoint fire marshals for their fire service districts as well as Bernstein's and Olive's respective rights to serve as local fire marshals.   Moreover, the complaint alleges that the charter amendments violate the plaintiff departments' respective constitutional rights “in that they affect the organization status or property of the volunteer fire departments and constitute a taking of the same without due process of law, both procedurally and substantively” and similarly that the charter amendments violates the individual plaintiffs' constitutional rights in that they “adversely affect and take their property and liberty rights in their respective jobs without due process of law, both procedurally and substantively.”   The complaint further alleges that the mayor submitted “a contingent budget” which will limit and cut off municipal funding for the plaintiff departments' operations in violation of the TRFD management agreement and the SFC management agreement with the defendant city.   The first count seeks a declaratory judgment declaring the actions of the defendants illegal.   The second count seeks a temporary and permanent injunction preserving the status quo and precluding the city from continuing to unilaterally implement the charter amendments.

III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

The Connecticut Supreme Court has set forth the standards and process for determining whether or not a party is entitled to a jury trial.  “[U]nder Article 1st, section 19 of the Connecticut Constitution as amended ‘the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.’   We have consistently held that the scope of Article 1st, section 19, is defined by applying an historical test.   The right to a jury trial may not be abrogated for causes of action that were triable to the jury prior to the Constitution of 1818, and existing at the time of the adoption.   Citations omitted.   Consequently, statutory action established since the adoption of the constitution of 1818 ordinarily fall outside the scope of the provision, ‘unless perhaps the new remedy constitutes a modification of existing remedies, so vital as to unduly limit and violate the right of trial by jury.’  “ United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Springbrook Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 297 (1949) quoting Meigs v. Theis, 102 Conn. 579, 592 (1925).

Accordingly, the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted “that the right to jury trial exists both in cases in which it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it and in cases substantially similar thereto”;  Ford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 50 (1990) (emphasis in original);  see also Skinner v. Angliker, 211 Conn. 370, 374 (1989).   The court has noted that at common law legal claims were tried to a jury but equitable claims were tried to a court.  Ford, supra.   Therefore equitable actions are not within the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury.  Franche v. Farmhold, Inc., 191 Conn. 201 (1983).

Connecticut General Statutes section 52–215 recognizes this dichotomy between civil actions which are equitable in nature and those which are actionable at law.   The right to a jury trial is further limited in that special statutory proceedings not previously recognized and not similar to those that were recognized are tried to the court.

“The test is whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury.”  Skinner, at 375 (citations omitted).  “Accordingly, in determining whether a party has a right to a trial by jury under the state constitution and section 52–215, the court must ascertain whether the action being tried is similar in nature to an action that could have been tried to a jury in 1818 when the state constitution was adopted.   This test requires an inquiry as to whether the course of action has roots in the common law, and if so, whether the remedy involved was one in law or equity.   If the action existed at common law and involved a legal remedy, the right to a jury trial exists and the legislature may not curtail the right either directly or indirectly.”   Skinner at 375–76 (citations omitted).

In order to determine whether or not the defendant is entitled to a jury trial the court must examine the nature of the plaintiffs' claims and determine whether or not the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature as would have been triable to a jury prior to 1818.   The examination must determine whether or not the plaintiffs' claims have their root in common law and if so whether the remedy involved was one in law or equity.   Accordingly we turn to the nature of the plaintiffs' claim.

IV. NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS

The individual plaintiffs claim that they have been effectively dismissed from their positions as fire chief and fire marshal in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 7–302 (fire chief) in Connecticut General Statutes section 29–300 (fire marshal).

In that regard those particular claims of the individual plaintiffs are claims that sound in wrongful discharge and the opinion in Ford, supra is instructive.   In Ford, plaintiff brought an action for wrongful discharge in violation of section 31–290a.  (Section 31–290a prohibits discharge of an employee for filing a workers' compensation case).   The court noted that even though the statutory right was created subsequent 1818 it was “in essence a statutorily created tort deriving from the action for wrongful discharge ․ It should be recalled that our modern law of torts has its origin in the common law actions of trespass and trespass on the case.”  Ford at 52.  “[T]respass on the case ․ [was] designed to afford a remedy for obviously wrongful conduct resulting in injuries which were not forcible or not direct.”  Ford, at 52, footnote 2 quoting W. Prosser and W. Keeton, Torts (5th ed.1984) sec. 6, page 29.   Similarly, though the specific right that the individual plaintiffs claim the defendants have violated is statutorily created subsequent to 1818, it is essentially a claim of wrongful discharge which has its roots in the protection of individuals from tortuous conduct.   Such claims were recognized at common law and were triable to a jury.   Accordingly, insofar as the individual plaintiffs' claims sound in wrongful discharge, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.

The plaintiffs additionally claim that the defendants have violated certain written agreements, to wit, the TRFD management agreement and the SFC management agreement.   These claims sound in breach of contract.   Breach of Contract claims, of course, are actions at law that have always been triable to a jury.   To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that their contractual rights have been breached, the defendants are entitled to a trial by jury.   Similarly, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that their contractual rights have been tortuously interfered with the defendants are also entitled to a trial by jury.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs' objection to the defendants' claim for a jury trial is overruled and the case shall remain on the jury docket.

While the objection is overruled this decision should not be construed as a ruling that the defendant is entitled to a jury trial for all of the matters covered by the complaint.   Additional claims made include allegations of an unconstitutional taking.   A claim that the action of a governmental body has effectively taken the property of a private property owner such as the plaintiffs herein or has effectively diminished the value of that property by its regulatory scheme are claims of eminent domain or inverse condemnation.   Such claims are equitable in nature, as to both the merits and damages, and a party is not entitled to a jury.  Cumberland Farms Inc., v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45 at 72–74 (2002).   See also Northeast CT. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 256 Conn. 813 (2001).

Moreover, to the extent the plaintiff departments have alleged that the defendants have violated Connecticut General Statutes sec. 7–301 or Connecticut General Statutes sec. 7–313e the plaintiffs are claiming violation of statutory rights of fire departments which rights and which actions do not appear to have existed at common law.   To the extent the plaintiff departments' claim that their rights provided in those statutes have been violated, the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial.

Finally court notes that the second count seeks injunctive relief and therefore appeals to the equitable powers of the court.   To the extent the second count seeks equitable relief the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial.

When legal and equitable issues are combined in the single action the right to a jury trial depends upon the relative importance of the two claims.   With regard to the second count of the complaint the defendants are not entitled to a jury as a matter of right.   However, pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book 16–10 no issues of fact in an equitable action shall be tried to the jury except under order of the judicial authority.   Our Supreme Court has advised that the assignment of issues of fact to a jury in an action that is primarily equitable should be invoked sparingly.  Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 571 (1938).   See also United States Trust Company v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 44–45 (1985).

This opinion is not intended to restrict a determination of the trial judge to assign factual issues of the second count to a jury should the trial judge determine that such is appropriate.

V. SUMMARY

In so far as the complaint sets forth claims sounding in wrongful discharge, breach of contract and tortuous interference with contract the defendants are entitled to have the factual issues determined by a jury.   To the extent that the complaint alleges an unconstitutional taking of property by way of eminent domain or inverse condemnation and to the extent it alleges violations of newly created statutory rights of the plaintiff departments, defendants are not entitled to have the factual issues decided by a jury.   To the extent the complaint seeks equitable relief, as it does in the second count, the defendants are not entitled to a trial by jury unless the trial judge determines that the relative importance of the legal claims outweighs the importance of the equitable claim for relief.

Regardless of the nature of the claim, issues of law are always reserved for the court and only the court can provide for the declaratory or injunctive relief that the plaintiffs seek upon a finding of facts by the jury pursuant to appropriately crafted interrogatories.

Nothing in this opinion should be construed to reflect upon the merits of any parties' claim or to suggest that other procedurally appropriate tools should not be considered in addressing the issues raised by the pleadings.

GENUARIO, J.

Genuario, Robert L., J.