IN RE: Cayden C.1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On April 26, 2012, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Rachelle Faith B., and Charles C. to their child, Cayden (d.o.b. October 4, 2010).   The parents have appeared and are represented by counsel.   The child is represented by counsel.   Neither parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

The case was assigned for a two-day contested trial on the termination of the parent's rights.   The most recent addendum to the social study (Exhibit C) reveals that neither parent is now living in Connecticut since May 31, 2012, when the mother left for Florida and the father left for Texas.   Both parents were reached by telephone and were able to participate in the proceedings.   The mother was in Missouri, the father was in Texas.   Each parent made a statement indicating that they wanted Cayden to be placed with the paternal grandmother, Evelyn C.² Counsel have all agreed that the letters in the file, one from the father dated October 2012 and one from the paternal grandmother dated November 13, 2012, could be considered as motions for a transfer of guardianship to the paternal grandmother.

The court has received a significant number of studies, arrest reports, letters from DCF to the parents, conviction records, an important letter to the paternal grandmother, and other documents.   The court has heard the testimony of the social worker and from the paternal grandmother, who traveled at her own expense from Brooklyn, N.Y. to attend court and to testify in support of her request for guardianship.   After considering all the documentary and testimonial evidence, the court makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.

Initial Findings

A termination of parental rights under § 17a–412(j) on non-consensual grounds, as have been pleaded requires the court to find whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parents, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

As has been indicated, the parents have both been served and thus located.   As will be demonstrated, DCF has made reasonable efforts through the offer of appropriate and available services to promote a reunification with the child.   In this case, the court must determine whether the parents or either of them has been able to benefit from the offered services, and if not, determine the disposition of the case that is in the best interest of the child.

Adjudication

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

Grounds

As statutory grounds for terminating the parent's rights, the petition alleges failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3).   Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except, as here, where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights, i.e. rehabilitation.

General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3) provides in relevant part that termination is warranted if the trial court, in the adjudicative phase, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child (1) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and (2) the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and (3) the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

(1) The record reflects a finding that Cayden was adjudicated to be uncared for in that he was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his wellbeing on December 22, 2010 (Graziani, J.).

(2) The record further reflects that specific steps were provided to the parents at the time of the initial order of temporary custody and at the time of the neglect adjudication and most recently on June 15, 2011, for Rachelle Faith, and on July 5, 2011, for Charles C. (Exhibits F and G.)

(3) The third factual determination for this court, and that which requires greater factual attention is:  whether the parents have achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render either of them able to care for this particular child.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents'] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [that the parents have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue ․ As part of the analysis, the trial court must obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities, which includes prior adjudications of neglect, substance abuse and criminal activity.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 353–54, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).   See also In re Christopher L., 135 Conn.App. 232 (2012).

Rachelle Faith, the Respondent Mother

While the court was unable to observe her, Exhibit J, her Department of Corrections admission record reports that she is a 36–year–old, blond female, 5 foot 8 inches tall and weighed 180 lbs, at the time of admission to prison (1/17/08).   DCF records indicate her mother was married and divorced six times, and that all six of her siblings have different fathers.   She reports her childhood was excellent.   Rachelle Faith has four older children who are not in her care due to her inability to parent because of substance abuse issues.

The mother reports a long history of substance abuse with crack cocaine.   She told a New Perceptions intake worker (Exhibit CC) that she was “using (crack cocaine) about $300 per day every day and she was using it for 7 years.”   She also reported to smoking a half-pack of cigarettes a day, she has been arrested for prostitution, has spent at least 2 and 1/2 years incarcerated, she has four arrests for drug charges, she has eight major driving violations (including manslaughter with a vehicle), her license is suspended, she does not have a car and she has had inpatient treatment for substance abuse in Florida and Connecticut.

Cayden, as well as her four older children, have all been removed from her for ongoing substance abuse and domestic violence.   She has been offered by DCF, a mother and child substance abuse program.   She has refused.   She has entered and completed many programs through the years, she has left without completing programs and in the end, she returns to drugs.   Programs are set forth on pages 5 and 14 of Exhibit A.

She and Charles have had another child since they both left Connecticut in May 2012, no doubt conceived when they were living together in Connecticut.³  On July 1, 2012, in Florida, Rachelle Faith gave birth to her sixth child, a daughter Ciara.   The child remained hospitalized for several weeks due to severe withdrawal symptoms from cocaine and marijuana.   The child was removed from the hospital by the Florida child protection agency and remains in their care.   Clearly, Rachelle Faith has not rehabilitated herself.   All six of her children have been removed due to her addiction.   As indicated earlier, she asks the court to place the child with the paternal grandmother.

Charles C.

Cayden's father is the acknowledged or putative father of Cameron, age 9, Camry, age 6, Cayden, aged 2, and Ciara, aged five months.   Charles reports to DCF that he was born in New Jersey, he does not know his biological father nor know his name.   He reports that as his mother, Cayden's paternal grandmother, was in school or working, he was raised by his godmother who “taught him to be a man.”   After finishing the 11th grade, Charles moved to Texas where he remained for ten years.   He was involved with a woman by whom he had two children.   He left them in 2008.   Prior to his departure from Texas, he was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in the loss of one arm.

Charles has a history of alcohol abuse dating to 2002, in regard to driving under the influence.   When DCF became actively involved in this case due to domestic violence with the child's mother, Charles was referred to Family Based Recovery Program where he tested positive for cocaine on March 23, 2011, and April 1, 2011.   The Specific steps and the social worker called for Charles to obtain anger management services regarding the domestic violence and substance abuse counseling.   He was referred to Supportive Housing for Families and referred to the Bureau of Rehabilitation Services.

Charles was referred for substance abuse treatment, but was not eligible because he did not acknowledge a problem.   He began the anger management program in July 2012 but stopped attending the program as he was required to attend the Family Violence Education Program as a condition of his probation.   He completed that program on November 20, 2011.   He also completed the STEP program for effective parenting.   DCF paid his rent in July, November and December 2011, to prevent him from being evicted.

Charles has indicated he feels guilty for leaving Texas and was torn between staying in Connecticut with Cayden and returning to Texas.   He left Connecticut on May 31, 2012, and has not returned.   On September 19, 2012, the social worker contacted Charles in Texas.   He indicated that he was not in any treatment nor was he employed.   While Charles was making a satisfactory effort to comply with the specific steps, when he left Connecticut and discontinued individual counseling, stopped visitation, he effectively gave up any further attempts at rehabilitation as it relates to this particular child.

Accordingly, as to both parents, the court finds that Cayden has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and that the mother and father have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they or either of them could assume a responsible position the life of the child. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I).

The Motion for Transfer of Guardianship

Evelyn C., the paternal grandmother testified in very poignant and emotional testimony.   She is a fifty-five year old, special education teacher in Brooklyn, N.Y. It is evident that she has the personality, faith and vigor to do a great job.   She has a three bedroom apartment where she lives with a thirty-five year old son.   Evelyn was hopeful that her son Charles would comply with all he had to do to get his son back.   She was hopeful that, if that did not occur, her niece, Lynda Faye, in Tennessee, would get custody of Cayden.   So Evelyn stayed out of the controversy because Charles told her to do so.   At the conclusion of her testimony, weeping, she said most notably, “I am family.   I am a single black mother who is trying to keep my children together.   I just want my Cayden.”

The court is convinced that she would have easily satisfied any investigation necessary to become a foster parent or a guardian, if she had made a timely offer to help.   But she did not.   She did not know that DCF must file a proposed permanency plan within nine months of the child's removal from the home, so that a hearing can be conducted within one year as required by the state and federal law to determine a permanency plan for the child.   Indeed, Connecticut Statute § 17a–110a(d) requires DCF to make “an assessment of the likelihood of the child's being reunited with either or both birth parents” within six months of out-of-home placement.   Time is critical in child placement decisions.

So DCF sent Evelyn a letter (Exhibit TT), on April 12, 2011.   The three page letter said, among other things:

You have been identified as an adult relative of the child named above and this letter is being sent to you to advise you that your relative is currently in the care of DCF. I encourage you to contact me as soon as possible in order to discuss your ability and willingness to participate in your relative's case.   I may be reached at (telephone number omitted ).   To start this process it is important that you contact me as soon as you receive this letter.

The letter went on to explain in great deal the possible scenarios for placement and to provide some legal and practical guidance for assuming child care.   Several times it urges the recipient to call immediately.   At one point it states in bold lettering and underlined:  “Time is of the essence in responding to this request, as we must make placement decisions that serve the best interests of your relative child.”   Evelyn acknowledges that she received and read the letter but did not contact DCF. She did not contact DCF for more than a year.

On June 21, 2012, (fourteen months after receiving the letter) Evelyn filed a motion to intervene.   She told DCF that the parents had lied to her and asked her not to get involved.   That was a very unfortunate communication.   She stated it was her impression that Cayden was going to be returned to the parents and she told DCF that if that was not possible then she wanted the child placed with her.   It was too late.

Not only does DCF have a statutory duty to make child placement decisions within six to nine months, those time-frames are consistent with sound legal child placement principles.  “Finally, we agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court, in crediting the testimony of the child welfare professionals and terminating the respondent's parental rights on the basis of Davonta's need for stability, permanence and closure, was not merely invoking “empty incantations,” as the respondent has claimed.  In re Davonta V., supra, 98 Conn.App. 53.   This court has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives.  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with his best interest);  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 263, 829 A.2d 855 (2003) (trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous where much of child's short life had been spent in custody of commissioner of children and families and child needed stability and permanency in her life);  In re Teshea D., supra, 9 Conn.App. 493–94 (“child's need for permanency in her life lends added support to the court's finding that her best interest warranted termination of the respondent's parental rights”).   “Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (83–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 401 (2004).

Here Cayden was removed from the parents at six months old.   The evidence supports a finding that the child lived in a very dysfunctional, chaotic home with substance abusing parents engaged in domestic violence.   Cayden was placed in a secure, non-violent, loving environment in a family that consists of a mother, a father, a biological child of the foster parents, an adopted child by the foster family and Cayden.   The social worker testified that Cayden looks to the foster parents as his mom and dad.   He is bonded and attached in this home.   The children relate to each other as siblings.   Cayden has no special medical or psychological needs except for asthma which is treated with an inhaler.   Cayden has been in this family for eighteen months of the most important time in a child's life.⁴  Evelyn acknowledges that the foster home deserves her thanks, nonetheless she wants Cayden.   The federal and state law make it clear that placement decisions must be made quickly.   Evelyn was notified promptly in accordance with state and federal law and was told that “time is of the essence.”   Her failure to act very unfortunately allowed her grandchild to form a new reality in a new family.   That cannot be undone without harm to the child.   Her motion for guardianship is denied.

III. Statutory Findings

During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103 (2000).  “In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a–112(k) ].”  In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)).   The seven factors “serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.”  In re Quanitra M., supra, at 104.  “There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009).   The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section.

1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES— § 17a–112(k)(1)

Multiple timely and appropriate services were provided for the parents.   Those services included, but are not limited to:  treatment and permanency plans;  case management services;  and administrative case reviews;  transportation services for visitation supervised by DCF personnel (see Exhibits JJ, MM, NN), or by therapeutic visitation programs;  and most urgently, repeated referrals so that Rachelle Faith could participate in both Natchaug hospital and community-based Perception Programs substance abuse counseling and/or evaluations.

2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW— § 17a–112(k)(2)

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, through the provision of timely reunification services.   Reunification was not a feasible plan unless and until Rachelle Faith could conquer her adult life-long illegal drug usage.   She has not.   Charles was competently working toward reunification, completing required programs, until he abruptly left Connecticut, stopped counseling, stopped visiting and has not returned.

3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS— § 17a–112(k)(3)

Rachelle Faith has violated a number of court orders pertinent to the specific steps.   All of the specific steps are subservient to the goal of substance abuse treatment, recovery and continued abstinence.   It is unnecessary to address her housing, her lawful income, her relational problems with others, her issues of domestic abuse, if she remains an active drug abuser.   She has no appreciation of the impact of her drug use on her children.   Her last child, born in July 2012, had illegal drugs in her system at birth.   Her four oldest children were removed because of her drug use.   Rachelle Faith remains impaired and has violated this most essential directive of the court to obtain and benefit from substance abuse treatment.   As indicated earlier, Charles, after initial delay, began compliance with the specific steps.

4. THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES— § 17a–112(k)(4)

Whatever bond Cayden had with the biological parents has been weakened over time since they left Connecticut six months ago.   While the child has visited with the maternal grandmother during his first six months of life, it was hardly sufficient to achieve any form of attachment.   The child is completely attached to his foster parents.   He views his caretakers as his family.

5. AGE OF THE CHILD— § 17a–112(k)(5)

Cayden was born on October 4, 2010.

6. PARENT'S EFFORT TO ADJUST CIRCUMSTANCES— § 17a–112(k)(6)

Previously discussed.   The parents have each walked away from the child.

7. EXTENT TO WHICH RESPONDENT WAS PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN— § 17a–112(k)(7)

No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented the parents from maintaining, at least a visiting relationship with Cayden, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent interfere with such relationship.

IV. Orders

“The public policy of this state is:  To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect;  to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental capacity for good child care ․” General Statutes § 17a–101 (a).  “Time is of the essence in child custody cases ․ This furthers the express public policy of this state to provide all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 439–40, 446 A.2d 808 (1982).

After due consideration of the child's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment and the totality of circumstances;  and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights;  and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following.

ORDERS

That the parental rights of Rachelle Faith and Charles C. are hereby terminated as to the child Cayden C. That the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for him.   That a case plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law.   Primary consideration for adoption of Cayden shall be offered to the current foster parents.

The permanency plan calling for termination of parental rights and adoption is approved.   The court finds that reasonable efforts have been made to approve the plan.   The Clerk of any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 81 Columbia Ave. Willimantic CT 06226 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

It is so ordered this 21st day of November 2012

Foley, JTR # 433

FOOTNOTES

FN2. As will be seen, this whole case would have been entirely different had they made that joint request two years ago..  FN2. As will be seen, this whole case would have been entirely different had they made that joint request two years ago.

FN3. Genetic testing confirmed Charles' paternity, as he was not certain..  FN3. Genetic testing confirmed Charles' paternity, as he was not certain.

FN4. “Prenatal development and the first two years are the time when the genetic, organic and neurochemical foundations for impulse control are being created.   It is also the time when the capacities for rational thinking and sensitivity to other people are being rooted—or not—in a child's personality.”   Ghosts from the Nursery, Karr–Morse and Wiley, P. 4. The Atlantic Monthly Press, New York (1997)..  FN4. “Prenatal development and the first two years are the time when the genetic, organic and neurochemical foundations for impulse control are being created.   It is also the time when the capacities for rational thinking and sensitivity to other people are being rooted—or not—in a child's personality.”   Ghosts from the Nursery, Karr–Morse and Wiley, P. 4. The Atlantic Monthly Press, New York (1997).

Foley, Francis J., J.T.R.