Angela Klonoski et al. v. Kenneth DiPietro et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION # 130.00, DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION # 134.00

The plaintiffs seek two injunctions pursuant to their September 24, 2012 amended complaint's prayer for relief:  The first injunction seeks reinstatement of plaintiff, Klonoski, to her position on the Board of Education.   The second injunction seeks to “[restrain] Defendants DiPietro and Smith from deeming anyone to be any employee of the Plainfield Public School system who has not been subject to a criminal background check and who has not met all the legal prerequisites for employment in a Connecticut school district.”

BACKGROUND

Ms. Klonoski is a resident of Plainfield and has three children in the Plainfield Public Schools.   Her youngest child receives special education services.   In November 2007, Ms. Klonoski was elected to and sworn into the Board.   Mr. Reale is a taxpayer in Plainfield.

On July 7, 2011, Ms. Klonoski attended a field trip with her disabled son.   Upon her return, she submitted an invoice to the Plainfield Public Schools seeking reimbursement for 10.5 hours at a rate of $15 per hour as the result of functioning as staff at a field trip to New Hampshire on July 7, 2011.   A purchase order was processed on August 25, 2001, and payment was made by check dated September 9, 2011.   The check was accepted and endorsed by Ms. Klonoski on July 7, 2011.

On March 7, 2012, the defendant, Superintendent DiPietro, requested that the Board's attorney, William R. Connon, provide an opinion regarding whether General Statute § 10–232 (Restrictions on employment of members of board of education) was applicable to Ms. Klonoski.   Attorney Connon provided his opinion on March 9, 2012.   In relevant part, he opined:

After reviewing the exhibits introduced at the hearing ․ and discussing the matter with you, it is apparent that Board member Klonoski submitted an invoice to the Plainfield school district on July 7, 2011.   As part of this invoice she sought compensation for time she spent supervising a student on a field trip.   She was employed for ten and one-half hours at the rate of $15.00/hour ․

The statutory prohibition is absolute and instantaneous ․ By operation of law, therefore, Angela Klonoski can no longer be considered a member of the Plainfield Board of Education.   Her position became vacant at the moment she accepted payment for her services, if not earlier, when she began working with the expectation of compensation on July 7, 2011.

On March 12, 2012, the defendant, Chairman Smith, called Ms. Klonoski and informed her that by virtue of General Statute § 10–232 and her receipt of payment for the field trip, she had vacated her seat on the Board by operation of law and would not be permitted to participate any further in Board meetings.   When a vacancy occurs on the Board mid-term, pursuant to the Charter, the Board has the authority to appoint a new member.   The Democratic Town Committee unanimously endorsed the appointment of Kathleen Sendley–Barry to the vacant seat.   The Board voted to accept her nomination on April 11, 2012.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo while the rights of the parties are being determined ․” (Internal alterations omitted). e.g., Town of Bozrah v. Chmurynski, 303 Conn. 676, 682 (2012).   The standard for issuance of a temporary injunction is well settled:

A temporary injunction is a preliminary order of the court, granted at the outset or during the pendency of an action, forbidding the performance of the threatened acts described in the original complaint until the rights of the parties respecting them shall have been finally determined by the court.   The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo and protect the moving party from immediate and irreparable harm until the rights of the parties can be determined after a full hearing on the merits.   The plaintiffs, to be entitled to such relief, must show:  (1) probable success on the merits of their claim;  (2) irreparable harm or loss;  and (3) a favorable balancing of the results or harm which may be caused to one party or the other, as well as to the public, by the granting or denying of the temporary relief requested.

(Internal quotation marks omitted).   Fleet Nat. Bank v. Burke, 45 Conn.Stipp. 566, 570 (1998) (quoting, Deming v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 650, 659 (1912);  citing, Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295 (1941);  Griffin Hosp. v. Comm'n on Hosps.   & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 457–58, (1985)).   Courts also consider whether there is an adequate remedy at law. e.g., Aqleh v. Cadlerock Joint Venture II, L.P., 299 Conn. 84, 97 (2010).

In the first instance, the injunction seeking reinstatement of the plaintiff, Klonoski, to her position is denied because there is an adequate remedy at law.   Where quo warranto and writ of mandamus are pled and available, no injunctive relief is available.  Bartlett v. City of Rockville, 150 Conn. 428, 430 (1963);  see, e.g., Weingerl v. Schlesinger, CV94–00462965, 1994 WL 372643 at * 2 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 7, 1994) (denying temporary injunction because the plaintiff had remedy through quo warranto and/or mandamus);

It has long been the general rule, established by the overwhelming weight of authority in this country that equity does not have jurisdiction to remove public officers or to restrain or relieve against proceedings for their removal ․ An officer who has been wrongfully removed has an adequate remedy at law in a mandamus action for reinstatement or in quo warranto, as the circumstances may dictate and equity therefore will not interfere.   Bartlett, at 430–32

The harm the plaintiffs seek to avoid Ms. Klonoski's removal from the Board occurred nine months ago and is reparable in that she can seek ouster of her replacement through quo warranto and reinstatement through mandamus.¹

In the second instance, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable and imminent harm to support an injunction to prevent defendants, DiPietro and Smith, from “deeming anyone to be any employee of the Plainfield Public School System who has not been subject to a criminal background check and who has not met all the legal perquisites for employment in a Connecticut school district.”   The designation of an individual as an employee, in and of itself, does not create a substantial likelihood if immediate irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' application for temporary injunctions is denied.

BY THE COURT

Calmar, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Mr. Reale has not alleged that he will suffer any harm at all if the temporary injunction is denied..  FN1. Mr. Reale has not alleged that he will suffer any harm at all if the temporary injunction is denied.

Calmar, Harry E., J.