Nancy Lewis v. Kevin Paddy (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON POSTJUDGMENT MOTION FOR MODIFICATION

This matter came before the court on a post judgment motion for modification of a foreign child support order.   The parties to the instant action were never married but have a child in common.   On December 13, 1999, the plaintiff secured a paternity judgment and child support order from the state of Wisconsin.   At said time the defendant resided in Wisconsin and the plaintiff and minor child resided in Connecticut.   The plaintiff and minor child have continued to reside in Connecticut.   The defendant relocated to Virginia in 2007.

On or about April 18, 2012, the plaintiff registered the paternity judgment and support order with the state of Connecticut pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–179.¹  Thereafter, by motion dated June 18, 2012, the plaintiff moved to modify the order and seeks to extend the duration of the order to the child's twenty-first birthday on the basis of the child's alleged disabled status pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–84(c).

It is undisputed that Connecticut has jurisdiction to entertain the motion to modify.   What is disputed is whether the substantive law of Wisconsin, the issuing state, or Connecticut, the home state of the minor child and plaintiff, should apply.   Both parties concede that Wisconsin law does not allow for the extension of a child support order beyond a child's nineteenth birthday or graduation from high school, whichever occurs first.   The plaintiff contends that the application of Connecticut law would permit the court to extend the child support order to the child's twenty-first birthday on the basis of the child's alleged disabled status pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–84(c).  The defendant argues that Wisconsin law must apply, but that even if Connecticut law were to apply Gen.Stat. § 46b–84(c) would not entitle the plaintiff to the relief she seeks as said statute applies only in cases where the parties were married.

A review of the applicable statutes and case law,² supports the position that the Connecticut Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines should be utilized in determining the amount of the child support order but that Wisconsin ³ substantive law is controlling as to the duration of the order.

Gen.Stat. § 46b–179b provides for the registration of foreign paternity judgments and directs that such judgments shall be enforced and treated in the same manner as a judgment of the Family Support Magistrate.   Enforcement and modification of judgments of the Family Support Magistrate Division are governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Gen.Stat. § 46b–212, et seq.

Gen.Stat. § 46b–212o, entitled Applicability of state law, provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in sections 46b–212 to 46b–213w, inclusive, a responding tribunal of the state shall:  (1) Apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings;  and (2) determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state. ”  (Emphasis added.)   Thus, pursuant to subsection (2) Connecticut child support guidelines shall apply.   However, the inquiry does not end there as the statute carves out exceptions as provided for in sections 46b–212 to 46b–213w.   One such exception is found in Gen.Stat. § 46b–213j, entitled Choice of Law. Said statute expressly states that “(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the law of the issuing state governs:  (1) The nature, extent, amount and duration of current payments under a registered support order ․” ⁴

Likewise, Gen.Stat. § 46b–213q(d), which pertains to the modification of support orders from another state, expressly provides that “[i]n a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support.”

Thus, pursuant to Gen.Stat. §§ 46b–212o, 46b–213j and 46b–213q(d) the responding tribunal of this state shall apply the substantive and procedural law of Connecticut in deciding the motion to modify and utilize the Connecticut Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines to determine the modified support order, but the duration of the support order must be determined in accordance with the substantive law of Wisconsin.

For the reasons set forth above, the duration of the support order must be determined in accordance with the substantive law of Wisconsin.

Connors, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff states in her brief that she properly registered the foreign judgment pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–71;  however, said statute only pertains to the registration of foreign “matrimonial” judgments.   As set forth in Gen.Stat. § 46b–70 foreign matrimonial judgments refers to judgments, decrees or orders of the court between married or formerly married parties.   The parties in the instant action were never married.   The defendant correctly references the filing of the judgment pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–179 in his motion for Determination of Controlling Jurisdictional Law of Foreign Child Support Modification dated September 4, 2012..  FN1. The plaintiff states in her brief that she properly registered the foreign judgment pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–71;  however, said statute only pertains to the registration of foreign “matrimonial” judgments.   As set forth in Gen.Stat. § 46b–70 foreign matrimonial judgments refers to judgments, decrees or orders of the court between married or formerly married parties.   The parties in the instant action were never married.   The defendant correctly references the filing of the judgment pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–179 in his motion for Determination of Controlling Jurisdictional Law of Foreign Child Support Modification dated September 4, 2012.

FN2. The plaintiff cited Cartledge v. Evans, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA07–4028072 (April 23, 2010, Frazzini, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr 731), in support of her position that Connecticut law should apply to the duration of the support order.   Cartledge is factually distinguishable as it involved a foreign matrimonial judgment and a situation where both parties and the minor children resided in Connecticut at the time of the modification.   However, more importantly although the court utilized the Connecticut Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines in calculating the amount of the support owed it noted that under both UIFSA and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B, certain portions of the order, including the duration of the support, would still be governed by the law of the issuing state, Massachusetts.   Thus, Cartledge does not support the position that Connecticut law should apply to the issue of the duration of the support order.   To the contrary, the analysis set forth in Cartledge calls for the application of Massachusetts law to the issue of the duration of the child support order..  FN2. The plaintiff cited Cartledge v. Evans, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA07–4028072 (April 23, 2010, Frazzini, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr 731), in support of her position that Connecticut law should apply to the duration of the support order.   Cartledge is factually distinguishable as it involved a foreign matrimonial judgment and a situation where both parties and the minor children resided in Connecticut at the time of the modification.   However, more importantly although the court utilized the Connecticut Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines in calculating the amount of the support owed it noted that under both UIFSA and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B, certain portions of the order, including the duration of the support, would still be governed by the law of the issuing state, Massachusetts.   Thus, Cartledge does not support the position that Connecticut law should apply to the issue of the duration of the support order.   To the contrary, the analysis set forth in Cartledge calls for the application of Massachusetts law to the issue of the duration of the child support order.

FN3. In Wisconsin, when the court renders a paternity judgment the age of a child eligible for support is set forth by statute as follows:  “(4) Age of child eligible for support.   The court shall order either party or both to pay for the support of any child of the parties who is less than 18 years old, or any child of the parties who is less than 19 years old if the child is pursuing an accredited course of instruction leading to the acquisition of a high school diploma or its equivalent.”  Wis. Stat. § 767.511(4)..  FN3. In Wisconsin, when the court renders a paternity judgment the age of a child eligible for support is set forth by statute as follows:  “(4) Age of child eligible for support.   The court shall order either party or both to pay for the support of any child of the parties who is less than 18 years old, or any child of the parties who is less than 19 years old if the child is pursuing an accredited course of instruction leading to the acquisition of a high school diploma or its equivalent.”  Wis. Stat. § 767.511(4).

FN4. Subsection (d) provides for the application of Connecticut law once an order consolidating arrearages is made..  FN4. Subsection (d) provides for the application of Connecticut law once an order consolidating arrearages is made.

Connors, Susan A., J.