Anne M. Bradley v. Mark DeLeito et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

The defendants, Mark DeLeito, Ronald Quagliani and Steven Kaplan have filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's Amended Complaint for the failure of the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.   Specifically, the defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to set forth any clearly identifiable causes of action and, instead, includes overly vague factual allegations and generic references to “slander,” “unlawful blocking,” and unjust arrest.   The defendants argue that the only potential reference to a legally cognizable cause of action of slander is insufficient because none of the necessary factual underpinnings for such claim are included, namely that:  (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement;  (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person;  (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person;  (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.   See, Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84 (2004).

Additionally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff fails to make any specific allegations against the defendant Kaplan, except that he is the President of the University of New Haven, and she sent him a letter in 2006.   The plaintiff refers to the defendant Quagliani only with respect to a 2006 incident that led to her criminal conviction, referring to actions of his subordinates.   The defendants also raise the question of whether the plaintiff's action is time-barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52–577.¹  However, the court will not consider that issue in the context of a motion to strike.

The plaintiff has filed two objections to the motion to strike.   Neither the first objection, dated July 18, 2012 or the second objection, dated August 1, 2012 address the sufficiency of her complaint as to slander, defamation or any cognizable cause of action.   The plaintiff has filed her objection dated August 1, 2012, pursuant to Practice Book sections 10–44, 61–3 and 61–4.   Both Practice Book §§ 61–3 and 61–4 are not applicable, as they relate to appeals of a judgment.  Practice Book § 10–44 regarding a substitute pleading and judgment, which reads in part, as follows, is also not relevant:

Within fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading;  provided that in those instances where an entire complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count in a complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint has been stricken, and the party whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or count thereof ․

Practice Book § 10–44.

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480 (2003).   Accordingly, “[t]he proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial.”  Gutlock v. Gutlock, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309 (1993), citing Practice Book § 10–39.   It is axiomatic that a motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded.”  R.K. Construction, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381 (1994).   However, a motion to strike “does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Falkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576–88 (1997).   When deciding a motion to strike, the court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sullivan v Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117 (2006).

Discussion

“Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander ․ Slander is oral defamation ․ libel ․ is written defamation ․ libel per se ․ is a libel the defamatory meaning of which is apparent on the face of the statement and is actionable without proof of actual damages.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagnon v. Houstonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 848 (2006).   Our Supreme Court explained the four elements of defamation in the case of Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78 (2004).   The Craig court stated “the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement;  (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person;  (3) the defamatory statement was published to the third person;  and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Craig, supra, 84.

A statement is defamatory if it “tends to injure ‘reputation’ in the popular sense;  to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”   W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984), p. 773.   Substantial truth provides an absolute defense to otherwise defamatory statements of fact impugning reputation.  Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican–American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 113, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982).

The Amended Complaint is dated June 25, 2012.   The plaintiff primarily sets forth factual allegations that she applied to the University of New Haven (“UNH”) in May 2012, and that the defendant DeLieto, Chief of Police at UNH somehow prevented her from applying for admission.   She states she has a complaint pending in the U.S. District Court for Connecticut referencing a 2006 incident that resulted in her involuntary confinement to a psychiatric hospital, based upon police involvement.   She was ultimately convicted of a crime after sending a package containing certain items to the defendant Kaplan, President of UNH. She claims she was “drugged up and sexually assaulted” by unidentified persons during her confinement.   She vaguely references “unjust arrest,” “obvious slander and continuous aggressive actions,” and “unlawfully blocking” her from the University premises.

“When claiming defamation, [c]ertainty is required in the allegations as to the defamation and as to the person defamed;  a complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom.   A complaint is insufficient to withstand dismissal for failure to state a cause of action where, other than the bare allegation that the defendant's actions caused injury to plaintiff's reputation, the complaint set forth no facts of any kind indicating what defamatory statements, if any, were made, when they were made, or to whom they might have been made.”   Welker v. Gniadek, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, No. CV10–6008196–S (Oct. 21, 2010, Fischer, B., Judge), quoting, Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 98 0486346 (July 12, 2002, Berger, J.), aff'd, 76 Conn.App. 907, 822 A.2d 372 (2003).

The plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth with any specificity a cognizable legal cause of action Each of her objections to the motion to strike contain numerous complaints and grievances against the defendants, the defendants' legal counsel, the court, the court clerk's office and her own bank, regarding ways in which the plaintiff claims to have been wronged and her rights violated.   The court has read her amended complaint and her objections several times and cannot discern what point the plaintiff is attempting to make, other than to voice continuing dissatisfaction with the defendants, the court system and other entities and institutions.   The court is aware of its obligation to construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.  Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., supra, 277 Conn. 117, but even given these legal parameters, the court cannot be put in a position of guessing or twisting and turning to find sufficient allegations stating some cause of action upon which relief could be granted.   The motion to strike the entire amended complaint is granted.²

THE COURT

By:  Judge Richard E. Arnold

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Sec. 52–577 reads as follows:No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of..  FN1. Sec. 52–577 reads as follows:No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.

FN2. The plaintiff's complaint has the following caption:  “Complaint–Unlawful Refusal by Mark DeLieto for Plaintiff to Re–Apply to University of New Haven, To Enter Property, To Speak to Individuals at that University, Which is in Part Public Property.”   The complaint appears to be in one count as it is not subdivided into various counts..  FN2. The plaintiff's complaint has the following caption:  “Complaint–Unlawful Refusal by Mark DeLieto for Plaintiff to Re–Apply to University of New Haven, To Enter Property, To Speak to Individuals at that University, Which is in Part Public Property.”   The complaint appears to be in one count as it is not subdivided into various counts.

Arnold, Richard E., J.