Ray Weiner et al. v. City of Bridgeport et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a petition for an injunction and a request for declaratory relief in the form of a permanent injunction brought by the plaintiff, Queens Grant Limited Partnership (Queens Land), the owner of commercial property located in Bridgeport at 964 Crescent Ave. The plaintiff is petitioning the court to prohibit the defendants, the City of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport Economic Development Company (BEDCO), from conveying property, located at 232–96 Williston Ave in Bridgeport, to the defendant, Sampson Associates, LLC.

Based on the credible evidence submitted during this four-day hearing, as well as the parties' post-trial briefs, the court makes the following factual and legal conclusions:  By way of background, in the late 1990s the City of Bridgeport recognized that its East Side/East End was at a critical juncture.   The area was originally comprised of sizable factories, restaurants and residences.   It became struggling with the physical realities of abandoned buildings blight and the social, economic hurdles of unemployment.

Aside from various economic development programs enacted by the City of Bridgeport, the City applied for and received funds from the Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development (CDECD) to prepare and submit a Master Development Plan (MDP), pursuant to chapter 132 of the Connecticut General Statutes.

Humbert Sacco is civil engineer employed by TPA Design Group Engineering Firm to prepare a draft for the Municipal Development Plan for Bridgeport in 1998.   This included the writing as well as the descriptive maps and designs.

The draft was made as a recommendation to the Bridgeport Economic Development Corporation, the development plan encompassed approximately 500 acres.

Edward P. Lavernoich is the deputy director for the office of planning and economic development.   He has been employed in that office for 25 years.   He has held the position since 2004.   He is the city's representative on BEDCO.

As a member he votes on all matters requiring board approval, including the adoption of the MDA annual budgets and the sale of specific pieces of property.

At the time the MDP was adopted.   He was the chief project manager for zoning.   Under state law, local development agencies have to adopt a Municipal Development Plan and the City Council has to approve the plan before eminent domain powers can be implemented in accordance with the plan.   It then must be approved by the appropriate State and Federal economic agencies.

This project was called the Seaview Avenue Industrial Park project.   The basic premise was that there were certain abandoned or blighted properties around existing industrial uses.   Those properties were going to be assembled and they would be dedicated for industrial use to expand industries 1 in that particular area.   Residential units within the area were going to be relocated.

When asked what the purpose of a municipal development plan.   Mr. Lavernoich testified:  “In essence, you're looking for opportunities to create a better land-use pattern for commercial and industrial business investment.   Thus, and with the powers of the plan, it allows you to acquire properties that might be considered incompatible uses, acquire properties that are blighted with the owners not investing the property, acquire properties (in the) East Side Restoration Area.” The MDA was formulated and submitted to the Connecticut Department of Economic Development (CDECD).   Approval and any modifications of the plan are required to be approved by the CDECD as the state of Connecticut is funding implementation of the plan, as well as allowing the cities to proceed with condemnation proceedings.   The plan was approved by the state of Connecticut and the Bridgeport city Council with BEDCO designated as the city agency to monitor and implement the Plan.

When the project was first proposed two companies approached the city with requests to allow them to expand their facilities.   The companies were the plaintiff, Queens Grant Limited Partnership and a company called Magnatech.   Both of these companies were located on the same block in the Seaview Avenue area designated for expansion assistance by the MDP.

By way of description, the block with which we are concerned is located on the East Side of Bridgeport.   The northern Street of the block is Crescent Avenue.   The Eastern Street of the block is Bunnell Street.   The southern Street is Williston Avenue and the Western Street is Seaview Avenue.   The plaintiff owns property on the northeast corner of Crescent Avenue and partially along Bunnell Street.   The company was unable to expand its facilities as Amtrak owned and operated railroad tracks on the northern side of Crescent Avenue.   Directly to the west on the block were two buildings.   Across the street on Bunnell Avenue was a construction company.   The only available area for expansion were four residential lots located on Bunnell Street, from the plaintiff's property down to the corner of Williston Street.

Magnatech employed over 250 people and the only major parking was located on the other side of Seaview Avenue, which was apparently the subject of a redevelopment plan itself.   On the southern side of Williston, across from Magnatech were seven residential lots.

When the plan was adopted, several areas in the 500 acres were designated as projects.   With respect to the plaintiff company.  “Project 1–A. Williston–Bunnell Site Development,” was included as part of the “Seaview Industrial Park Project.”   To begin implementation, the four lot residential lots Below Queens Land were condemned and cleared.

With respect to Magnatech, “Project 2–a.   Directed that 1.5 acres on the Williston Street were to be developed for parking.   As a result, seven residential lots on the southerly side of Williston were also condemned and cleared to implement the Magnatech parking lot.

As a requirement of the MDP, any property subject to expansion must be in compliance with Bridgeport's Zoning Regulations.   As such, the zoning for the four vacant lots on Bunnell Street was changed to Light Industrial to accommodate the plaintiff's industrial expansion.

It was decided that because the Williston lots were to be initially used as a parking lot, the zoning remained residential.

Herbert Harrington testified that he is the owner of the plaintiff, Queens Land, as well as the owner of the tenant leasing the property on Crescent Avenue, Rotair Industries, a company which manufactures helicopter parts.

Harrington testified that BEDCO began discussions with respect to the further development of the block for industrial expansion.   Queens Grant's objective was to expand their facility south on Bunnell to Williston.   Over the years they have acquired other properties to allow for expansion, but were limited to any northern expansion as railroad tracks are located along the northern side of Crescent Avenue.   None of any properties owned by Queens Land Limited were purchased after the master plan was developed and therefore none was subject to the benefits or obligations of the Master Development Plan.

In March of 2009 Queens Land and BEDCO entered into a Land Disposition Agreement (LDA) providing that the city of Bridgeport would obtain and clear the residential properties along Bunnell Street between the Queens Grant property and Williston Avenue.   The city would then convey the property to Queens Land for the sum of $67,788.00.   As required, the LDA was approved by BEDCO, the Bridgeport City Council and the State of Connecticut.

The contract which had a “time is of the essence” clause which provided as a condition precedent that the City receive approval from the CDECD, as well as the U.S. Department Of Commerce Economic Development Administration.   If the City had not obtained the approval of those agencies and provided written notice to the buyer within 14 days from the “effective date” of the contract this agreement was to be null and void and all deposits made by the buyer shall be returned to the buyer forth with;  otherwise this condition was be deemed to be satisfied.   The City, has in fact obtain the necessary federal and state approvals.   The “effective date” is defined on the initial page as the date the contract was signed.   The contract further provided that the title was to take place on March 13, 2009 unless the parties mutually agreed in writing to a different closing date, which has not been done.   Harrington testified that he received no communication regarding canceling the contract nor has he requested a return of the deposit.   Queens Land has yet to close on the four vacant lots.

With respect to the lots intended to provide a parking lot for Magnatech, after the seven lots on Williston Street had been condemned and cleared, Magnatech went out of business before they even signed an LDA. In addition, the company that owned the property where the Magnatech building was located went bankrupt.   As a result, the city foreclosed on the property and the foreclosure docket indicates they took title by strict foreclosure in July of 2012.

Ironically, at this time, the seven lots on Williston Street, the four lots on the Bunnell Street and the buildings and land where Magnatech was located are all actually owned by the City of Bridgeport, not Magnatech or Queens Land.

Keith Cryan testified that after Magnatech went out of business and there could be no parking lot constructed for their use, the City went into a disposition mode to attempt have the property developed in compliance with the goals of the Master Plan. After several years, two developers approached BEDCO with a proposal that they would jointly construct an industrial building on the seven vacant lots on Williston.

As the property had been zoned for residential, a modification of the plan was required.   With respect to modification, which required the same approval is the development plan, the BEDCO went to the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission with the developer and change the zone from residential to light industrial.   It eventually went to the city Council, which approved the change of zone as well as did the CDECD.   For some unexplained reasons the developers never executed an LDA with BEDCO with respect to the modified plan.

Some three years later, the defendant, Sampson Industries, approached BEDCO with a proposal for industrial use of these seven lots on Williston Street by constructing a facility for the manufacturing of post consumer goods by processing certain elements of deconstruction.

Mr. Taylor testified that his background consisted of several years in the demolition business having managed several of the major projects in Bridgeport.   He testified that he became interested in a Federal program instituted by the U.S. Green Building Council.   The purpose, for environmental and energy purposes was to modify the waste stream of demolition material from being disposed in landfills or incinerators.   The mission now is to recapture, recycle, reuse and restore those components that were once deposited in landfills by facilitating a manufacturing facility with a conveyor belt.   Components from the construction site are processed and desegregated to make them into marketable, variable products to be redistributed to other manufacturers for use and post consumer products.

The governing body is the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection from whom his company has obtained certification classifying them as a manufacturer of components for industry use.

The process begins when materials, which are taken from the deconstruction site, are required to pass a demolition survey conducted by a licensed, accredited inspector to identify any potential hazardous materials or toxic substance or anything basically harmful in compliance with the requirements of the State of Connecticut.   It is prescreened by a proper contractor to remove the material prior to the demolition in compliance with requirements of the State of Connecticut.   In addition, the facility does not take rocks, bricks or any type of material requiring any crushing.   They remove sheet rock, plaster, carpet, vinyl products, installation and other items.

Sampson does not own or use their own trucks, but the materials are brought in by outside vendors.

The facility would consist of a five-story building.   The entire operation is done indoors under negative air pressure.   Negative air pressure assures that no visual emission escapes from the building and creates a safe air environment for the worker.   The defendant testified that they are committed to hire only people within walking distance in the neighborhood as employees for this semi-skilled process.   They presently anticipate 25 employees per shift and hope to increase that number to 60.   In addition, he has met with and been approved by various neighborhood groups and associations.

The defendant did not apply for a zoning change as the proposed use was in compliance with the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations for light industrial.   The defendant, however, did apply to the Bridgeport Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance for to increase truck traffic from five trucks per day to 25 trucks per day.   It is significant that the defendant opposed the variance and has now filed an appeal after approval by the board.

On February of 2009 the defendant, Sampson Industries, entered into an LDA with BEDCO.   The LDA was approved by the State Economic Development Commission.

The Queens Land's owner testified that the area was for the development of light industrial and in his opinion, the five-story building will dominate the neighborhood and is going to process construction materials.

Harrington testified that he was concerned that the truck traffic would reduce the volume of production by his non-party tenant.   He did admit that Amtrak railway runs on a regular basis across the street from the building and vibrates the building.   He also admitted that the building is located across from a construction company where every equipment is trafficking every day.   He admitted that he really did not know what effect the project would have.

Queens Land claims as the main reason for its opposition is anticipation of a dramatic increase in truck traffic.   He also was “suspect” that there'll be a certain amount of effect on the air quality.   He admitted that it was only speculation.

Aside from the owner of Queens Land, there was no additional testimony evidence, studies or expert opinion as to any of the suspicions raised by the plaintiff with respect to truck traffic and air quality, all of which, one would assume, had been subject to the discretion of the zoning board.

The plaintiff claims that the section in the MDP attached to his LDA which states “provided if modified after the lease or sale of real property.   The modification must be consented by the lessee or purchaser of such real property” the plaintiff claims, as such, any modification required his permission.   The plaintiff admitted that he is a contract purchaser or a contract vendee, but that he is not an owner of any property subject to the above provision.

He admitted that the LDA included a clause that “time is of the essence” and that it did provide for closing on March 13, 2009, which never took place and that no change in a closing date was agreed upon as was required in the contract.   He also admitted that they had and still have an interest in buying the Williston Street property.

In addition to various Bridgeport officials who testified in favor of the project and that, in their opinion, was in compliance with the existing Master Development Plan, there was compelling testimony from Lillian Wade, a resident of the community.

Ms. Wade testified she has been residing in proximity to the Williston Street property for 32 years.   She is president of the Neighborhood Revitalization Zone and a member of the East End Community Council.   The purpose of these organizations is to evaluate any applications for permission for factories or infrastructure in the area intended to create jobs.   She testified that the defendants had presented their proposal and architectural plans for the construction of a material reduction site seeking approval from the respective organizations.   She testified that the organizations approved the project and would create jobs for the East End residents.

With respect to the trucks, Ms. Wade indicated she had no concern about truck traffic as she had lived in the East End for 32 years and there has always been trucks.   They were not worried about noise as the operation would be self-contained within the building.   She also repeated that they had pledged to employ individuals in the community and, at the present time, there are no jobs.   She testified that Rotair does not usually hire neighborhood employees ․ “what happens is when someone proposes to have a factory and infrastructure they come to these neighborhood committees to see if we think it's a good idea and whether we support them.   Then if we don't think it's a good idea we tell them we not supporting them.”   In this case, Ms. Wade and the committees did feel it was a good idea.

Queens Land is claiming that they are entitled to injunctive relief as well as a declaratory ruling granting a permanent injunction.

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the issuance of an injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Anderson v. Latimer Point Management Corp., 208 Conn. 256, 262, 545 A.2d 525 (1988).  “An injunction is an extraordinary remedy which is not mandatory, but is left to the court's sound discretion even if there is a proper showing of irreparable harm.”   Demers Exposition Services, Inc. v. Porter, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 466718 (September 12, 1995, Goldberg, J.);   see also Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, 200 Conn. 151, 165, 510 A.2d 440 (1986) (such relief may be denied even when irreparable harm has been shown).  “In exercising this discretion the trial court must balance the competing interests of the parties ․ and the relief granted must be compatible with the equities of the case.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 225, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984).  “[T]he exercise of discretion by the trial court [is] in light of the totality of the relevant circumstances.”   Doublewal Corp. v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 392, 488 A.2d 444 (1985).   “Injunctive relief may not lie where it is predicated on the fears and apprehensions of the party applying for it or where it would be incompatible with the equities of the case ․” (Citations omitted.)  Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d 784 (1980).

Based on the foregoing, it is the finding of this court that on the basis of the credible evidence submitted, Queens Land is not entitled to the relief requested.

The classic requirements for a permanent injunction are irreparable harm and the lack of adequate remedy at law ․ The prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, exercised according to settled principles of equity.  Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 235 Conn. 562–63 (1995).

The plaintiff claims it will suffer irreparable harm if injunctions are not issued.  “[I]rreparable harm arises when there exists no legal remedy furnishing full compensation or adequate redress for a wrong done to or sustained by an individual.   The injury or wrong complained of must be serious or material and not adequately reparable by damages at law in that, such damages will not restore the complaining party to the position in which the party formerly stood.”   Allshouse v. Farmer, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 153327 (March 10, 1997, Tierney, J.) [19 Conn. L. Rptr. 4]. “Although absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm.”   Silitschanu v. Groesbeck, 12 Conn.App. 57, 65, 529 A.2d 732 (1987), aff'd, 208 Conn. 312, 543 A.2d 737 (1988).

In this case, the plaintiff has shown no credible evidence as to any harm irreparable to itself or anyone else.   The only testimony it offered was that the facility will be a five-story building and they “suspect” traffic may affect their building, which is located on the other side of the block across the street and is subject to the vibrations of a railroad across the street passing every day, and a construction company utilizing heavy equipment on a regular basis across the adjacent street.   There was no factual evidence submitted, no surveys, studies, expert opinion or additional witnesses concerning an adverse effect of this operation.   After four days of the testimony of several witnesses, except for the owner of the plaintiff company, not one witness testified in opposition to the project or as to any adverse effects it may have on the area.

Ms. Wade testified that she has lived in the neighborhood for 32 years and that there has always been truck traffic in that area.   The plaintiff admitted that his “suspicion” truck traffic was based on speculation.

It would be contrary to the concept of this extraordinary relief to grant it on a hardship this court finds is nonexistent.  “Injunctive relief may not lie where it is predicated on the fears and apprehensions of the party applying for it or where it would be incompatible with the equities of the case ․” (Citations omitted.)  Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d 784 (1980).

It is a finding of the court that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm.   With respect to the prerequisite that the plaintiff not have an alternative remedy at law, the plaintiff has presently filed an appeal from the zoning board of appeals approval of the variance for the defendants.   It is the opinion of the court that this administrative appeal is indeed a viable alternate remedy at law, which renders the request for injunctive relief as improper and redundant.  Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414 (1992).

It is the finding of the court that the plaintiff does have an alternate remedy at law.

The plaintiff is requesting the court order the City to comply with the original intended project by the MDA, which was to construct a parking lot for Magnatech on the Williston Street property.

There is a doctrine known as “Impossibility of Performance.”   A concise statement of it is set forth in 17 Am.Jur.2d, “Contracts” at § 655, pages 612–13.   There it says:  “Impossibility of performance may be classified as original impossibility or supervening impossibility.   Original impossibility is impossibility of performance existing at the time the contract was made, so that the contract was to do something, that was impossible from the outset, while supervening impossibility exists when the subject matter of the contract for which the parties bargained is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed due to an unforeseen supervening act, for which the promisor is not responsible.”

As the evidence indicated, after the MDA was approved, Magnatech went out of business and is no longer in existence.   Prior to doing so, Magnatech never purchased the Williston Street property, nor did they ever enter a contract to do so.   In effect, the plaintiff is asking the court to enforce a nonexistent contract to build a parking lot on property owned by the city of Bridgeport for the benefit of a nonexistent third party, which is, to say the least, impossible.

The plaintiff claims that under the master development plan, and in particular the reference to modification, it is entitled to a declaratory ruling prohibiting the defendants conveying the property without his consent.   The court disagrees.

The section with which we are concerned is a statute incorporated into the master development plan.  C.G.S. § 8–200.  “Modification of development plan.   Abandonment of plan and Conveyance of property.   Limitations. (a) A development plan may be modified at any time by the development agency, provided, if modified after the lease or sale of real property in the development project area, the modification must be consented to by the lessees or purchasers of such real property or their successor or successors in interest affected by the proposed modification.   Where the proposed modification will substantially change the development plan as previously approved, the modification must be approved in the same manner as the development plan.”

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review and the guiding legal principles.  “[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review ․ The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply ․ When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 367, 984 A.2d 705 (2009).

The salient portion of the section provides that if a modification takes place “after the sale or lease of real property, the modification must be consented to by the lessees or purchasers of such real property or their successor or successors in interest affected by the proposed modification.”   There is no question that the plaintiff, Queens Land and Magnatech never purchased any properties in the Seaview Avenue area pursuant to the MDA. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to meet the initial condition precedent of standing.   It is also the opinion of the court, pursuant to the phrase that the modification “must be consented to by the lessees or purchasers of such real property or their successor or successors in interest affected by the proposed modification” requires a that the modification must be consented to by only the party who has purchased the subject property to be modified.   This is contrary to the claim of this plaintiff that any developer in the 500–acre project may prohibit the granting of a modified industrial plan for any other property in the project.   It is logical that the intent of the legislature was to require a developer who purchases, and may perhaps have constructed an industrial facility must consent to a modification of its investment.   There is no logical basis for granting any developer in the 500 acres, such as the plaintiff, to arbitrarily prohibit a modification to someone else's property and obstruct the intent of the MDA without even having to establish any basis for doing so.   To extend the plain meaning of the text, as suggested by the plaintiff, would result in an absurd and unworkable result.

The section also requires that “when the proposed modification will substantially change the development plan as previously approved, the modification must be approved in the same manner as the development plan.”   It is the opinion of the court that a modification, which this court does not consider substantially changing the development plan was previously modified.   Three years before, Sampson signed this purchase agreement, two developers proposed an industrial facility, to be constructed on the Williston Avenue property.   BEDCO and the developers jointly applied for and approved to a change of zoning for Williston Street from residential to light industrial.   The change of zone and proposal of the developers was reviewed and approved by the Bridgeport City Council and subsequently by the State of Connecticut Economic Commission.   Those actions were in compliance with the requirements for modification of the MDA.

The plaintiff introduced no evidence that at the time the modification was obtained, the LDA between itself and BEDCO had even been signed.

The present proposal by Sampson Industries is not a modification, but an accepted use in Bridgeport's light industrial zone in furtherance of the intent of the MDP. Sampson has received certification classifying them as a manufacturer of components for industrial use from the Federal Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.  C.G.S. § 32–9p(d) defines a “Manufacturing Facility as any plant building or other real property ․ Which is acquired after July in 1978 in a distressed municipality, targeted as an investment community, pursuant to C.G.S. § 32–222(2) which is to be used for the manufacturing, processing, or assembling of raw materials.”   As such, Sampson did not require a zoning approval but did apply for a variance from the Zoning Board of Appeals to increase truck traffic from 5 to 25 per day.

“Where the granting of the injunction would cause damage to the defendant greatly disproportionate to the injury of which the plaintiff complains, it may be held inequitable to grant a mandatory injunction and the plaintiff may be remitted to her remedy by way of damages.”  Moore v. Serafin, 163 Conn. 1, 6–7, 301 A.2d 238 (1972);  Although the issuance of an injunction rests within the sound discretion of this court, a “trial court must balance the competing interests of the parties ․ and the relief granted must be compatible with the equities of the case.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dukes v. Durante, supra, 192 Conn. 225.   In particular, a party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of showing a balancing of the equities in its favor over the hardships to the defendant.   See Housing Authority v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 3311.

With respect to balancing the equities should an injunction be granted and the properties remain in status quo, the plaintiff offered no evidence of the alleviation any harm or damages.   It should be noted that at the request of Queens Land, the City of Bridgeport at its expense, condemned, cleared and changed the zoning to light industrial, for the four lots on Bunnell Street.   Queens Land signed an LDA to purchase the property in March of 2009.   Although all of the conditions precedent have been completed, Queens Land has yet to comply with its contractual obligation with the city to purchase the property.   As a result, the four lots have remained vacant and unproductive.   In addition, the owner of Queens Land testified that they are interested in obtaining the Williston Street property.

In the opinion of the court, the defendants conduct in equity, amounts to bad faith, which is prohibitive of its equitable claims.

In contrast, if the injunction were granted with respect to the city of Bridgeport and the defendant, Sampson Industries, the hardships would be severe.

With respect to the city of Bridgeport, it would have expended hundreds of thousands of dollars to condemn and clear 11 acres in a blighted area intended to receive economic assistance.   Instead, the 11 acres have remained vacant for years and as a result, the city of Bridgeport is losing tax revenue.

Irene Wade and her neighbors who have been unable to obtain employment are losing the opportunity to work at a facility committed to hire members of the community within walking distance.

Sampson will have lost, aside from expenses paid to date, its opportunity to construct and operate a facility which will as serve both an ecological, as well as an economic asset for the community, as was intended by the enactment of the Master Development Plan. As was indicated, the city of Bridgeport has recognized that the East Side/East, East/End of the city has become a blighted area where industry expansion has been constrained.   The projects proposed by the MDA, including the current plan for Williston Street, are intended to increase industrial development in that area which would result in employment opportunities, increased tax revenue for the city and incentives for local industries to expand.   It is the finding of this court that the attempt by the plaintiff to enjoin development of the Williston Street property represents an unfortunate obstruction of the intent of the Development Plan. As such, it is the decision of the court that any consideration of granting this injunction is prohibited by equity.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to its cause of action and therefore, judgment may enter for the defendants with costs.

GILARDI, J.T.R.

Gilardi, Richard P., J.T.R.