Anna Marie Angelo, Conservator v. Sergio Quesada et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant, Lincoln Technical Institute, moves to strike the fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint in which the plaintiff alleges negligence and violation of the Connecticut Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).   This plaintiff, as conservator of Victoria Angelo, commenced the present action against, among others, the defendant driver, Sergio Quesada, and the defendant owner, Monica Hernandez, of a motor vehicle that was involved in a single-vehicle accident that caused severe personal injuries to Angelo.   Lincoln Tech moves to strike the fifth count claiming that it does not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff, and moves to strike the sixth count contending that the plaintiff has failed to allege a legally sufficient claim supporting a CUTPA violation.   For the reasons hereinafter discussed, the motion is denied.

The following facts alleged by the plaintiff are relevant to this motion and must be accepted as true.   Lincoln Tech is an educational institution that offers programs, including a nursing program.   In order to be eligible for the nursing program, Lincoln Tech required each prospective student to provide a copy of a driver's license.   Quesada, a minor, and Angelo, were enrolled in the nursing program at the time of the subject accident.   Lincoln Tech knew that Quesada had a learner's permit, but that he had not yet passed his driver's test and obtained a license.   Quesada drove himself to school despite not having a license.   On March 21, 2011, Quesada drove Angelo and another student off campus to have lunch.   Lincoln Tech did not provide a cafeteria.   At that time, Quesada lost control of his vehicle and struck a utility pole resulting in Angelo suffering severe and debilitating personal injuries.

The plaintiff claims in the fifth count that Angelo's injuries and losses were caused by the negligence of Lincoln Tech in various ways.   The crux of the allegations relate to the fact that, despite its eligibility requirements to the contrary, Lincoln Tech was negligent in admitting Quesada into its nursing program without requiring him to provide a copy of his driver's license, and when it knew that he only had a learner's permit.

Lincoln Tech moves to strike the negligence count claiming that, under the circumstances, it does not owe a legal duty to Angelo.   The plaintiff responds that Lincoln Tech's claim of lack of a duty focuses on the alleged negligence of Quesada in the operation of his vehicle, as opposed to Lincoln Tech's own alleged negligence in admitting Angelo into its nursing program under the alleged circumstances.   The plaintiff contends that she “is not seeking to hold Lincoln Tech responsible for Sergio Quesada's negligence, but for Lincoln Tech's own negligence.”

“Whenever any party wishes to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10–39.  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[I]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).   A motion to strike “does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 580.

I

As noted by plaintiff's counsel, our Appellate Court, in an opinion authored by former Chief Justice Borden, recently decided a case wherein the Court discussed in detail the common law concerning the existence of duty of care.   The issue before the court in Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 135 Conn.App. 119, 43 A.3d 186 (2012), was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant concluding that the defendant owed the plaintiffs no duty of care.  Id., 121.   The undisputed facts were that the defendant was the owner and landlord of a multi-family apartment building.   Id., 122.   Debris was strewn across the building's backyard, and the defendant had notice of that condition.  Id. Children were playing in the backyard when one child decided to see if they could break a rock by throwing it to the ground from a third-floor apartment.  Id. The rock struck the plaintiff in the head causing her injuries.  Id.

“The existence of a duty of care is a prerequisite to a finding of negligence ․ The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant [breached] that duty in the particular situation at hand ․ If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.

“Our Supreme Court has stated that the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case ․

“In negligence cases [such as the present one] in which a tortfeasor's conduct is not the direct cause of the harm, the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor's duty [owed] to the plaintiff ․ The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual ․ Essential to determining whether a legal duty exists is the fundamental policy of the law that a tortfeasor's responsibility should not extend to the theoretically endless consequences of the wrong ․ Even where harm was foreseeable, [our Supreme Court] has found no duty when the nexus between a defendant's negligence and the particular consequences to the plaintiff was too attenuated ․ Put another way, [i]t is a well established tenet of our tort jurisprudence that [d]ue care does not require that one guard against eventualities which at best are too remote to be reasonably foreseeable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted;  Citations omitted.)  Id., 124–25.

Lincoln Tech premises its claim that it did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care on its assertions that it would be against public policy to find it responsible for the negligence alleged by the plaintiff, and that the harm suffered by Angelo was not reasonably foreseeable to Lincoln Tech. Under the peculiar circumstances of this action, the court disagrees.

The court will first consider whether an ordinary person in Lincoln Tech's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate harm of the general nature of that suffered by Angelo was likely to result.   The court is required to “focus on the general nature of the harm suffered, and not the specific manner in which the harm occurred ․” Id., 192.   The inquiry is whether a reasonable educational institution such as Lincoln Tech, knowing that it requires prospective nursing students to provide a copy of their driver's license as part of the application process, knowing that students have to drive to and from campus to attend school, knowing that it does not provide a cafeteria for students, knowing that students at times leave campus to eat lunch, and knowing that it admitted a student into the nursing program without requiring him to provide a copy of his driver's license, and with only a learner's permit, would be able to foresee that harm a person was likely to suffer harm of the general nature that Angelo suffered in this action as a result of Quesada losing control of his vehicle.   The court answers the question in the affirmative ¹ and concludes, generally, that sustaining injury as a result of an accident involving a student of Lincoln Tech that was not properly licensed to drive and who drove off campus during the school day for lunch was reasonably foreseeable.  “Put another way, [the court] think[s] that this case is close enough to the margin of reasonable foreseeability that it would be inappropriate to foreclose the foreseeability inquiry as a matter of law.”  Id., 127.

The court must next consider in the duty calculus whether there are public policy reasons to extend such a duty of care to Lincoln Tech under the circumstances.  “[I]n considering whether public policy suggests the imposition of a duty, we ․ consider the following four factors:  (1) the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review;  (2) the public policy of encouraging participation in the activity, while weighing the safety of the participants;  (3) the avoidance of increased litigation;  and (4) the decisions of other jurisdictions ․ [A] totality of the circumstances rule ․ is most consistent with the public policy goals of our legal system, as well as the general tenor of our tort jurisprudence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted;  citations omitted.)  Id., 128–29.

The court applies these four factors and concludes that imposing a duty of care on Lincoln Tech under the circumstances of the present case is not inconsistent with public policy.   The court first considers the normal expectation of the parties in the activity under review.   The activity under review here is Lincoln Tech's knowing admission of a student into its nursing program who did not possess a driver's license, which was a requirement for eligibility.   It is not unreasonable under the circumstances for other students, such as the plaintiff, to expect Lincoln Tech to only allow licensed drivers into its nursing program.   In considering the second factor, encouraging participation in the activity, the court concludes that as a matter of public policy it is desirable to encourage Lincoln Tech to adhere to its requirement that prospective students to the nursing program provide a copy of a driver's license as part of the admissions process in view of the nature of the school and the specific program.   As for the third factor, the court finds that there is little likelihood that imposing such a duty would increase litigation.   Finally, as to the fourth factor, the court concludes that decisions of other jurisdictions are not particularly helpful given the unique facts of this action.

In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that Lincoln Tech owed Angelo a reasonable duty of care.   Therefore, Lincoln Tech's motion to strike (110.00) the fifth count is denied.²

II

Lincoln Tech moves to strike the sixth count in which the plaintiff alleges that Lincoln Tech's conduct violates CUTPA.   Specifically, Lincoln Tech claims that “the plaintiff also has not alleged sufficient facts to support that the acts the plaintiff complains of were performed in Lincoln Tech's primary trade or business of providing educational services.”

Although the sixth count is not a model of pleading clarity, the plaintiff has, for purposes of a motion to strike, sufficiently alleged facts in support of a CUTPA claim.   Therefore, the motion to strike the sixth count is denied.

III

The defendant, Lincoln Tech's motion to strike (110.00) the fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.

TYMA, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Within the procedural framework of a motion to strike, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true.   This procedural anomaly, to some extent, directs the court's decision in this case..  FN1. Within the procedural framework of a motion to strike, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true.   This procedural anomaly, to some extent, directs the court's decision in this case.

FN2. Lincoln Tech also moves to strike the fifth count claiming that the facts are insufficient to show any negligent conduct by Lincoln Tech was a proximate cause of Angelo's injuries.   Specifically, Lincoln Tech states that its alleged negligence “was clearly not a substantial factor in bringing about ․ Angelo's injuries.”   A cursory review of the complaint shows that the plaintiff has pleaded the necessary elements of a negligence claim, which allegations the court must accept as true.   Consequently, the motion to strike on this ground is denied..  FN2. Lincoln Tech also moves to strike the fifth count claiming that the facts are insufficient to show any negligent conduct by Lincoln Tech was a proximate cause of Angelo's injuries.   Specifically, Lincoln Tech states that its alleged negligence “was clearly not a substantial factor in bringing about ․ Angelo's injuries.”   A cursory review of the complaint shows that the plaintiff has pleaded the necessary elements of a negligence claim, which allegations the court must accept as true.   Consequently, the motion to strike on this ground is denied.

Tyma, Theodore R., J.