Robin L. Kolodecik et al. v. Hospital of Saint Raphael et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE # 125, OBJECTION # 131 AND REPLY # 132

The captioned matter arises out of an appeal from rulings of Hamden–Bethany Probate Court removing the plaintiffs as co-administratrix of the estate of their late mother, Eleanor Kolodecik, “Estate,” appointing a successor administrator of the Estate, and granting the defendant's, “HSR,” application to reject the plaintiffs' attempted disallowance of HSR's claim against the Estate in the amount of $2,574,387.00 for services claimed to have been rendered to the Estate.

CHRONOLOGY

August 23, 2009 Eleanor Kolodecik died.

October 15, 2009 Plaintiffs appointed fiduciaries of the Estate of their late mother, Eleanor Kolodecik by the Hamden–Bethany Probate Court.

December 4, 2009 Inventory in the Estate filed in the Probate Court.

January 15, 2010 Hospital of St. Raphael, “HSR,” filed a $2,574,387.00 claim for services rendered against the Estate in the Probate Court.

April 25, 2010 Estate filed a Return and List of Claims in the Probate Court, including the HSR claim, allowing the listed claims, including the HSR claim, and gave notice to HSR in compliance with C.G.S. 45a–360(a)(2).

May 6, 2011 HSR petitioned the Probate Court to remove the fiduciaries of the Estate.

June 30, 2011 the Estate fiduciaries disallow the HSR claim for $2,574,387.00 in apparent contradiction to their previous allowance of the claim, see action of April 25, 2010 noted above.

July 18, 2011 HSR applied to the Probate Court to reject the disallowance of the HSR claim against the estate exercising rights under C.G.S. 45a–363(b)(2), though the HSR petition to the Probate Court is not part of the Superior Court file but is merely described by the parties.

August 10, 2011 Probate Court hearing held on removal of the fiduciaries and the disallowance of the HSR claim apparently pursuant to C.G.S. 45a–364.

January 23, 2012 Probate Court decree issued removing the fiduciaries, appointing a successor fiduciary and rejecting the disallowance of the HSR claim against the Estate.

The plaintiffs timely filed their appeal from the Hamden–Bethany Probate Court in the New Haven Superior Court on February 21, 2012.   The relief sought in the complaint is:

Vacate the entire Probate Court decree;  and

Restore the plaintiffs as fiduciaries of the Estate.

On July 24, 2012 HSR filed an Amended Answer and three Special Defenses.   The Third Special Defense is the subject of the plaintiff's September 11, 2012 Motion to Strike.

The Third Special Defense alleges four paragraphs concluding:  “The Plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.”   The four paragraphs are directed only at the topic of the plaintiffs' initial allowance of and later disallowance of the HSR claim against the estate.   The Third Special Defense does not address the plaintiffs' claim for reinstatement of fiduciaries for the estate.

Plaintiffs move to Strike the Third Special Defense asserting that:  (1) laches is an equitable defense unavailable in an action at law such as the captioned case;  and (2) that the Special Defense alleges facts inconsistent with the Complaint and is therefore procedurally defective pursuant to P.B. 10–50.

The defendant HSR opposes the motion to strike arguing that the appeal from Probate is not an action at law and therefore equitable defenses are appropriate and further that even if the appeal is an action at law, sometimes in such circumstances, equitable defenses are appropriate.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading ․’ Eskin v. Castiglia, 253 Conn. 516, 522, 753 A.2d 927 (2000).   In deciding on a motion to strike, the court must ‘read the allegations of the complaint generously to sustain its viability ․’ Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193, 212, 746 A.2d 730 (2000).   The court ‘must take as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint [or necessarily implied from the allegations] and must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency,’ Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 226, 717 A.2d 202 (1998).  ‘The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.’  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  ‘If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.’  Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000) ․ Moreover, [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).”   Dickinson v. Volicella, J.D. New Britain, Docket No. CV 02 0516604 S, (January 13, 2004, Robinson, R., J.), 2004 WL 204867.

“When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate.  Kerin v. Stangle, 209 Conn. 260, 264, 550 A.2d 1069 (1988);  Satti v. Rago, 186 Conn. 360, 365, 441 A.2d 615 (1982).   In probate appeals, a Superior Court may admit any evidence that was received by the Probate Court or could have been received by it ․ [but] may not receive evidence that the Probate Court could not have received because it came into existence subsequent to the Probate Court hearing.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hall v. Schoenwetter, 239 Conn. 553, 556 n.6, 686 A.2d 980 (1996).”  In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, fn 10 (2000).

“We have emphasized the narrow limits of probate courts' equitable powers in a long line of cases extending over more than one century.  [C]ourts of probate do not have any general equity jurisdiction.  Hall v. Pierson, supra, 63 Conn. 344;  see Killen v. Klebanoff, supra, 140 Conn. 118.   Similar to implied powers, probate courts possess only those equitable powers as are necessary for the performance of their statutory duties.  Hall v. Pierson, supra, 344.  “[T]he equity which the Probate Court administers must grow out of and be inseparably connected with the matter the court is acting upon.”   Killen v. Klebanoff, supra, 118;  see Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., supra, 160 Conn. 429;  Hewitt's Appeal from Probate, 53 Conn. 24, 37, 1 A. 815 (1885).  “The situation, therefore, in which the Probate Court may exercise equitable jurisdiction must be one which arises within the framework of a matter already before it, and wherein the application of equity is but a necessary step in the direction of the final determination of the entire matter.”  Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., supra, 429.”  In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 593 (2000).

“Laches consists of an inexcusable delay which prejudices the defendant;  (f)irst, there must be a delay that is inexcusable, and, second that delay must have prejudiced the defendant.”  Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 350 (1990).   Here the Third Special Defense alleges what the court might infer is a claim of inexcusable delay, but fails to allege prejudice as a result.   The defense fails to allege a necessary element of the defense of laches and is legally insufficient as a consequence.

A distinguishing characteristic between the action at law and the suit in equity is in the nature of relief requested:  damages versus equitable relief.   Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, ‘Action at Law’ and ‘Action in Equity.’

The relief requested by the HSR is allowance of a claim against the estate for unpaid medical bills, i.e. a demand for money damages, QED:  an action at law.   The defense of laches is clearly an equitable defense.

Conclusions

The Third Special Defense addresses only the claim of legal relief sought by the plaintiffs with respect to their defense to the claim for money damages asserted by HSR against the plaintiffs' decedent for medical services rendered by HSR to the decedent during the decedent's lifetime.

The motion to strike the Third Special Defense is granted because the gravamen of the defense is a claim for money damages, i.e. an action at law and the defense of laches is available only to a claim seeking equitable relief.   Furthermore, the defense of laches is insufficiently pled in that there is no claim of prejudice to the defendant as a consequence of the ‘inexcusable delay’ caused by the plaintiffs' conduct.

Zemetis, J.

Zemetis, Terence A., J.