Stavros Lazaridis v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co. et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (129.00)

FACTS

This case arises out of a two-car accident.   Stavros Lazaridis, the plaintiff, has sued Kani Pennant and the Hertz Corporation (Hertz), amongst others.   The plaintiff filed a substituted complaint dated April 4, 2012 wherein the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, the following.   On or about October 30, 2009, the plaintiff, while operating a motor vehicle, was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Pennant as a result of Pennant's negligence.   The defendant Hertz owned the vehicle driven by Pennant.   While operating the vehicle, Pennant was an employee, agent or servant of Hertz and acting in the course of his employment or agency.

On May 18, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to count one.   In support of the motion, the defendant submitted (1) a memorandum of law;  (2) a copy of an affidavit of Kim Leone, a senior claim examiner for the defendant and (3) a copy of a rental agreement between Hertz and Pennant for the vehicle driven by Pennant during the alleged accident.   The plaintiff has filed no memorandum, affidavit or documentation in opposition to the motion.   The unopposed motion was heard at the short calendar on September 24, 2012.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).   When “there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof.”   Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).  “The existence of a duty [in a negligence case] is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006).

The defendant asserts the following grounds in support of its motion.   First, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) ¹ has preempted General Statutes § 14–154a,² thereby abolishing negligence claims based on vicarious liability against renters of motor vehicles, and, therefore, the defendant's status as a car rental company precludes its liability.   Second, § 30106(a) has preempted General Statutes § 52–183, and, furthermore, Pennant's capacity was not that of agent, servant or employee, whose actions, under an agency theory, could make the defendant vicariously liable as a principal or an employer.   The defendant's grounds are discussed in turn.

I.

On August 10, 2005, Congress enacted § 30106, which expressly preempts state laws, such as § 14–154a, that purport to hold those who rent or lease motor vehicles vicariously liable for harm that arises during a rental or leasing period.   See Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n.1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006) (“[A]s of August 10, 2005, federal law preempts the state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies.  49 U.S.C. § 30106”).   Consistent with the statute, the Connecticut courts have stated three requirements to applying the statute:  “The first prong, requiring that the action must have commenced on or after the statute's effective date of August 10, 2005 ․ The second requirement ․ that the vehicle owner must be engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles ․ The third and final requirement ․ that there can be no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the vehicle owner.”   Steinfeld v. Lipman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5009730 (July 30, 2008, Bellis, J.) (granting summary judgment and noting “Connecticut courts have routinely granted motions filed by defendants based on § 30106 where the conditions have been met”).

The documentation and affidavits filed by Hertz readily satisfy the first two elements of the Steinfeld test.   With regard to the third element, Hertz contends that the plaintiff's allegations in count one sound in negligence based solely on vicarious liability, that is, that no negligent acts of the defendant are alleged.   The court observes that paragraph 11(I) of the first count contains an allegation that the vehicle “was not equipped with brakes adequate to bring it to a controlled stop” and that “the brakes were not in good working order.”   However, the operative allegation in paragraph 11(I) is that the defendant “operated” the vehicle while it was in that condition.   Only the defendant Pennant operated the vehicle, and, accordingly, the court must conclude that the allegation is directed against the individual defendant and not Hertz.   Nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting an action against a rental car company where there is evidence that the rental car company negligently permitted a car to be driven with inadequate brakes.   That, however, is not the allegation contained in the complaint presently before the court.   Therefore, the three conditions of § 30106 have been met.   Consequently, insofar as liability is based on § 14–154a, § 30106 precludes the defendant from being vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of Pennant.

II.

Section 52–183, entitled “Presumption of agency in motor vehicle operation,” provides:  “In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle [for the negligence of] the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.   The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.”

The defendant has submitted the following evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of § 52–183 and establish the absence of an issue as to the fact that Pennant was not the defendant's agent.   In her deposition, Leone states:  “Kani Pennant is not, nor has ever been, a servant, agent or employee of Hertz.”   The plaintiff has presented no evidence to contradict this affidavit, and, therefore, has failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue as to whether Pennant was an agent of the defendant.   Consequently, the defendant has met its burden, insofar as liability is based upon an agency theory, that the defendant is not vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of Pennant.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendant Hertz is granted.

BY THE COURT

GENUARIO, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 provides in relevant part:  “(a) In General.   An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person ․ shall not be liable under the law of any State ․ by reason of being the owner of the vehicle ․ for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use ․ of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner ․ is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner ․ (c) ․ [T]his section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section [August 10, 2005].”.  FN1. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 provides in relevant part:  “(a) In General.   An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person ․ shall not be liable under the law of any State ․ by reason of being the owner of the vehicle ․ for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use ․ of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner ․ is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner ․ (c) ․ [T]his section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section [August 10, 2005].”

FN2. General Statutes § 14–154a provides in relevant part:  “Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.”.  FN2. General Statutes § 14–154a provides in relevant part:  “Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.”

Genuario, Robert L., J.