Charlotte Joseph v. The City of Stamford South House Health Care Center et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (117.00) CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (Correction to Memorandum of Decision dated July 18, 2012) (Correction made was re typographical error on page 1. Defendant's name corrected to read The City of Stamford Smith House Health Care Center et al.

This motion to strike by defendant Barbara Fleischer was not opposed by any opposition papers on behalf of the plaintiff or any oral argument at short calendar.

The motion to strike the first count alleging a violation of Gen.Stat. § 46a–60(a)(1) (CFEPA) is granted in that individual employees may not be held liable under CFEPA based on the statutory language, Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 744 (2002), and the arguments contained in Fleischer's memorandum of law.

The motion to strike the second count alleging retaliation in violation of Gen.Stat. § 46a–60(a)(4) is granted because the complaint does not allege the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.   In employment discrimination cases this has been defined as more than inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.   Examples of such material changes are termination, demotion, wage, salary or benefit loss, or diminution of title.  Martin v. Westport, 108 Conn.App. 710, 718–19 (2008).¹  In this case the plaintiff has not alleged any actions by Fleischer that amount to an adverse employment action.

The motion to strike the third count alleging intentional infliction of emotional harm is granted.   The plaintiff has not made any specific allegations against Fleischer in connection with her claim of intentional infliction of emotional harm.   At most, she alleges that “defendants were motivated to make false allegations against the plaintiff in retaliation for the plaintiff having previously engaged in protected conduct in as much as she complained that they had subjected her to racially offensive conduct.”   This allegation includes Fleischer only because the defendants are mentioned in the plural.   Even assuming it is directed at Fleischer, the allegation does not come close to alleging facts that meet the standard set forth in Carol v. All State Insurance Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442–43 (2003), and other cases cited by the defendants.

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Martin v. Westport, supra, involved a claim of discrimination under Gen.Stat. § 31–290a prohibiting discharge or discrimination against employee who exercises rights under the workers' compensation laws.   The same standard, however, is employed in general retaliation claims such as this.   See Galayba v. New York City Bd. of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000);  Sanders v. New York City Human Resources Administration, 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.2004);  Kelib v. Conn. Housing Finance Authority, Superior Court, CV 05 4010160 judicial district of Fairfield (Nov. 21, 2005, Rodriguez, J.);   Majewski v. Bridgeport Bd. of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, CV 03 0406893 (Jan. 20, 2005, Arnold, J.)..  FN1. Martin v. Westport, supra, involved a claim of discrimination under Gen.Stat. § 31–290a prohibiting discharge or discrimination against employee who exercises rights under the workers' compensation laws.   The same standard, however, is employed in general retaliation claims such as this.   See Galayba v. New York City Bd. of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000);  Sanders v. New York City Human Resources Administration, 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.2004);  Kelib v. Conn. Housing Finance Authority, Superior Court, CV 05 4010160 judicial district of Fairfield (Nov. 21, 2005, Rodriguez, J.);   Majewski v. Bridgeport Bd. of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, CV 03 0406893 (Jan. 20, 2005, Arnold, J.).

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.