Suzanne Nowacki v. Michael Nowacki (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

(Plaintiff's February 28, 2011 postjudgment motion:  No. 325 for sole legal and physical custody)

The plaintiff mother, Suzanne Sullivan, filed motion No. 325, on February 28, 2011, requesting that she be awarded sole legal and physical custody of her two minor children and that the defendant father, Michael Nowacki, be limited to supervised visitation only.¹  On May 19, 2011 and on June 27 and June 28, 2011, this matter was addressed at a hearing at which the plaintiff was represented by attorney Kevin F. Collins, the children were represented by an attorney for the minor children, Veronica E. Reich, and the defendant represented himself.   In the course of the hearing, the court heard testimony from the parties and their witnesses and received documentary evidence.   The children's interests were protected by a guardian ad litem.

The court has considered the credible evidence, the parties' arguments, and the proposed orders.   Additionally, the court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and the witnesses at the time of trial.   The court has also carefully examined the exhibits admitted during the hearing.

Procedural Background 2

By way of background, the marriage of Suzanne Nowacki and Michael Nowacki was dissolved by decree, dated June 29, 2005.   At that time, the parties entered into a separation agreement, which the court accepted and incorporated into the judgment of dissolution.   There are two minor children issue of the marriage:  Timothy John Nowacki, born November 1994, and Kerry Jane Nowacki, born November 1996.   The parenting plan included joint legal and physical custody of the minor children, and, in general, provided for a “one week on, one week off” schedule with each parent.³

On June 11, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification seeking legal and primary physical custody of the minor children.   On June 29, 2009, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an attorney for the minor children (AMC).   Shortly thereafter, on July 2, 2009, attorney Veronica Reich was appointed as the AMC. The court further ordered that a psychological evaluation of the parties be conducted after the AMC had an opportunity to meet with both parties and her clients.   On November 3, 2009, after a hearing, it was ordered that Dr. Kenneth Robson conduct the psychological evaluation of the parties.

In December 2009, the AMC filed an ex parte emergency motion for modification of custody and parenting time.   This motion asserted that, since the AMC's appointment in July 2009, the defendant's behavior had become increasingly erratic and there were concerns regarding the long-term welfare of the children.   On December 2, 2009, the court, Schofield, J., granted the AMC's ex parte motion.   Specifically, the court provided in relevant part:  “It is ordered that the plaintiff ․ have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children ․ and that the defendant ․ have supervised visitation, on schedule to be determined, pending further hearing before this court.   It is further ordered that the defendant ․ be cited to appear before this court then and there to be heard on this issue.”

Subsequently, on January 22, 2010, the court, Schofield, J., commenced a hearing regarding the AMC's ex parte request for sole legal and physical custody to determine whether the ex parte order entered by the court should be continued in full force and effect.   The hearing was suspended once the court found that the defendant was not competent to represent himself in the proceedings.   The court's finding was based on testimony from Dr. Kenneth Robson that the defendant was unable to perceive the reality of the situation and deal with it in a normal manner.   In conjunction with suspending the proceedings, the court stated that, based on Dr. Robson's assessment of the defendant's competence to represent himself, it would consider the appointment of someone to represent the defendant.

On November 19, 2010, the court, Malone, J., vacated Judge Schofield's decision, finding that the defendant was now able to represent himself.   The court ordered that the hearing on custody modification, which had been suspended since January 22, 2010, be scheduled to resume at a later date.⁴

On January 10, 2011, this matter was referred to the Regional Family Trial Docket (RFTD), and on January 15, 2011, the RFTD conducted a status conference with both parties and counsel.   The court, Calmar, J., advised that, in light of the fact that the December 2, 2009 ex parte emergency orders regarding custody and supervised visitation had remained in place without resolution for over a year, there would be a “fresh start.”   In conjunction with this determination, the court indicated that the ex parte orders still in place would terminate on Friday, March 4, 2011, unless a motion or motions based on current circumstances had been filed and determined prior to that date.   In this regard, the court advised the parties that they would have an opportunity to file new motions addressing custody and visitation of the minor children, including, if necessary, emergency motions, provided they were filed no later than February 28, 2011.   The parties were ordered to appear in court on March 4, 2011, and to maintain their availability to appear in court for trial on March 10, 15, 16 and 18, 2011.

On February 28, 2010, the AMC filed her second ex parte emergency motion for modification of custody and the plaintiff filed the instant motion, No. 325.   Thereafter, on March 4, 2011,⁵ the court denied the AMC's second postjudgment ex parte emergency motion for modification of custody and parenting time.   The court's action in terminating the ex parte order effectively reinstated the original parenting responsibility plan of June 29, 2005, which provided for joint legal custody and the sharing of physical custody on a week-to-week basis.⁶  This arrangement was, nevertheless, subject to existing criminal protective orders.⁷  The court ordered an updated evaluation of the parties by Dr. Robson and the parties were ordered to appear on March 15, 2011.

The defendant subsequently appeared in the Norwalk G.A. and successfully modified the existing criminal protective orders, allowing for visitation with his children.   He resumed his parenting time with his daughter, Kerry, and, to a lesser extent, his son, Timothy.

On March 15, 2011, the court convened a hearing ⁸ to address a number of outstanding motions,⁹ including, specifically, the defendant's March 14, 2011 motions to reconsider the appointment of Dr. Robson and remove the AMC. The court appointed Dr. Harry Adamakos, a psychologist, as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor children, emphasized the AMC should focus on the expressed interests of the children, and entered financial orders regarding the payment of retainers to Dr. Adamakos and Dr. Robson.¹⁰  The court established a briefing schedule on the issue of standing as it related to the defendant's motion to remove the AMC.¹¹ The court entered orders addressing nondisparagement and Our Family Wizard communication issues.¹²  The parties were directed to reserve June 27 through July 1, 2011, for trial.

On April 7, 2011, the court served notice that a hearing would be conducted on April 15, 2011, to address the defendant's motion to remove the AMC, the plaintiff's motion for contempt concerning the defendant's failure to meet with and pay retainers to Dr. Adamakos and Dr. Robson, and the plaintiff's motion for modification of custody related to the issue of private school enrollment for Timothy Nowacki.

On or about April 13, 2011, the defendant was found in summary contempt by the court, Grogins, J., and incarcerated until May 13, 2011.

The defendant attended the hearing held on April 15, 2011, at least initially, via video conferencing.¹³  On the motions concerning the role of the AMC, the court found there was no evidence that the actions of the AMC prejudiced the defendant's case and therefore the defendant lacked standing to remove the AMC. Accordingly, the AMC's oral motion to dismiss the defendant's motion for an order removing the AMC was granted.   The defendant's motion for order to remove the AMC was denied.

On the plaintiff's emergency motion for modification of custody, dated March 23, 2011, the court found that the parents did not have the ability to co-parent with respect to the children's education and further that the defendant had no present ability to communicate effectively with the necessary parties, including the AMC and the plaintiff.   The court found it was in the best interest of the children to order that the plaintiff be entitled to make final decisions on issues related to the education of the two minor children following reasonable efforts to advise the defendant and to obtain his consent.   The court further found that the plaintiff had made such an effort to provide advice and seek the defendant's consent with respect to the issue of Timothy's attendance at Avon Old Farms.   Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff the authority to make decisions concerning Timothy's enrollment in a private school, effective immediately.

On the plaintiff's motion for contempt, the court heard evidence regarding the defendant's alleged failure to meet with and pay retainers to Dr. Adamakos and Dr. Robson.   The plaintiff's motion in this regard was granted in part.   The court found that the March 15, 2011 orders were clear and unambiguous and that the defendant willfully refused to comply with the orders requiring the payment of retainers to Dr. Robson and Dr. Adamakos.   The plaintiff was ordered to pay the retainers to Dr. Robson and Dr. Adamakos no later than May 5, 2011, and to file an updated financial affidavit on the same date.   A compliance hearing was scheduled for May 10, 2011.¹⁴

On May 4, 2011, the court advised the parties that the AMC's motion to modify custody, filed May 2, 2011, seeking emergency custodial relief, would be heard at the compliance hearing on May 10, 2011.

At the May 10, 2011 hearing the defendant was again given the opportunity to participate via videoconferencing from his place of incarceration.¹⁵  When the hearing started, the defendant stated that he had filed a grievance with the Judicial Review Council against Judge Calmar the day before.   A fax copy was obtained from the Judicial Review Council and reviewed.   The proceedings were suspended to allow Judge Holzberg, in accordance with Practice Book § 1–22b, to conduct a hearing on the disqualification issue.¹⁶

When the proceeding resumed, the court addressed the defendant's motion for continuance concerning the filing of an updated financial affidavit and the payment of the retainers.   In light of the defendant's continued incarceration, the motion was granted, in part, with revised orders that the defendant pay his share of the retainers to Dr. Robson and Dr. Adamakos and file an updated financial affidavit on or before May 19, 2011, at 4:30 p.m. The AMC's motion seeking emergency custodial relief, dated May 2, 2011, was rescheduled to May 19, 2011.   The court indicated that, because the issue of custody was scheduled for trial from June 27 through July 1, 2011, the May 19, 2011 hearing would be expedited and limited to the issue of whether it was unsafe for one or both of the minor children to be in the defendant's care.

At the evidentiary hearing on May 19, 2011,¹⁷ Dr. Robson testified that, while he had no concerns with the plaintiff's parenting skills, as she had exhibited remarkable strength in the face of significant stressors, the defendant had severe impairments which interfered with his day-to-day functioning and judgment.   Dr. Robson testified to his belief that the defendant was bipolar, manic/psychotic with paranoid personality disorder with histrionic and narcissistic traits.   Dr. Robson characterized the defendant as having a serious and pervasive illness requiring treatment, therapy and possibly medication.¹⁸  Additionally, Dr. Robson testified the defendant has a high IQ but is vindictive,¹⁹ impulsive and susceptible to boundary violations.   He stated, as well, that the defendant's thinking is tangential, his speech overproductive, and that he exhibits a merging of ideas.   Dr. Robson indicated that he had the opportunity to observe the defendant's participation in the court proceedings on May 10 and 19, 2011.²⁰  His observations at these proceedings only served to confirm his diagnosis.   Dr. Robson observed the defendant talking over the court and participants, with little apparent regard for others.   Dr. Robson noted that when the court muted the defendant's remarks, the defendant appeared to enjoy himself, smiled and relaxed, projecting a feeling of being in “charge” of a situation most people would have found uncomfortable.   Dr. Robson testified that the children, particularly Kerry, were vulnerable to their father's poor parenting skills and nonexistent co-parenting ability.   Dr. Robson opined that, unfortunately, the severity of the defendant's impairment prevents him from appreciating the impact of his behavior on the children.   Dr. Robson concluded the defendant was not emotionally safe as a parent and therefore it was not in the best interest of the children to be in his care and custody so long as his condition remained untreated and unabated.   Dr. Robson's findings were thorough and persuasive and are adopted by the court.

Based on all the evidence, the court determined that if the defendant continued his unsupervised visitation pursuant to the (then) existing orders both children would be subject to a significant risk of serious emotional harm.²¹  Moreover, the court found the harm of limiting contact with the defendant father was not outweighed by the harm of continuing the existing orders.   While the court declined to modify the existing orders as they related to joint legal custody and the parenting schedule, the court on an interim basis ordered that all contact between the defendant and the children be supervised by a licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist approved by the GAL or an individual agreed upon by the parties pending further orders of the court.²²

Having outlined the pertinent procedural and factual underlayment, the court turns now to the motion at hand.

Plaintiff's Motion No. 325 for Modification

On June 27, 2011, the hearing on the plaintiff's motion No. 325 for modification, postjudgment dated February 28, 2011, was addressed.   At this hearing, the plaintiff sought an award of permanent sole legal and physical custody, limiting the defendant to supervised visitation until he engages in and successfully completes an appropriate course of mental health therapy.   The defendant testified as the plaintiff's first witness and was followed by Anthony Pavia, the former principal of New Canaan High School.   At the conclusion of the day's proceedings, the defendant was ordered to arrive at 9:05 a.m. on June 28, 2011, in order to address trial management compliance before the 10 a.m. resumption of the hearing.

Notwithstanding the court's order, on June 28, 2011, the defendant did not arrive at the courthouse until 11:05 a.m. The defendant indicated that immediately prior to the commencement of the hearing, he had filed complaints with the Judicial Review Council against Judge Calmar.   Once this court verified that such a complaint had, in fact, been filed, the court asked Judge Holzberg to conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant's filing should require this court to be disqualified from continuing to hear the matter.   Pursuant to this court's request, Judge Holzberg immediately conducted a proceeding pursuant to Practice Book § 1–22b and found no basis for Judge Calmar to disqualify himself as the judicial authority of the proceeding.   Upon receiving the ruling, the defendant indicated his intent to depart the courthouse in order to go to the United States District Court.   When the proceeding resumed at 12:05 p.m. with Judge Calmar, the defendant returned to the courtroom.   The defendant was invited to remain and participate.   Nevertheless, the defendant left the courtroom, asserting that this court is a fraud.   In the defendant's absence, the plaintiff thereafter made an oral motion for default regarding her custody motion.   This motion was denied and the hearing proceeded without the defendant's presence.   The final witness at the hearing was the court appointed GAL, Dr. Adamakos, who was called to testify by the AMC and questioned, as well, by the plaintiff.   Pending a written decision, the court, sua sponte, modified the existing interim orders of visitation to provide that Timothy had the discretion to decide whether or not he wished to visit with his father.   The court also ordered that visitation with Kerry should be supervised by a paid supervisor whose credentials were approved by the GAL, without requiring that the individual be a licensed clinical professional, and that Dr. Adamakos would no longer be a supervisor of visitation.   The hearing concluded.

On August 8, 2011, the defendant filed a complaint containing a multitude of allegations regarding the handling of the instant litigation in the United States District Court, District of Connecticut, against Judge Calmar and 143 other public officials.   Based on this new filing, Judge Holzberg conducted a hearing on September 27, 2011, pursuant to Practice Book § 1–22b.   The court, Holzberg, J., found no basis for Judge Calmar to disqualify himself as the judicial authority of the proceeding.²³

On October 5, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for mistrial regarding the proceeding conducted on June 27 and 28, 2011, asserting that his first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth and fourteenth amendment rights had been violated.²⁴

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on all of the credible evidence adduced at relevant hearings, the court makes the following findings:

The Nowacki children, Timothy and Kerry, are polite, well mannered, bright and articulate for their respective ages.   Timothy is expressive and open and, as the older child, he believes he can control his relationship with his parents.   He is, nevertheless, concerned that it is sometimes painful to be with his father.   While he desires a relationship with his father, he feels his father is emotionally dangerous to him at the present time.²⁵  Kerry, younger and more guarded, is reluctant to pick sides.   She is committed to maintaining neutrality in family relationships.   She is clearly fretful.

The plaintiff, 42, is employed as a senior vice president for eastern sales at Fox broadcasting.   She has been the primary caregiver for the minor children since the postjudgment ex parte emergency motion for modification of custody and parenting time was granted by the court on December 2, 2009.   She demonstrates a stable and resilient character in the midst of a traumatic and disruptive environment.   Her equanimity is impressive.   The court has no concerns regarding her ability to parent.

The defendant, 57, was terminated from his employment with CBS on January 11, 2010.   He is articulate, well groomed and initially appears well mannered, well integrated and rational.   He professes unconditional love for his children.   The court believes he loves his children and cares deeply about them.   On a philosophical basis, he believes the children benefit from a parenting relationship with both parents:  that both parents offer important opportunities to their children.   Historically he has been supportive of them.   As to his former wife, the defendant believes the plaintiff is a malignant narcissist who has hidden financial assets overseas and is involved in tax fraud.   He contends that the plaintiff was motivated to seek a change in custody and alienate him from his children in retaliation for his disclosure of what he asserts to be the plaintiff's financial corruption and his efforts to modify the financial support obligations.   The defendant perceives himself to be the victim of parental alienation.

Suspicion and mistrust appear almost immediately and pervasively in the defendant's relationships with the professionals who have been involved with the family in these post-dissolution child-related controversies.   He views the AMC as his adversary and does not believe that the children have received any benefit from her participation in this litigation.²⁶  He appears to take no responsibility for his present circumstances;  rather, he blames others.   Based on the court's own observations, as well as evidence adduced at hearings, the court finds that the defendant is capable of sharp and uncontrolled temper outbursts.   The court credits Dr. Robson's testimony, given on May 19, 2011, that the defendant is grandiose, narcissistic and paranoid.   The court credits, as well, Dr. Robson's findings that the defendant's clinical condition, which includes an Axis I bipolar disorder and an Axis II paranoid personality disorder with histrionic and narcissistic traits, has been emerging over the last two or more years.   Unfortunately, the defendant does not accept responsibility for his behaviors, is unable to look beyond his own preoccupations and has characteristics of religiosity ²⁷ and grandiosity.   He holds grudges and has great difficulty forgiving perceived slights.   His self righteous resentment interferes with his ability to enjoy an insight into his problems, and specifically the impact his behavior has on his children.   This court adopts Dr. Robson's findings regarding the defendant's mental health status and its impact on his suitability to assume parenting responsibilities.

Dr. Adamakos, the court appointed GAL, testified on June 28, 2011, that in the course of performing his assigned duties, he observed the same character traits and behaviors described by Dr. Robson.   He noted that the defendant lacks control and judgment;  he is nonresponsive, over reactive, rigid and egocentric.   Dr. Adamakos opined that the defendant's view of the world is so driven by principles that he loses sight of the people he is dealing with.   He has histrionic characteristics, that is, he is overly emotional and draws attention to himself using dramatic actions.   Dr. Adamakos testified, that all of these characteristics, when coupled with his missionary zeal, inhibit him from understanding the negative impact he has on his children.   Dr. Adamakos' findings were thorough and persuasive and are adopted by the court.

The defendant's inappropriate behavior was evidence not only by his interaction with professionals assigned to assess the family but by his behaviors away from the litigation venue.   For example, following the implementation of the initial December 2, 2009 ex parte orders of sole custody and visitation, on Friday, December 11, 2009, the defendant replied to an e-mail invitation for his son's hockey team dinner by advising the approximately forty parents on the e-mail thread that in retaliation for his efforts to modify support,²⁸ the plaintiff, her attorney and the AMC had conspired to “[kidnap] Kerry and Tim” and that the court had violated his rights abusively by changing custody without affording him a hearing.   The defendant advised all email recipients that he would go on a “hunger strike” effective Sunday night until the original custody plan was reinstated in full and asked the recipients of the e-mail to “please keep my children in your thoughts and prayers.”   When the defendant met with Dr. Robson on December 15 and 16, 2009, he advised that he had in fact gone on the hunger strike and had described the details of his efforts with his children.   The defendant did not appreciate that broadcasting his upset with the court proceedings and sharing his reactions with his children would frighten them (and humiliate his son).   Rather, he apparently felt it was of paramount importance that the children know that he would not participate in any form of supervised visitation.

This incident is but one of several examples of the defendant's rigid, overreactive and narcissistic world view.   Two others amplify this finding.

During the course of these proceedings, the defendant has evinced an inability to place his children's interests above his own perceived need to manifest his disagreement with court orders.   From December 2, 2009, when the plaintiff was granted sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, until March 4, 2011, when this court vacated the ex parte orders reinstating the original June 29, 2005 parenting responsibility plan,²⁹ the defendant's visitation with his children was subject to supervision.   The defendant exercised his opportunity for visitation twice during this fifteen-month period.   The two occasions, including one at Christmas, were arranged by the AMC and were only successful because they involved unpaid supervision utilizing family and friends as supervisors.   The defendant refused to engage in, as he describes it, “pay-per-view” visitation.   Dr. Adamakos opined that the defendant largely refused to participate in supervised visitation because such an arrangement was validation of allegations regarding his suitability as a parent made by his adversaries.   In sum, the evidence that the defendant failed and refused to participate in supervised visitation with a paid supervisor aptly demonstrates that it was of greater value to the defendant to vindicate a principle than to take the opportunity to be with his children over an extended period of fifteen months.³⁰

Finally, the defendant's perceptions and illness have interfered with his ability to effectively and safely parent.   On Sunday, April 3, 2011, the defendant's daughter, Kerry, spontaneously disclosed to her father, after seeing a boy in church, that the boy had been at their home drinking and that her brother, Timothy, had consumed alcohol on occasion.³¹  The next day, the defendant sent an e-mail to David Abbey, the superintendent of schools in New Canaan, the plaintiff's attorney and the AMC, advising of his son's use of alcohol in violation of the sports contract, which Timothy had executed as a student athlete.   The defendant disclosed information concerning the abuse of alcohol by other students.   He requested that the plaintiff withdraw her motion for full legal custody and closed his missive with the following statement:  “A very disappointed dad feels an ethical and moral obligation to reveal this the enabling of unlawful conduct of Tim and a lack of discretion shown by the childcare provider who dropped Tim at the game.   It will define legal boundaries for all future conduct of why God, not the courts, creates and defines the sometimes challenging job required of us as parents to provide the necessary guidance to our children to keep them safe from decisions which they believe are theirs alone to make.”

On April 6, 2011, the defendant faxed a note to the New Canaan chief of police requesting an investigation of the underage drinking incidents.   He offered to arrange to have Kerry interviewed as part of the investigation.³²

On April 8, 2011, the defendant sent an e-mail, captioned “We love Tim Nowacki and his dad requests your support,” to the plaintiff's attorney, the AMC, Dr. Robson, school officials and the parents of involved children, disclosing three incidents of underage drinking by his son and others.   The defendant reviewed the status of his custody and visitation case and stated that it saddened him to “know that the zero tolerance policy which both parents and students sign as athletes resulted in the decision reached, for understandable reasons, to not enforce the code upon the knowledge.”   The defendant solicited information from the recipients concerning their knowledge of the underage drinking events and asked that those involved cooperate fully with legal authorities and “encourage Tim to know that regardless of his errors of judgment and declarations of independence, that his father's love is inescapable light source because it resides in his heart.”   The defendant advised in the two-page e-mail that he would send a letter later in the day to the school superintendent, the police chief and the head of the Department of Children and Families, former Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz, seeking an investigation into the failure of the plaintiff, her attorney and the AMC to report the underage drinking to the family courts and proper legal authorities.³³

On June 17, 2011, the defendant placed an ad in the New Canaan News, duplicating a letter to the editor rejected by New Canaan Advertiser, reviewing the history of his efforts since April 4, 2011, to report incidents of underage drinking in New Canaan by a number of high-profile high school athletes.³⁴  The defendant championed a proper investigation into the selective enforcement of the “athletic code of conduct contracts” by the superintendent of schools, the high school principal and the New Canaan Police Department.

As to this last example, the issue of course is not whether it was appropriate for the defendant to be concerned about adolescent drinking.   Concerned parents who ignore signs of underage drinking by their children and their children's peers do so at their peril and that of their children.   It is the manner of the defendant's reaction and his unnecessarily public humiliation of his son that are of concern to this court.   Indeed, the court is aware that the New Canaan Board of Education has adopted a zero tolerance policy for its student athletes and codified it in a written contract that is signed by the athlete and a parent.

These examples highlight a central question in these proceedings, that is, whether the defendant's repeated poor judgment and distorted perceptions interfere with his ability to effectively parent his children.   The evidence dictates the conclusion that, until the defendant confronts his own mental health and emotional stability needs, his role in his children's lives must be guarded for their welfare and protection.

CONCLUSION

In rendering this decision and making the ensuing orders, the court has carefully considered the statutory criteria in General Statutes § 46b–56 regarding custody.   Joint legal custody as a prerequisite requires that parents work together cooperatively, jointly and in a reasonable manner in the best interest of their children.   This requires the parties be able to participate in meaningful communication so that they can cooperatively make the decisions necessary for the upbringing of their children.   This court finds that it is contrary to the best interests of the children for their father to share their custody.   This court finds the defendant is unable, in his current state, to co-parent with the plaintiff.   He does not have the emotional resources to function as a joint decision maker.   The court finds that the statutory presumption in favor of joint custody is overcome.   Moreover, the court finds that it is in Kerry's best interest that her time with her father is limited, structured and supervised.   The court is aware that in the recent past the defendant has refused to exercise supervised parenting time with his children.   Rejecting supervised visitation is a matter of principle and pride for the defendant.   The court has balanced the benefits to Kerry of seeing her father with the risk of unsupervised visitation.   The court finds that unsupervised visitation renders Kerry vulnerable and places her in the middle of extraordinary conflict.   The court is hopeful, though not optimistic, that the defendant will recognize it is one thing to say you love your children unconditionally, but it is another to put yourself through something you view as offensive, even demeaning, as a demonstration of deep and abiding love.

ORDERS

1. The plaintiff shall have sole legal and sole physical custody of Timothy and Kerry Nowacki.

2. The defendant, shall have parenting time with the minor child Timothy Nowacki as follows:  when the child is in New Canaan at Timothy's sole discretion, and at times arranged directly between Timothy and the defendant provided Timothy has the opportunity to drive himself to his father's home or a neutral location and has the ability to leave on his own.   When the child is in boarding school the defendant's access will be limited to events traditionally attended to by parents, hockey games, parent weekends and the like provided he receives Timothy's invitation to such events.   Visitation arranged directly with and agreed to by Timothy may be unsupervised.

3. The defendant shall have parenting time with Kerry Nowacki as follows:  1) for a period of three consecutive hours, on a weekly basis, midweek, at a specific time and day to be arranged by the professional supervisor, and 2) two weekend days per month, for a period of not less than three and not more than seven consecutive hours per weekend day, at a specific time to be arranged by the professional supervisor.   All parenting time exercised by the defendant, with Kerry, shall be with a professional supervisor until further order of this court.   The supervisor shall be mindful of the court's orders in paragraph 10 below.   The supervisor shall have the authority to immediately terminate parenting time with Kerry for an apparent violation of court orders or in the event the supervisor deems the situation emotionally or physically unsafe.   The GAL shall select a professional supervisor to supervise all of the defendant's time with Kerry.³⁵

4. The defendant shall also have additional supervised parenting time with Kerry Nowacki, under the same terms and conditions as set forth above, for a period of three consecutive hours on each of the following holidays:  Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve or Christmas Day, Easter Sunday, Memorial Day or Columbus Day and the Fourth of July.

5. Because it is in the best interests of the children that the defendant substantially improve his behavior, judgment, thought processes, parenting abilities and develop co-parenting skills, he is ordered to participate in a course of psychiatric treatment for a duration and with regularity as determined by a medical professional or as determined to be adequate by a court on motion of either party.   Periodic reports of compliance with treatment and/or medication shall be provided to the GAL if any.   Any psychiatrist or psychologist engaged by the defendant for this purpose shall be provided by the defendant or the GAL, if any, with copies of all existing court orders and the reports of the court ordered evaluator Dr. Kenneth Robson.

6. The defendant, shall not, under any circumstances, send the children any form of electronic communication, including but not limited to e-mails, text messages, Skype, instant messaging, and the like.   The defendant shall not contact the children on their personal cell phones.   Notwithstanding the above, the defendant:  1) may attempt to contact Kerry, on a land line, if available, and speak with her no more than once per day, on each day that he does not exercise parenting time, in the evening between the hours of 6 p.m. and 9 p.m.,³⁶ and, 2) the defendant may speak with Timothy if Timothy initiates a call to speak with his father about any matter and the defendant may respond to electronic or telephonic communications initiated by Timothy for the sole purpose of effectuating the parenting time set forth in paragraph 2 above.

7. The defendant shall be permitted to attend those games, practices, performances and other events in which Kerry regularly participates, to the extent that members of the general public regularly and usually are invited to attend unless the school or extracurricular supervisory official bars his attendance.   The defendant shall provide the plaintiff through Ourfamilywizard.com (OFW) with at least forty-eight hours notice of his intention to be present at any such event unless it is impossible to do so.   It is the intention of this order that while the defendant may greet Kerry in the customary fashion at any such activities, he is not to utilize any such occasion to be alone with her, sit with her, or occupy her other than to initially great her.

8. The defendant shall be restrained from contacting teachers, coaches or administrators at any school except, in writing, and only for the purpose of receiving information about grades, extracurricular activities and other school-related information or functions.   The defendant shall not attend parent-teacher conferences unless he receives an explicit request that he do so.

9. The parties shall continue their enrollment in the OFW website and shall conduct all communications regarding parenting matters, parenting time, information sharing, schedule alterations and reimbursable expense matters on the website and shall not e-mail directly regarding issues relating to the children but shall post all communications exclusively on the website.   The GAL and/or the AMC, if any, shall be given access to OFW to monitor the communications of the parties.   Neither party shall fail to renew the annual subscription to the website without a signed and filed stipulation or court order.

10. Neither of the parties shall initiate nor cultivate any disparaging or negative comments about the other party in writing or within the hearing of the children.   Neither party is to initiate or cultivate a discussion of the court proceedings regarding custody, visitation or parenting responsibilities in writing or within the hearing of the children, and there shall be no verbal exchanges except to exchange pleasantries during those times that the parents are together in front of the children.

11. Except for the purposes of selecting a paid supervisor, participating in any appeal and/or pursuing the payment of fees and costs the AMC's appearance is deemed withdrawn and the GAL's appointment is terminated subject to reappointment.

BY THE COURT,

HARRY E. CALMAR, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. At the time of the parties' marital dissolution, the plaintiff's birth game of Sullivan was restored to her..  FN1. At the time of the parties' marital dissolution, the plaintiff's birth game of Sullivan was restored to her.

FN2. This is a matter where a partial review of the case's postjudgment history on issues of custody may be helpful to provide a context for the court's conclusions concerning the defendant's testimony, demeanor and respect for the court and its orders..  FN2. This is a matter where a partial review of the case's postjudgment history on issues of custody may be helpful to provide a context for the court's conclusions concerning the defendant's testimony, demeanor and respect for the court and its orders.

FN3. On January 18, 2005, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding custody and parenting time, which was incorporated in the terms of the judgment..  FN3. On January 18, 2005, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding custody and parenting time, which was incorporated in the terms of the judgment.

FN4. Hearings were held on July 6, 2010, and on July 14, 2010, to address financial issues and plan for a hearing on July 23, 2010, to address competency issues and the AMC's fees..  FN4. Hearings were held on July 6, 2010, and on July 14, 2010, to address financial issues and plan for a hearing on July 23, 2010, to address competency issues and the AMC's fees.

FN5. The defendant arrived thirty minutes late for the proceeding..  FN5. The defendant arrived thirty minutes late for the proceeding.

FN6. The defendant's “one week on, one week off” cycle was effective immediately, with his “week off” commencing March 6, 2011, and his “week off outing” scheduled for March 9, 2011.   This effectively provided for the defendant to begin his “week on” parenting time on March 13, 2011..  FN6. The defendant's “one week on, one week off” cycle was effective immediately, with his “week off” commencing March 6, 2011, and his “week off outing” scheduled for March 9, 2011.   This effectively provided for the defendant to begin his “week on” parenting time on March 13, 2011.

FN7. It came to the court's attention during the course of the hearing that the defendant was subject to a protective order(s).  Nonetheless, the details, substance and basis for the order(s) were not brought to the court's attention..  FN7. It came to the court's attention during the course of the hearing that the defendant was subject to a protective order(s).  Nonetheless, the details, substance and basis for the order(s) were not brought to the court's attention.

FN8. The defendant arrived fifteen minutes late for the proceeding..  FN8. The defendant arrived fifteen minutes late for the proceeding.

FN9. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument /reconsideration of the decision to vacate the December 2, 2009 postjudgment ex parte emergency order.   The plaintiff's counsel described the court's ruling as a snap decision, which served to empower the defendant.   The plaintiff's counsel went on to describe the court's decision as stunning, mind boggling, imprudent and mistaken..  FN9. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument /reconsideration of the decision to vacate the December 2, 2009 postjudgment ex parte emergency order.   The plaintiff's counsel described the court's ruling as a snap decision, which served to empower the defendant.   The plaintiff's counsel went on to describe the court's decision as stunning, mind boggling, imprudent and mistaken.

FN10. A number of motions concerning financial matters were referred back to the judicial district of Stamford..  FN10. A number of motions concerning financial matters were referred back to the judicial district of Stamford.

FN11. The court ordered briefs to be filed by March 25, 2011..  FN11. The court ordered briefs to be filed by March 25, 2011.

FN12. Our Family Wizard is a website based tool for scheduling parenting time calendars and visitation schedules, sharing information and managing expenses..  FN12. Our Family Wizard is a website based tool for scheduling parenting time calendars and visitation schedules, sharing information and managing expenses.

FN13. While the defendant never filed form JDFM–20, an application and writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, requesting transport to the court, arrangements were made allowing the defendant to participate through videoconferencing.  Practice Book § 23–68.   At the commencement of the hearing the defendant advised he was filing an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, declared the video conference unconstitutional and declined to stop talking despite numerous warnings that he should permit the court the opportunity to speak to him.   Because of his unwillingness to listen and persistence in speaking, the defendant's voice was temporarily muted by the court.   He, thereafter, declined to participate via video..  FN13. While the defendant never filed form JDFM–20, an application and writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, requesting transport to the court, arrangements were made allowing the defendant to participate through videoconferencing.  Practice Book § 23–68.   At the commencement of the hearing the defendant advised he was filing an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, declared the video conference unconstitutional and declined to stop talking despite numerous warnings that he should permit the court the opportunity to speak to him.   Because of his unwillingness to listen and persistence in speaking, the defendant's voice was temporarily muted by the court.   He, thereafter, declined to participate via video.

FN14. The court appointed Attorney Kutz to represent the defendant at the compliance hearing..  FN14. The court appointed Attorney Kutz to represent the defendant at the compliance hearing.

FN15. The defendant did not file form JDFM–20, an application and writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to request transport to the court.   Arrangements were made allowing the defendant to participate through video conferencing.  Practice Book § 23–68.   Throughout the proceeding, the defendant had to be muted when he refused to verbally give quarter to the court and other participants..  FN15. The defendant did not file form JDFM–20, an application and writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to request transport to the court.   Arrangements were made allowing the defendant to participate through video conferencing.  Practice Book § 23–68.   Throughout the proceeding, the defendant had to be muted when he refused to verbally give quarter to the court and other participants.

FN16. At the conclusion of the hearing the court, Holzberg, J., found that Judge Calmar was not disqualified from continuing as the judicial authority in the proceedings.   The defendant advised he would file a grievance against Judge Holzberg.   In continuing to preside in this and subsequent postjudgment hearings, the court has been mindful that the defendant has either filed or threatened to file grievances or law suits against other members of the judiciary who have handled this file.   Mindful of the court's parens patria responsibilities to children and confident of the court's ability to maintain impartiality while seeking to determine the children's best interest, this court has chosen not to voluntarily recuse itself from this matter.   While recusal may be the road easier taken, resolution of this difficult matter, particularly the need to bring some closure for the children while fairly hearing their parents' concerns and allegations, has been the court's abiding commitment..  FN16. At the conclusion of the hearing the court, Holzberg, J., found that Judge Calmar was not disqualified from continuing as the judicial authority in the proceedings.   The defendant advised he would file a grievance against Judge Holzberg.   In continuing to preside in this and subsequent postjudgment hearings, the court has been mindful that the defendant has either filed or threatened to file grievances or law suits against other members of the judiciary who have handled this file.   Mindful of the court's parens patria responsibilities to children and confident of the court's ability to maintain impartiality while seeking to determine the children's best interest, this court has chosen not to voluntarily recuse itself from this matter.   While recusal may be the road easier taken, resolution of this difficult matter, particularly the need to bring some closure for the children while fairly hearing their parents' concerns and allegations, has been the court's abiding commitment.

FN17. The defendant was more than fifteen minutes late for the hearing..  FN17. The defendant was more than fifteen minutes late for the hearing.

FN18. Dr. Robson is doubtful that the defendant will avail himself of therapy because the defendant denies any mental health problems..  FN18. Dr. Robson is doubtful that the defendant will avail himself of therapy because the defendant denies any mental health problems.

FN19. During the course of these proceedings, Dr. Robson, and other professionals in this case were subjected to abusive ad hominem attacks on their moral and physical characters by the defendant.   Other than to state that the court finds the attacks totally without merit they do not merit further discussion..  FN19. During the course of these proceedings, Dr. Robson, and other professionals in this case were subjected to abusive ad hominem attacks on their moral and physical characters by the defendant.   Other than to state that the court finds the attacks totally without merit they do not merit further discussion.

FN20. Dr. Robson conducted his first evaluation of the defendant on December 15 and 16, 2009.   Pursuant to the court's order on March 4, 2011, to update the psychiatric evaluations of both parties, Dr. Robson re-interviewed the defendant at the Osborn Correctional Facility in Somers, where the defendant had been transferred from the Bridgeport Correctional Facility.   During this session, Dr. Robson listened to a monologue from the defendant, who left after fifteen minutes.   Dr. Robson was unable to conduct a formal mental status examination because of the defendant's behavior..  FN20. Dr. Robson conducted his first evaluation of the defendant on December 15 and 16, 2009.   Pursuant to the court's order on March 4, 2011, to update the psychiatric evaluations of both parties, Dr. Robson re-interviewed the defendant at the Osborn Correctional Facility in Somers, where the defendant had been transferred from the Bridgeport Correctional Facility.   During this session, Dr. Robson listened to a monologue from the defendant, who left after fifteen minutes.   Dr. Robson was unable to conduct a formal mental status examination because of the defendant's behavior.

FN21. The court asked Dr. Robson whether the defendant was a danger to himself or others.   Dr. Robson testified that, although the defendant's judgment had deteriorated since he began working with the Nowacki family, he did not believe that the defendant was homicidal or suicidal at the time..  FN21. The court asked Dr. Robson whether the defendant was a danger to himself or others.   Dr. Robson testified that, although the defendant's judgment had deteriorated since he began working with the Nowacki family, he did not believe that the defendant was homicidal or suicidal at the time.

FN22. Upon hearing the court orders, the defendant declared that the proceedings were a “crock” and left..  FN22. Upon hearing the court orders, the defendant declared that the proceedings were a “crock” and left.

FN23. The defendant attended this hearing..  FN23. The defendant attended this hearing.

FN24. The defendant's motion for mistrial, dated October 5, 2011, was denied on October 20, 2011..  FN24. The defendant's motion for mistrial, dated October 5, 2011, was denied on October 20, 2011.

FN25. On June 21, 2011, upset that Timothy was unwilling to join him for visitation, the defendant e-mailed him, “Good luck with Dave Barrington [the stepfather].   He's your new dad.   That is what you said.   You don't want to see me.   As you wish.   Kerry inherits everything.   Am going to move, adopt a couple of children who would appreciate having a dad.   You want nothing to do with your dad.   You get your wish.   You have disowned me ․”.  FN25. On June 21, 2011, upset that Timothy was unwilling to join him for visitation, the defendant e-mailed him, “Good luck with Dave Barrington [the stepfather].   He's your new dad.   That is what you said.   You don't want to see me.   As you wish.   Kerry inherits everything.   Am going to move, adopt a couple of children who would appreciate having a dad.   You want nothing to do with your dad.   You get your wish.   You have disowned me ․”

FN26. Throughout this proceeding, the defendant has treated the AMC with extraordinary disrespect.   He has gone to lengths to belittle, humiliate and chastise her.   His ad hominem attacks against her constituted a pattern of abuse outside of any reasonable norm.   The court is particularly grateful for her professionalism and stalwart protection of the children's best interests in the face of this conduct from the defendant..  FN26. Throughout this proceeding, the defendant has treated the AMC with extraordinary disrespect.   He has gone to lengths to belittle, humiliate and chastise her.   His ad hominem attacks against her constituted a pattern of abuse outside of any reasonable norm.   The court is particularly grateful for her professionalism and stalwart protection of the children's best interests in the face of this conduct from the defendant.

FN27. Dr. Robson defined religiosity as a preoccupation with religious issues.   The comments of the defendant are delivered as if they were sermons..  FN27. Dr. Robson defined religiosity as a preoccupation with religious issues.   The comments of the defendant are delivered as if they were sermons.

FN28. The defendant credits a substantial change in circumstances to the plaintiff's recent promotion..  FN28. The defendant credits a substantial change in circumstances to the plaintiff's recent promotion.

FN29. After the ex parte sole custody orders were vacated on March 4, 2011, and the defendant had the opportunity to resume unsupervised visitation with his son, he responded to his son's initial reluctance to visit his home for parenting time by contacting the New Canaan police and the FBI to report his son as an abducted child..  FN29. After the ex parte sole custody orders were vacated on March 4, 2011, and the defendant had the opportunity to resume unsupervised visitation with his son, he responded to his son's initial reluctance to visit his home for parenting time by contacting the New Canaan police and the FBI to report his son as an abducted child.

FN30. On a few occasions the defendant attended, unsupervised, public school and sporting events where his children were present.   From May 19, 2011, until June 28, 2011, when supervised visitation was reimposed by the court, the defendant exercised his opportunity for visitation only once, on Father's Day weekend..  FN30. On a few occasions the defendant attended, unsupervised, public school and sporting events where his children were present.   From May 19, 2011, until June 28, 2011, when supervised visitation was reimposed by the court, the defendant exercised his opportunity for visitation only once, on Father's Day weekend.

FN31. By all accounts, Kerry was motivated to tell her father about the drinking out of a sincere concern for her brother, not to get him in trouble with the police or prevent him from playing hockey..  FN31. By all accounts, Kerry was motivated to tell her father about the drinking out of a sincere concern for her brother, not to get him in trouble with the police or prevent him from playing hockey.

FN32. The police did not request an interview with Kerry.   When the defendant volunteered his fourteen-year old daughter for an investigatory interview of her brother and his friends he placed her in the crosshairs of the controversy..  FN32. The police did not request an interview with Kerry.   When the defendant volunteered his fourteen-year old daughter for an investigatory interview of her brother and his friends he placed her in the crosshairs of the controversy.

FN33. In fact, the initial e-mail was copied to Judge Calmar (the court declines all e-mail from parties), Carolyn Signorelli, Chief Child Protection Attorney, and Joette Katz..  FN33. In fact, the initial e-mail was copied to Judge Calmar (the court declines all e-mail from parties), Carolyn Signorelli, Chief Child Protection Attorney, and Joette Katz.

FN34. The letter to the editor did not disclose his son as a participant in the underage drinking incidents..  FN34. The letter to the editor did not disclose his son as a participant in the underage drinking incidents.

FN35. The defendant shall be responsible for the cost of paid supervision, without prejudice to the modification of this order at the time of any postjudgment child support hearing in the judicial district of Stamford..  FN35. The defendant shall be responsible for the cost of paid supervision, without prejudice to the modification of this order at the time of any postjudgment child support hearing in the judicial district of Stamford.

FN36. The phone calls may be recorded at the discretion of the plaintiff..  FN36. The phone calls may be recorded at the discretion of the plaintiff.

Calmar, Harry E., J.