Laura Langello v. West Haven Board of Education (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

STATEMENT OF APPEAL

The plaintiff, Laura Langello, appeals from the decision of the defendant, the West Haven Board of Education (Board), upholding an independent hearing officer's recommendation to terminate her employment as a music teacher.   For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

II

BACKGROUND

The return of record and pleadings reveal the following relevant facts and procedural history.   The plaintiff was employed as a tenured music teacher at several schools within West Haven since approximately 1982.  (Return of Record [ROR], Termination Hearing Transcript [Hearing Tr.] Vol. 5. p. 47.)   During the past several years of her career, at least since the early 1990s, the plaintiff suffered from various psychological ailments, including post traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, sleep disorders, mood disorders and suicidal ideation, among others.  (ROR, Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact [FOF] # # 2, 3.) During the same period, she suffered, as well, from a number of physical medical problems, including a benign cyst in her brain, allergies, respiratory problems and other injuries resulting from various falls and accidents.  (ROR, FOF # 2;  Board Exhs. 5, 6;  Plaintiff Exh. 11.)   As a result of these conditions and disorders, which on multiple occasions were acute enough to bring about her inpatient hospitalization, the plaintiff was frequently absent from work not only on a short-term basis, but also for significantly longer periods as a result of several extended leaves of absence which she sought and the Board granted.  (ROR, FOF # # 5, 6.) Even in the face of these frequent absences and their obvious impact on school operations and student learning, the Board made various accommodations for the plaintiff's disabilities and conditions, accommodations that ranged from adjustments to her work schedule and school assignment;  (ROR, FOF # 9);  to the hiring of a full-time paraprofessional to assist her in the classroom.  (ROR, Board Exhs. 12, 14.)

Throughout her career, and despite the accommodations made by the Board, there were several incidents and complaints involving the plaintiff's performance as a music teacher.   Most recently, in 2007, these incidents caused the then superintendent of schools, Jo Ann Andrees, to document in a letter to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had appeared “unfocused if not disoriented, had difficulty leading ․ [her students] in an organized and smooth-flowing manner, [and] seemed to not be aware of student names or which musical selections went with which class.”  (ROR, Board Exh. 4F.) The letter went on to recommend that the plaintiff contact her physician to rule out “any possible medical/medication issues which may have contributed to [her] behavior.”  (ROR, Board Exh. 4F.) Thereafter, there were a series of incidents in the 2008–2009 school year—which culminated in the particularly troubling events of a day in April 2009.  (ROR, FOF # 19;  ROR, Board Exh. 41.)   On that day, the plaintiff arrived at the wrong school, appeared dazed and confused, and claimed (inaccurately) that her car had run out of gas and that she had locked her keys in her car.  (ROR, FOF # 19;  ROR, Board Exh. 41.)   Later that same day, while the plaintiff was being observed in her classroom by the school principal and the school system's fine arts supervisor, the plaintiff attempted to dismiss a classroom of children after only twenty minutes of the forty-minute class had passed.  (ROR, FOF # 19;  ROR, Board Exh. 41.)   Shortly after these incidents, the current superintendent of schools, Neil Cavallaro, initiated the process under which the plaintiff would undergo a fitness for duty assessment.¹  (Hearing Transcript Vol. 3 pp. 31–32;  ROR, Board Exh. 17.)

The plaintiff was thereafter placed on paid administrative leave through the 2009–2010 school year.  (ROR, Board Exh. 17;  ROR, FOF # 6.)   During that period, the plaintiff submitted to evaluations and testing by several medical professionals, the results of which were coordinated and compiled by a psychiatrist, Dr. Remo Fabbri, who had been retained by the Board to conduct the fitness for duty evaluation.  (ROR, Board Exh. 17.)   The plaintiff signed releases for several medical professionals to provide their opinions to Dr. Fabbri.  (ROR, FOF # # 26–28;  ROR, Board Exh. 17;  Board brief.)   Several of these evaluations indicated that the plaintiff suffered from disabilities that included verbal memory deficiency, depressed executive functioning and impulsive tendencies.  (ROR, Board Exh. 7.) An evaluation by a clinical neuropsychologist, Dr. Armin Thies, concluded that the plaintiff's deficits in memory and executive functioning were sufficient to interfere with her daily activities.  (ROR, FOF # 30.)   On the basis of these evaluations and reports from a range of different treatment providers, Dr. Fabbri concluded that the plaintiff's conditions made it difficult for her to fulfill several of the duties of her employment.  (ROR, Board Exh. 6.)

On January 11, 2010, Cavallaro informed the plaintiff that the termination of her contract was under consideration.  (ROR, Board Exh. 1A.) The plaintiff, on January 15, 2010, requested an explanation of the reasons for her potential termination.  (ROR, Board Exh. 1B.) On January 20, 2010, the Board, pursuant to the terms and limitations of General Statutes § 10–151(d), identified the reasons for possible termination as (1) inefficiency and/or incompetence;  (2) disability;  and (3) other due and sufficient cause.²  (ROR, Board Exh. 1C.) On January 29, 2010, the plaintiff requested a hearing on the Board's claims.  (ROR, Board Exh. 1D.)

Both parties agreed to a single independent arbitrator—a hearing officer, Susan Meredith.  (ROR, FOF.) A series of hearing sessions were held on February 24, March 19, March 26, March 31, April 1, and April 2, 2010.  (ROR, FOF.) At the hearing, several witnesses were called including Dr. Fabbri, Superintendent Cavallaro, several teachers, parents, and the plaintiff herself.  (ROR, Hearing transcripts.)   On April 28, 2010, the hearing officer issued her findings of facts and conclusions, as well as her recommendation that the plaintiff's employment be terminated.  (ROR, FOF.)

On May 3, 2010, the Board adopted the independent hearing officer's determinations and recommendation.  (ROR, Board Minutes.)   On May 5, 2010, the superintendent formally terminated the plaintiff's employment.  (ROR, Termination letter.)   The plaintiff appealed the Board's decision to the Superior Court on May 21, 2010, challenging the Board's findings and conclusions, and contending that “the termination of her employment violated the provisions of § 10–151(c).”  Attacking each of the grounds for her termination, the plaintiff contends in her appeal and supporting memorandum that “A. She was not shown to be inefficient or incompetent based upon any evaluation using teacher evaluation guidelines established pursuant to section 10–151b of the General Statutes;  B. She was not shown to be so disabled that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation;  [and] C. There was no other due or sufficient cause for her termination.”  (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 1.) The plaintiff further argues that the Board's decision was “clearly erroneous” as well as “arbitrary and capricious.”  (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 2.) The Board submitted a reply brief on September 29, 2010, arguing that the termination was properly administered “following completion of termination proceedings pursuant to § 10–151(d).”  (Board Brief.)

The court conducted a hearing on this matter on September 21, 2011 at which counsel for both parties argued their respective positions.   At that hearing, the Board narrowed its claims and modified its position in two respects.   First, the Board indicated that it was relying on only two of the statutory grounds set forth in § 10–151(d)—specifically, “disability” and “other due and sufficient cause”—as the bases for the plaintiff's termination, and was no longer pursuing the claim that she was inefficient or incompetent.   Second, contrary to the legal argument advanced in its brief, the Board conceded for purposes of this appeal that the Board was required to make reasonable accommodations to the plaintiff because of her physical and mental conditions.³  In response to that concession, the plaintiff emphasized that it was not her contention that the Board had failed to provide her reasonable accommodation.   To the contrary, the plaintiff specifically contends that the Board did comply with its obligation in that regard.   The appeal here is based instead on the claim that, having afforded reasonable accommodation to the plaintiff's disability, the Board terminated her employment despite her ability, as accommodated, to perform the essential functions of her job.

III

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) does not apply to board of education decisions;  see Rogers v. Board of Education, 252 Conn. 753, 763–64, 749 A.2d 1173 (2000); ⁴  the court itself is bound by some components of the UAPA when deciding the merits of an appeal.  General Statutes § 10–151(e), which establishes the process and procedures by which a tenured teacher may appeal his or her termination of employment by a board of education provides in relevant part that “[t]he court, upon such appeal [of a termination], shall review the proceedings of such hearing” and “may affirm or reverse the decision appealed from in accordance with subsection (j) of 4–183.”   This reference to § 4–183(j), which is a statutory provision contained within the UAPA, severely limits the nature and extent of the court's review, and requires that the board of education's decision be affirmed unless substantial rights of the teacher-plaintiff have been prejudiced.  General Statutes § 4–183.⁵

Our Supreme Court has delineated the court's responsibility in appeals brought in connection with the termination of a tenured teacher.  “Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ․ This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 768.⁶

“[O]n review of a school board decision, it is not the function of the trial court ․ to retry the cause ․ The credibility of witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters within [the defendant board's] province.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 713, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).   Therefore, “the trial court's function is to determine whether the board has acted illegally and not to substitute [the court's] judgment for that of the board.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 713–14.

IV

DISCUSSION

As outlined in § 10–151(d) and as applicable to the present matter, “[t]he contract of employment of a teacher who has attained tenure ․ may be terminated at any time for ․ disability, as shown by competent medical evidence ․ or [for] other due and sufficient cause.”   Here, the Board contends that the plaintiff's termination was based on substantial evidence relevant to each of these statutorily permissible grounds, and that the Board's decision in this regard was neither arbitrary nor capricious.   The plaintiff argues that the Board's adoption of the hearing officer's findings regarding these statutory factors was “clearly erroneous” as well as “arbitrary and capricious,” and on that basis appeals the Board's decision to terminate her employment under § 10–151(d).  As noted earlier, the court agrees with the Board and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that the Board's action was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and that there existed substantial evidence before the Board to support the plaintiff's termination on each of these statutory bases.

A

Disability

Turning first to the claim of disability, the court concludes that the Board appropriately determined that the plaintiff suffered from a “disability as shown by competent medical evidence” as specified by § 10–151(d)(4).   While there are no Connecticut appellate cases considering disabilities in the context of teacher employment, there is one Connecticut trial court decision addressing a teacher's termination under the disability provision of § 10–151(d)(4).   In Lefevre v. Board of Education, Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham, Docket No. CV 94 0049135 S (October 12, 1995, Sferrazza, J.), aff'd, 44 Conn.App. 901, 688 A.2d 366 (1997), the Superior Court upheld the school board's termination of a teacher who was suffering from several mental health disabilities.  Id. The court found that the board properly relied on evidence that the teacher at times in the school had appeared dazed, had been confused about who she was speaking to, had spoken incoherently, and had expressed irrational fears about students stealing or hiding objects from her.  Id. The board also was found to have properly relied on evidence demonstrating that the teacher did not exert proper control over student behavior in the classroom, and that her teaching methods lacked discernable objectives and were ineffectual.  Id. Moreover, the court noted that the board had before it testimony and reports from medical experts which concluded that the teacher suffered from a “borderline personality disorder with depressive and paranoid features and exhibit[ed] psychotic-like thinking.”  Id. Indeed, the court in Lefevre held that the board was entitled to rely on these diagnoses as a basis for termination, even though the evaluating psychiatrist declined to express an opinion on whether the teacher could fulfill her work responsibilities.  Id.

As in Lefevre, the court concludes here that the record before the Board provided substantial support for its conclusion that the plaintiff's disability rendered her unable to fulfill her duties, notwithstanding the Board's significant and repeated efforts over many years to accommodate her needs.   The Board had before it the evaluations by several medical professionals and their testimony before the hearing officer, all of which showed unambiguously that the plaintiff was disabled in such a way and to such a degree that would cause her to have difficulty completing essential components of a teacher's job description.   Specifically in this regard, Dr. Fabbri testified that, based on his psychiatric evaluation of the plaintiff, he believed that she would have difficulties (1) establishing and maintaining standards of student behavior required to provide a productive classroom environment;  (2) developing instructional plans and effectively organizing class time;  (3) giving clear direction to students concerning their assignments;  and (4) conducting classes productively through the use of appropriate instructional techniques and materials.  (ROR, FOF # 37.)   In the court's opinion, on the basis of this testimony alone, the Board could have reasonably found that the plaintiff suffered from a disability that provided a statutorily sufficient basis upon which to justify her termination.

That said, the Board here did not rely solely upon the opinion of Dr. Fabbri.   The Board had before it significantly more substantial evidence, including, for example, the testimony of the plaintiff's personal psychiatrist, Dr. Daniel Moore, as well as the evidence offered of the plaintiff's behavior while in the school and classroom.   The Board also properly could have considered, and chosen to rely heavily upon, the opinion offered by Dr. Thies, a clinical neuropsychologist, which indicated that the plaintiff's performance as a teacher suffered as a result of marked deficiencies in her ability to store and retrieve information, and limits on her “executive functioning”—that is, functioning responsible for regulating judgment and coordinating mental activities.⁷  In this context, the record shows that the plaintiff was having problems teaching her students and maintaining an appropriate learning environment in the classroom—even with the aid of a full-time paraprofessional and other accommodations.   In fact, there was evidence presented that, because of the plaintiff's disabilities, the paraprofessional had been required to take on broader responsibilities, particularly in the areas of instruction and evaluation of students, than may have been appropriate given the paraprofessional's lack of a state teaching certification.

The Board also had evidence before it of a series of bizarre incidents involving the plaintiff that occurred during the school day and upon school grounds.   There were, for example, instances where parents or other staff would find the plaintiff asleep in her car outside of the school.  (ROR, FOF # 18;  Hearing Tr. Vol. 1, p. 106.)   She had, on occasion, dismissed her students without any supervision prior to the end of the class period, either because she had become confused as to her and the school's schedule (ROR, Board Exh. 41);  or because she was unable to control student behavior in her classroom.   (ROR, Board Exh. 4D;  ROR, Hearing Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38.)   In fact, these incidents, along with others that impacted adversely on students' skills and development, were the subject of numerous complaints from parents, which demanded that their child be transferred out of both the plaintiff's music class and the band program that she directed.  (ROR, Board Exh. 3.)

Under these circumstances and faced with this type of evidence, the Board cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in adopting the conclusions and recommendation of the hearing officer and in choosing to terminate the plaintiff's employment.   It may well be true, as the plaintiff contended at oral argument, that the Board for many years and until 2010 had attempted to accommodate her special needs, and by doing so, permitted her to continue her employment.   But the plaintiff's claim that the Board's willingness to provide accommodations to her in the past thereby compels the Board to offer additional and potentially limitless future accommodations, is simply unsupported in law and wholly without merit.   To the contrary, given the expert medical testimony before the Board indicating that the plaintiff's condition would likely never improve, the Board appropriately could find that termination was an unavoidable necessity—particularly in light of the adverse impact that the plaintiff, even with the benefit of previous accommodation, continued to have on student learning and safety, and on the effectiveness and efficiency of school operations.   In sum, while this is unquestionably a sad case, there existed substantial evidence that the hearing officer, and thus the Board, could rely upon in making the decision to terminate the plaintiff for her disability under § 10–151(d)(4).

B

Other due and sufficient cause

In Connecticut, “other due and sufficient cause” is treated as “equivalent to good cause,” and “includes any ground which is put forward by the [school] committee in good faith and which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the committee's task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system.”  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 769.  “[T]he decision to terminate must be reached after a careful examination of all pertinent factors relating to the particular situation, with due consideration of the effect the teacher's conduct will have on the school authorities as well as on the students.”  Id., 769–70.  “[I]n deciding whether particular conduct constitutes due and sufficient cause for termination, the impact of that conduct upon the operation of the school is a significant consideration.”  Id., 770.   In determining whether termination is justifiable, the board, and later a reviewing court, is to apply “a qualitative not quantitative analysis,” recognizing that a teacher's isolated incidence of negative behavior can suffice for termination even “against the backdrop of an [otherwise] excellent record.”  Id., 771–72.

In this case, there are several incidents that raised legitimate questions about the plaintiff's judgment and abilities that would justify the Board's decision to adopt the hearing officer's recommendation.   For example, in December 2008, the plaintiff unquestionably created a dangerous situation and imperiled the safety of students when she released forty students from band class, unsupervised, because they were misbehaving.  (ROR, FOF # 17.)   This extraordinary lapse in judgment created an unsafe situation for the students, not only in the opinion of the school's principal;  (ROR, FOF # 17);  but doubtlessly, too, in the opinion of the parents whose children's physical or mental well-being was thereby negatively impacted.⁸  Another equally troubling event occurred in April 2009, when, as previously described, the plaintiff reported to the wrong elementary school, and took over an hour to realize that she was not in the right place.  (ROR, FOF # 19.)   When alerted to her error, the plaintiff's reaction was marked by further confused thinking which made erroneous references to her car running out of gas, and her keys being locked in her car.  (ROR, FOF # 19.)   Although this odd behavior caused school administrators to instruct her to remain within that school for the day and not to report to her assigned school, the plaintiff left anyway, taking twenty minutes to travel the one-half mile to the other school.  (ROR, FOF # 20.)   Once at the other school, the plaintiff inexplicably attempted to end a forty-minute class after twenty minutes, and was only prevented from doing so by the school principal.  (ROR, FOF # 21.)   On these occasions, and on frequent other occasions as well,⁹ the plaintiff was described by school officials, students and/or parents as appearing “confused,” “exhausted,” “unfocused,” “overwhelmed,” “zoned out,” “disoriented,” and even “zombie-like.”  (ROR, FOF.)

There was also evidence presented that the plaintiff had failed to adequately perform many of the duties incumbent upon a certified school teacher.   The Board heard from parents whose children had reported that they were learning nothing from the plaintiff in her class and that at times she would even fall asleep in the classroom.   Additionally, as noted earlier, there was evidence that the plaintiff not only looked for assistance from her paraprofessional, but actually delegated to the paraprofessional many of the tasks that the plaintiff was required by law to perform herself.   In this regard, the record specifically reflected that the plaintiff required her paraprofessional to grade students' assignments and coordinate student schedules, and actually to calculate the grade that students would receive on their report cards.  (ROR, FOF # 50.)   While the plaintiff contests this finding of fact, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support it.   It was therefore reasonable and not arbitrary for the Board to find that the plaintiff compromised student learning and the instructional environment within the classroom by delegating these responsibilities to uncertified personnel.

Further compromising the school system's efforts to promote student learning and development was the plaintiff's frequent absence from the classroom.  (ROR, FOF # # 5, 6.) Her absence rate over the documented dates in the record averaged over 30 days per school year—that is, over one-sixth of each school year—a statistical average that actually understates her total absences because it does not factor in the two years during which she was on leave for the entire school year.¹⁰  (ROR, FOF # 7.)   While there may have been documented reasons for many of these absences, it is not arbitrary and capricious for the Board to have determined that the plaintiff's record prevented her from adequately providing an educational experience for her students.   Indeed, no other conclusion fairly could be drawn given the undeniable impact on learning that would be occasioned by a teacher's absence at this staggering rate.

On the basis of these factors and the entirety of the record, the court concludes that there existed substantial evidence that the Board properly relied upon in the exercise of its right to terminate the plaintiff's employment under § 10–151(d)(6).   In reaching this conclusion, the court recognizes and has considered that the plaintiff did offer evidence that some parents were satisfied with her classroom teaching, and the after-school musical concerts which she planned and coordinated.  (ROR, Plaintiff Exh. 1.) But this evidence does not mean that the Board's decision was arbitrary or capricious.   While reasonable minds perhaps could differ,¹¹ and the plaintiff has shown that some students benefited from her instruction, the Board had the discretion to terminate the plaintiff's employment when her continuing behaviors so profoundly interfered with student safety and educational progress.   The substantial evidence of these behaviors therefore supported the Board's exercise of discretion in terminating the plaintiff's employment for “other due and sufficient cause” under § 10–151(d)(6) of the General Statutes.

V

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the Board's decision upholding the independent hearing officer's recommendation to terminate the plaintiff's employment as a teacher was not arbitrary or capricious, and was, in fact, fully supported by substantial evidence of the plaintiff's disability, as shown by competent medical evidence, as provided for in § 10–151(d)(4);  and other due and sufficient cause, as provided for in § 10–151(d)(6).   The present appeal is therefore dismissed.

THE COURT

Gold, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. This was not the plaintiff's first fitness for duty examination.   In the 1992–93 school year, a similar fitness examination had been ordered after the plaintiff appeared confused and overwhelmed, and was having difficulty performing even simple tasks.  (ROR, FOF # 8.)   The Board at that time continued the plaintiff's employment, and in recognition of some of her particular needs, thereafter began to make the types of scheduling and classroom accommodations that are referred to in this memorandum.   (ROR, FOF # 9, # 10.).  FN1. This was not the plaintiff's first fitness for duty examination.   In the 1992–93 school year, a similar fitness examination had been ordered after the plaintiff appeared confused and overwhelmed, and was having difficulty performing even simple tasks.  (ROR, FOF # 8.)   The Board at that time continued the plaintiff's employment, and in recognition of some of her particular needs, thereafter began to make the types of scheduling and classroom accommodations that are referred to in this memorandum.   (ROR, FOF # 9, # 10.)

FN2. General Statutes § 10–151(d), which is part of Connecticut's so-called “Teacher Tenure Act,” provides that a tenured teacher's employment may only be terminated for one of the following reasons:  “(1) Inefficiency or incompetence ․;  (2) insubordination ․;  (3) moral misconduct;  (4) disability, as shown by competent medical evidence;  (5) elimination of the [teacher's] position ․, or (6) other due and sufficient cause.”.  FN2. General Statutes § 10–151(d), which is part of Connecticut's so-called “Teacher Tenure Act,” provides that a tenured teacher's employment may only be terminated for one of the following reasons:  “(1) Inefficiency or incompetence ․;  (2) insubordination ․;  (3) moral misconduct;  (4) disability, as shown by competent medical evidence;  (5) elimination of the [teacher's] position ․, or (6) other due and sufficient cause.”

FN3. The Board had raised questions in its brief regarding the interplay between § 10–151(d) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the extent to which the ADA imposed additional requirements on school boards seeking to terminate a tenured teacher on the basis of a disability..  FN3. The Board had raised questions in its brief regarding the interplay between § 10–151(d) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the extent to which the ADA imposed additional requirements on school boards seeking to terminate a tenured teacher on the basis of a disability.

FN4. The Supreme Court observed that “[a]lthough a board of education considering termination of a tenured teacher's employment contract acts in a quasi-judicial capacity ․ a board of education is not an administrative agency as defined by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) ․ and is not subject to the provisions of the UAPA.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 763–64..  FN4. The Supreme Court observed that “[a]lthough a board of education considering termination of a tenured teacher's employment contract acts in a quasi-judicial capacity ․ a board of education is not an administrative agency as defined by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) ․ and is not subject to the provisions of the UAPA.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 763–64.

FN5. General Statute § 4–183(j) provides “[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.   The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;  (3) made upon unlawful procedure;  (4) affected by other error of law;  (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;  or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.   If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings.   For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment.”.  FN5. General Statute § 4–183(j) provides “[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.   The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;  (3) made upon unlawful procedure;  (4) affected by other error of law;  (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;  or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.   If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings.   For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment.”

FN6. As our Supreme Court has noted:  “The substantial evidence rule imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency ․ It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [board], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion ․ The law is also well established that if the decision of the [board] is reasonably supported by the evidence it must be sustained.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Connor v. Waterbury, 286 Conn. 732, 741, 945 A.2d 936 (2008).  “This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 742..  FN6. As our Supreme Court has noted:  “The substantial evidence rule imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency ․ It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [board], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion ․ The law is also well established that if the decision of the [board] is reasonably supported by the evidence it must be sustained.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Connor v. Waterbury, 286 Conn. 732, 741, 945 A.2d 936 (2008).  “This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 742.

FN7. Dr. Thies noted further that, based on the results of psychological testing, the plaintiff would likely manifest poor concentration and organizational skills and some degree of memory deficiency, and would experience difficulty in learning new material, in using and manipulating data, and in adapting to new work environments and responsibilities.   These troubling assessments were certainly supported by the test results which, as Dr. Thies observed, placed the plaintiff (despite her significant level of education) in the lowest one percentile on several tests, including those that measured aspects of memory and reading comprehension.  (ROR, FOF # 30–36.).  FN7. Dr. Thies noted further that, based on the results of psychological testing, the plaintiff would likely manifest poor concentration and organizational skills and some degree of memory deficiency, and would experience difficulty in learning new material, in using and manipulating data, and in adapting to new work environments and responsibilities.   These troubling assessments were certainly supported by the test results which, as Dr. Thies observed, placed the plaintiff (despite her significant level of education) in the lowest one percentile on several tests, including those that measured aspects of memory and reading comprehension.  (ROR, FOF # 30–36.)

FN8. The Board had before it evidence that these students were later found wandering the halls of the school, some crying and emotionally distraught and necessitating intervention by the school nurse.  (ROR, FOF # 17;  Board Exh. 4D;  Hearing Tr. Vol. 1 p. 38.).  FN8. The Board had before it evidence that these students were later found wandering the halls of the school, some crying and emotionally distraught and necessitating intervention by the school nurse.  (ROR, FOF # 17;  Board Exh. 4D;  Hearing Tr. Vol. 1 p. 38.)

FN9. Several other incidents regarding the plaintiff's odd and unfocused behavior in the school and during after-school band concerts prompted school officials and parents to express concerns.  (ROR, FOF # # 12, 13, 15, 16.)   In fact, over the years, the plaintiff was often the subject of complaints lodged by parents who had witnessed, or whose children had reported, some of her more bizarre behaviors and her frequent absences from the classroom—and the impact these factors had on student learning.  (ROR, Board Exh. 3.) Perhaps most tellingly, evidence was presented to the Board that the plaintiff had been the subject of a greater number of complaints than any other teacher in the City of West Haven.  (ROR, FOF # 43;  Hearing Tr. Vol. 1, p. 36.).  FN9. Several other incidents regarding the plaintiff's odd and unfocused behavior in the school and during after-school band concerts prompted school officials and parents to express concerns.  (ROR, FOF # # 12, 13, 15, 16.)   In fact, over the years, the plaintiff was often the subject of complaints lodged by parents who had witnessed, or whose children had reported, some of her more bizarre behaviors and her frequent absences from the classroom—and the impact these factors had on student learning.  (ROR, Board Exh. 3.) Perhaps most tellingly, evidence was presented to the Board that the plaintiff had been the subject of a greater number of complaints than any other teacher in the City of West Haven.  (ROR, FOF # 43;  Hearing Tr. Vol. 1, p. 36.)

FN10. Making matters worse, the plaintiff often failed to alert school officials of her absences and to arrange for coverage by a substitute teacher.  (ROR, FOF # 16;  ROR, Board Exh. 4G.).  FN10. Making matters worse, the plaintiff often failed to alert school officials of her absences and to arrange for coverage by a substitute teacher.  (ROR, FOF # 16;  ROR, Board Exh. 4G.)

FN11. For example, while the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist believes that the plaintiff is capable of performing her job functions, this opinion is clearly at odds with the conclusions reached on this question by other medical professionals involved in this case.   In any event, “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 768.   Ultimately, it was the Board's duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and to draw appropriate conclusions therefrom..  FN11. For example, while the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist believes that the plaintiff is capable of performing her job functions, this opinion is clearly at odds with the conclusions reached on this question by other medical professionals involved in this case.   In any event, “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Rogers v. Board of Education, supra, 252 Conn. 768.   Ultimately, it was the Board's duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and to draw appropriate conclusions therefrom.

Gold, David P., J.