Bruce A. Blowers v. Ann Marie Blowers (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

BACKGROUND

This dissolution action was tried to the court over the course of many months.   The trial was originally scheduled for July 21, 22, 25 and 26, 2011.   The trial required additional time and was continued to August 11 and 22, 2011.   Additional trial time was then scheduled on October 27 and 28, 2011;  however, the plaintiff was unable to attend the final day of trial, scheduled on October 28, due to health related issues.   The trial was therefore rescheduled and concluded on December 9, 2011.

The parties, Bruce and Ann Marie Blowers, were married in Las Vegas, Nevada on November 15, 2005.   One minor child has been born issue of this marriage:  Jennifer N. Blowers, born on August 27, 2007.   The plaintiff is sixty years old and is in poor but improving health.   He proceeded at trial as a self-represented party.   The defendant is thirty-two years old and is in good health.   She was represented by counsel at trial and a court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) represented the best interests of the minor child.

A. Marital History

The parties initially resided together for several years at the plaintiff's long-standing family residence, located at 29 Kearns Drive, Granby, Connecticut.   However, the marriage has been troubled, nearly from its inception.   Although the plaintiff is a devoted father today, the news of his wife's pregnancy was a surprise to him and he openly doubted his paternity, thereby exacerbating the parties' already troubled marriage.

1. Allegations of Abuse

The defendant claims that she has been the victim of domestic violence.   In particular, she claims that the plaintiff once struck her arm while she was holding the minor child.   On this first occasion, she claims he threatened her with his fist, held his punch for a moment and then hit her arm.   She called the police but did not “press charges.”   On the second occasion of alleged abuse, the defendant claims that the plaintiff pulled her hair, closed a door on her hand and walked away.   She claims that she did not call the police because she feared her story would be viewed without credibility by the police.   She also claims that she did not leave the marital home with the minor child during this abuse, fearing that she would be arrested for kidnaping.   The plaintiff denies all of these allegations of abuse.

The defendant testified that the plaintiff uses very abusive and argumentative language toward her, and continues to do so with her and members of her family during pickups and drop offs with the minor child.   A most recent example of the numerous conflicts between the plaintiff and the defendant's family occurred during the course of the trial on August 12, 2011, when the plaintiff and the defendant's father, Mr. Leonard Fiedorczyk, engaged in a struggle over the minor child.   This struggle resulted in restraining order applications and the need for further evidence in this case, discussed in greater detail, infra.

The court credits the defendant's testimony over that of the plaintiff's regarding his controlling behavior and abusive language toward her;  however, these abuses were apparently not so serious in the defendant's mind to militate toward an arrest or an application for an order of protection.¹  The court nonetheless finds that these allegations of controlling behavior toward the defendant are evidence of some fault on the part of the plaintiff for the breakdown of the marriage.   However, the defendant does not remain blameless in this regard, as discussed further in this memorandum.

2. Separation of the Parties

The defendant ultimately left the marital home in April 2009, to establish her own residence.   She first moved in with her aunt and then found her own residence, located at the Turkey Hill apartment complex in nearby East Granby, where she continues to reside.²  This move from the marital home coincidentally occurred at or about the time that a department of children and families (DCF) case brought by the defendant was closed, in which she alleged substance abuse by the plaintiff.   This DCF case was determined to be unsubstantiated.   See Exhibit 1, p. 8. The court finds that this unsubstantiated act on the part of the defendant contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.

The defendant continued her claim at trial of the plaintiff's use of marijuana.   She credibly testified that she witnessed the plaintiff's use of marijuana many years ago;  however, she presented no credible evidence of his current or recent use of marijuana or any other illegal substance.   The plaintiff offered to be subjected to drug testing and further claimed to have been subjected to random drug testing as a postal service employee.   However, the plaintiff unilaterally admitted at the trial that he had used marijuana before the birth of his daughter.

The overwhelming focus and cause of the continuing disputes between the parties relates to the defendant's access to her four-year-old daughter while in the company of her fiancé, Mr. Peter Barry.   The plaintiff asserts that the cause of the breakdown of the marriage is the defendant's affair with Mr. Barry.   He is a convicted sex offender and is listed on the permanent sex offender registry, with a significant criminal history, primarily involving sexual violence.   However, he is not on parole or probation and has no other conditions of his release from prison, which occurred in 1997 after twelve years of incarceration.

There was no evidence presented of an affair between Mr. Barry and the defendant before she moved from the family home.   The only credible evidence presented at the trial showed that the defendant began a friendship with Mr. Barry after moving to the Turkey Hill apartment in April 2009.   At that time, Mr. Barry was a member of the church that the parties formerly attended with their daughter, where the plaintiff was a deacon.   By July 2009, Mr. Barry began visiting the defendant and the minor child at the Turkey Hill apartment.   When the defendant found that she was unable to afford the apartment alone, Mr. Barry signed the lease and began residing there with the defendant and the minor child in September of that year.   The court has no evidence that the defendant's relationship with Mr. Barry caused the breakdown of the marriage;  however, his continuing romantic involvement with the defendant is the primary catalyst of this lengthy and acrimonious dissolution process.

B. Mr. Peter Barry

Peter Barry was fifty-five years old at the time of his testimony.   He has a serious criminal history, involving eight arrests between 1977 and 1985, primarily for sexual assaults of varying degrees against females.   Exhibit D. Although one sexual assault arrest involved a minor who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense, there was no evidence presented of arrests or convictions of sexual crimes perpetrated against prepubescent children.   Mr. Barry has been incarcerated on two occasions for violent sexual offenses.   Most recently, he was sentenced to a period of twenty years of incarceration for sexual assault in the third degree and unlawful restraint, inter alia, based upon a charge of attempted sexual assault in the first degree.   He was released from prison in 1997 after serving twelve of his twenty-year sentence.

Since his release from prison approximately fourteen years ago, he has been arrested on three occasions, two of which are related to this case.   The first arrest involved disorderly conduct with the plaintiff and an emergency room nurse at the University of Connecticut Health Center, while the minor child was being treated for a dog bite.   This matter was dismissed.   The second involved a sex offender registry violation, which occurred in 2010.   Mr. Barry admitted that he was in violation of the law when, pursuant to court orders, he was living separately from the defendant at a hotel in Windsor Locks.   He credibly testified that he failed to return his registration letter because he misplaced the letter while moving.   He voluntarily alerted the appropriate authorities to these facts and was arrested.   He subsequently pleaded guilty and received a one-year suspended sentence and one-year conditional discharge on December 14, 2010, the conditions of which have not been disclosed to the court.

Mr. Barry has been married and divorced twice.   As the result of these two marital unions, he is the father of three children and the grandfather of five grandchildren.   One of his children has since passed away and another has been estranged since Mr. Barry's incarceration many years ago.   He has been employed steadily since his release, primarily by commercial cleaning services.   He has been employed consistently for the past five years by Admiral Cleaning, where the defendant also works on a part-time basis.

The court finds Mr. Barry to have been a credible and accurate witness on matters testified to in court.   The court further finds that he takes his history of sex offenses seriously and steadfastly follows his sexual offender protocols.   For example, while in the company of the minor child in the past, he was never alone with her and he does not engage in any disciplinary measures involving the child.   Although he claims he does not touch her, there is evidence of him holding her in his arms as a very young child in the church nursery.   Since the orders of no contact were issued by the court, Mr. Barry has had no contact with the child, except incidental and indirect contact while on the phone with the defendant.   He credibly claims that he intends no harm to this minor child and cares for her as he does his own grandchildren.

In light of Mr. Barry's criminal history, the defendant wisely submits that his only acceptable access to the minor child must be subject to supervision by a third party.   However, both the GAL and the family study recommendations exclude the defendant as the third-party supervisor.   The court agrees with this recommendation.

C. Confrontation Between Mr. Barry and the Plaintiff

On or about October 10, 2009, the minor child was the victim of a dog bite while in the custody and care of the defendant, and required emergency medical treatment.   The defendant notified both Mr. Barry and the plaintiff that the minor child was being treated at the University of Connecticut Health Center.   Mr. Barry arrived first, but when he became aware of the plaintiff's arrival, he decided to leave.   However, when the plaintiff saw Mr. Barry physically consoling his wife, he beckoned and then verbally confronted him.   Mr. Barry became angry and waived his fists in the plaintiff's face, one of which was in a cast.   An emergency room nurse interceded and called the police.   Although the plaintiff did not wish to “press charges,” Mr. Barry was subsequently arrested for disorderly conduct.   The charge was later dismissed and does not appear on his criminal record.

D. Further DCF Involvement

This incident resulted in a second DCF investigation, initiated by the plaintiff, based upon the fact that his daughter and wife were living with Mr. Barry.   The DCF investigation concluded that there was no substantiation of abuse or neglect by the defendant.   However, this determination appears to have been conditioned on the defendant's agreement to a safety plan involving no contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.

The defendant did not comply with this DCF order.   The defendant incredibly claimed that she was required to sign a blank safety plan by the DCF caseworker assigned to the case.   She then claimed that the no contact provision was handwritten after she signed the document.   She then claimed that she misunderstood the condition, which she believed allowed her daughter to have contact with Mr. Barry after an evaluation determined his low likelihood to re-offend.

According to the family relations study in this case, DCF's position is unchanged and the caseworker would not support contact between the minor child and Mr. Barry under any circumstance.   The plaintiff supports this conclusion and seeks a similar order in this dissolution proceeding.   The defendant disagrees and seeks supervised access by Mr. Barry, her fiancé.

E. Expert Testimony Concerning Mr. Barry

The defendant called Mr. William F. Hobson as an expert.   He is a licensed professional counselor specializing in sex offenders.   In addition, he has been Mr. Barry's therapist at different times over the course of many years;  initially while Mr. Barry was in prison where Mr. Hobson headed the sex offender treatment program for the Connecticut Department of Correction.   After qualifying him as an expert in his field, Mr. Hobson testified credibly to the court that Mr. Barry presents a low risk of re-offending, based upon his fixed, “historical” and now existing “dynamic risk factors.”   Although Mr. Barry's criminal history involved, in one of several instances, a teenage female minor, Mr. Hobson considered Mr. Barry's danger to the parties' minor child as relatively low, especially given her very young age and the passage of many years since his last sexual offense, which was committed in 1985.   Mr. Hobson concluded that so long as Mr. Barry follows his treatment protocols and his access is supervised, this young child would be exposed to a very low level of danger.   Although Mr. Hobson acknowledged the fact that this child will eventually reach the age of Mr. Barry's teenage victim, his low risk assessment is unchanged.   His assessment remains unchanged due to the passage of time since the last offense and Mr. Barry's continuous exposure to females of all ages since his release from prison in 1997.

However, Mr. Hobson qualified his predictive assessment in several ways.   First, the currently existing dynamic risk factors may change at any time.   Second, Mr. Barry's low risk assessment is among sex offenders as a subcategory, separate from other criminals, as well as the general civilian population.   Nonetheless, Mr. Hobson testified that recidivism among sex offenders is lower than it is for other categories of criminal offenders.

The court agrees with Mr. Hobson that it is not likely that Mr. Barry will engage in violent sexual assaults at this time, given his currently existing dynamic risk factors.

F. Supervised Access and Leonard Fiedorczyk

The defendant proposes that Mr. Barry's access to the minor child be permitted, but only under the supervision of a third party.   The defendant has proposed that her father, Mr. Leonard Fiedorczyk, be an authorized supervisor of Mr. Barry while he is in the company of the minor child.   At the closing argument, the defendant included the possibility of other, yet to be determined, third-party supervisors.

The plaintiff disagrees and vehemently opposes Mr. Barry's access to the minor child under any circumstance.   He asserts that Mr. Fiedorczyk should not be used as a supervisor of Mr. Barry.   He also asserts that the defendant should not use Mr. Fiedorczyk for pickups and drop offs of the minor child, due to his own volatile temperament.

Mr. Fiedorczyk testified before the court in this matter on two occasions.   The court finds Mr. Fiedorczyk to be a devoted grandfather.   He is seventy-one years old and is married, but has been living separately from his wife for many years.   He claims to be willing to move in with the defendant in order to supervise Mr. Barry's access to his granddaughter.   He credibly asserts that he places his granddaughter's personal safety foremost in importance.

The plaintiff considers Mr. Fiedorczyk unreliable in this role.   First, he considers Mr. Fiedorczyk too feeble for this proposed role, supervising a potentially violent sex offender.   In support of this concern, there was evidence presented that Mr. Fiedorczyk is hard of hearing and occasionally uses a cane for walking.   Primarily, however, the plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fiedorczyk is temperamentally unsuitable in this proposed role.   For example, the plaintiff generally asserted at trial, and it was not denied, that Mr. Fiedorczyk has a “lifetime ban” from a certain Wal–Mart, due to his aggressive behavior at that store in the past.   The plaintiff also points to several instances, showing that Mr. Fiedorczyk may be an unsuitable supervisor of Mr. Barry and, further, an unsuitable surrogate for the defendant in physical custody transitions.

1. Halloween 2010

In support of his assertion that Mr. Fiedorczyk is an inappropriate supervisor of Mr. Barry, the plaintiff points to an incident that occurred on Halloween over one year ago in 2010.   Apparently, Mr. Fiedorczyk offered to take the minor child “trick or treating.”   Upon his return to the Turkey Hill apartment with the minor child, the plaintiff claims Mr. Fiedorczyk saw the police arrive and panicked.   He asserts that Mr. Fiedorczyk then tried to escape with the child until he was pulled over by the police near the exit of this large apartment complex.   This was all witnessed by the plaintiff, who apparently alerted the police to the potential for contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child at the defendant's apartment.

Mr. Fiedorczyk credibly claims that he was simply attempting to ensure that Mr. Barry was out of the apartment before leaving the minor child with her mother.   Mr. Barry testified that he left the apartment after Mr. Fiedorczyk called to announce his arrival, and later saw him pulled over by the police as he, himself, was exiting the apartment complex.   This suggests that Mr. Barry had not left the apartment at the time of Mr. Fiedorczyk's arrival with the child at the apartment complex.

The plaintiff remains suspicious of these circumstances.   Although the court credits Mr. Fiedorczyk with credibility in his account of the event, he appears to have panicked at the prospect of simultaneously being in the company of the minor child and Mr. Barry, while in the presence of the police in violation of the court's order.   Although understandable, it shows that he lacks confidence in competently foreseeing and handling potentially difficult situations.

2. August 12, 2011

The plaintiff also testified that Mr. Fiedorczyk aggressively engaged in a struggle over the minor child on August 12, 2011, and pushed him to the ground.   By way of background, the current orders of the court provide the plaintiff with the right of first refusal in the event that the defendant is unable to care for the minor child during her parenting time for a period in excess of two hours.   See May 24, 2011 order of the court, Olear, J. On the morning of August 12, the defendant phoned the plaintiff to say that her father would pick the minor child up because she was unable to be there due to an appointment.   The plaintiff objected on two grounds.   First, Mr. Fiedorczyk was not welcome on his property.   Second, the defendant refused to indicate whether her appointment was of a greater duration than two hours, thereby triggering the plaintiff's superior right of continued access with the minor child over that of Mr. Fiedorczyk.

The court reaches the following factual conclusions from the testimony of both the plaintiff and Mr. Fiedorczyk.   The plaintiff was sitting on his front porch with the minor child on his lap when Mr. Fiedorczyk arrived.   As Mr. Fiedorczyk approached the plaintiff, he reached out for the minor child.   As this occurred, the plaintiff pulled back with the minor child on his lap.   As this happened, the minor child held onto the plaintiff's neck, and together father and daughter rolled to the ground.   During this event, it appears that there was some physical contact between Mr. Fiedorczyk and the plaintiff.   Mr. Fiedorczyk then took the child into his arms and left.   The police were called but no arrests were made.

Based upon the evidence, it appears to the court that all parties were unreasonable in their actions.   First, the defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the duration of her appointment so that the plaintiff was able to determine whether his first right of refusal was applicable.   Second, Mr. Fiedorczyk's aggressive approach toward the plaintiff to assert his daughter's right of access was unacceptable.   Finally, although it is hard to blame him for standing on his court-ordered rights, Mr. Blowers preemptively concluded that there would be a violation of his right of first refusal.   In doing so, he inflamed the incident and was incapable of constructively navigating this example of acrimony between the parties.   It is particularly disturbing that he allowed the incident to unfold in the presence of his daughter.   Mr. Blowers, then fifty-nine years old, and Mr. Fiedorczyk, then seventy-one years old, nearly turned a custodial transition of a then three-year-old into a wrestling match with the child in the center of the ring.   This is unacceptable.

After this incident, the plaintiff applied for an order of protection against Mr. Fiedorczyk, which was dismissed.   Soon thereafter, the plaintiff made another application for an order of protection.   The order of protection was granted by the court, Prestley, J., providing for no contact and a residential stay away.   The next day, Mr. Fiedorczyk unintentionally violated the order by dropping the minor child off at the plaintiff's home, but the police were not called by the plaintiff to arrest Mr. Fiedorczyk.   After a hearing was held by the court, Olear, J., the order of protection was reduced to a limited order of no threats or other abusive acts.

3. Relationship with Mr. Barry

The plaintiff is additionally troubled by the friendly relationship between Mr. Barry and Mr. Fiedorczyk.   They socialize occasionally, as would be expected of a future in-law relationship.   However, Mr. Barry appears to have ingratiated himself with Mr. Fiedorczyk by repaying a $5,500 loan, allegedly owed by the plaintiff to Mr. Fiedorczyk, which the plaintiff denies as a debt.

Mr. Barry nonetheless explains this as a simple act of helping a future family member survive economically, because Mr. Fiedorczyk is retired and on a fixed income.   Furthermore, Mr. Barry claims to have run out of money from his inheritance and has no other source of substantial income.   The implication of this is that he is no longer able to purchase Mr. Fiedorczyk's loyalty, although he claims this was never his purpose.

4. The Guardian Ad Litem's Recommendations

The GAL has made a straightforward recommendation concerning Mr. Barry:  that the minor child should have no contact with Mr. Barry and that they should not share the same address.   The GAL reaches this recommendation based on the conclusion that her client's relationship with Mr. Barry is generally unformed at this time, and therefore unimportant to her.   Although meeting a parent's new partner would be a likely occurrence in any family in transition, the GAL concluded that the child's association with a registered sex offender would result in a stigma, far overwhelming any relationship that Mr. Barry might have with the child.   In fact, Mr. Barry has not seen the child in two years.   The GAL further testified that the defendant's relationship with Mr. Barry has yet to completely stabilize, even though they are presently engaged to be married and Mr. Barry has purchased a home intended as their marital abode.

The GAL additionally recommends that the minor child be placed in a full-time day care to provide a safe haven from the unrelenting disputes between the parties during pickups and drop offs.   This recommendation was reiterated after the incident with Mr. Fiedorczyk on August 12, 2011.   The plaintiff disagrees with this recommendation.   He would simply prefer to spend more time with his child than a full-time day care schedule would provide, especially now that he is disabled and unemployed.

G. Substantial Changes in Circumstances

Since pendente lite orders were issued,³ there have been several substantial changes in circumstances.   First, the minor child is no longer permitted to attend the Apple Tree Learning Center.   According to the GAL, this resulted from the parties involving the Apple Tree Learning Center in their ongoing marital and parenting disputes.   The parties now disagree whether it is in the minor child's best interest to attend day care.   Second, the plaintiff had a serious heart attack requiring surgery at the beginning of this year.   He now also suffers from emphysema and other ailments, making him incapable of working as a letter carrier for the United States Postal Service where he was employed for over twenty-five years.   He is now unemployed and recently began receiving social security disability (SSD) payments in September.   He also has a pending application for early retirement benefits.

Although the defendant was not working substantially at the beginning of this trial, she is now employed on a part-time basis in two capacities:  working as a school bus driver and continuing to work part-time for Admiral Cleaning along with Mr. Barry.   Her employment as a school bus driver, however, raises several new issues between the parties concerning the best interest of the minor child.   The defendant brings the minor child with her to work at 6:30 a.m. on weekdays, even after overnights with the plaintiff on Wednesdays and Thursdays nights.   Following these overnights, the plaintiff prepares the minor child for the day and the defendant drives the child from Granby to her work location in Avon, where she prepares her vehicle.   The child then accompanies the defendant on her route in a booster seat, which is completed sometime after 8:00 a.m. The defendant then drives the child home, presumably to East Granby, until she returns to Avon for her afternoon school bus route.   At approximately 2:00 p.m., the defendant turns the minor child over to Mr. and Mrs. Fiedorczyk for her return to the plaintiff's home in Granby on Wednesdays and Thursdays, exactly two hours later for a 4:00 p.m. drop off.   On other days of the week, the court concludes that the child regularly rides with her mother during the morning and afternoon school bus routes.

The plaintiff considers the application of the existing access schedule to these changed circumstances to be contrary to the best interest of the child.   First, instead of spending at least four hours, and up to six or more hours, in a variety of vehicles on days of access when the defendant works, the plaintiff believes that the best interest of the child would be served by sleeping until a reasonable hour and eating a breakfast at home with him, as he is not working now and is available to care for her.   The court agrees.

Further, the plaintiff has been blamed by the defendant for not properly caring for the child's diaper rash, which he credibly counters has developed while the child has endured long rides with her mother in a booster seat.   This rash is now described as requiring antibiotic ointment for several open sores.⁴  The defendant explains that she engages in this routine to ensure that she spends as much time with her child as possible during her hours of access.   The irony of this situation and the plaintiff's complaints about its effect upon the child is that the schedule of 6:30 a.m. transfers was originally designed to accommodate his own schedule with the postal service, where he is no longer employed.

Finally, at the time the trial began, the plaintiff did not have a roadworthy motor vehicle.   At the most recent hearing in this matter on December 9, 2011, it is undisputed that the plaintiff now owns a registered 1987 Chevrolet Camaro and that he anticipates a second roadworthy vehicle within weeks;  namely, a 1997 Ford Taurus, currently in his possession.

II

ADDITIONAL FACTS AND ORDERSA. Jurisdiction and Dissolution of Marriage

After reviewing the evidence and evaluating the testimony of the parties and other witnesses, the court makes the following additional findings and conclusions.   The court has jurisdiction in this case and the marriage has broken down irretrievably with no reasonable expectation of reconciliation.   The parties have not received state assistance during the course of the marriage.   Based upon these findings, the marriage of the parties is ordered dissolved effective this date of judgment.

The court notes that, with the exception of the basic parenting schedule, the custody and access orders generally reflect the joint recommendations of the GAL and family relations study.

B. Custody

1. Legal Custody

In this case, the parties have expressed their desire for joint legal custody.   In addition, all professional recommendations have been to order joint legal custody in this case.   The court challenged the GAL on this point, despite her strong assertion that these parties, although individually good parents, find it exceptionally difficult to parent together.   The court also challenged the plaintiff on this point and his answers were less than emphatic, one way or the other, although he appears to hold out hope to successfully parent this child together with the defendant.   Both parents clearly love this child and the feelings of the parents toward their child are reciprocated.

In determining the best interests of minor children in Connecticut, the court is guided by the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–56 and, more specifically, the sixteen factors specified in subsection (c) of the statute.⁵  Pursuant to this statutory guidance and under the circumstances of this case, the court will accept singular chorus in this case and order joint legal custody to the parties, despite the continuous and ongoing disputes between them over what is in the child's best interest.   The defendant, supported by all of the professional recommendations in this case, seeks a shared residential custody and access schedule.   The plaintiff seeks, instead, primary residential custody.   Again taking into account the statutory criteria set forth in § 46b–56, the court awards primary residential custody to the plaintiff.   The access orders, however, will involve a substantial deviation from the traditional access schedule of every other weekend with the non-custodial parent.   Substantially more than half of the child's time and almost all of her overnights will be spent with the plaintiff.

This is a very difficult decision, especially one involving a four-year-old girl who has spent most of her time with her mother.   The decision has been reached only after considering all of the facts of this case and the applicable law.   The defendant has decided to continue her life with Mr. Barry.   She is, of course, free to do so.   This choice is, however, inconsistent with her ability to live with her child on a consistent basis, based upon the conclusions of this court, supported in part by the recommendations of the GAL and family relations study, as well as the past position of DCF.

Recent developments have tipped the balance in favor of the plaintiff spending more time with the child.   First, the plaintiff is now a stay-at-home father.   Although he is physically disabled, his health appears to have improved from last winter and to be relatively stable.   The court makes this finding in light of the medical incident that occurred on the morning of October 28, 2011.   Although the plaintiff thought he might be experiencing a serious medical problem at that time, he dressed his daughter for the transition that morning at 6:30 a.m. and then went to see his doctor.   The report subsequently received into evidence did not indicate there was a serious medical problem.   See Exhibit A, December 9, 2011.   In addition to his availability, the plaintiff has worked hard to barter for improvements to his two motor vehicles, allowing him greater flexibility in the transportation of his child and to provide for her needs.

On the other side of the access issue, the defendant has been struggling to meet the requirements of her employment and her desire to be with her daughter.   Her continued employment is now critical in light of the plaintiff's disability and limited income.   In addition, Mr. Barry's diminished assets and the orders of this court now impose the continuing necessity that the defendant maintains a separate address from Mr. Barry's in order to have access to her minor child.   The court also takes into consideration the fact that the parties have been unable to work with or seek out a day care provider to care for their child.   The defendant, instead, decided to bring the child with her to work for extended periods of time.   Although this may be a necessary approach under some circumstances, it is not appropriate under the evolving circumstances of this case.

2. Mr. Barry

The court adopts the recommendation of the GAL regarding Mr. Barry.   The court concludes that Mr. Barry should have no supervised access with the minor child at this time and they shall not share the same address.⁶  To be clear, this order requires the defendant to exercise her access rights at a location apart from Mr. Barry's residence.

The defendant believes that Mr. Barry presents no risk of harm to her child.   She believes this to be true, based upon the current risk assessment and the conclusion of Mr. Hobson, an expert in the field of sex offenders.   The court also understands that she believes in Mr. Barry's personal redemption, based upon the court's reading of the family relations report.   Generally, the court agrees with Mr. Hobson.   However, although Mr. Barry may not present an immediate threat of physical harm to the child, his currently existing dynamic risk factors may change at any time.   Assessing and monitoring these dynamic risk factors under future, unknown circumstances is problematic.

The court has also heard the theme during this trial that the child is too young to protect herself against Mr. Barry in the event of a relapse into his former behavior.   This understates the potential for harm to this child if a relapse were to occur, given Mr. Barry's past but substantial record of sexual violence.   In fact, it appears from his criminal record that adult women were unable to protect themselves from his violent sexual behavior in the past, albeit over twenty-five years ago.   The inherent problem with this analysis, however, is that it is speculative.   On the other hand, it is based upon strong historical evidence.   In light of this perplexing problem, the defendant has reasonably proposed supervised access to ensure her child's safety, however, no suitable supervisor is known to the court at this time, including Mr. Fiedorczyk.

The GAL's rationale is also given weight in making this determination.   Sharing the address of a person on the sex offender registry would more than likely give rise to a social stigma, imposed upon the child by her mother's interest in establishing a new family unit with Mr. Barry, whose many crimes and convictions were so significant that they warranted permanent placement on the registry.   If the child chooses to expose herself to this stigma as an adult, she is free to do so, but not as a developing child.   Moreover, and somewhat ironically, the plaintiff so strenuously opposes his daughter's exposure to Mr. Barry that the court finds it is likely that he will contribute to this stigma by manifesting his unceasing abhorrence to others regarding Mr. Barry's relationship with his ex-wife.

Absent an agreement by the parties in writing or a court-ordered modification, any contact between the child and Mr. Barry allowed by the defendant may be the subject of motions for contempt and modification of access and legal custody.   The defendant shall also make every reasonable effort to prevent any person from allowing unauthorized access or contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.   If the defendant has reason to believe that such access or contact has occurred, she shall not allow the child to be in the care or custody of any such person who has exposed the child to Mr. Barry.

Regarding Mr. Fiedorczyk, the court finds that he is not an appropriate person to supervise Mr. Barry's contact with the minor child.⁷  His actions fall short of the unassailable judgment and neutrality required for such an important function and he has no training or experience in monitoring the dynamic risk factors of sex offenders.   Although he is steadfastly loyal to his granddaughter and daughter, he is also far too close to Mr. Barry to be viewed as a neutral observer.   Most certainly, he is not trusted by the plaintiff to be responsible for the safekeeping of this child, which would lead to ongoing suspicion and the likely resurgence of the plaintiff's surveillance of Mr. Fiedorczyk.

C. Parenting Schedule

The court notes at the outset that the vacation, holiday and birthday schedule, infra, shall supersede this access order.   The child shall reside primarily with the plaintiff.   On alternating weekends, the defendant shall have parenting time with the minor child beginning on Fridays at 5:00 p.m. through 5:00 p.m. on Sundays, so long as she maintains her own residence.   All pickups and drop offs shall be the defendant's responsibility and occur at the plaintiff's residence.

In the event that the overnight visitation is to occur at any location other than the Turkey Hill apartment, the defendant shall provide the plaintiff with the address of the overnight location, the name of the owner or lessee of the location and any relevant contact information.

In addition to alternating weekends, the defendant shall have parenting time on any two weekdays of her choosing for a period of up to three hours, which may include lunch or dinner.   She shall have additional parenting time of up to five hours on off weekends on Saturdays after 9:00 a.m. or Sundays after 12:00 noon.   The defendant shall notify the plaintiff of her days and hours of access in writing.   Any changes to this basic schedule of access shall be provided to the plaintiff in writing at least seven days in advance.   In addition, if the daytime access with the child is to occur at any private residence, other than the Turkey Hill apartment or a public place, the defendant shall provide the plaintiff with the address of the location and any relevant contact information.   All daytime pickups and drop offs shall be the defendant's responsibility and shall occur at the plaintiff's residence.

Both parties should transport the minor child only in an automobile that is legally registered, insured and mechanically safe.   In the event that either parent is unavailable to care for the child for more than four consecutive hours during his or her parenting time, then the other parent should be given the first opportunity to parent the child during this period before other child care arrangements are made.

As recommended by the GAL, an appropriate day care setting would be an optimal solution to the historical problems and disputes between the parties during child access transitions.   However, the parties have also historically undermined the neutrality of at least one day care provider in the recent past and the parties have not sought a day care solution since they were forced to abandon the services of the previous day care provider.   Furthermore, the defendant is now a stay-at-home dad.   Although governmental or charitable child care subsidies may be available, the parties' resources are extremely limited at this time.   Under these circumstances, the court will not order that the child attend day care, especially in light of the expectation of the parties that the child is to attend kindergarten next year.

The court notes that Mr. Fiedorczyk continues to perform the function of drop offs to the plaintiff's home on a regular basis without incident.   He is therefore capable of performing curbside pickups and drop offs at times the defendant is unable to perform this duty.⁸  If the defendant chooses to exercise this option, she is to notify the plaintiff at least one hour in advance.   If Mr. Fiedorczyk allows unauthorized contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child, however, this order may be modified.

D. Holidays

1. Thanksgiving:  In even numbered years, the defendant shall have parenting time from 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Eve until 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Day, and the plaintiff shall have parenting time beginning at 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Day. In odd numbered years, the plaintiff shall have parenting time from 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Eve until 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Day, and the defendant shall have parenting time beginning at 3:00 p.m. on Thanksgiving Day.

2. Christmas Eve and Christmas Day:  In odd numbered years, the defendant shall have parenting time from 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Eve until 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Day, and the plaintiff shall have parenting time from 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Day until 10:00 a.m. on December 26.   In even numbered years, the plaintiff shall have parenting time from 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Eve until 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Day, and the defendant shall have parenting time from 10:00 a.m. on Christmas Day until 10:00 a.m. on December 26.

3. New Year's Day:  The defendant shall have parenting time for this holiday in even numbered years, and the plaintiff shall have parenting time for this holiday in odd numbered years.   This holiday shall be defined as 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.

4. Easter:  In even numbered years, the plaintiff shall have parenting time from Easter Eve through 3:00 p.m. on Easter Day and the defendant shall have parenting time from 3:00 p.m. on Easter Day until 1:00 p.m. on Easter Monday.   In odd numbered years, the defendant shall have parenting time from Easter Eve through 3:00 p.m. on Easter Day and the plaintiff shall have parenting time from 3:00 p.m. on Easter Day until 1:00 p.m. on Easter Monday.

5. Memorial Day and Labor Day weekends:  In even numbered years, the plaintiff shall have parenting time for Memorial Day and Labor Day weekends and the defendant shall have parenting time for Memorial Day and Labor Day weekends in odd numbered years.   These holiday weekends shall be defined as Friday at 2:00 p.m. until Tuesday morning at 8:00 a.m.

6. Independence Day:  In even numbered years, the defendant shall have parenting time for this holiday and the plaintiff shall have parenting time for this holiday in odd numbered years.   This holiday shall be defined as 8:00 a.m. on July 4 until 8:00 a.m. on July 5.

7. Mother's Day and Father's Day:  The defendant shall have parenting time on Mother's Day each year and the plaintiff shall have parenting time on Father's Day each year.   These holidays shall be defined as Saturday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

8. Birthdays:  Each parent shall have at least three hours of parenting time with the child on her birthday.   In addition, each parent shall have at least three hours with the minor child on his or her own birthday with seven days notice to the other parent.

E. Vacations

Each parent shall be entitled to two nonconsecutive weeks of uninterrupted vacation time with the child each year, with at least thirty days written notice to the other parent.   In the event that the vacation is to occur at any other location than the Turkey Hill apartment, the defendant shall provide the plaintiff with the address of the overnight location, the name of the owner or lessee of the location and any relevant contact information.   If the trip includes out-of-state travel, a written itinerary of the vacation, including flights, hotel information and numbers where the parent and child can be reached shall be provided to the other parent before the start of travel.   Each parent's selected vacation week shall allow for uninterrupted parenting time not to exceed seven consecutive days.

F. Miscellaneous Custody and Access Orders

1. Whenever the child is with one parent, the other parent shall be allowed to call the child every evening between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. Both parents shall consistently support and facilitate these nightly calls and shall not interrupt the child's telephone time to discuss personal or parenting issues.

2. Parents shall maintain a notebook during their parenting time wherein they shall communicate anything that the other parent should know about the child, as well as her issues and needs.   The notebook shall be transferred during transitions in parenting time.

3. Each parent shall provide adequate clothing and play things for the child while she is in his or her care.   If, however, the child wishes to transport favorite clothing or toys between her homes during transitions in parenting time, then such choices shall be supported.

4. The plaintiff shall not smoke cigarettes inside his home or car during his parenting time with the child.

5. Both parents shall take an active role in the child's medical care and maintain independent contact with her pediatrician and dentist to understand fully and objectively any health concerns and treatment needs.   Both parents shall follow the recommendations of the child's licensed medical and dental providers.   The child shall consistently receive all prescribed medications when she is with either parent.   In the event that the child becomes ill or injured while in one parent's care, the other parent shall be notified immediately so that he or she is aware of the child's health situation and any follow-up treatment requirements.

6. Parents shall refrain from making disrespectful comments about each other in front of the child and protect her from such comments within their households, among extended family members and friends, and in her school or other public settings.   Neither parent shall do anything to estrange the child from her other parent, injure her opinion of the other parent, or in any way stop her natural development of love for the other parent.

7. Parents shall refrain from making disrespectful comments in front of the child about family members or other individuals who care for or spend time with the child.   The plaintiff shall also refrain from making any negative remarks about Mr. Barry to the child and shall not expose her to such comments when she is in his care.

8. If the defendant is unable to pick up or drop off the child, then such exchanges may be facilitated by Mr. Fiedorczyk or by a mutually agreed upon third party.

9. The plaintiff shall have a roadworthy automobile that has been registered and insured during his parenting time.

10. So long as the plaintiff resides in the town of Granby, it shall be the primary residence of the child for educational purposes.

G. Counseling

The defendant shall continue in individual counseling with Kim Waltman at Pinchot Counseling Group to support her adjustment to the parenting plan vis-a-vis her continued involvement with Mr. Barry;  address her power and control issues with the plaintiff;  and explore other issues that compromise her willingness and ability to interact with the plaintiff and positively co-parent their child.

The plaintiff shall immediately engage in individual counseling to support his adjustment to the parenting plan and his continued involvement in co-parenting the minor child, address his power and control issues with the defendant, and explore other issues that compromise his willingness and ability to interact with the defendant and positively co-parent their child.

Both parents shall immediately enroll in a minimum of five parenting counseling sessions with Ann Tuller or Joan Whitten of AMPS, Inc. (AMPS).  Following completion of counseling at AMPS and engagement in individual therapy, and pending further input from the counselors, the parents shall engage in a program (e.g., the PEACE or F.I.T. Program) to improve their communication, negotiation and cooperative parenting skills.

H. Income and Child Support

The current financial circumstance of this family remains extraordinarily precarious.   Prior to the marriage in 2005, both parties were employed by the United States Postal Service.   At that time, the defendant had her own apartment in New Britain and the plaintiff had been the long-time owner of his ancestral home, located at 29 Kearns Drive, Granby, Connecticut, which thereafter became the marital abode.   Although she kept her New Britain apartment for a while, the defendant primarily resided with the plaintiff at 29 Kearns Drive, beginning in January 2003.

1. The Defendant's Income

The defendant earned up to $52,000 in 2004, which is slightly less than the plaintiff's income until his recent heart attack.   See Exhibits B and C. Prior to the marriage, and while the parties were living together, the defendant claims that she paid the plaintiff $300 per month for household expenses in Granby.   Although the plaintiff disagrees with this claim, the court credits the defendant's testimony over that of the plaintiff's.   However, the defendant decided to leave the postal service in approximately 2004 for the following reasons.   First, the defendant found the commute between her place of employment and Granby too difficult.   Second, she claims that the plaintiff became jealous of her during her extended and late hours of employment.

During the year of their marriage in 2005, the defendant's income dropped precipitously to $24,000.   See Exhibit G. Since then, she has been employed in a variety of capacities, including employment at a warehouse, as a check processor and as a part-time commercial cleaner at Admiral Cleaning.   More recently, she has also been employed as a school bus driver.   Her social security records show a substantial reduction in her income since 2004.   During the year of the birth of the minor child in 2007, the defendant's income dropped further, yet understandably, to approximately $11,000.   Two years after the birth of the child, the defendant's income rose slightly to $13,000 in 2009.

At the beginning of this trial, the defendant was minimally employed as a part-time commercial cleaner with Admiral Cleaning.   In this employment she was earning just over the minimum wage for a handful of hours per week, based upon her understanding that she was prohibited from working pursuant to an order of the court.   According to her tax records, the defendant earned income of only $1,700 in 2010.   Exhibit I.

The defendant is extremely intelligent and articulate.   She graduated eighth in her class from New Britain High School.   She is also alleged to have achieved a score of 1480 on her Scholastic Aptitude Test. She attended Central Connecticut State University on a full academic scholarship for several semesters and left the college with a B+ average.   She has since pursued training as a nurse and has passed the academic test for her license;  however, she was unable to successfully complete the practical test required for the completion of the degree and has not pursued this professional license any further.

Although she has not pursued a higher education since then, she has recently received her tractor trailer license which has enabled her to drive a school bus on a part-time basis.   Although she seeks additional employment opportunities, she feels highly constrained by the existing access orders of the court, as well as her admirable and innately driven responsibility to personally care for her child, despite the plaintiff's recent availability.

The defendant has asserted in the past that she was unable to support herself and pay her rent at the Turkey Hill apartment, especially in light of the fact that the plaintiff has not paid child support for some time.   At this time, the plaintiff is substantially in arrears on child support payments and owed $4,875 in child support as of December 9, 2011.   Until recently, the plaintiff has had little, if any, income due to his illness.   Due to the defendant's dire financial circumstances, Mr. Barry has remained on the defendant's lease and has substantially assisted her in paying her living expenses since the separation of the parties over two and a half years ago in 2009.   According to his testimony, Mr. Barry has paid in excess of $10,000 for these living expenses.   He has also substantially assisted the defendant in paying for her GAL and attorneys fees for these proceedings.   Generally, these fees have been in excess of $40,000, for which the defendant had very little income to pay.   The court infers from this and Mr. Barry's own testimony, that he has paid a substantial portion of these legal bills.   Although he intended these payments as gifts, the defendant claims she took these payments as loans.   Whether gifts or loans, the court finds that the substantial income stream from Mr. Barry, provided regularly in the past, has more likely than not come to an end.

Although the defendant still resides at her Turkey Hill apartment, Mr. Barry has purchased a home in Granby with money he inherited from his father's estate.   Mr. Barry and the defendant intend for this to become their marital home and have prepared a bedroom for the minor child to reside with them there, as well.   However, by order of the court, Prestley, J., on April 19, 2011, the child is specifically prohibited from entering Mr. Barry's home.

To explain her lack of income in the past, despite the availability of day care, the defendant believed there was a “work restriction” imposed on her by the court.   Although there is no specific work restriction order in the record, the court understands how the defendant's understanding of this order arose.   As a condition of accepting the shared custody recommendations of the GAL on April 16, 2010, the court, Dolan, J., admonished the defendant that she was required “to be with this child all of this time.”   Transcript of proceedings on April 16, 2010, p. 43, lines 19–21.   As a practical matter, this oral directive from the bench prevented the defendant from working during her access time, and seriously limited her opportunity to work.   The context of these proceedings, in the court's view however, was to additionally ensure that Mr. Barry had no contact with the minor child since there was no day care in place at that time.

This issue was addressed and corrected in a motion to modify, number 156, filed with the court by the defendant on May 11, 2011.   In deciding this issue on May 24, 2011, the court, Olear, J., permitted the defendant to work during the hours the child was at day care and up to two hours thereafter in the care of Mr. Fiedorczyk.   If her work hours exceeded this limit of two hours after day care, then the child was to stay with the plaintiff, which afforded him a right of first refusal.   The defendant nonetheless maintained in her testimony that she is under serious work limitations in light of her access schedule and she arranges her hours of work to ensure that her child spends no more than two hours with Mr. and Mrs. Fiedorczyk, so as not to trigger the plaintiff's right of first refusal.   The defendant previously testified that she worked from four to six hours per week at $8.50 per hour for Admiral Cleaning.   At that time, the defendant was substantially underemployed and was capable of working more hours for substantially more income than she received, especially while she had reasonable access to work-related day care.

She now testifies that she works from two to nine hours per week for Admiral Cleaning and has substantially increased her income by working as a school bus driver for an additional twenty hours per week at $13.70 per hour.   Her most recent financial affidavit therefore shows gross weekly income of $302, with net weekly income of $268.   Although her income potential is substantially higher, the court will not impute a higher income capacity to her at this time under the facts and unusual circumstances of this case.

2. The Plaintiff's Income

At the time this trial began, the plaintiff was seriously ill and unemployed.   Although he appears to be far younger than his 60 years, he was just over 100 pounds at the time the trial began and had no income or a working automobile.   Although he appears to have reasonably recovered from his serious heart attack and claims to have restored some thirty pounds of his lost weight, he credibly maintains that he is incapable of working as he has in the past, especially as a letter carrier.   Last spring, the plaintiff received $5,081 in state and federal income tax refunds, which he kept and primarily applied toward his past due mortgage payments in order to prevent a default and thereby save his home from foreclosure.   In addition, the plaintiff has been receiving his monthly SSD payments of $1,637, which he reports on his most recent financial affidavit as a gross and net weekly income of $409.   More accurately, this figure should be approximately $381 per week.   Although he believes he may be eligible for a social security benefit for the minor child, the plaintiff is awaiting a custody determination from this court before he applies for this benefit.   He further believes that he is not eligible for any lump sum payments for past eligibility.

The plaintiff anticipates that he will be eligible for an early retirement benefit of an additional $600 per month;  however, this benefit is subject to a debt owed for health care premiums paid on his behalf by the postal service of approximately $300 per month for the past year during his disability.   The court accepts the plaintiff's stated monthly income of $1,637 and finds that his current gross and net weekly income is $381.   This is not the plaintiff's full income potential, however.   He appears to be eligible for additional SSD payments on behalf of his daughter, which may be considered as income for child support purposes.⁹  In addition, he appears to be eligible for an early retirement benefit of $600 per month, by his own estimate.   Although the plaintiff denies his eligibility for lump sum payments for his past eligibility for any or all of these disability and retirement benefits, the court concludes that he may be eligible for retroactive payments of these benefits.

Therefore, the plaintiff is ordered to apply for SSD benefits for his minor child.   He is further ordered to seek any SSD retroactive payments to which he may be entitled.   The plaintiff is further ordered to apply for his early retirement benefit and any retroactive payments of this benefit for which he may be eligible, subject to his repayment of the cost of his medical insurance premiums.   The plaintiff provided evidence that this cost has been paid by the postal service during his disability, in anticipation of his eligibility for early retirement.   The court orders that the plaintiff immediately inform the defendant in writing of his receipt of any such payments or determinations of eligibility.

3. Child Support

Based upon the income of the parties, the basic child support obligation is $159 per week.   The presumptive amount of this figure attributable to the plaintiff is $94 ¹⁰ and the presumptive amount attributable to the defendant is $65.   The defendant is eligible for a child support deviation, based upon the parenting plan, which substantially deviates from the traditional parenting plan.¹¹  This is ordered by the court.   Her child support obligation is therefore reduced to $0 per week.   This deviation is based upon the fact that the defendant will be with her child on a schedule involving eight of fourteen days, including two overnights.

Any retroactive or lump sum payments received by the plaintiff from SSD or his early retirement shall be applied first to the child support arrearage owed to the defendant, which is found by the court in the amount of $4,875.   Any additional amounts received shall then be paid to the GAL, for an arrearage owed in the amount of $8,903.75, as of November 14, 2011.   To this amount, the court adds $250 for the GAL's court appearance on December 9, 2011, for a total arrearage owed of $9,153.75.   These amounts are incorporated into this final judgment.

On each of these judgment debts, the plaintiff is ordered to pay $100 per month until they are paid in full.   These amounts shall be the subject of a review of the plaintiff's income and expenses within ninety days of this judgment, to determine his eligibility for or receipt of additional SSD and retirement benefits, after which they may be modified.

I. Extracurricular Activities

The parties shall equally share any expenses for agreed upon extracurricular activities, such as but not limited to, school trips, supplies, driving lessons, school pictures and registration fees, until the child graduates from high school or turns nineteen, whichever is later.

J. Medical Insurance

The parties shall each be responsible for their own medical insurance and unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and shall be responsible for the cost of all premiums.   If the defendant exercises her right to COBRA coverage through the defendant's health insurance plan, the plaintiff shall assist her with her application, as necessary.

The plaintiff shall continue to carry and pay for medical and dental insurance for himself and the benefit of the parties' child, so long as it is available to him at a reasonable expense through his employer or retirement benefit or as a veteran and, if not, then through the plaintiff's employer, so long as it is available to her through her employer at a reasonable expense.   If neither party has medical and dental insurance available through employment, then the plaintiff shall obtain medical insurance through HUSKY.   The provisions of General Statutes § 46b–84(e) and (f) are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth in this judgment.¹²

The parties shall share any unreimbursed medical, dental, prescription, orthodontia and psychological expenses not paid for by insurance.

K. Post–Secondary Education

The court finds that if this family had remained intact, support for post-secondary education would have been made available, to the extent the family could have afforded to do so.   Therefore, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–56c,¹³ the court retains jurisdiction over the post-secondary educational support of the child.

L. Life Insurance

The plaintiff shall maintain his current life insurance policy, if any, as available at a reasonable cost through the postal service retirement plan.   The defendant shall obtain any life insurance available to her through her employer at a reasonable cost.   Both parties shall name the other as beneficiary, which shall be held in trust for the benefit of the child so long as she is eligible for support under General Statutes §§ 46b–84 and 46b–56c.   Any life insurance proceeds remaining shall be distributed to the child upon reaching the age of 23.

M. Alimony

“[T]he purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing support.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dombrowski v. Noyes–Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).   The statutory authorization for the award of alimony in dissolution cases is provided in General Statutes § 46b–82.¹⁴  In light of these considerations, no alimony is ordered in this case.

N. Real Estate and Other Assets

Our Supreme Court has stated that “the purpose of property division is to unscramble the ownership of property, giving to each spouse what is equitably his [or hers] ․ The bare legal title to property acquired or accumulated by the spouses during marriage often does not correspond to their real rights in such property.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Watson v. Watson, 221 Conn. 698, 711, 607 A.2d 383 (1992).  “The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well.”  Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn.App. 415, 420, 853 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004).

“The distribution of assets in a dissolution action is governed by § 46b–81, which provides in pertinent part that a trial court may assign to either the husband or the wife all or any part of the estate of the other ․ In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party ․ shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates ․ This approach to property division is commonly referred to as an all-property equitable distribution scheme ․ [Section 46b–81] does not limit, either by timing or method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property subject to a trial court's broad allocative power.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn.App. 106, 111–12, 920 A.2d 340 (2007);  see also General Statutes § 46b–81.¹⁵

1. Real Property

The plaintiff owns the former marital residence, located at 29 Kearns Drive, Granby, Connecticut.   On his most recent financial affidavit, dated December 9, 2011, he values his home at $180,000, subject to a mortgage of $74,000, leaving $106,000 in equity, which he claims was accumulated entirely prior to the marriage.   On past financial affidavits, the plaintiff's estimated value of this property has diminished from a high figure of $210,000 on January 18, 2010, to $200,000 on his financial affidavit dated November 24, 2010.   On his financial affidavit of June 16, 2011, he valued his home at $190,000.

The defendant considers the value of the property to be higher than these estimates, and has offered as evidence the town of Granby's comparative net assessments on the grand lists of 2005, the year of the marriage, compared with 2010.   The town of Granby's 2005 real estate grand list shows a net assessment of $149,660, representing only 70 percent of the actual market value.¹⁶  This would extrapolate into a market value of approximately $214,000, which is considerably higher than the plaintiff's estimate of the current value of the property.   By comparison, a recent net value of $194,000 is shown on the 2010 real estate grand list, representing only 70 percent of the actual market value.   Exhibit A. This would extrapolate into a market value of approximately $280,000, which is a full $100,000 higher than the plaintiff's estimate of the current value of the real estate.

The defendant seeks 50 percent of the net equity in the home accrued during the six-year marriage, which she estimates to be $25,000.   This is based upon her assertion that the home's value grew by approximately $50,000 between 2005 and today, according to the town of Granby's grand lists.   The grand list assessments are difficult to evaluate without further evidence of the context in which they were determined.   There are basic, unanswered questions about how the town's actual appraisal process was conducted, and whether it was merely a statistical revaluation of the entire grand list.   Other basic questions are difficult for the court to answer, absent the testimony of an official from the assessor's office, or other expert, such as what data was used and from what years in the revaluation process.   Without knowing the basis for the town's assessment, it becomes more difficult for the court to evaluate the conclusions reached by the assessor's office, especially in this time of volatility in the real estate market, which is likely to affect some markets more than others.   Absent answers to such questions, the court finds the grand lists relevant but not especially reliable evidence of the increase in value of the marital real estate since 2005.   Therefore, the court finds that the defendant has failed to prove an increase in the value of the property during the relevant period.

Absent an expert opinion, the court accepts the plaintiff's layman opinion of the value of his real property.   Based upon this factual finding, the defendant has no claim to this asset, based upon her assertion of a passive increase in the value of this marital asset.   As authority for accepting the plaintiff's opinion, the court notes that he is the sole owner of the property.  “Our Supreme Court has held that a party, although having no qualification other than his ownership, is competent to testify as to the value of his real property.   See Lovejoy v. Darien, 131 Conn. 533, 536, 41 A.2d 98 (1945);  see also Anderson v. Zweigbaum, 150 Conn. 478, 483 n.1, 191 A.2d 133 (1963).   Commentary to § 7–1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence acknowledges this narrow exception to the general rule that lay witnesses may not give expert opinions.”  Porter v. Thrane, 98 Conn.App. 336, 341, 908 A.2d 1137 (2006).

The defendant also claims to have expended $25,000 in savings bonds during the course of their relationship and asserts that she was required to use this entire asset in support of the preservation and maintenance of the household.   In her proposed orders, she therefore seeks an additional $25,000 as an equitable division of the real property as compensation for her contribution to the home.   In support of this claim, she testified that she made between two and three mortgage payments at times the plaintiff was unable to meet this obligation, due to his compulsive gambling.   She further claims to have provided $2,100 for a water heater and $750 for a tractor, which required repairs of $1,000, as well as a humidifier and the payment of other household expenses.

Although the defendant claims to have substantially expended these bonds on household expenses over the course of the relationship, she was unable to state how much was expended during the marriage.   She did, however, claim these funds were necessary at times to preserve and maintain the real estate and that, at times, the plaintiff's gambling losses resulted in cash flow problems so severe that they received shut-off notices from utility companies.   The plaintiff disputes all of these allegations, but for the water heater, which was purchased for $2,100.

The court finds that the defendant's financial contribution to the maintenance of the marital home was not so substantial to justify compensation and many of her claimed contributions predate the marriage in 2005.   Further, she experienced a voluntary and precipitous drop in her income during the first year of her marriage and she should not be reimbursed for assets expended in this context.   This substantial drop in her income predates the birth of the minor child in August 2007, at which time it would ordinarily be anticipated.

Based upon these findings, the defendant shall not receive any reimbursement for these bond or other funds from the plaintiff.

2. Other Assets and Liabilities

According to his most recent financial affidavit, the plaintiff owns no other substantial assets, other than the furniture in his home and two automobiles of marginal value.   Although the equity in his home is $106,000, the court finds this asset was accumulated prior to the marriage of the parties.   Also according to his financial affidavit, he owes in excess of $40,000 in debts.

According to the defendant's most recent financial affidavit, she owns a 2000 Ford Taurus, valued at $3,000.   She previously showed a joint interest in 343 shares of Stanley stock, valued at $25,269 on her financial affidavit of July 21, 2011.   This asset is now absent from her most recent financial affidavit.   In addition, she now shows bank deposits of over $22,000, owned jointly in combination with other family members.   Also according to her most recent financial affidavit, she owes in excess of $27,000 in debts, primarily to her father.   It is worth noting that, in addition, she claims an “unknown” amount of debt to Mr. Barry.

3. Division of Assets and Liabilities

In considering the applicable law for the distribution of assets and liabilities, the court concludes that the parties shall keep all of the property in their possession and any assets and liabilities they may have, as shown on their financial affidavits.¹⁷  They shall also hold each other harmless from any and all liabilities in their respective names or otherwise listed on their respective financial affidavits.

The marital home is the plaintiff's ancestral home and this is a relatively short-term marriage.   The plaintiff is currently disabled and unemployed.   Although the defendant remains substantially underemployed and is far younger than the plaintiff, the court finds that she is healthy and intelligent and will have ample time and opportunity to accumulate assets.   Although she claims to have left the marriage due to physical abuse and use of illegal substances by the plaintiff, these allegations were not satisfactorily substantiated to anyone, including this court.

Based upon the facts of this case and the applicable law, the parties shall keep title to the property held in their own names, including the automobiles in their possession, and the plaintiff shall keep the family home in his name alone, free of all claims by the defendant.   This home was purchased from the estate of the plaintiff's parents many years before the marriage occurred and he hopes to pass title to his daughter after his passing.

4. Pensions and Retirement Funds

In light of previous findings of the court regarding the relative age, health and future income capacity, all retirement accounts, deferred compensation, 401(k) accounts, and pensions in the parties' names shall be retained as their own, free from any claim by the other.

O. Tax Exemptions

The parties shall alternate the exemption for the minor child for federal and state tax purposes, beginning with the plaintiff for the 2011 tax year and in all odd numbered years thereafter, while the child remains eligible for the exemption.

P. Attorneys Fees

The defendant seeks the payment of a portion of her attorneys fees in this case, which have been substantial.   The defendant has either expended or now owes a total of approximately $38,000 in attorneys fees.   The plaintiff, however, has proceeded as a self-represented party in this case for the past two years.   Therefore, noting this disparity, she seeks $15,000 in attorneys fees.   The court finds the defendant's attorney to have conducted this trial in a manner that has articulated and focused his client's issues, while the plaintiff has been unfocused and repetitive, generally, substantially lengthening the duration of this trial.   The court nonetheless concludes that the plaintiff shall not be responsible for any of the defendant's attorneys fees in this case.

“General Statutes § 46b–62 governs the award of attorneys fees in a dissolution proceeding.   Normally, where parties are financially able to pay their own attorneys fees they should be permitted to do so ․ There is an exception to the rule, however, in that, if denying an award of attorneys fees would undermine the court's prior financial orders, then the court, in its discretion, may order the payment of attorneys fees.”  (Citation omitted.)   Costa v. Costa, 57 Conn.App. 165, 171, 752 A.2d 1106 (2000).   In addition, the text of General Statutes § 46b–62 further directs the court to consider the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–82 concerning alimony.   See footnote 14, supra.

In taking these statutory criteria into account, the court finds that neither party is financially able to pay these attorneys fees, and further based upon these criteria, the court concludes that each party shall be responsible for their own legal fees in connection with this matter.

Q. Other Motions

1. Motion for Restraining Order

The defendant seeks an order to restrain the plaintiff in his interactions with Mr. Fiedorczyk.   See Motion No. 163.   This motion was heard and ruled upon by the court, Abery–Wetstone, J., on October 18, 2011.   The court will issue no orders in this regard at this time, other than that the pickups and drop offs, if they occur, shall be curbside.

2. Motion for Contempt, No. 148

The defendant filed a motion for contempt, No. 148, alleging the wilful failure of the plaintiff to pay child support.   This motion was filed on March 25, 2011.   Although the plaintiff received a tax refund of over $5,000 in the spring of 2011, the court has insufficient evidence of a wilful noncompliance of a court order on or before that date.   The plaintiff's serious illness and unemployment status at that time are well documented and have been proven to the court.   He claims that he used the money at that time to save the only substantial marital asset in this case.   The plaintiff may have been in wilful noncompliance of his child support order since his receipt of his SSD check in September;  however, this issue is not before the court.

The court nonetheless has ordered that the plaintiff pay $100 per month on the arrearage found in the amount of $4,875, as of December 9, 2011.   The court also finds the plaintiff has wrongfully withheld payment of this debt in light of evidence presented to the court of his income since September.   Therefore, in the event that the plaintiff is in default of his payments for a period greater than ninety (90) days after this judgment, the remaining arrearage shall be accelerated and become due and payable immediately.   Simple interest of 10 percent on the remaining arrearage shall commence immediately upon such default pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.

In the event of a default, said arrearage shall be secured by a mortgage on the plaintiff's real estate at 29 Kearns Drive, Granby, Connecticut.   Payments shall continue to be made at the rate of $150 per month.   Any balance which is outstanding shall be paid in full upon the sale, refinance or other transfer of the plaintiff's interest in said property.   Said arrearage shall continue to accrue simple interest at ten percent (10%) per annum until paid in full pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.   In addition to the accumulated arrearage, the plaintiff shall be responsible for the reasonable legal fees in preparation of the mortgage, recording fees and costs to record a release.

3. Motion for Contempt, No. 150 and No. 164

On March 25, 2011, the GAL also filed a motion for contempt, No. 150, alleging the wilful failure of the plaintiff to pay her fees.   On April 19, 2011, the court, Prestley, J., continued this motion to be heard at the time of trial.   Subsequently, on June 22, 2011, the court, Olear, J., ordered the plaintiff to enter into a payment plan of at least $100 per month on this debt until the time of trial or at the time he received income.   No payments have been made by the plaintiff pursuant to this order.

Subsequently on December 2, 2011, the GAL filed a motion for contempt, No. 164, for his continued failure to pay her fees.   The court finds the plaintiff in contempt, based upon the filing of this motion and the continuing order of the court to pay a minimum of $100 per month, upon his receipt of income, which began in September.   In the event that the plaintiff is in default of his payments for a period greater than ninety (90) days after this judgment, the remaining arrearage shall be accelerated and become due and payable immediately.   Simple interest of 10 percent (10%) on the remaining arrearage shall commence immediately upon such default pursuant to General Statutes § 37–3a.

Any default on the arrearage shall be secured by a mortgage on the plaintiff's real estate at 29 Kearns Drive, Granby, Connecticut.   Payments shall continue to be made at the rate of $150 per month.   Any balance which is outstanding shall be paid in full upon the sale, refinance or other transfer of the plaintiff's interest in said property.   Said arrearage shall accrue simple interest at ten percent (10%) per annum until paid in full.   In addition to the accumulated arrearage, the plaintiff shall be responsible for the reasonable legal fees in preparation of the mortgage, recording fees and costs to record a release.

4. Defendant's Motion to Correct and/or Reconsider dated June 3, 2011

The motion to correct and reconsider, allegedly dated June 3, 2011, is denied.   The court is not in possession of this motion.   Further, this court notes that it entered no orders as of that date giving rise to a motion to correct or reconsider.

5. Defendant's Motion to Escrow Social Security Disability

The defendant filed a motion to escrow SSD retroactive payments, No. 162.   The court denies this motion in light of the court's order for the defendant to make immediate payments of any such proceeds to the defendant and the GAL.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

MARK H. TAYLOR, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although the plaintiff did not use abusive language in court, he found it difficult to contain his discontent with the testimony of other witnesses.   In court, Mr. Blowers often demonstrated an incredulous tone and indignation when confronted with views and positions contrary to his own.   For this, Mr. Blowers was admonished on many occasions over the course of this lengthy trial that he must limit his persistent and quarrelsome responses to testimony from the witnesses called to the stand..  FN1. Although the plaintiff did not use abusive language in court, he found it difficult to contain his discontent with the testimony of other witnesses.   In court, Mr. Blowers often demonstrated an incredulous tone and indignation when confronted with views and positions contrary to his own.   For this, Mr. Blowers was admonished on many occasions over the course of this lengthy trial that he must limit his persistent and quarrelsome responses to testimony from the witnesses called to the stand.

FN2. The defendant resides in building number eight, apartment number ninety-two..  FN2. The defendant resides in building number eight, apartment number ninety-two.

FN3. During the DCF investigation in November 2009, the writ, summons and complaint in this matter were filed, accompanied by the plaintiff's motion for ex parte relief concerning custody and access to the minor child.   DCF records were subpoenaed to the initial hearing in this case on December 9, 2009.   By agreement of the parties, pendente lite orders were issued by the court, Dolan, J. These orders specifically prohibited contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.   In addition, the GAL was appointed with access to all DCF records, and her fees were ordered to be equally divided between the parties.After a hearing was held on April 16, 2010, during which Mr. Barry testified and both parties were represented by counsel, the GAL's recommendations were adopted by the court, Dolan J., providing for joint legal custody and shared access by the parties, with an order of no contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.   The shared access schedule provided for pickups at 6:30 a.m. from the plaintiff's home and drop offs at 4:00 p.m. to accommodate the parties' work schedules, which have since changed.   The court further ordered a family relations screening.   On May 12, 2010, a comprehensive evaluation was recommended and ordered by the court.Financial orders were also issued at the April 16, 2010 hearing, requiring the plaintiff to pay child support in the amount of $125.   This figure deviated from the presumptive child support guideline amount of $175 by $50, based upon a shared parenting plan.   The presumptive amount of $175 was based upon the plaintiff's gross weekly income of $1,130 and the defendant's imputed gross weekly income of $340.   Her actual income at the time was $125.   Based upon this actual income, the presumptive child support figure is higher at $193 per week.Several subsequent orders have been issued concerning discovery, scheduling and accumulated liabilities for child support and GAL fees.   Other changes in the initial custody orders in this case include the agreement of the parties for the minor child to attend the Apple Tree Learning Center.   The order of the court, Olear, J., on May 24, 2011, made several changes to the schedule, some of which no longer apply.   No other substantial changes have been made to the basic access schedule..  FN3. During the DCF investigation in November 2009, the writ, summons and complaint in this matter were filed, accompanied by the plaintiff's motion for ex parte relief concerning custody and access to the minor child.   DCF records were subpoenaed to the initial hearing in this case on December 9, 2009.   By agreement of the parties, pendente lite orders were issued by the court, Dolan, J. These orders specifically prohibited contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.   In addition, the GAL was appointed with access to all DCF records, and her fees were ordered to be equally divided between the parties.After a hearing was held on April 16, 2010, during which Mr. Barry testified and both parties were represented by counsel, the GAL's recommendations were adopted by the court, Dolan J., providing for joint legal custody and shared access by the parties, with an order of no contact between Mr. Barry and the minor child.   The shared access schedule provided for pickups at 6:30 a.m. from the plaintiff's home and drop offs at 4:00 p.m. to accommodate the parties' work schedules, which have since changed.   The court further ordered a family relations screening.   On May 12, 2010, a comprehensive evaluation was recommended and ordered by the court.Financial orders were also issued at the April 16, 2010 hearing, requiring the plaintiff to pay child support in the amount of $125.   This figure deviated from the presumptive child support guideline amount of $175 by $50, based upon a shared parenting plan.   The presumptive amount of $175 was based upon the plaintiff's gross weekly income of $1,130 and the defendant's imputed gross weekly income of $340.   Her actual income at the time was $125.   Based upon this actual income, the presumptive child support figure is higher at $193 per week.Several subsequent orders have been issued concerning discovery, scheduling and accumulated liabilities for child support and GAL fees.   Other changes in the initial custody orders in this case include the agreement of the parties for the minor child to attend the Apple Tree Learning Center.   The order of the court, Olear, J., on May 24, 2011, made several changes to the schedule, some of which no longer apply.   No other substantial changes have been made to the basic access schedule.

FN4. These competing complaints of inadequate care are consistent with recurring cross complaints of failure to properly care for the child's health care needs.   One of these recurring complaints is the defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that the child is particularly sensitive to carbohydrates and that the plaintiff serves her ice cream and candy while she is in his care and custody, resulting in some agitation in her observed behavior.   The plaintiff disagrees with this unsubstantiated diagnosis but nonetheless agrees to comply with the directives of the child's pediatrician in this and other health care matters..  FN4. These competing complaints of inadequate care are consistent with recurring cross complaints of failure to properly care for the child's health care needs.   One of these recurring complaints is the defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that the child is particularly sensitive to carbohydrates and that the plaintiff serves her ice cream and candy while she is in his care and custody, resulting in some agitation in her observed behavior.   The plaintiff disagrees with this unsubstantiated diagnosis but nonetheless agrees to comply with the directives of the child's pediatrician in this and other health care matters.

FN5. General Statutes § 46b–56(c) provides:  “In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.”.  FN5. General Statutes § 46b–56(c) provides:  “In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.”

FN6. No motion to modify this order shall be filed absent a written determination by a licensed therapist for the child that it would be in her best interest to have contact with Mr. Barry.   The determination of the therapist must also be based upon the conclusion that the defendant has not unduly or inappropriately influenced the child's perception of Mr. Barry.   Absent such a recommendation from the child's licensed therapist, the parties may not agree to any contact with Mr. Barry.   If the parties agree to the recommendation, it shall be in writing and signed by both parties.   If the parties disagree with the recommendation of the child's therapist, the matter may be the subject of a motion to modify, requiring expert testimony of the appropriateness of any recommended contact and, if so, under what specific circumstances and limitations, if any, including a professionally supervised setting..  FN6. No motion to modify this order shall be filed absent a written determination by a licensed therapist for the child that it would be in her best interest to have contact with Mr. Barry.   The determination of the therapist must also be based upon the conclusion that the defendant has not unduly or inappropriately influenced the child's perception of Mr. Barry.   Absent such a recommendation from the child's licensed therapist, the parties may not agree to any contact with Mr. Barry.   If the parties agree to the recommendation, it shall be in writing and signed by both parties.   If the parties disagree with the recommendation of the child's therapist, the matter may be the subject of a motion to modify, requiring expert testimony of the appropriateness of any recommended contact and, if so, under what specific circumstances and limitations, if any, including a professionally supervised setting.

FN7. This request for relief is now moot.   The court nonetheless addresses this issue in light of the evidence presented at trial and to create a record in light of future motions to modify, if any are filed..  FN7. This request for relief is now moot.   The court nonetheless addresses this issue in light of the evidence presented at trial and to create a record in light of future motions to modify, if any are filed.

FN8. The pickups and drop offs by Mr. Fiedorczyk have been the subject of an order by the court, Abery–Wetstone, J., dated October 18, 2011.   The order provides for the manner in which the drop off shall be performed.   Although this is a reasonable pendente lite order, the evolving maturity of the child and the advancing age of Mr. Fiedorczyk may make this order unreasonable over time.   Therefore, the court will not continue the specific requirements of the order, except that it to be performed curbside..  FN8. The pickups and drop offs by Mr. Fiedorczyk have been the subject of an order by the court, Abery–Wetstone, J., dated October 18, 2011.   The order provides for the manner in which the drop off shall be performed.   Although this is a reasonable pendente lite order, the evolving maturity of the child and the advancing age of Mr. Fiedorczyk may make this order unreasonable over time.   Therefore, the court will not continue the specific requirements of the order, except that it to be performed curbside.

FN9. Social Security Disability payments (SSD) are includable as income for child support purposes.   See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–1(11)(A)(x)..  FN9. Social Security Disability payments (SSD) are includable as income for child support purposes.   See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–1(11)(A)(x).

FN10. The plaintiff sought a deviation from this amount, based upon his extraordinary medical expenses of $230 per month.   See Exhibit 2, December 9, 2011.   In light of the court's order of access, this is not an issue requiring a decision at this time.   In addition, according to the plaintiff, his expenses may be reduced after he transitions into a new health insurance plan, which has yet to be determined.   The court further notes that the plaintiff has been ordered to apply for additional SSD and retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.   Therefore, this request may be the subject of a motion to modify after his determination of the medical plan that he will continue on with his daughter and the determination of his income, based upon his eligibility for additional SSD payments and early retirement..  FN10. The plaintiff sought a deviation from this amount, based upon his extraordinary medical expenses of $230 per month.   See Exhibit 2, December 9, 2011.   In light of the court's order of access, this is not an issue requiring a decision at this time.   In addition, according to the plaintiff, his expenses may be reduced after he transitions into a new health insurance plan, which has yet to be determined.   The court further notes that the plaintiff has been ordered to apply for additional SSD and retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.   Therefore, this request may be the subject of a motion to modify after his determination of the medical plan that he will continue on with his daughter and the determination of his income, based upon his eligibility for additional SSD payments and early retirement.

FN11. Section 46b–215a–3(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies lists the six criteria that may justify deviation from the presumptive support amounts as:  (1) other financial resources available to a parent “that are not included in the definition of net income, but could be used by such parent for the benefit of the child or for meeting the needs of the parent,” (2) “[e]xtraordinary expenses for care and maintenance of the child,” (3) “[e]xtraordinary parental expenses ․ that are not considered allowable deductions from gross income, but which are necessary for the parent to maintain a satisfactory parental relationship with the child, continue employment, or provide for the parent's own medical needs,” (4) “[n]eeds of a parent's other dependents ․ [where] a parent may be legally responsible for the support of individuals other than the child whose support is being determined,” (5) “[c]oordination of total family support” when considerations involving the division of assets, provision of alimony and tax planning “will not result in a lesser economic benefit to the child,” and (6) “[s]pecial circumstances” relating to reasons of “equity,” including shared physical custody, extraordinary disparity in parental income, the best interests of the child and “[o]ther” equitable factors..  FN11. Section 46b–215a–3(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies lists the six criteria that may justify deviation from the presumptive support amounts as:  (1) other financial resources available to a parent “that are not included in the definition of net income, but could be used by such parent for the benefit of the child or for meeting the needs of the parent,” (2) “[e]xtraordinary expenses for care and maintenance of the child,” (3) “[e]xtraordinary parental expenses ․ that are not considered allowable deductions from gross income, but which are necessary for the parent to maintain a satisfactory parental relationship with the child, continue employment, or provide for the parent's own medical needs,” (4) “[n]eeds of a parent's other dependents ․ [where] a parent may be legally responsible for the support of individuals other than the child whose support is being determined,” (5) “[c]oordination of total family support” when considerations involving the division of assets, provision of alimony and tax planning “will not result in a lesser economic benefit to the child,” and (6) “[s]pecial circumstances” relating to reasons of “equity,” including shared physical custody, extraordinary disparity in parental income, the best interests of the child and “[o]ther” equitable factors.

FN12. General Statutes § 46b–84(f) provides in relevant part:  “(2) The court shall include in each support order a provision for the health care coverage of the child who is subject to the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section.   Such provision may include an order for either parent or both parents to provide such coverage under any or all of subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this subdivision ․ (A) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to name any child as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance or benefit plan carried by such parent or available to such parent at a reasonable cost, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision ․ (B) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to:  (i) Apply for and maintain coverage on behalf of the child under the HUSKY Plan, Part B;  or (ii) provide cash medical support, as described in subparagraphs (E) and (F) of this subdivision.   An order under this subparagraph shall be made only if the cost to the parent obligated to maintain the coverage under the HUSKY Plan, Part B, or provide cash medical support is reasonable, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision.   An order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be made only if insurance coverage as described in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision is unavailable at reasonable cost to either parent, or inaccessible to the child.”.  FN12. General Statutes § 46b–84(f) provides in relevant part:  “(2) The court shall include in each support order a provision for the health care coverage of the child who is subject to the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section.   Such provision may include an order for either parent or both parents to provide such coverage under any or all of subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this subdivision ․ (A) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to name any child as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance or benefit plan carried by such parent or available to such parent at a reasonable cost, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision ․ (B) The provision for health care coverage may include an order for either parent to:  (i) Apply for and maintain coverage on behalf of the child under the HUSKY Plan, Part B;  or (ii) provide cash medical support, as described in subparagraphs (E) and (F) of this subdivision.   An order under this subparagraph shall be made only if the cost to the parent obligated to maintain the coverage under the HUSKY Plan, Part B, or provide cash medical support is reasonable, as described in subparagraph (D) of this subdivision.   An order under clause (i) of this subparagraph shall be made only if insurance coverage as described in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision is unavailable at reasonable cost to either parent, or inaccessible to the child.”

FN13. General Statutes § 46b–56c provides in relevant part:  “(a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor's or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction.   An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.”.  FN13. General Statutes § 46b–56c provides in relevant part:  “(a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor's or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction.   An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.”

FN14. General Statutes § 46b–82 provides in relevant part:  “(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b–81.   The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party.   The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.   In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”.  FN14. General Statutes § 46b–82 provides in relevant part:  “(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b–81.   The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party.   The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.   In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”

FN15. The provisions of General Statutes section 46b–81 are as follows:  “(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b–45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.   The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect. (b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52–500.   When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties. (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”.  FN15. The provisions of General Statutes section 46b–81 are as follows:  “(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b–45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.   The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect. (b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52–500.   When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties. (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b–51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

FN16. Upon motion dated December 19, 2011, the court reopened the evidence in this case to admit the town of Granby's grand list for 2005..  FN16. Upon motion dated December 19, 2011, the court reopened the evidence in this case to admit the town of Granby's grand list for 2005.

FN17. “While there is no express provision in General Statutes § 46b–81 authorizing a court to order that sole liability for the debts of the parties be imposed upon one of the parties, § 46b–81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property.   It provides, in part, that the court ‘may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.’   Among the factors to be considered in any order entered under § 46b–81 are the ‘estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.’  “ Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 191, 429 A.2d 470 (1980)..  FN17. “While there is no express provision in General Statutes § 46b–81 authorizing a court to order that sole liability for the debts of the parties be imposed upon one of the parties, § 46b–81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property.   It provides, in part, that the court ‘may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.’   Among the factors to be considered in any order entered under § 46b–81 are the ‘estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.’  “ Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 191, 429 A.2d 470 (1980).

Taylor, Mark H., J.